A Historical Institutionalist Analysis of the Evolution of South Africa's Municipal Electricity Sector within the Broader Electricity Supply Industry by Covary, Theodore
A Historical Institutionalist Analysis of the Evolution of 
South Africa’s Municipal Electricity Sector within the 
Broader Electricity Supply Industry  
Theo Covary 
January 2020 
Thesis Presented for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
In the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment 



















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 











I, Theo Covary, declare that this thesis, in concept and execution, has been composed solely by 
myself, except for the normal guidance received from my supervisor. This thesis has not been 
submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree at this University or any 
other University. Except where it is stated otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work 





• My supervisor Dr Andrew Marquard for his guidance and insights. Then, my co-supervisor Dr Grové 
Steyn for his technical inputs.  
 
• To all those who agreed to be interviewed and who were so generous with their time and personal 
records. The long conversations about events from as far back as the 1930’s right through to 2017 
were fascinating, enriched the research and a highpoint for me. 
 
• To the AMEU secretariat, managed by van der Walt & Co since the 1980’s, which has preserved 
reports, minutes and event proceedings dating back to 1915. This thesis is largely anchored on these 
documents and my task was made significantly easier by having access to a largely complete, accurate 
and detailed account of events. Here, I take the opportunity to posthumously thank Mr Ewing, the 
AMEU secretary, who retired in 1974 after many decades of dedicated service and meticulous record 
keeping. 
 
• Through this research I have become acutely aware of how insidious, abhorrent and destructive racial 
segregation truly is, and which existed long before it was formalised by the National Party when they 
came to power in 1948. My hope is that some of what I have discovered is communicated to the 
reader. 
 
• To Mike and Rob for your support and willingness to listen to my progress updates at our weekly 
breakfast meetings.  
 
• To Strato for reviewing, editing and meeting my deadlines. It was a long innings and you were there 
right to the end. 
 
• George Angelopulo for your time, reviews and guidance.  
 
• Finally, to Phlee, Margot and Constantine who secretly kept thinking “Right, what’s all this, then?”, 













Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................................  
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 1 
1. Introduction, Research Objectives and Outline of the Research .......................................................... 2 
1.1 Motivation for this Study .............................................................................................................. 2 
1.2 Contextual Background – The Development of the ESI and its Stakeholders .............................. 4 
1.3 Municipal ESI as a Subject for this Study ...................................................................................... 6 
1.4 Hypothesis, Research Objectives and Research Questions .......................................................... 7 
1.5 Justification for this Research ....................................................................................................... 9 
1.6 Methodology and Associated Matters ....................................................................................... 10 
1.6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 10 
1.6.2 Methodological Approach ............................................................................................................. 11 
1.6.2 Primary and Secondary Research Sources .......................................................................... 13 
1.6.3 Research Challenges and Author Bias ................................................................................. 15 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis ................................................................................................................ 17 
1.8 Content of Chapters .................................................................................................................... 18 
2. A Framework to Analyse the Enduring Nature of Decisions on the EDI made by Political Institutions .  
  ............................................................................................................................................................ 20 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 20 
2.2 Institutions and Institutionalism ................................................................................................. 22 
2.2.1 Defining Institutions ............................................................................................................ 22 
2.2.2 Politics and Institutions ....................................................................................................... 24 
2.2.3 Distinguishing between Institutions and Organizations ..................................................... 28 
2.3 New Institutionalism ................................................................................................................... 28 
2.3.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism ......................................................................................... 30 
2.3.2 Sociological (Normative) Institutionalism ........................................................................... 31 
2.3.3 Historical Institutionalism ................................................................................................... 32 
2.3.4 Comment on Drawbacks of the Three Primary New Institutionalist Approaches .............. 41 
2.4 Incremental Institutional Change – Historical and Constructive Institutionalism ...................... 43 
2.4.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 43 
2.4.2 Modes of Change ....................................................................................................................... 43 
2.4.3 Agents of Change ....................................................................................................................... 46 
 
 
2.5 Concluding Comment .................................................................................................................. 47 
3 Conceptual Framework ....................................................................................................................... 48 
3.1 Conceptualising Decentralised Local Government ..................................................................... 48 
3.2 Politics – Administration linkage ................................................................................................. 48 
3.3 Centralized and Decentralized Government ............................................................................... 49 
3.3.1 Overview and Developments during the 20th Century ....................................................... 49 
3.3.2 Decentralization .................................................................................................................. 50 
3.3.3 Benefits and Shortcomings of Decentralization ................................................................. 52 
3.3.4 Political Legitimacy .............................................................................................................. 53 
3.4 Overview of Municipal Finance Sources ..................................................................................... 53 
3.4.1 A View on the Relationship between National and Local Government ............................. 53 
3.4.2 Period 1: Financial Theory of Municipal Funding Models (Mid 1980 – 2000) .................... 56 
3.4.3 Period 2: Financial Theory of Municipal Funding Models (2000 – 2015) ........................... 61 
3.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 66 
4. The Evolution of Central, Provincial and Municipal Government Administration in South Africa ..... 67 
4.1  Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 67 
4.2 Government Prior to 1910 .......................................................................................................... 67 
4.3 Creation of the Union of South Africa (1910 - 1948) .................................................................. 68 
4.3.1 Central Government: .......................................................................................................... 68 
4.3.2 Provincial Government ....................................................................................................... 69 
4.3.3 Local Government ............................................................................................................... 70 
4.4 The Rise and Fall of the National Party and its Grand Apartheid Project (1948-1994): ............. 70 
4.4.1 Central Government: National Party’s Policy of Separate Development ........................... 70 
4.4.2 Provincial Government – Towing the (National) Party Line ............................................... 80 
4.4.3 Local Government – White Local Authorities (WLA) .......................................................... 81 
4.4.4 Local Government – Black Local Authorities (BLA) ............................................................. 83 
4.5 A New Constitution, Spheres of Government and Democracy (1993-1996) .............................. 84 
4.5.1 Interim Constitution ............................................................................................................ 84 
4.5.2 Final Constitution ................................................................................................................ 85 
4.6 New Beginnings? (1997 -2014) ................................................................................................... 86 
4.6.1 Establishing Democratic and Decentralised Local Government ......................................... 86 
4.6.2 RDP and GEAR ..................................................................................................................... 87 
4.6.3 Green and White Papers on Local Government ................................................................. 88 
 
 
4.6.4 Assessment of the Local Government White Paper ........................................................... 91 
4.6.5 Performance of Local Government from 1998 ................................................................... 92 
4.7 A Historical Institutionalist Perspective ...................................................................................... 97 
5. Local Government, its Finances and the Role of Electricity .............................................................. 103 
5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 103 
5.2 South African Local Government Finance under Democracy ................................................... 103 
5.2.1 Period 1: 1994 - 2003 ........................................................................................................ 103 
5.2.2 Period 2: 2004 -2015 ......................................................................................................... 107 
5.2.3 Municipal Finance Practise compared to Municipal Finance Theory ............................... 111 
5.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 112 
6. Economic History and the Role of Electricity .................................................................................... 114 
6.1 Objectives and Structure of the Chapter .................................................................................. 114 
6.2 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 115 
6.3 Economic Development up to 1910: How the Discovery of Minerals Changed Everything ..... 116 
6.3.1  Economic Development: Setting the Scene ...................................................................... 116 
6.3.2  Supplying the Gold Mines with Electricity ........................................................................ 120 
6.3.3 A Historical Institutionalist Perspective and Identification of the First Critical Juncture . 122 
6.4 The Union of South Africa (1911-1948) .................................................................................... 122 
6.4.1 Creating the Economic Rules of the Game ....................................................................... 122 
6.4.2 Consolidating the Electricity Supply Industry to Create a State Monopoly ...................... 125 
6.4.3 A Historical Institutionalist Perspective ............................................................................ 129 
6.5 The Apartheid Years (1948 – 1994) .......................................................................................... 131 
6.5.1 Apartheid Economics: Boom to Bust ................................................................................ 131 
6.5.2 The Development of the National Electricity Supply Industry under the ‘Nats’............... 139 
6.5.3 A Historical Institutionalist Perspective ............................................................................ 147 
6.6 Democracy – At Last! (1994 – 2015) ......................................................................................... 150 
6.6.1 Economic Development .................................................................................................... 150 
6.6.2 The National Electricity Supply Industry: To Restructure or to Reform? .......................... 160 
6.6.3 A Historical Institutionalist Perspective ............................................................................ 171 
6.7 Chapter Comments and Findings .............................................................................................. 173 
7. Municipal Electricity Undertakings and Local Government .............................................................. 177 
7.1 Objectives and Structure of the Chapter .................................................................................. 177 
7.2 Historical Backdrop – Up to and Including Union (1910) .......................................................... 177 
 
 
7.3 The Union of South Africa (1910 – 1948) .................................................................................. 178 
7.3.1 Municipal Finances and the Policy of Rate Relief from MEU Revenue ............................. 178 
7.3.2 The AMEU and the Policy of Rate Relief from MEU Revenue .......................................... 182 
7.3.3 Municipal Electricity Undertakings: Development and Operations up to 1948 ............... 188 
7.3.4 Concluding Comment ........................................................................................................ 190 
7.3.5 A Historical Institutional Perspective ................................................................................ 191 
7.4 The Apartheid Era (1948 – 1994) .............................................................................................. 192 
7.4.1 Municipal Electricity Undertakings: Development and Operations ................................. 193 
7.4.2 Municipal Finances and the Policy of Rate Relief from Municipal Electricity Undertaking 
Revenue ........................................................................................................................................... 204 
7.4.3 Johannesburg’s Municipal Finance and Electricity Surplus .............................................. 206 
7.4.4 Conclusion and Second Critical Juncture .......................................................................... 213 
7.5 Democratic Elections and Electricity for All (1994 – 2017) ....................................................... 215 
7.5.1 Setting the Scene .............................................................................................................. 215 
7.5.2 The National Electrification Programme (NEP) and the New Regulator (NER) ................ 216 
7.5.3 MEU’s Contribution to the National Electrification Programme ...................................... 218 
7.5.4 RED’s (So Close, Yet so Far), ISMO and ADAM (Much of the Same) ................................. 219 
7.5.5 Democracy and the Evolution of the AMEU (1994 – 2012) .............................................. 226 
7.5.6 Non-Payment of Municipal Services and Funding Shortfalls ............................................ 232 
7.6 Case Study: Johannesburg Electricity Undertaking (JEU) ......................................................... 234 
7.6.1 Aligning to a New Political Structure and Extended Service Area (1995 – 2001) ............. 234 
7.6.2 Corporatization – The Establishment of City Power (2001 – 2017) .................................. 237 
7.6.3 Right of Reply – City Power Management’s Response to Research Findings ................... 250 
7.6.4 A Historical Institutionalist Perspective ............................................................................ 253 
8 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 259 
8.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 259 
8.2 History and Electricity Matters (Research Objectives) ............................................................. 259 
8.3 Summary of Findings (Research Questions) ............................................................................. 264 
8.4 Assessment of Objective 2 ........................................................................................................ 272 
8.5 Assessing the Usefulness of Historical Institutionalism as a Theoretical Framework .............. 274 
8.6 Final Thoughts & Additional Research Findings ........................................................................ 276 
9 Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 283 
9.1 Books and Journals.................................................................................................................... 283 
 
 
9.2 South African Government Publications (All) ........................................................................... 306 
9.3 Online Websites and Press Articles........................................................................................... 310 
 
TABLE OF TABLES 
Table 1-1: Primary Research Sources .......................................................................................................... 14 
Table 2-1: Typologies of Path-Dependent Explanations of Institutional Reproduction ............................. 38 
Table 2-2: Types of Gradual Change ........................................................................................................... 44 
Table 3-1: Benefits and Shortcomings of Decentralization ........................................................................ 52 
Table 3-2: Total Revenue Sources of Local Government ............................................................................ 57 
Table 3-3: Characteristics of a Good Local Tax ........................................................................................... 64 
Table 4-1: Proposed Models of Local Government – Thornhill Report 1990 ............................................. 78 
Table 4-2: Objectives and Functions of Municipalities (1977) .................................................................... 82 
Table 4-3: Non-Municipal Functions (1977) ............................................................................................... 82 
Table 4-4: Summary of administrative systems to meet service delivery requirements – White Paper on 
Local Government (1998) ................................................................................................................... 89 
Table 4-5: Categories of Municipalities (2011) ........................................................................................... 93 
Table 4-6: Gatherings by Province (Violent) (2005 - 2008) ......................................................................... 96 
Table 4-7: National Gatherings (2011 - 2014) ............................................................................................. 96 
Table 6-1: Railway, Population and GDP of selected African countries (1820-1913) ............................... 117 
Table 6-2: Annual average exports in £ million (1850 -1909) ................................................................... 119 
Table 6-3: Output and Employment in Industry (1916/17 – 1948/49) ..................................................... 125 
Table 6-4: Timeline of Major Work undertaken by Merz McLellan (MM) – 1918 to 1940 ...................... 129 
Table 6-5: Contribution of Commodity Production to GDP (1948-70) ..................................................... 133 
Table 6-6: Analysis of Wages (1939 - 1960) .............................................................................................. 139 
Table 6-7: Escom Tariff versus Consumer Price Index (1973 - 1985) ........................................................ 142 
Table 6-8: Johannesburg MEU’s Eskom Electricity Sales and Purchases (1948 – 1952) ........................... 148 
Table 6-9: Key Policy Interventions of Zuma Presidency (2009) ............................................................... 156 
Table 6-10: Workforce Profile of Black People in Government, SOE’s and Private Sector ...................... 158 
Table 6-11: BBBEE Codes .......................................................................................................................... 159 
Table 6-12: BBBEE Levels .......................................................................................................................... 159 
Table 6-13: Chronology of Blackouts in the Western Cape ...................................................................... 163 
Table 6-14: Summary of Findings of South Africa’s Political Economy (1910 – 2017) ............................. 174 
Table 7-1: Contribution to Total Municipal Revenue (£) for Johannesburg by Category (1905-1934) .... 179 
Table 7-2: Contribution of Municipal Undertakings to the Relief of Rates for Johannesburg (1925-1937)
 .......................................................................................................................................................... 180 
Table 7-3: Summary of Responses to the AMEU Executive Committee on the Policy of Rate Relief at the 
1937 Conference ............................................................................................................................... 185 
Table 7-4: Municipal Power Stations in Major South African Cities ......................................................... 190 
Table 7-5: AMEU NELF Progress Report.................................................................................................... 203 
Table 7-6: Key Events and Explanatory Notes to Figure 7-6 ..................................................................... 209 
Table 7-7: Surplus / (Deficit) for Selected Municipal Functions for Johannesburg (1991 – 1994) ........... 212 
Table 7-8: Municipal Applications for Eskom Allocation to fund the Electrification Programme (1997) . 219 
Table 7-9: Summary of National, Local and Eskom Perspectives to REDs ................................................ 221 
Table 7-10: Summary of AMEU Response to NER Work Groups .............................................................. 227 
Table 7-11: Payment Levels of Administrative Areas within Johannesburg (1996 -1998) ....................... 235 
Table 7-12: Extracts from City of Johannesburg Consolidated Financial Statements (1996 – 2000) ....... 236 
 
 
Table 7-13: Direct Nominal Price Elasticity between 2006 and 2011 ....................................................... 241 
Table 7-14: City Power Total Demand 2006 to 2017 (GWh/annum) ........................................................ 242 
Table 7-15: City Power Performance compared against NERSA Guidelines (Real, 2015) ........................ 243 
Table 7-16: Summary and Evaluation of City Power Energy Efficient Programme .................................. 248 
Table 7-17: Average Municipal Effective Tariff (Revenue from sale of electricity / units sold) ............... 249 
Table 7-18: Levels of Cross-Subsidisation at City Power (2015 / 2016) .................................................... 251 
Table 8-1: Historical Analysis of the Power Act (1910) ............................................................................. 265 
Table 8-2: Counterfactual Analysis of Electricity Distribution as a Constitutional Mandate (2006) ........ 269 
Table 8-3: Impact of Relief of Rates (1936 – 2017) ................................................................................... 278 
 
TABLE OF FIGURES 
Figure 1-1: Political Parties Controlling South African Government since 1910 ........................................ 18 
Figure 2-1: Types of Institutions ................................................................................................................. 23 
Figure 2-2: Outputs of Institutional Bodies ................................................................................................. 24 
Figure 2-3: Contingency in a self-reinforcing sequence .............................................................................. 36 
Figure 2-4: Factors and Direction of Institutional Change .......................................................................... 45 
Figure 2-5: Institutional Sources of Change Agents .................................................................................... 47 
Figure 3-1: Population Living in Urban Areas (1950-2030) ......................................................................... 55 
Figure 3-2: Total Population of Urban and Rural Areas in South Africa (1950 – 2050) .............................. 56 
Figure 3-3: Municipal Revenue Sources ...................................................................................................... 58 
Figure 3-4: Financing Tools for Municipal Functions and Services ............................................................. 62 
Figure 3-5: Public Finance Principle for Local Government Revenue ......................................................... 63 
Figure 4-1: Map of South Africa before 1994, with homelands ................................................................. 72 
Figure 4-2: Map of South Africa with 8 metropolitan municipalities, provincial and district borders (2011)
 ............................................................................................................................................................ 93 
Figure 4-3: Evolution of South Africa’s Political System analysed through New Institutionalist Theory (1910 
to 1948) ............................................................................................................................................. 100 
Figure 4-4: Evolution of South Africa’s Political System analysed through New Institutionalist Theory (1948 
to 1994) ............................................................................................................................................. 101 
Figure 4-5: Evolution of South Africa’s Political System analysed through New Institutionalist Theory (1994 
to 2017) ............................................................................................................................................. 102 
Figure 5-1: State of Fiscal Decentralisation in South Africa (1994-2003) ................................................. 105 
Figure 5-2: National Transfers to Local Government (2003 to 2016) ....................................................... 109 
Figure 5-3: Breakdown of National Transfers to Local Government (2007 – 2013) ................................. 109 
Figure 6-1: Rate of Inflation and US$ / ZAR Exchange Rate, 1960 - 1990 ................................................. 135 
Figure 6-2: Current Account Balance and Capital Flows as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (1950 
– 2005) .............................................................................................................................................. 137 
Figure 6-3: GDP Growth Rates and Inflation Rates (1961 – 1993)............................................................ 138 
Figure 6-4: Price of Gold in US$ per ounce (1970 -2013) ......................................................................... 141 
Figure 6-5: Total employment in the Manufacturing Sector (1990s) ....................................................... 153 
Figure 6-6: Exports per Capita amongst Natural Resource Exporters ...................................................... 154 
Figure 6-7: Proposed ESI Structure Based on 2001 Cabinet Decision ...................................................... 161 
Figure 6-8: Nominal Annual Eskom Tariff Increases and Inflation Rate (1993 – 2016) ............................ 165 
Figure 6-9: Timeline of Major ESI Events (1994 – 2015) ........................................................................... 170 
Figure 7-1: Annual Property Tax Collections versus Contributions from Trading Undertakings in Aid of 
Rates for Johannesburg Municipality  (1904-1936) .......................................................................... 180 
Figure 7-2: AMEU ‘Quo Vadis’ SWOT Analysis .......................................................................................... 201 
 
 
Figure 7-3: Proposed ESI Structure for South Africa (1993) ..................................................................... 203 
Figure 7-4: JEU Annual Sales (1952 - 1995) ............................................................................................... 207 
Figure 7-5: Average Percentage Growth in Electricity Sales for Johannesburg (1952 - 1995) ................. 207 
Figure 7-6: Annual Contributions towards Rate Relief and Tariff Increases for Johannesburg (1952 - 1995)
 .......................................................................................................................................................... 208 
Figure 7-7: Annual Contributions towards Rate Relief from Electricity Surpluses for Johannesburg (1952 – 
1994) ................................................................................................................................................. 210 
Figure 7-8: Annual Contributions from Property Rates and Electricity Surpluses for Johannesburg (1975 – 
1995) ................................................................................................................................................. 211 
Figure 7-9: Contribution of Property Rates and Electricity Sales to Total Revenue for Johannesburg (1975 
– 1994) .............................................................................................................................................. 212 
Figure 7-10: Aggregated Income and Expenditure Statement for Johannesburg (1991 – 1994) ............. 213 
Figure 7-11: Six Wall-to-Wall REDs ........................................................................................................... 220 
Figure 7-12: Estimated Refursbishment and Maintenance Backlog of EDI in 2008 ................................. 223 
Figure 7-13: Percentage of Overall Municipal Income Earned from Sales of Electricity (2013) ............... 233 
Figure 7-14: City of Johannesburg – Electricity Sales and Purchases (1995 – 2000) ................................ 237 
Figure 7-15: Electricity Surplus Contribution to Total Municipal Surplus for Johannesburg (2002 – 2015)
 .......................................................................................................................................................... 238 
Figure 7-16: City Power Bulk Purchases and Electricity Revenue (2002 – 2015) ...................................... 238 
Figure 7-17: Electricity Purchased versus Delivered, Johannesburg (2007 – 2015) ................................. 239 
Figure 7-18: Revenue from Electricity Sales for six Metros (2007 – 2015) ............................................... 240 
Figure 7-19: City Power 2016 SWOT Analysis ........................................................................................... 243 
Figure 7-20: Total Electricity Losses at City Power (2002 – 2016) ............................................................ 246 
Figure 7-21: Revised Electricity Surplus for Johannesburg if Losses Capped at 10% (2006 – 2015) ........ 247 
Figure 7-22: City Power Non-Technical Loss Percentage – Audited versus Internal (2011 – 2017) ......... 252 
Figure 8-1: Political, Economic and Technical Linkages in EDI .................................................................. 261 














ADAM Approach to Distribution Asset Management 
AGSA Attorney General of South Africa 
AMEU Association of Municipal Electricity Undertakings 
ANC African National Congress 
ASGISA Accelerated Shared and Growth Initiative for South Africa 
BLA Black Local Authority 
BBBEE / BEE Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment / Black Economic Empowerment  
BLA Black Local Authority 
CDF Capital Development Fund 
CoJ/City City of Johannesburg or The City  
CIGFARO Chartered Institute of Government Finance, Audit and Risk Officers 
EDI Electricity Distribution Industry 
Eskom  National Electricity Utility – Electricity Supply Company. Previously Escom/Evkom 
EE Energy Efficiency 
ECB Electricity Control Board – Replaced by NER and then NERSA 
ESI Electricity Supply Industry 
DA Democratic Alliance 
DME / DoE Department of Minerals and Energy (until 2009) Department of Energy (from 2009) 
DPE Department of Public Enterprise 
GEAR Growth Employment and Redistribution 
GJMC Greater Johannesburg Metro Council  
GNU Government of National Unity 
HI  Historical Institutionalism 
IMF and WB  International Monetary Fund and World Bank  
ISMO Independent System Market Operator 
IPP  Independent Power Producer 
IDP Integrated Development Plan 
JEU Johannesburg Electricity Undertaking (City Power from 2000) 
LED Local Economic Development 
ME Municipal Entity 
MEC Mineral Energy Complex 
MEU  Municipal Electricity Undertakings 
MLC Metropolitan Local Council 
MM  Merz McLellan (Electrical Consulting Engineers) now Mott McDonald 
MW / GW Megawatt / Gigawatt  
NDP National Development Plan 
NER / NERSA National Electricity Regulator of South Africa (previously NER) 
NT National Treasury 
NP / Nats National Party 
PC President’s Council 
PE  Public Entity 
RDP  Reconstruction and Development Programme 
REDs Regional Electricity Distributors 
 
 
RE Renewable Energy 
REIPPPP Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Procurement Programme 
RSC Regional Services Council 
SAR South African Railways 
SOE State Owned Enterprise 
UP United Party 
UME / SALGA United Municipal Executive replaced by South African Local Government Association 
after democratic elections (1996) 
VFPC / VFTPC Victoria Falls (and Transvaal) Power Company 

























This study has been partly inspired by the fact that historical narratives on the evolution of the South 
African Electricity Supply Industry (ESI), have for the most part focused on the national vertically 
integrated utility, Eskom; with far less attention being paid to the role that the municipal electricity 
undertakings (MEU’s) have, and continue to, play. Indeed, this is somewhat surprising if one considers 
that MEU’s began operating more than 20 years before Eskom’s 1923 formation; and perhaps this lack of 
focus on MEU’s is compounded by Eskom’s operational crisis from 2006 (threatening its ongoing viability), 
which has overshadowed the perilous situation that MEU’s have found themselves in.     
The research thus has two objectives. The first is to provide a detailed historical account of the role of 
MEU’s and their contribution to the country’s ESI from their genesis; while demonstrating the linkages 
between Eskom, MEU’s and the three tiers of government. The second then examines how from the 
formation of the Union (1910), two fundamental but diametrically opposing objectives continue to 
prevail: 1) An over-burdened, financially ‘self-sufficient’, local government, whose limited scope to collect 
revenue means electricity surpluses must be maximised to cross-subsidise its operations; and, 2) A 
vertically integrated utility, mandated to generate electricity at the lowest unit price, so as to provide the 
energy intensive economy with a competitive advantage. These contradictions, which have endured for 
many decades, reached fever pitch in the last 20 years, contributing significantly to the demise of ESI 
reforms initiated in 2000 and abandoned in 2010. Simultaneously, they have worsened the crisis of local 
government, which is constitutionally mandated to deliver basic services to its constituents, whose failure 
to do so, in many instances now threatens national government legitimacy at the most fundamental level. 
Within this context, the research, (based on the premise that history and institutions matter), employs 
the theoretical framework of new institutionalism, as applied through the lens of historical 
institutionalism (HI). Here, application of HI’s core tenets revolves around identifying and explaining the 
critical junctures which create path dependency and institutional lock-in, while also accounting for 
incremental change which undoubtedly exists over a 120-year period. However, the unjust social and 
economic history of the country, where political decisions (pre and post-apartheid) have had a 
disproportional impact on state entities, requires closer scrutiny. For this, a detailed conceptual 
framework is employed to disentangle the complex relationship that has developed between the three 
tiers of government and their respective interacting powers. 
Ultimately, in delivering a detailed historiography of municipal electricity supply, the research posits that 
the ESI requires deeper fundamental reform than envisaged in 2000; and that most importantly, this must 
take cognisance of the extent to which MEU’s are embedded within local government. This, the research 
believes, will increase the likelihood of local government participation and acceptance; perhaps pointing 
to an as yet unexplored path forward out of the South African ESI’s current quandary.  
 





1. Introduction, Research Objectives and Outline of the Research  
1.1 Motivation for this Study   
In 2013, after seven years of uncertain electricity supply and regular blackouts, South Africa was in a state 
of crisis and the national utility’s (Eskom1) strapline of ‘keeping the lights on’ had shifted from a mantra 
to an urgent national goal. By any account a less than lofty national ideal. 
Predicted as far back as the mid to late 1990s – and regardless of whether the supply shortages were due 
to a decade’s inaction or immediate circumstances – after more than 20 years of over-supply and close to 
30 years since the last electricity shortages, to continue with the Eskom metaphor, in December 2005 the 
lights went off and the Western Cape was plunged into darkness. But this was only a teaser of what was 
to come; albeit that national government and Eskom quickly moved to assure that the problem could, and 
would be, contained; and that there was no crisis (Le Roux, 2006). Such hopes however quickly faded 
when the entire electricity system came close to collapsing, necessitating national rolling blackouts in late 
2007 and early 2008; with massive repercussions to citizens’ daily lives and the economy, and raising 
serious concerns about the country’s ability to host the Soccer World Cup in 2010.   
Civic society was understandably frustrated, and to an extent enraged, with many questions being asked 
about Eskom management and government planning (Creamer 2008; Mail & Guardian 2008). It was truly 
a ‘fallen hero’ moment in the eyes of many South Africans, because Eskom had been specifically created 
with the objective of providing a cheap and sufficient national supply of electricity, which it had done 
successfully for decades. Formed in 1923 as part of the country’s industrialization strategy and integral 
thereto, it has become the backbone of the country’s energy intensive economy. In 2000, Eskom 
generated more than 95% of South Africa’s electricity, undertook all transmission and shared distribution 
with municipalities (Municipalities accounted for approximately 40% of sales revenue and 60% of its 
customer base) – in a classic case study example of the traditional vertically integrated utility model. It 
was the sixth largest utility in the world (fourth in the 1980s) and a global force in the international power 
sector. Indeed, just a year later, in 2001, it won the Financial Times Global Power Company of the Year 
 
1  Established in 1923 as the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM), also known by its Afrikaans name Elektrisiteitsvoorsieningskommissie 
(EVKOM), by the government of the Union of South Africa. These two acronyms were combined to form Eskom in 1987 under the Electricity Act 
(40) which was passed to corporatize the utility. Eskom is, and has always been, wholly owned by the government. The utility is the largest 
producer of electricity in Africa, is among the top seven utilities in the world in terms of generation capacity and among the top nine in terms of 
sales. It is the largest of South Africa's state owned enterprises. The company is divided into Generation, Transmission and Distribution divisions. 
Generating 95% (including 5% imports) of the country’s supply, municipalities 1% and others 4% (inter alia Independent Power Producers (IPPs). 
As the only transmission licensee Eskom is responsible for all transmitted electricity. The responsibility for distribution is shared between Eskom, 
the municipalities and other licensed distributors. About 180 municipalities distribute 40% of electricity sales to 60% of the customer base.  
Annually in consultation with the Minister of Public Enterprises, Eskom agrees on its performance objectives, measures and indicators in line with 
government treasury regulations under the Public Finance Management Act. The annual targets are annexed to a list of principles agreed between 
Eskom and its shareholder (the shareholder compact) and regular reports are provided. The compact does not interfere with the normal principles 
of company law. The relationship between the shareholder and board is preserved. The board ensures that proper internal controls are in place 
and that Eskom is effectively managed. The compact promotes good governance by helping to clarify the board and shareholder roles and 
responsibilities and ensures consensus on Eskom’s mandate and key objectives. 
Eskom has a unitary board structure with a majority of independent non-executive directors. The directors, appointed by the shareholder, are 
drawn from diverse backgrounds (local and international).  
Chapter 6 outlines how Escom and then Eskom governance structures have evolved since its founding - Chapter 6.4.2 considers the 1910 Power 
Act and the 1922 Electricity Act, Chapter 6.5.2 details the reforms taken to ‘corporatize’ Escom to Eskom in 1987, and 6.6.2 lists the Acts and 




Award for its technical excellence in plant production, maintenance and operation. The question that begs 
asking then is: How could chronic supply shortages have occurred merely four years on? In fact, more 
appropriately: Why did these supply shortages persist for so long? There was no end in sight in 2013; and 
the country still lived and functioned under the constant threat of blackouts. To make matters worse, the 
two coal fired power stations (9.6 GW) that Eskom was building, were bedevilled with huge cost overruns 
and delays; and continue to be in 2017. Indeed, on this trajectory, the demise of Eskom itself, and at the 
very least in its current structure, is predicted (Jaglin & DuBresson, 2016). The crisis however also unveiled 
opportunities: Was it possible that coal’s stranglehold on South Africa’s electricity production via the total 
dominance of coal-fired power stations in electricity generation, would finally be challenged? Would this 
crisis be the catalyst of wholesale reform in the sector and targeted integration of renewable energy 
sources into the national grid? The signs were promising: 1) The National Renewable Energy White Paper, 
which set a 10 000 GWh target of RE generation over a ten-year period (2003-2013) and which had largely 
been ignored until 2008, was remembered and dusted off, and Eskom announced that its Solar Water 
Heater rebate scheme would install 825 000 units over a five-year period and in so doing contribute 23% 
to the target. Renewable Energy (RE) feed-in-tariffs were announced in 2009 – converted to a bidding 
process by a ministerial determination in 2011 – which granted generation licenses to the private sector. 
By 2013, after three rounds of bidding, 64 projects valued at US$14 billion to generate 3.9 GW had been 
selected (Eberhard, 2014); 2) Even energy efficiency (EE) now joined the party and the 2005 National 
Energy Efficiency Strategy, which set an overall voluntary 12% reduction in energy consumption by 2015, 
received attention. Eskom identified EE as the most effective and efficient way to reduce demand in the 
short term, especially during peak periods, while supply issues were being addressed. Its Demand Side 
Management programme, subsequently renamed Integrated Demand Management (IDM), was launched 
in earnest in 2008. All sectors and users were eligible for participation, from carefully selected individual 
projects at mines and heavy industry where multiple MW could be removed, right down to small projects 
that saved watts but lent themselves to easily executable and repeatable actions, such as efficient lighting 
rollouts and retrofits. By way of example, in 2012, millions of compact fluorescent lights had replaced 
incandescent light bulbs (and by 2016 when the initiative ended over 70 million had been distributed 
(Eskom, 2018); 3) National Treasury also made discrete funding available to municipalities to undertake 
internal EE projects, and levied taxes on incandescent lightbulbs and on the sale of electricity generated 
from non-renewable resources; and 4) Industry and government came together to sign the National 
Energy Efficiency Accord in 2009, where 40 large users committed themselves to EE strategy targets. But 
would such programmes result in structural changes or where they a short-term response to see the 
country through the crisis?  
Here, the underlying motivation for this study stemmed from numerous consulting assignments 
undertaken on behalf of government and international development agencies from 2007, seeking ways 
out of the crisis2. More specifically, I completed several detailed EE barrier analyses, which found that the 
country’s expectations of abundant, stable supply and low electricity tariffs, (Eskom’s mandate since 
1923), were entrenched and ingrained in the energy intensive nature of the economy and in the attitude 
of both large and small users; making the barriers plentiful and stubborn. Electricity users, especially the 
large ones, fixated on low tariffs and inflexible demands for incredibly unrealistic short pay back periods, 
which made almost all EE investment impossible. This was compounded by the plain truth that during an 
 
2 My work assignments have never dealt with the research topic and have been limited to developing and assessing energy efficiency 
interventions. I have never been employed or contracted by City Power (or any other municipality). My work has not provided me with any 




outage, EE didn’t help much at all. Wasn’t the solution then ensuring individual energy security? Installing 
a generator would allow businesses or households to continue during outages. But increases in the 
frequency of outages, a daily occurrence during certain stretches, unfortunately only deepened the mind-
set of individual survival over a coordinated approach. Peculiarly, national government and Eskom-
sponsored EE efforts were being paid little more than lip service by the major metropolitan 
municipalities3. The long-term benefits of sustainable energy consumption were relatively straightforward 
and obvious. But after considering events, a more complex phenomenon worthy of deeper investigation 
could also be seen manifesting in the triangular dynamics between: 1) Eskom’s model of monopolising 
generation so as to benefit from economies of scale, which was a government priority and meant that 
Eskom always had its ear; 2) The steady but ever-increasing pressure on national government to balance 
economic growth policies, which were rooted in an energy intensive mind-set, against more recent 
national and international pressure to commit to environmental sustainability, such as climate change 
targets; and, 3) The provision of services (electricity, water, refuse removal and others), as a municipal 
function from the turn of the previous century, which was formally allocated to municipal government in 
the 1996 Constitution. Ultimately, it is these triangulated dynamics of “coopetition”, evolving now for 
over a century, which inspired this study; and while the research uses an established theoretical 
framework, its intention is not to develop new theory. The focus falls rather on the detailed examination 
of a century-long course of events, within and facilitated by, a uniquely triangulated historical context 
worthy of in-depth analysis – as viewed and scrutinised through the analytical prism of established 
theoretical tenets. In this the researcher believes that the study has proved successful, in that it has 
provided a means (detailed & chronological institutional analysis) to illuminate and unpack the dynamic, 
historical, politically rooted, complexities that today impact electricity provision in contemporary South 
Africa.     
1.2 Contextual Background – The Development of the ESI and its 
Stakeholders 
The development of South Africa’s Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) has several interesting and somewhat 
unique features. The first is that the discovery of the country’s mineral wealth – diamonds in Kimberly 
(1870’s) and gold in Johannesburg (1880s) – coincided roughly with great advancements in electrical 
generation technology, which made electrification technically and financially viable. Kimberly switched on 
its electric streetlights in 1882, becoming the first town to do so in Africa and the Southern Hemisphere; 
and the first town in South Africa to have a municipal electricity undertaking4 (MEU). The second feature 
is one of unusually rapid development, largely because the great quantities of power needed by the gold 
 
3 At the southern tip of Africa, the Republic of South Africa is a parliamentary republic with a three tier system of government. Government is 
divided into three parts: The Executive (the Cabinet), Legislature (Parliament), and Judiciary (the courts). The Executive is responsible for ruling the 
country through different departments or ministries. Parliament is made up of two groups, the National Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP). The National Assembly is made up of all the Members of Parliament (MP's) that got seats in the general elections. The NCOP 
represents the nine provinces in the national government and every province has ten representatives in the Council. The two highest courts in 
South Africa are the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. South Africa's government differs greatly from those of other 
Commonwealth nations. The national, provincial and local levels of government all have legislative and executive authority in their own spheres 
and are defined in the Constitution as "distinctive, interdependent and interrelated". 
There are nine provinces which are divided into 52 districts: 8 metropolitan and 44 district municipalities which are further sub-divided into 226 
municipalities. In 2016 the country’s population was estimated to be 56 million, 8 million of which reside in Johannesburg, its biggest city. For a 
detailed explanation see Chapter 4.6.5. For a map please see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.6 explains the categories of municipalities 
4 The term “electricity undertaking” was introduced by the Transvaal Power Act (Act 15 of 1910) which defined the generation and distribution of 
electricity in a specific area. In 1956 the AMEU adopted the following definition: A local authority carrying on an electricity supply undertaking”. 




mines quickly attracted power companies and international investors. Thirdly, the predominance of the 
mining industry meant that supply of electricity to city and town residents, which was more complicated 
and financially less lucrative, was left to the municipalities. Thus, from inception, the Electricity Supply 
Industry (ESI) developed in two separate streams.  
Recognising from the outset that the country’s mineral resources were a ‘wasting asset’ which would 
inevitably be depleted, the new government after the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, 
moved quickly to develop and implement an industrialization strategy to modernise – using its mineral 
wealth as springboard and first pillar. The second pillar, racial segregation, was deepened, in that the black 
population was now viewed as an inexhaustible and cheap source of labour. And the third pillar, was the 
extension of the ultimate requirement of the mining industry: universal, cheap and reliable power. 
Government’s priority was to consolidate and take control of the private sector utilities supplying industry 
and mines, which it achieved through the creation of the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom). 
Municipal ESI5, an important but secondary priority, was ultimately dealt with in the 1960s; but checked 
in the interim by ring-fencing municipal ESI operations to their area of jurisdiction and imposing maximum 
supply limits to individual users.      
As apartheid inevitably became untenable, and internal and international pressure mounted, the 
government became increasingly isolationist and focused on self-sufficiency. Energy was key, and Escom 
was allowed significant leeway if it supplied the power the country needed. For example, its ‘innovative’ 
funding practices, which were unlikely to meet basic financial accounting guidelines, were tolerated, as 
they eliminated the need for government to provide funding. Inevitably, this went too far and by the early 
1980s large tariff increases (to fund its construction programme) had the public and industry baying for 
action. This was containable, but Escom erred by provoking the ire of the authoritarian state president 
PW Botha, who immediately reigned it in. Forced to modernize and subscribe to credible financial 
practices, Eskom from 1987 emerged an unlikely hero before and after the first democratic elections in 
1994, with its noteworthy contributions to electrifying the previously unserved, or very under-served, 
black areas. Eskom, once again, enjoyed a prolonged golden era, until the 2005 blackouts. 
The narrative described above, has been well researched and documented from as far back as the 1970s. 
On the history and role of Eskom, inter alia, see (Fine & Rustomjee 1996; Christie 1984; Horwitz 1994; 
Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000; Steyn 2001; McRae 2006; Jaglin & DuBresson 2016); on energy policy 
(Fine & Rustomjee 1996; Marquard 2006; Eberhard 2000; Eberhard 2005b; A Eberhard 2007). Research 
literature on the development of South Africa’s industrialization policy and the role played by the state 
abounds, and there are too many resources to list here, but are referenced to in the research. What is 
clear however, is just how pervasive electricity, and Eskom by default, is in South Africa – succinctly 
summed up by Dr de Beer6:  
“If you control Eskom, you control the South African economy.”   
 
5 The research refers to both municipal ESI and EDI.  MEU’s until the late-1960s generated and distributed electricity within their jurisdiction, 
hence ESI. In 1969 municipalities agreed to relinquish their right to generate electricity in return for exclusive distribution rights, transforming to 
EDI. The terms are not used interchangeably but refer to the time periods, where both periods are being addressed then Municipal ESI is used. 
The events are detailed in Chapter 6.4.1 
The Electricity Pricing Policy of the South African Electricity Supply Industry, issued by the Department of Minerals and Energy (2008) defines EDI 
as the “distribution industry connected to supply voltage not exceeding 132kV” and ESI as “Generation, transmission and distribution”. 




The narrative that has however received far less attention, albeit that it is a key component of the 
triangulated dynamics spoken of earlier, is municipal ESI; and it is the discourse around this element that 
the research aims to contribute to – providing a hitherto relatively unexplored perspective on the critical 
role that municipal ESI has played in the economic and political dynamics of electricity supply for over a 
century in South Africa.  
1.3 Municipal ESI as a Subject for this Study 
Internationally, strong local government7 is viewed as desirable. It is at the forefront of service delivery, 
and, in theory, is more readily held accountable on issues that directly impact on residents. It is much 
harder to do this if these services are administered by the centre, where national interests take priority in 
voting decisions. Residents are also more likely to trust local government than national government 
(Siddle 2011, p.3). Neglected and subordinate to provincial and national government under apartheid, 
local government was elevated in the 1996 Constitution to a sphere of government, giving it the same 
standing as the other two tiers. We are all however acutely aware that being independent is difficult 
without the requisite financial means; and so it is with local government. The greater the reliance on 
national transfers and grants, the higher the probability that they are conditional or subject to preferred 
policy directions. And therein lies the rub. Central authorities are loathe to share their tax raising 
instruments with other tiers of government for several legitimate reasons: over taxing; tax exporting; the 
efficiency of centralized collection; taxpayer perceptions of double taxation; overseeing broader 
objectives of income redistribution or macroeconomic stability (Bird 2011; Bird 2001; Slack 2009; 
Martinez-Vazquez 2015; Bahl & Linn 1992). This leaves property tax as the main, and in many instances 
the only, true tax revenue source for local government. In South Africa, the decision to formalise the 
established municipal practice of using surpluses from user fees to fund their activities in the 1996 
Constitution and prohibiting local government from levying taxes that competed with national 
government’s revenue collection, seemingly addressed many of the issues. Given the politically charged, 
weak economic conditions and the imperative of independent and democratic local government, the 
solution may have been the most appropriate. But was a different model ever an option? 
Municipal ESI has a longer history than Eskom. The Association of Municipal Electrical Engineers (now the 
Association of Municipal Electricity Undertakings - AMEU) was formed in 1915, when 22 engineers from 
17 municipal towns got together to promote common interests, such as technology, national standards, 
tariffs and distribution systems. Over time, as cities grew, so did the demand for electricity, and the 
municipal electricity undertakings became utility companies, generating and transmitting within their 
supply area. MEU’s were known for their competence and operated profitable businesses, which the 
municipal finance departments were quick to recognize and exploit. But was this a good idea? The 
undertakings did not believe so, arguing that inflating tariffs to avoid increasing property taxes, was 
effectively levying a tax on electricity, which may be counter-productive because consumers could 
respond by reducing their consumption or switching to other fuels. The debate between councillors, who 
supported the relief of rates from electricity surpluses, and the electricity undertakings, who did not, 
raged for over 15 years, while the practice continued and gained momentum, making its reversal more 
 
7 The thesis refers to both local government and municipalities. These terms, for the purposes of this research have the same meaning and are 




difficult. Ultimately, political expediency won the day and in the early 1940s the practice had been 
established and accepted.   
Over the next two decades, municipal electricity undertakings went from strength to strength. Indeed, 
during the 1940s and 1950s when Escom was still establishing itself and struggling to meet the ever-
increasing demands from mining and related energy intensive sectors, it entered into long term supply 
agreements with the Johannesburg electricity undertaking and did not object to their applications for the 
construction of new generation plants. Escom reversed its decision in the mid-1960s, when its build 
programme had stabilised and a national grid was within grasp, by convincing government not to issue 
any new generation licenses to municipalities, but did not object to their existing right to distribute 
electricity. MEU’s were forced to squeeze as much life as they could from their existing power stations 
and concentrate on their distribution grids. Entering into supply contracts with the only supplier, Escom, 
made them price takers with little room for negotiation. With national government putting all its energy 
into defending and maintaining apartheid, little attention, and even less funding, was made available to 
municipalities who were expected to be self-funding. The surpluses from user charges for municipalities 
to fund their operations now became indispensable.  
The onset of democracy brought a new set of issues for municipalities. Black townships, largely ignored 
by the white local authorities, were now required to be integrated into their jurisdictional areas and 
properly serviced. Eskom, under its Electrification for All programme which started in the late 1980s, had 
taken the lead in this regard – rapidly overshadowing the apartheid’s government efforts in the 1980s to 
provide services to black areas funded by the Regional Services Council (RSC) levy which was collected in 
white areas8 9. This put municipal electricity undertakings under immense pressure to respond and keep 
up, while facing structural, technical and financial challenges, such as having to absorb new supply areas 
with different equipment, or having funds previously allocated for capital projects frozen or arbitrarily 
withdrawn for non-electrical projects. Protecting and maintaining user fees became a municipal priority.  
Within this context, the 1998 Energy White Paper then detailed national government’s plan to reform the 
entire ESI. For distribution, this implied the creation of between 5 – 8 regional electricity distributors 
(RED’s). The financial implications for municipal revenue and financial standing were massive. Lengthy 
and detailed attempts to develop a mutually acceptable model, which came at great cost, failed; and REDs 
were officially declared dead by cabinet in 2010. Generation and transmission reforms did not fare much 
better, and the ESI looks very much like it did before the white paper was published.    
1.4 Hypothesis, Research Objectives and Research Questions 
With reference to the above-mentioned interlocking dynamics, the underlying hypothesis of this research 
is that the provision of basic services for the majority of South Africans who were side-lined under 
apartheid, fell at the feet of local government – as mandated in the constitutional, policy and regulatory 
 
8 During apartheid, local government was split according to race. As a result, local government was disjointed and separate infrastructure existed 
for each race group, with white residential areas well serviced and areas inhabited by all other race having a very low level of service. The Regional 
Services Act (1985) aimed to achieve economies of scale and increase efficiency by reducing the duplication of services by providing them on a 
joint basis. To fund the programme, the Act called for a levy to be charged by employers on employee wages which had to be paid in their region. 
A detailed explanation is provided in Chapter 4.4 
9 During the apartheid, legislation segregated people on racial classification. The Population Registration Act No. 30 of 1950 divided the population 
into three main racial groups: Whites, Natives (Blacks), Indians and Coloured people (people of mixed race). Race was used for political, social 




framework following the 1994 democratic elections. In this, bringing government closer to the people was 
to be achieved by adopting the principles of decentralised government, which in turn would strengthen 
democracy. Thus, the long-held practise of cross-subsidising non-related municipal functions from the 
surpluses generated from the provision of services, primarily electricity distribution, was essentially 
enshrined in the constitution. But in providing a reliable revenue source, it entrenched an unsustainable 
business model for MEU’s. More significantly however, this action resulted in much deeper implications 
for the national ESI; and is one of the contributing factors pushing the national ESI to breaking point. 
Indeed, national government soon recognised the consequences of this decision and from 2000 
attempted to reform the sector under the decade-long RED’s initiative, which it was ultimately forced to 
abandon – leaving the electricity distribution model that has been in place since electricity was first 
supplied by municipalities, largely unchanged. Ultimately, national government’s failed reform efforts, 
which did not lack commitment or conviction, point to the complex linkages which exist between: 1) Local 
government and Eskom (its competitor and supplier, in a strained relationship of “co-opetition”), which 
by extension includes national government in the role of Eskom’s only shareholder; and 2) local 
government as the ‘political master’ of MEU’s. Here, conflict between Eskom, government (national and 
local) and MEU’s, is not a new development and can be traced back to the start of the 20th century. Indeed, 
the vested interests which developed over many decades and that are now firmly entrenched, point to 
the need for much deeper understanding of the situation, if effective and lasting reform are to be 
accepted by all affected stakeholders. Ultimately, failure to address the status-quo is likely to further 
hamper local government in achieving its service delivery mandate; have significant negative financial and 
operational impacts on the national utility; be a drag on the national and municipal economy; and 
compromise and frustrate related national policies, such as climate change and energy efficiency targets.  
Accordingly, the next step is identifying an appropriately suited framework which can encapsulate the 
intricacies of political and economic decisions over such a long period of time – one that acknowledges 
that historical developments are seldom straightforward or linear. Moreover, a key measure is the ability 
to focus on the dynamics of the power relations present in the existing institutions which provided certain 
actors or interests greater power than others in the creation and future trajectory of new institutions. A 
framework able to identify the reasons why a direction pursued over others yields two outcomes. Firstly, 
it isolates the motives of the dominant vested interests. And secondly, access to the actual, rather than 
perceived or assumed available alternatives discarded at the time allows for a more complete 
understanding of the issues at play, facilitating case study counter-factual analysis. The hypothesis 
recognises institutional change has occurred in South Africa over the last 120 years, but notwithstanding 
these changes, the core tenets of policies initiated in the early 1900’s continue to influence decision-
making. The practises of state institutions, where the forces inertia has taken hold, are seemingly 
impervious to change. These themes of historical change and path dependency, which is not limited to 
history generally, need to be interrogated appropriately to gain a better understanding of: 1) Why events 
have unfolded as they have; and 2) The outcomes of identified critical junctures of the mandate of MEU’s 
and the municipal funding model in South Africa. As the relationships between the three tiers of 
government are complex, complicated further by the national monopolistic utility, and include relational, 
regulatory and funding policies (Elson, 2008 pg 6) each dimension needs to be analysed separately and as 
a whole.  
Based on the concept of path dependence, historical institutionalism provides a robust framework to 
explain present day outcomes by recognising the starting point and then tracing the sequence and timing 




deemed suitable and appropriate for this study. As McCarthy (2011, pg 4) explains in selecting historical 
institutionalism as the appropriate framework to assess the transformation of Ireland 1958 to 1993: 
 
“For historical institutionalists history really matters because the present and the future are 
connected to the past by the continuity of a society’s institutions. At the heart of historical 
institutionalism is the idea that policy choices made when a policy is being initiated or an  
institution formed will have a continuing influence long into the future. Not only that, the path  
chosen may often be sub-optimal due to compromise and political expediency”  
The research intention, and its academic contribution, is thus neither to create new theory, nor to attempt 
to accurately predict the future, (although likely outcomes will be put forward based on observations 
made), but rather to untangle the dynamics of the three key role-players in the ESI over a period of 110 
plus years. In this, the research has the following objectives: 
1. To provide a detailed historical account of the role of MEU’s and their contribution to the country’s 
ESI from their genesis, while demonstrating the linkages between Eskom, MEU’s and the three tiers 
of government, within the framework of historical institutionalism and in so doing assess its 
effectiveness. 
2. To examine how, from the formation of the Union (1910), two fundamental but diametrically 
opposing objectives continue to prevail: 1) An over-burdened, financially ‘self-sufficient’, local 
government, whose limited scope to collect revenue means electricity surpluses must be maximised 
to cross-subsidise its operations; and, 2) A vertically integrated utility, mandated to generate 
electricity at the lowest unit price, so as to provide the energy intensive economy with a competitive 
advantage.   
It follows that two corresponding research questions require addressing:    
1. What were the key political decision points that shaped and continue to influence municipal ESI (EDI 
from 1969)?  
2. To what extent was the inability of local and national government to find a political solution in the 
RED’s reform process, a product of underestimating broader ESI dynamics and the stubbornness of 
many decades of an entrenched status quo?    
Ultimately then, just as the relationship between Eskom and the national economy has been extensively 
researched and commented upon; this researcher believes that the links between the ideals of 
decentralized local government and the realities of municipal electricity operations and municipal 
finances, too offer a worthy subject for more detailed analysis, within acknowledged theoretical 
frameworks. 
1.5 Justification for this Research  
Local government is mandated to provide services to all its citizens to improve their quality of life, while 
creating an infrastructural environment which enables economic activity and creates opportunities – by 
all accounts a significantly important responsibility. This stemmed from the country’s constitutional 
fathers opting for decentralised local government as an additional means to strengthen the nation’s 




a strong message to the ruling party occupying national government, with many loyal members voting for 
opposition parties. Of course, the decentralised approach is most effective when municipalities can 
generate most of their revenue requirements, so as not to be excessively beholden to national 
government for funding, which is the primary reason for the constitution granting them exclusivity on 
property taxes and the provision of municipal services. However, since the early to mid-2000s, there has 
been undeniable evidence that local government is failing in its duty to meet its responsibilities – as 
evidenced by several national government interventions, from turn-around strategies and training, to 
increased funding.  
In response to this intense pressure to improve existing performance, municipalities have taken drastic 
measures, which include reallocating budgets, delaying appropriate capital investments and avoiding 
necessary maintenance projects, until being able to find themselves on a firmer financial and functional 
footing. This is most evident in their electricity distribution networks, where the investment backlog rose 
to over R68 billion in 2017, from R28 billion in 2008.     
Under such circumstances, one could thus posit that gaining a detailed understanding of the municipal 
business model’s reliance on surpluses generated from electricity distribution services, is paramount. It 
could also be argued that the issues involved are self-explanatory and there for all to see; and that by 
extension, the solutions are straightforward and need not be complicated. However, 10 years of effort to 
reform electricity distribution by national government under the RED’s initiative, amounted to nothing; 
and may very well have hastened the decline of the municipal distribution networks, as many investments 
were suspended during the negotiations. This demonstrated just how deeply entrenched this 110-year-
old surplus practise has become; and the intention of the research is thus to provide an understanding of 
the immense complexities involved, which have far-reaching ramifications for local government, and 
which must be considered and appreciated in their entirety, if the necessary and long overdue reforms 
aimed at providing lasting solutions, are to have an increased chance of success. In this process, the thesis 
which focuses exclusively on South Africa, aims to make contributions to the fields of history, energy 
(electricity) studies, political economy, political science, policy development, public administration and 
governance. 
1.6 Methodology and Associated Matters 
1.6.1 Introduction  
Neo-institutional theory is one of the primary theoretical perspectives which can be applied “to 
understand organizational behaviour as situated in and influenced by other organizations and wider social 
forces” (Lounsbury & Zhao, 2014). Within this operational environment an organization’s main goal, in 
addition to succeeding economically, is to survive and gain legitimacy. Lounsbury and Zhao go on to 
confirm that the scope of the neo-institutional theory was expanded to consider the transformation and 
change of institutions.   
Globally, the ESI value chain consists of three primary components - generation, transmission and 
distribution. Participation in this sector involves, amongst other things, aligning with national policy, 
regulatory compliance, financial sustainability, internal and external pressures, conflicting goals and 




three components have always been, and remain, government owned entities which, on the face of it, 
implies that strategic institutional change and reform is potentially less complicated and more readily 
attainable, this has not been the case. Indeed, the original institutional and operational framework for the 
ESI, and more specifically those governing MEU’s, in South Africa remains largely intact since operations 
began over 120 years ago despite multiple calls for and attempts to reform the sector. The methodology 
described in the next section aims to achieve Lounsbury and Zhao’s above stated objective to identify and 
understand the linkages and inter-relatedness of MEU’s within the broader ESI.  
1.6.2 Methodological Approach 
South Africa is endowed with vast quantities of mineral resources; and its transition to an industrialised 
state, as Christie (1984) points out,  was possible for three reasons: 1) The availability of large quantities 
of thick, shallow and unfaulted coal seams; 2) Laws which provided cheap black labour for the mines and 
power stations; and, 3) An ESI that was structured by government to specifically provide cheap energy for 
mines, transport and manufacturing. Christie goes on to state that although South Africa produced cheap 
electricity, this was never for the good of the people, but to serve the particular interests of the state and 
owners of property. And his study, which employs an historical approach (page 1), explores the political 
and economic history of South Africa from a neo-Marxist industrial economics perspective. Horwitz (1994) 
used a socioeconomic framework to trace the apartheid system, and its demise, through electricity. 
Rustomjee and Fine (1996) on the other hand, argued that the country’s industrialization was driven 
almost exclusively by minerals and energy and their associated industries - the so-called Minerals Energy 
Complex (MEC) - to the extent that industrial policy for non-MEC manufacturing was largely limited to 
import substitution. Adopting a “broader analytical framework” (p7) which employs multiple theoretical 
approaches, they undertook a detailed historical analysis, via the prism of political economy, to 
demonstrate that economic development is dependent on the dynamics between linkages and agencies. 
Conradie and Messerschmidt (2000) provide a straightforward but detailed historical account of Eskom in 
evaluating the rationale behind major capital investment decisions by large utility companies, and Steyn 
(2001) used an economic institutional case study approach to compare the recently privatised ESI in 
England and Wales with Eskom. Marquard (2006) made use of “three complementary approaches to 
understand and explain the development of South African energy policy” (page 5), namely: policy 
networks; political influence on policy processes; and institutional and organisational influences. Baker 
(2014) in considering the political economy of energy transitions undertook a case study of South Africa 
making use of a socioeconomic approach. Finally, in undertaking a critical review on behalf of the National 
Treasury with regards the issues facing South African cities with respect to electricity, Eberhard made use 
of a conceptual framework.  
Delivering a tome of historical facts and analysis, the above list constitutes some of the most prevalent 
research undertaken on South Africa’s ESI. Except for the two most recent studies (Baker and Eberhard) 
two common threads bind them. Firstly, they all explore the development and linkages between mining 
and energy10; energy and the economy; and energy and politics, or more appropriately, apartheid and its 
legacy. Secondly, in delivering a detailed historical account (which they all do), the starting point is either 
the introduction of electricity into the country, or the formation of Escom shortly thereafter in 1922. Here, 
 
10 Some studies consider all energy whereas others limit themselves to electricity, For purposes of simplicity the broader term of energy is used 




this research aims to complement this series of literature by adding a new chapter – a detailed historical 
account of municipal ESI that considers the above-mentioned links between mining, energy, the economy 
and politics. Baker and Eberhard’s research is relevant because they focus on the challenges facing the 
electricity distribution system in recent years and their research approach and outputs provides valuable 
insight for the case study of Johannesburg.   
To contribute meaningfully to the above-mentioned literature, it is necessary for an overall picture to be 
painted. One which aligns and emphasizes their fundamental findings, namely that the apartheid project 
and the underlying structure of the country’s mineral endowments almost singularly influenced all 
political decision making, with far reaching consequences which overshadow the country in present day 
2019. Thus, without this broader consideration the bigger picture may be overlooked or even missed - a 
primary reason why the RED’s reform process failed, as the research will show. Given this context the 
research on MEU’s cannot be divorced from broader questions affecting the entire ESI. It follows then, 
that in order to deliver a historical account of how the political economy of the research subject evolved, 
a specific approach is necessary; one that is able to access and align with the research methodology used 
in the above studies.  
The research has used three levels of analysis and two primary research tools. The analysis entailed: 1) 
The use of a conceptual framework to undertake a detailed analysis of decentralised local government; 2) 
Detailed historical tracing to identify critical junctures which are then examined to determine the events 
which gave rise to them, their consequences and the political linkages that have shaped municipal ESI; 
and 3) A case study of the Johannesburg MEU. The two primary research tools used are: 1) Concepts and 
typologies developed by historical institutionalism; and 2) Selected interviews to verify, complement and 
supplement research findings. Thus, in addressing the research questions, the above methodology aims 
to achieve the following:  
• Firstly, to determine where the decisions which shaped the municipal ESI were made. It is likely that 
executive pronouncements did not emanate from the MEU’s (technical) or intra local government, 
but were exerted from higher, more powerful, tiers of government. Accordingly, it is necessary to gain 
a detailed understanding of the institutional arrangements of relevant government institutions and 
how elites were able to exercise their will to give effect to their policy. Moreover, and of significant 
importance, it is necessary to understand how competing objectives played out. Which of these 
dominated and why? Satisfying this requirement, thus necessitates an approach which not only 
considers contributing factors, but which simultaneously identifies key inflection points, or critical 
junctures – the events that create path dependency and institutional lock-in, as detailed in Chapter 2. 
(This is intended to answer the first research question); 
• Linked to, and a product of, the first research question, is a broader local government perspective on 
its obligations, and more pressingly, the high expectations placed on it by its elevation to a sphere of 
government in 1994. This is particularly necessary for the second research question; namely why a 
political solution could not be found between the spheres of government to reform municipal EDI, 
albeit that it was deemed necessary and overdue. And the impasse is even more confounding, given 
that most representatives from the two spheres were from the same political party – the African 
National Congress; and 
• Surpluses from electricity sales operated by MEU’s, have been a major contributor to local 
government finances since electricity was introduced to towns and used to cross subsidise other non-




operate at break-even or at a loss, this is not the case for the country’s eight metropolitan 
municipalities, which consistently produce sizable surpluses, and are home to 40% of the country’s 
population and continue to grow as people migrate in search of work opportunities (See Chapter 
3.4.1). This study limits itself to the latter, as the bulk of the country’s household, commercial and 
industrial consumers, reside in these areas. To fulfil research objective 2 and indeed the central theme 
of the research, a detailed historical study of municipal ESI is followed by a case study of 
Johannesburg, the country’s largest MEU11 in Chapter 7. 
1.6.2 Primary and Secondary Research Sources  
The thesis commences by gaining an international perspective of the fundamentals of decentralised local 
government. Using this as a foundation, the evolution of the South African national, municipal and local 
political landscape is presented, together with the development of the broader ESI and its association 
with mining, labour and politics. Up to this point, the thesis has relied mostly on secondary research, 
augmented where possible and appropriate, with primary sources. These take the form of government 
reports, source documents, financial accounts and the like. Also, semi-structured interviews to encourage 
open discussion, were conducted with:  
• Author of the Thornhill Report (1990) which considered possible models for local government 
(Professor Thornhill); 
• Former CEO of Merz McLellan, an engineering company whose relationship with South Africa’s ESI 
dates back to the First World War, and continues to service the industry (Mr Frantz);  
• Local government academics and sector specialists (Dr Siddle and Mr Solomon);  
• Finance consultant to Treasury on electricity demand patterns in South African cities (Dr R Eberhard);   
From here, as will be seen by the reader, in tackling the subject of the study – namely municipal ESI the 
thesis shifts to multiple and numerous primary resources. And in doing so the thesis has the following 
unique features: Firstly, although the South African electricity narrative has been told before from 
different perspectives (Eskom, national policy, politics and apartheid, mineral wealth), the research 
findings have shown that a consolidated municipal and AMEU account does not exist. Secondly, in addition 
to qualitative research practises of face-to-face interviews, published records and other secondary 
sources, the hunt for information has also led to the discovery of new and previously unconsidered 
primary material. In quantifying the type and number of primary sources accessed, Table 1-1 provides a 
conservative summary. 




11 Johannesburg became, and has remained, the country’s economic and financial hub from when gold was first discovered in the 1880s. 
(Chapter 4.6.5 provides an explanation of South Africa’s municipal boundaries and governance structure). The Johannesburg MEU has always 
been the country’s largest and at the epicentre of all major events which have affected municipal electricity supply, making it the most suitable 




Table 1-1: Primary Research Sources 
Type Description Total 
AMEU Committee Meeting 
Minutes (1950 - 2017 12 ). 
Minutes from meetings 
from 1917 to 1950 were not 
found, presumably lost  
The meetings, held bi-annually (on average), covered all topics relevant to MEU’s, 
such as: technical, economic, political, training, international events, finance, 
membership, challenges (copper and electricity theft) etc. Only a small portion of the 
minutes reported on the research topic but all were reviewed. Length of minutes 
varied between 5 to 10 pages, often with annexes – some of which were referenced 
but not included13 
>140 
AMEU Proceedings Journals 
(1915 – 2017)  
The journals, printed for these bi-annual (and then annual) conferences, include 
discussion topics and peer reviewed papers. Although technical in nature, the subject 
of relief of rates and other policy decisions feature regularly. The index / content 
sections of all available journals were checked to identify papers of interest, which 
were then reviewed to ascertain their relevance 
>40 
City of Johannesburg 
Annual Report of the 
General Manager Electricity 
The report was first produced in 1951 and provided a summary of events for the year 
under review. Typically, the report consisted of up to ten pages of reporting (text) 
and then twenty pages of tables, graphs and financial accounts. The reports were a 
rich and invaluable source of information. The reports were stopped in 1995 when 
the ANC took control of the municipality14 
45 
City of Johannesburg 
Annual Report and Financial 
Statements (1971 – 1995) 
Published annually reporting on all municipal activities   14 
City Power Annual Business 
Plan (2002 – 2017) 
Introduced in 2002 as a reporting requirement, the reports each cover a 5-year 
period, aimed at tracking actual against targeted performance. The plan is dynamic 
in nature i.e: Five-year targets are often adjusted during their lifetime or removed 
altogether.   
15 
City Power Financial 
Statements (2002 – 2017) 
Audited financial statements as required by the Municipal Financial Management Act 15 
Merz McLellan 15  (MM) 
Internal Library  
As British consulting engineers formed in 1902, MM played a pivotal role in the 
establishment and development of South Africa’s national and municipal ESI – see 
Chapter 6.4.2. The company library contained reports and strategic plans  
5 
Other  National Treasury Provincial and Municipal Annual Reports;  
Government of South Africa Annual Books;  
Ministerial Publications, such as Green and White Papers, Strategy Documents and 
Action Plan  
>15 
 
There were also interviews with industry participants, who provided insights, “behind the scenes” 
perspectives and could confirm or dispel written accounts of events - such as, for example, the events 
surrounding Mr Leishman in the 1960s (Chapter 7.4), which were confirmed by Mr Bridgens, who started 
his apprenticeship at the Johannesburg MEU in 1958. Interviewees also provided unique information. In 
one such instance, Mr Frantz provided Mr Merz’s 1930 handwritten briefing notes prepared for his trip to 
South Africa. The full interview16 list is:  
 
 
12 Although the minutes of AMEU meetings over the more recent past (20 years) are readily available, with some published on the AMEU website. 
It is the minutes from 1950 until 1994 which provided great insight, as they were all but forgotten  
13 The minutes have been stored for many years and have not been accessed in decades. Invariably some pages and annexes are missing or 
damaged. Overall however, they proved to be a rich and reliable information source   
14 As per Mr Pomeroy, chief electrical engineer of Johannesburg MEU in 1995 
15 The company is now known as Mott McDonald 
16 Numerous attempts to multiple individuals at the National Energy Regulator (NERSA) were declined. Likewise, several researchers and 




1. Mr J Venter: AMEU Secretary since the 1980s - active pre and post democratic elections; 
2. Mr S Bridgens: Johannesburg electricity undertaking employee 1958 to 2001 and chairman of the 
South Africa Institute of Electric Engineers 2007 to 2009; 
3. Mr M Clarke: Johannesburg electricity undertaking employee 1958 to mid-1980s. Honorary member 
of the AMEU;  
4. Mr M Pomeroy: Johannesburg electricity undertaking employee 1979 to 1996, when he resigned as 
Chief Electrical Engineer (CEO); 
5. Dr W de Beer: Former CEO of Electricity Distribution Industry (EDI), a state-owned entity created to 
oversee municipal EDI reform;  
6. Mr H Whitehead: Former head of Durban municipal electricity undertaking and AMEU chairman in 
the 1990s. Featured prominently during the RED’s reform process representing local government;  
7. Dr D Marais: Independent consultant contracted by City Power. Active during the research period;  
8. Mr Q Green: Head of Business, City Power in 2017; 
9. Mr L Pieterse: Head of Technical, City Power in 2017; 
10. Mr P Vermeulen: Head of demand side management at City Power in 2016. 
1.6.3 Research Challenges and Author Bias 
Impediments to research covering a period of over 110 years - and which accesses meeting minutes, 
consulting reports, industry research journals and proceedings and the like - can be split into old (1-3) and 
(4) new:  
1. Availability and Accessibility: Documents over time can be perceived to be of little value. Indeed, the 
AMEU minutes pre-1950 were lost, and those from 1950 only survived because the company 
appointed to manage the AMEU secretarial services has only changed once since then. The minutes 
themselves languished in a basement but were thankfully intact. And it is entirely possible that 
precious decades-old documents are in a cupboard, storeroom or government building, and may be 
unearthed, but similarly destroyed. Indeed, the United Municipal Executive ((UME) - the political 
equivalent of the AMEU), reconstituted and renamed as the South African Local Government 
Association (SALGA) after the democratic elections, is referenced regularly in the AMEU minutes. In 
speaking to SALGA to enquire about the existence and whereabouts of UME records, I was informed 
that when moving to their new building, most of the historical documents were discarded; 
presumably deemed to be surplus to requirements. Equally, as at 2015, no formal record-keeping 
which the public may access, has taken place since SALGA’s formation;    
2. Completeness and Accuracy: Not all documents survive and may have been missing from the start. 
For example, minutes or reports refer to a topic and then reference an attached document or annex 
for detail, which is not included. It was also the case that minutes for some meetings were missing. 
With no other sources to corroborate events information was pieced together through an exercise of 
identifying citations of the subject from previous and subsequent citations;  
3. One-sided Perspective: The minutes and journals of the industry association (AMEU) reflect their 
position and interests. Unfortunately, as explained above, information that was as detailed as the 
AMEU minutes, and which provided an account of perspectives, from the UME, national and provincial 
government, and Eskom for example, was not found. However, the author can unequivocally state 
that the AMEU meeting minutes were found to be detailed and provided the inputs of all parties, 




interviews, conference proceedings and other reliable research sources to triangulate the findings; 
and  
4. Current Reporting and Record Keeping: The issue of inadequate and sub-standard reporting in 
government institutions is regularly raised by the auditor general. And City Power’s five-year business 
plans are a particular case in point. These detailed reports introduced in 2002 (up to 150 pages) were 
found to be repetitive, disjointed, using vague and opaque language, containing glaring and obvious 
errors, delivered in inconsistent format; and of greatest concern, changed or omitted reported 
statistics from year to year, without any explanation or recognition. Similarly, a clear deterioration in 
the quality of AMEU minutes has been experienced. The original secretary responsible for minutes 
(1950 to 1974) provided a detailed account of meetings, which included context, a discussion 
summary of various members’ viewpoints and the final outcomes. From the 1990s however, minutes 
were reduced from ~10 pages down to 3-4 pages. Here again, the findings were enriched and 
triangulated primarily through interviews of members who sat in the meetings, as detailed in the list 
of interviewees 
In many ways, knowing that the first three challenges are inherent in a historical study of this nature, 
influenced the methodology and framework adopted for the research. Here, in being warned (Van der 
Heijden 2014; Béland 2007; Bovens & Hart 1998) about the pitfalls of historical story-telling, the following 
approach was employed. Firstly, providing a detailed account and views of all stakeholders, allows the 
reader to gain a balanced perspective. The downside is that it lengthens the narrative, but this in my view 
is a necessary trade-off. Secondly, it is imperative to ensure that the order of facts is delivered accurately; 
as misrepresenting their sequence, consciously or through error, is likely to compromise the research 
findings. Thirdly, selective inclusion or exclusion produces the same negative outcomes as the previous 
point – inaccuracy – and is to be avoided at all cost.  Adhering to these requirements has been a priority 
in my research practice, so as to eliminate to the greatest extent possible, any personal bias which may 
creep into this study.  
Interviews were used to triangulate and test the accuracy of the research. Clearly this is very difficult to 
achieve for events that occurred over 30 years ago, let alone a century. However, it was possible to 
confirm information from as far back as the 1950s, as per the examples cited above. In an additional 
example, Mr Frantz, whose father was a local government councillor in Cape Town in the 1930s and 1940s, 
confirmed the political pressure placed on their MEU’s colleagues to continually increase surpluses from 
electricity sales, as property taxes were unpopular with the electorate. Then, Professor Thornhill who 
helped shape the post-apartheid municipal structure, provided valuable insight; highlighting what was 
proposed, versus what was adopted, and why. Also, inconsistencies in the City Power annual reports were 
raised during interviews with its management, and clarifications were provided. Ultimately, to once again 
take further precaution against bias, interviewees were offered the opportunity to review the 
interpretation of their inputs and comments; and this right of reply is included at the end of the case study 
(Chapter 7.4.3). 
Finally, the possibility exists that due to my involvement in the sector there is a risk regarding personal 
implicit bias. Here I would point out that my assignments are not directly related to the research topic and 
more importantly, I have never been contracted by City Power or any other municipal undertaking. The 
identification and selection of interviewees were an outcome of the research findings and this was not 
influenced by existing relationships, professional or otherwise. Indeed, I had never previously met or 




now at the University of Pretoria and I was granted an interview through his support staff; Mr Pomeroy 
on leaving the Johannesburg MEU started a new career and significant effort was required to track him 
down; Mr Solomon lives in London and consults in Africa; Mr Whitehead is retired and lives in Durban 
(600km from Johannesburg); Mr Green and Mr Pieters from City Power availed themselves through a 
formal research request. To the best of my knowledge, the author’s involvement in an unrelated sector 
of the industry had no influence in facilitating the interviews nor did any of the interviewees respond in a 
manner that may have affected their answers or inputs 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
In meeting its objectives, the rationale for the structure of this thesis follows the views of historical 
institutionalism, which requires the identification of the original contingent event. As mentioned 
previously, electrification largely coincides with the discovery of minerals in South Africa. From this period 
until 1910 however, the analysis limits itself to contextual background and relevant information thereof; 
and there are two reasons for this. The first is that municipal electrification only started in earnest from 
1910. The second, is that the formation of the Union of South Africa (in 1910) provides a convenient and 
conjunctive starting point for the examination of a united South Africa.  
From Union onwards, three time periods have been identified, mostly because particular groups 
dominated the control of each period: From 1910 – 1948 the English-speaking population-controlled 
mines and the economy. In 1948 the nationalist Afrikaner-supported National Party (NP) won the 
elections, formalised apartheid and wrested significant control of the economy for Afrikaners. The NP 
ruled until the first democratic elections in 1994, when the African National Congress came into power 
and the third and final period began.  
Figure 1-1 illustrates how just four political parties, and in reality, three, have dominated executive power 
in South Africa. This is relevant because common sense would dictate that during long periods of 
uncontested control, the removal of existing policies to introduce new ones would be significantly easier. 
Indeed, since 1910, in a period of 107 years, South Africa has only had 12 heads of state17, implying that 
on average each one has held their position for 9.5 years18. Furthermore, the transition from one period 
to the next, is characterised by a fundamental transfer of power and control from one cultural or race 
group to another. Under these circumstances, the opportunity for sweeping change to take place is not 
only probabilistic but expected (whether it materialises or not); and it is for this reason that the selected 
time periods are deemed appropriate. 
 
17 This excludes President Ramaphosa who was elected State President in February 2018 






Figure 1-1: Political Parties Controlling South African Government since 1910 
1.8 Content of Chapters 
This study consists of eight chapters. The present chapter introduces the subject, contextualises the 
issues, provides a justification for the research, identifies the research objectives and the ensuing research 
questions, and explains the structure of the thesis. The next two chapters are largely theoretical and 
provide a conceptual foundation on which the chapters that follow are grounded, while the next four 
delve into the empirical research and the final chapter summarises and considers the research findings. 
Given the complex nature of the research topic a multiple framework approach was deemed most 
appropriate by making use of a theoretical and conceptual framework. 
Chapter 2 develops the new-institutionalist theoretical framework, applied through historical 
institutionalism; commencing with a definition of institutions, and more specifically how political 
institutions relate to this research. An academic review of new-institutionalist literature is then 
undertaken and core terms and concepts explaining both institutional stability and change, are detailed. 
The final step in the development of the theoretical framework then expounds on the four approaches 
considered under new institutionalism, with historical institutionalism at the centre. Having substantiated 
the selected framework’s appropriateness and examined how it should be applied, the chapter concludes 
with the research objectives and questions, and methodological approach. 
Chapter 3 then advances the thesis by developing the conceptual framework of decentralized local 
government. It begins by exploring the linkages between politics and administration from a global 
perspective, followed by the differences between centralized and decentralised government. The chapter 
then evaluates mainstream international thinking on municipal funding models, which developed in 
conjunction with the push for decentralised local government that began in the 1980s.   
Chapter 4 establishes the conceptual framework to track the evolution of the three tiers of government 
introduced in South Africa in 1910. Here, although the study’s main concern is local government, the 
latter’s intrinsic inter-connectedness with national and provincial government means that it cannot be 
analysed in isolation. Within this context, the research findings are delineated into the three time periods 
that have broadly defined South Africa’s political power landscape since 1910: The dominance of the 
English-speaking Randlords following the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910; the rise of 




government from 1994 to the present. Here particular attention is paid to the elevation of local 
government and its service delivery mandate, national government’s policies to support local 
government, as well as the economic plans implemented to grow and transform the economy.  
With the overall 3-tier of government context set, focus then falls on local government in Chapter 5. Here, 
a key success factor of decentralised local government is economic self-sufficiency; and this chapter 
provides a review of local government finances in SA post 1994 and examines how they have fared.  
Chapter 6 then examines the political economy of South Africa from an electricity perspective - tracking 
the country’s economic history under the three identified time periods and electricity’s role in the 
country’s development. Indeed, mining and its associated industries, on which the economy was built, is 
by its nature highly energy intensive, and mining companies made it clear that they expected an affordable 
and reliable supply from government. This has had tremendous impact on the evolution of electricity 
supply in South Africa and the priorities that it was based on and powered by. 
Chapter 7 then provides denouement by bringing the various strands of a complex dynamic together and 
undertakes a detailed historical investigation into municipal electricity undertakings and their 
contributions to municipal finances, with Johannesburg the country’s biggest city and economic centre as 
case study. Surpluses from electricity sales and the process of how they emanated, were applied and then 
became entrenched, are traced within this chapter. Here, while the period up to 1994 is covered in 
significant detail, the focus lies on the period post-1994, with particular attention paid to municipal EDI’s 
role and contribution to the national electrification project, national government’s attempts to reform 
the industry, as well as the negative impact of large tariff increases on municipal surpluses and their knock-
on effects.  
Chapter 8 provides a conclusion to, and summarises and evaluates, the research findings, while 
postulating potential ways that this research could be applied and taken further by future researchers and 















2. A Framework to Analyse the Enduring Nature of Decisions on 
the EDI made by Political Institutions  
“Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it whether it exists or not, diagnosing it 
incorrectly, and applying the wrong remedy.”   Sir Ernest Benn   
2.1 Introduction 
South Africa’s recent electricity shortages have had a profound effect on South Africans and their 
economy. Structural reforms mooted in the late 1990s, failed. Had they not, it could possibly be argued 
that the crisis may have been avoided. But speculating on the road not travelled is not the subject here, 
in a study focused on the road well-travelled and why. On this road today, just as with ESI, local 
government too has been in the spotlight for all the wrong reasons. Service delivery protests are regular, 
often turning violent and destructive, with seemingly no area in the country spared. Continued auditor 
general findings of financial mismanagement and incompetence have been as consistent as they are 
regular. Indeed, the democratic era’s objective of municipal self-financing (especially the metropolitan 
and large cities) and decentralized local government has seen the opposite of the self-financing priority 
occur, with national transfers steadily increasing, rather than decreasing, with a parallel continued 
dependency on surpluses from electricity sales. In Johannesburg for example, the country’s biggest city 
and economic powerhouse, electricity surpluses accounted for more than 30% of total revenue (2009-
2014), even though one in three units of the electricity purchased during the same period was lost to 
technical and non-technical losses.  
These issues loom large in the everyday life of South Africans and have done for a long time. Significant 
political debate and academic research exists and continues to be generated on the importance of an 
independent and self-sufficient local government that is responsible for and capable of service delivery; 
the importance of a stable and affordable electricity supply, which for over a century has been the engine 
of the country’s energy intensive economy; and finally the need for a national government that is able to 
grow the economy and in so doing create jobs to reverse the gross inequality which currently persists. In 
2015, at 0.63 the country’s GINI coefficient was one of the highest in the world19   
But these issues are not new to the country. South Africa experienced regular power outages and high 
tariff increases in the late 1970s to fund Escom’s overly ambitious continuous build programme, with calls 
for national government to intervene being largely ignored. Similarly, local government from as long ago 
as the 1930s complained that its revenue was insufficient for the municipal functions allocated to it by 
national government to be effectively and adequately delivered. In this, national government appointed 
several commissions of enquiry over the decades to investigate the veracity of such allegations, all of 
which resulted in little to no financial relief being afforded, either through additional taxing powers or 
greater national transfers; with no meaningful reduction in the responsibilities allocated. This situation 
was put under even greater pressure with the dawn of democracy, when municipalities were tasked with 
 
19 In 2017 The World Bank reported that South Africa remains a dual economy with one of the highest inequality rates in the world, 
perpetuating both inequality and exclusion. According to Statistics South Africa, the GINI coefficient measuring relative wealth reached 0.65 in 
2014 based on expenditure data (excluding taxes), and 0.69 based on income data (including salaries, wages, and social grants). The poorest 





making up for over a century of almost complete neglect of their adjacent townships – underserviced 
environments where black South Africans were forced to live under apartheid.  
On the face of it, such challenges may only represent a specific period of insufficient prioritisation as other 
issues enjoy greater focus. For example, when the political will to act finally emerged in the mid-1980s, it 
was swift and seemingly effective. In truth however, it was not effective and the challenges were far 
beyond temporary, as the country found itself in a very similar situation just 20 years later - with this new 
crisis now persisting for over 10 years in 2018 and counting. Furthermore, at first glance the link between 
decentralized, democratic government and municipal ESI may seem tenuous at best. Here again the 
research will show that this is not the case – and that indeed its impact is as deep as it has been long-
lasting. For example, the research has found that the concerns about the municipal practise of relief of 
rates were first raised in 1906 (Christie, 1984), and that the dire long-term consequences of the 
institutional arrangements to support this practise, predicted by the AMEU as early as the mid-1920s, 
were brushed aside by the political elite for reasons of political expediency and benefit, and continue to 
have an impact to this day. This raises the question as to why the warnings were ignored. Were they not 
sufficiently understood? Was it the case that the arrangements served a political purpose and their 
consequences amounted to an acceptable trade-off? Perhaps delays in dealing decisively with potential 
impacts meant that change became more complex with each passing year - leading to further 
postponement and leaving it for future administrations to address. Maybe changes made were not 
immediately evident. We cannot be sure, without deeply delving beyond particular periods into a more 
detailed, longer term narrative, because what is suggested by the research is that issues which existed 
from the genesis of municipal ESI, evolved in tandem with its development – thus implying that the 
interplay of factors that creates and embeds outcomes, occurs over the long term. The way to confirm 
this assertion then, would be through detailed and objective historical analysis which has the means to 
allow for the simultaneous study of politics, economics and organizational behaviour, and to furthermore 
assess how institutional structures, norms, behaviour and rules are able to influence or constrain the 
behaviour and actions of individuals over time. Indeed in seeking to demonstrate that history matters and 
that the current arrangements are the result of a long and well-trodden road, (making directional changes 
(reform) difficult), an approach that lends itself to such an endeavour is new-institutionalism, because it 
merges the study of formal institutional rules and structures with the actions of political actors. (Steinmo 
2000; Thelen 1999; March & Olsen 2006; Steinmo 2008) The research thus makes use of new 
institutionalism, approached through the lens of historical institutionalism, which is “best described as an 
approach to studying politics” (Steinmo, 2008, pg 151) as its theoretical framework.    
Before embarking on any analysis or explanation of the merits of institutionalism as a theoretical 
framework, it is necessary to first understand and define the meaning of institutions in general terms as 
a starting point for the chapter. This then leads to the next step of exploring the dynamics that exist 
between institutions and politics, and the differences between institutions and organisations.  Then, with 
such building blocks in place, the section of this chapter that follows, deals with institutionalism as an 
appropriate approach – taking into account that institutionalism as a framework is itself evolving. Indeed, 
from old institutionalism came new-institutionalism, with North, March & Olsen being its authoritative 
scholars in the 1980s. Hall and Taylor then spoke of the three institutionalisms  in the mid-1990s, rated 
on a scale between ‘calculus’ and ‘cultural’ (Hall & Taylor 1996, p.950), and by 2000 as many as seven had 
been identified (Rhodes et al. 2008, chap.4), with more to come as research evolves. Here, Hall and 




more recent addition (constructivist) – are evaluated to motivate why historical institutionalism was 
deemed the most appropriate. Also, the lexicon particular, but not necessarily exclusive, to historical 
institutionalism, is explored and explained; inter alia: path dependence, critical junctures, exogenous 
shocks, negative and positive feedback loops, drift and other terms. The paradox between path 
dependence, which implies a fixed and rigid path, and the inevitability of incremental change over long 
periods of time, is also explored, given that this dichotomy is probably the biggest criticism of historical 
institutionalism. Ultimately, by this section’s end, the analysis will motivate why the theoretical 
framework of new-institutionalism, (focused through the lens of historical institutionalism) is appropriate; 
but this does not imply that the other approaches are in any way inferior or inappropriate – 
“Institutionalism comes in many flavours, but they are all perspectives for understanding and improving 
political system” (March & Olsen 2006, p.5).  
The penultimate section of the chapter then considers Eskom’s most recent fall from grace, which 
commenced in the mid-2000s and is still ongoing in 2018, because its impacts have shaken the entire 
country and national economy and have had a profound effect on municipal EDI (Chapter 6).  
The chapter then concludes by articulating the methodological approach to be used to answer the 
research questions listed in the previous chapter.    
 
2.2 Institutions and Institutionalism 
Political institutions define the framework within which politics takes place 
       March & Olsen (1989, 18)  
2.2.1 Defining Institutions 
At the most fundamental level, institutions are a human construct created to order political, social and 
cultural interaction; and why social sciences have defined “institutions” to be in opposition to “nature”.  
On the one hand institutions can be used as instruments of dominant social control, but on the other can 
liberate humans from social bonds and nature. Elaborating further, Immergut (2011) states that 
institutions exist on a continuum of formality. At their most informal they are characterized by: habits- 
repetitive action of a self-conscious actor; customs - habits shared by a community; and conventions - 
agreed procedures, such as language. The defining factor for institutionalization is a move from the 
informal to the formal. Adherence to customs results in a shift to a more formal version of 
institutionalization, where societal norms have been accepted by the majority and now become more 
strongly binding – often represented by laws whose transgression is subject to punishment exercised by 
an authorized public institution. Furthermore, the workings of some institutions may rely on other 
institutions, and similarly may vary with regards to whether they are self-reinforcing, (where it is clear to 
the participants that it is in their self-interest to conform), or require meta-institutional intervention, 
which introduces the concepts of “rules of the game” and “appropriate” behaviour. Three types of 





         Source: Immergut (2011) 
Figure 2-1: Types of Institutions  
The “institutionalization” of something, such as an entity for example, may denote the frequency, 
stickiness or nature of a habit and the accession of allocating it the status of an institution. This extends 
to the degree to which habits, norms and knowledge are inculcated, indoctrinated or introduced by 
various means; creating rules, structures and standard operating procedures (March & Olsen, 2008) 
(Steinmo 2001). Taking this one step further, institution may then refer to the executing body or building. 
Individuals who have internalised the instructions of an institution in a dependable manner, then operate 
or staff these institutions and are expected to be trustworthy, such as doctors, army generals or 
government ministers. Betraying this position of trust should result in them being held accountable by the 
people they serve.  
The confluence of institutions creates outputs, as shown in Figure 2-2. Institutionalism is the study of 
these institutional effects, and because institutions are seen as arbitrary, in the sense that they are a 
human construct which vary from nation to nation or may not exist at all, institutionalism must be a 
relativistic approach. For example, an institution that may have been the product of arbitrary results of a 
contingent event, may have unintended consequences for individuals, societies, politics and markets. 
“Consequently, institutionalists view developments in these spheres as artefacts of institutions and, hence, 





Figure 2-2: Outputs of Institutional Bodies  
2.2.2 Politics and Institutions 
Having examined the nature of institutions, the next step is to interrogate them in the context of the 
research.  Steinmo (2000), in concurrence with Immergut’s views, states that institutions at the broadest 
level are nothing more than rules; making them the foundation of all political behaviour. And although 
these rules may be formal (constitution) or informal (cultural norms), organized politics would not be 
possible without institutions. For Steinmo, institutions structure politics in three ways: 1) They determine 
who is able to participate in each political arena; 2) They shape the political strategies of the actors 
involved; and, 3) They influence what these political actors believe to be preferable and possible. 
For March & Olsen (1989, p.16) politics is conspicuously influenced by the institutional structure in which 
it occurs. They astutely observe that the premise of organization is that not everything can be addressed 
at the same time, or as required, but that this is necessary for a comprehensive solution. This implies that 
a central anomaly of institutions is that any increase in capability will reduce comprehensiveness, meaning 
that at times, specific issues, participants, viewpoints or values, are supressed or omitted. Bureaucratic 
and organizational literature contends that organizations simply follow rules, with the bulk of the 
behaviour resulting from pre-specified standard operating procedures. This too can be said of political 
institutions: reflected by routines, problem solving or use of discretionary powers; generally implemented 
without extensive analysis. However, it does not automatically follow that these rules are trivial, ill-
conceived or unreasoned, as they are often the product of careful consideration and/or could reflect 





“… routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms and technologies 
around which political activity is constructed. This also includes beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures 
and knowledge that surround, support, elaborate, and contradict those roles and routines.”   
As a result, action is based on identifying the symptoms and matching them to the appropriately 
prescribed rule, rather than evaluating the situation to identify and apply an approach that yields the best 
outcome for the institution or is even in the self-interest of the executing agent. Notably these routines 
are independent of the individual actors who execute them and endure over the longue durée. This results 
in them being relatively resilient to multiple staff turnover, to the personal preferences of personnel, to 
changes in political control and changes in the external environment. The multitude of routines 
undoubtedly makes political institutions appear to be bureaucratic, inflexible, unreasonable, insensitive 
and perhaps even thoughtless. But routines serve a purpose: They allow for consistency and simultaneous 
processes, provide certainty, help to avoid conflicts and clarify codes of meanings to interpret ambiguous 
situations, while representing individual and collective interests and reducing indecision.  
Within this context, the concept of institutions undoubtedly dominates political analysis, but diverse views 
however exist across disciplines as to the kinds of rules and relations that are construed as institutions. 
This also applies to how political analysis is approached in the understanding of: 1) The nature of 
institutions and the setting in which political actors most typically act; 2) The processes that decode 
structures and rules into political impacts; and 3) The processes that decode human behaviour into 
structures and rules to create, maintain, transform or even end institutions.  
In the context of this study, institutionalism implies the study of political institutions – theoretical ideas 
relating to the relations between institutional characteristics and political agency, performance and 
change. The endogenous nature and social construction of political institutions is emphasized by 
institutionalism, as a study of the rules and structures (detailed above), which exist within institutions, 
while exerting and creating a partly autonomous role.  Institutions thus cannot be viewed simplistically as 
equilibrium contracts amongst self-seeking, scheming individuals or arenas for contending social forces 
(Bell 2002; Rhodes et al. 2008; Steinmo 2008; March & Olsen 1989; Goodin 1996).  
As indicated, institutionalism has several approaches, which all provide perspectives for understanding 
and (hopefully) improving political systems. Here, before analysing the ‘old’ and transitioning to the ‘new’ 
institutionalism and the more dominant or popular approaches associated with it, the introduction of 
several concepts analysed by March & Olsen (1989) in their authoritative book on political institutions, is 
required. Indeed, these concepts have been specifically identified as primary themes of the research. 
Rule Following: The principle of rules and rule following impacts greatly on institutions. Five elements are 
associated with this practice: Firstly, the logic of appropriateness is a fundamental reason of political 
actions. Actions are fitted to situations by their appropriateness within a conception of identity. Secondly, 
action – including politically important situations – is institutionalised through frameworks of routines and 
rules. Thirdly, rules are adapted to reflect historical experience, not the situation. Thus, it is the rules and 
not the experience that becomes accessible to individuals who were not present; and as a result the 
experiential justifications for rules become irretrievable. Fourthly, rules may bring order, but with this 




variability or standardisation. Finally, rules must be sustained by trust and confidence if they are to 
endure; while the notion of trust has more to do with appropriateness than reciprocity.   
Collectively these five elements demonstrate why the individual will of political actors becomes less 
important and why historical traditions, as recorded and enacted within a complex of rules, are often of 
greater significance. Seen in this light, a calculus of political costs and benefits is less important than 
identity and appropriateness; and expectations of the future are less predominant than learning as 
recorded in history, and dependent on routines and norms (ibid, page 37-38). 
Institutionalization and the Interpretation of Meaning: Three features can be identified in the 
construction of meaning in political institutions. The first is how individuals within political institutions 
attribute meaning and value to their pasts and their futures. Secondly, the way in which they comprehend 
the world, becomes an enactment of that world. Finally, interpretation is not only an instrument of other 
processes such as decision making, but a central concern in its own right. Participants in political processes 
thus tend to exaggerate the reliability not only of historical data but of history itself. They overestimate 
the likelihood of events that actually occur and underestimate the likelihood of events that do not, but 
may easily have occurred; and exaggerate in hindsight their own foresight (ibid, page 39-40). 
A key component of broadly accepted institutional meaning, is legitimacy. Political institutions, and the 
individuals who run them, need to demonstrate to their constituency that their decisions are legitimate. 
This is done if decisions achieve valued objectives or if the process followed is deemed appropriate and 
acceptable. Thus, good decision making is measured by valued qualities, such as information gathering 
and consulting relevant people, while acting decisively but prudently. Ultimately, the fact that legitimacy 
depends as much on appropriateness of intentions as it does on outcomes, means that processes become 
more effective in reinforcing values sequentially, rather than in articulating those values through action. 
Thus politicians act to assure their audience of three essential things: 1) That they have acted intelligently, 
and their decisions show analysis, planning and the systematic use of information; 2) Decisions made are 
sensitive to the concerns of relevant people and the concerns of the right people have been heard in the 
process, to assure that decisions and aspired intentions are relevant - independent of their 
implementation; 3) That the political system is controlled by its leadership; and appropriately so (ibid, 
page 49). 
Transforming Political Institutions: Not all rules are necessarily good ones, and least of all those with 
indefinite lifespans within contexts of change. Good sense is also not guaranteed; and institutional 
transformation may require the toleration of extensive adjustment periods (to change), during which 
diverse, conflicting and inefficient solutions survive (North 1981, p.9). Indeed, some institutions develop 
a character that discourages arbitrary structural changes or significant change, rather than fluidly adapting 
to their environment. Indeed, secure monopolies, be they in the public or private sector, simply do not 
have to improve to survive (North 1993, p.2). Added to this, is the risk averse nature of human beings and 
how they respond to deteriorating circumstances. Here Weyland (2008, p.286) cites prospect theory 
(human decision making biases) in his explanation of actors who are more likely to persist with existing 
sub-optimal institutional circumstances - adopting bold, counter-measures to avoid a sure, but limited, 
loss, rather than pursue the uncertain and unknown risks of change - but in so doing, risk far greater 
deterioration. Thus, institutions preserve themselves in part by being resistant to many forms of change 




constitutional rules. Routines are maintained because they are embedded in a structure of routines, by 
socialization and the way in which they organize attention. The manner in which meaning is developed 
provides order and stability, and is sustained by social pressure and education (North 1981, p.54). 
Institutional Reform as Public Policy: On the topic of decentralization, March & Olsen noted that 
demands for institutional reform began to grow in the 1980s, with administrative institutions being 
viewed as too complex, centralized, sectored, inflexible and difficult to influence. They were too distant 
from their constituents and had become inefficient and ineffective. Many called for greater 
decentralization and the prioritisation of national interests, which were being marginalized by major but 
narrow, highly organized and well-funded interest groups (ibid, page 97). 
Preferences, Power and Democratic Institutions: Political science and economic theory tends to define 
the challenge of politics as one of aggregating prior and exogenous individual preferences into a collective 
choice – through bargaining, coalition formation, and the exercise of power. Under such a constricted 
conception of politics, the result is an incomplete understanding of power in a democracy, and 
consequently, an incomplete specification of the problem involved in designing democratic institutions 
(ibid, page 157). 
The Role of Political Institutions: Under March & Olsen’s definition of institutional analysis, political actors 
are driven by institutional duties and roles, as well as calculated self-interest; while politics is organised 
around the construction and interpretation of meaning, as well as of choice; and routines, rules and forms 
evolve through history-dependent processes, which do not reliably and quickly reach unique equilibria. 
Concurrently, the institutions of politics are not simple echoes of social forces and the polity is something 
different from, or more than, an arena for competition among rival institutions. In short, the organisation 
of political life makes a difference, and institutions affect the flow of history. 
Politics is organised by a logic of appropriateness. Political institutions are collections of interrelated rules 
and routines, which define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations. The 
process involves determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the obligations 
are of that role in that situation. When individuals enter an institution, they try to discover and are taught 
the rules. When they encounter a new situation, they try to associate it with a situation for which rules 
already exist. Through a logic of appropriateness, political institutions realise both order, stability and 
predictability on the one hand, and flexibility and adaptiveness on the other. In a logic of appropriateness, 
behaviours, beliefs and actions are intentional but wilful. They involve fulfilling the obligations of a role in 
a situation. Action stems from a conception of necessity, rather than preference. Ambiguity of conflict in 
rules is typically resolved, not by shifting to a logic of consequentiality and rational calculation, but by 
clarifying the rules – what the situation is and which definition fits. A tension exists between the logic of 
appropriateness and the logic of consequentiality, which need not exist. Thus, typical characteristics in 
political institutions are the healthy charade and contributory hypocrisy, in which reasons and actions are 
not tightly linked, but place pressure on each other in a way that strengthens each.  
Ultimately, political outcomes are a function of three factors: 1) The distribution of preferences (interests) 
among political actors; 2) The distribution of resources (powers); and, 3) The constraints imposed by the 




2.2.3 Distinguishing between Institutions and Organizations 
For the purposes of this research, it is important to differentiate between institutions and organisations. 
In drawing a conceptual distinction between the two in greater detail, North (1993, p.1) explains it thus: 
“Institutions are the rules of the games and organizations are the players. The interaction between the 
two shapes institutional change.” Here North’s definition of institutions aligns with the one provided in 
Chapter 2.2.1 – formal and informal rules which have been developed by humans to constrain human 
actions. These constraints, coupled with standard economic constraints, define the opportunity set in the 
economy. Organizations on the other hand, are groups of individuals bound together by a common cause, 
which can be economic, political or social. For North, the types of organizations formed is determined by 
the institutional matrix; but once formed, organizations have the ability to induce institutional change by 
altering the rules themselves or influencing the effectiveness of enforcement. Similarly, for Khalil (1995), 
institutions embody formal and informal constraints, while organizations are agents. Khalil’s analysis of 
the two concludes that although the two are inter-related they are mutually exclusive, and that there is 
“no one-to-one correspondence between the set of institutions and the performance of organization” (ibid, 
page 446). He quotes Eggertson - “similar rules can create different behaviours and outcomes.” Thus, what 
becomes important is the analysis of the behaviour and response of the organization, in addition to the 
structure of institutions and by implication the “correct” structure for a desired outcome. Success or 
failure of organizations is not simply the result of the “correct” mix of laws and regulations. 
In contrast, two highly regarded academics interviewed on the topic, held a divergent viewpoint (March 
and Friedberg, 2011). For them, too much has been made of the distinction between institutions and 
organizations. For March, an institution is a collection of rules and organizations are instruments to act 
within these rules. Thus, he does not see a stark difference between the two: “Suppose I make a 
distinction, what difference does it make?” Friedberg concurred with this view, noting that the high level 
of interaction between the two, naturally results in them influencing each other at various levels. The 
primary distinction for March is that both change over time, but institutions do so at a much slower rate 
than organizations, and it is this difference in the rate of change between the two, which has 
consequences (ibid, page 240).  
The research proceeds on the basis that organizations can be economic, social or political in nature (North) 
and that essentially as per March and Arellano institutions and organizations are inextricably linked.    
2.3 New Institutionalism  
Institutions, as has been explained, are set up to create certainty, reduce transactions costs and improve 
operational efficiency and/or cooperation - for the primary purpose of achieving outcomes valued by 
society (North 1990, 3–9). Whereas social science concerns itself with the broader impact of institutions 
in human society and social relationships, political science has focused on power and institutions. For Bell 
(2002) this is attributed to the following: Institutions constitute a very large part of the political landscape, 
with governance occurring in and through institutions; institutional actors wield power and are able to 
mobilize institutional resources in political battles and governance relationships; and institutions shape 
and constrain political behaviour. But as Williams (2012, p.48) points out, once established and stable, 




Traditionally, political science was a relatively straightforward study of political institutions, focused on 
the formal legal arrangements that it described and mapped. Under this field of research, (referred to 
now as old institutionalism), behaviour was a direct consequence of the rules in place, of how these rules 
came about in the first place and whether the rules delivered on behalf of the common good. The 
emphasis was on description, with little attention paid to analysis and theory building (Bell 2002; Rhodes 
et al. 2008; Immergut 2011).  
The progression of political science saw it move away from history, law, and philosophy, to entrench itself 
in economics, sociology, anthropology, social and cognitive psychology. The focus now fell on behaviour, 
because it was noted that people within institutions did not always follow rules, and there were questions 
as to why certain informal groups of individuals became more dominant than the formal structure they 
found themselves in. The political behaviour movement of the 1950s, whose emphasis was on observable 
behaviour, was then bolstered by technology improvements. These provided a new and efficient means 
for mass surveys, shifting the research approach to a quantitative explanation and comprehension of the 
political environment, now made possible by the technological means for executing large quantitative 
studies. These developments brought renewed interest and scholarship to the study of political science 
under new institutionalism, and consequentially a vast array of approaches emerged - to the extent of 
incongruence (March & Olsen 2006 Preface) (Immergut 1998, p.6) (Williams 2012, p.48). Immergut is clear 
that although observable behaviour was the point of departure for new institutionalism, institutionalists 
“vehemently reject observed behaviour as the basic datum of political behaviour”; and indeed that 
observed behaviour is insufficient for the purposes of explaining “all the phenomena of government”, 
because behaviour occurs in the context of institutions and can only be so understood; while individuals 
from different backgrounds will interpret the same evidence differently (North 1993). Or that, as per Hall 
& Taylor (1996, p.936), institutions play a role in the determination of social and political outcomes. March 
& Olsen (2006, p.4), who are sociological new institutionalists and promote a logic of appropriateness 
over that of consequence (where political actors are empowered and constrained to act within the 
prescriptive rules of the institution with which they identify, and therefore fulfil these rules rather than 
consider the consequences) state that institutions are a relatively enduring collection of rules and 
organized practises, and as such (Steinmo 2000) they are the foundation of all political behaviour. A key 
objective of new institutionalist analysis is to understand and explain why actors choose a particular 
definition of their interest and not an equally plausible alternative (Immergut 1998, p.7). New 
institutionalism tries though to avoid unfeasible assumptions, which require too much of political actors 
in terms of normative commitments (virtue), cognitive abilities (bounded rationality) and social control 
(capability) (March & Olsen 2006, p.16). 
The theory of new institutionalism has three primary approaches or perspectives: sociological, rational 
choice and historical. Several others exist, such as discursive and network institutionalism. Here, all 
approaches help in understanding and improving political systems (March & Olsen, 2005, pg 5), but each 
embodies its own unique set of strengths and weaknesses. The basic similarity in all perspectives is that 
something identified at a higher level is used to explain processes and outcomes at a lower level of analysis 
(Amenta & Ramsey 2010, p.15); therefore the paradigm and its approaches is deductive and allows 
researchers to conduct theory testing as a methodology. An analysis by Hall & Taylor (1996, p.950) on the 




The three different approaches are now explored, with historical institutionalism considered last and in 
detail.   
2.3.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism  
Developed at the same time as, but independent of historical institutionalism, rational choice 
institutionalism arose from the study of American congressional behaviour. From a rational choice 
perspective, congressional outcomes are not expected to produce stable majorities and should 
demonstrate a high level of cycling, as new majorities seek to overturn their predecessor’s bills. In reality 
the reverse has been true. Once enacted, legislation remains resilient and endures. Rational choice 
institutionalism sought to explain this discrepancy and was premised on the basis that institutions are 
used by actors to maximise their utility. Existing neo-economic tools (transaction-cost economics, 
property rights, rent seeking, bounded rationality and behavioural economics) were adopted to develop 
an approach  to explain how institutions are created, how political actors behave, and the consequences 
of their interactions (Rhodes et al. 2008; Immergut 1998; Hall & Taylor 1996).  
Hall & Taylor (1996, p.945) identify four notable features. Firstly, actors have a fixed set of preferences, 
dedicating extensive effort and planning in their attainment. Secondly, in seeking to maximise utility, 
actors tend to produce sub-optimal outcomes for the collective. Typically, this is because mechanisms 
within institutions do not guarantee the complementary behaviour of others. The prisoner’s dilemma20 is 
an apt example. Thirdly, actors are motivated by strategic calculus, which is based on how their 
counterparts are likely to behave. In setting the “rules of the game”, defining the boundaries and the 
sequence of activities, political actors are able to influence outcomes by limiting the options of their 
counterparts. This strategic interaction, or calculus approach, influences policy outcomes. Fourthly, 
rational choice institutionalists explain how institutions originate. The starting point is specifying the 
functions the institution serves and the benefit the institution provides to those who created it; and that 
the organization is sustained by the voluntary agreements of the relevant actors; and survives because it 
provides greater benefits to the dominant actors than other institutional forms.  
In short, rational choice institutionalism focuses on social utility and the self-interest of actors. Their 
motivating forces are characterised by short-term planning and decision-making, but kept in check by the 
strict formal procedures and written rules of their institutions (Kaarlejarvi 2003, p.10).  
In accounting for change, rational choice institutionalists have varied views. The approach holds that 
institutions represent an equilibrium state, and once this preferred state is attained, the institutional 
founders seek to lock-in rules and choices to maintain this state (negative feedback loop); but that this is 
not always possible. Douglass North, a founding father of new institutionalism, is of the view that the 
constant interaction between institutions and organizations creates competition. This competition forces 
investment in skills and knowledge, which in turn improves the efficiency of the organization. This 
ultimately causes prices to change, forcing a re-negotiation of the terms of participation and in turn a 
change in institutional rules and enforcement procedures. Although punctuated equilibrium is a 
possibility, actors avoid it as it threatens existing vested interests, and is most likely to occur when 
competing organizations are in a state of gridlock. Thus, change is incremental, path dependent and 
 
20 The prisoner's dilemma is a standard example of a game analysed in game theory that shows why two completely "rational" individuals might 




subject to the rate and extent at which competition amongst organizations leads to investments in skills 
and knowledge; where: “path dependency could mean nothing more than that yesterday’s choices are the 
initial starting point for today’s” (North 1993, p.4). With political organizations being far more prone to 
inefficiency, transaction costs are usually higher and change slower, while polity can, and often does, 
frustrate private enterprise through perverse incentives. Margaret Levi though, begs to differ. For her, 
change is most likely when simultaneous events of individuals seeking change can increase their 
effectiveness, while the blocking powers of individuals whose interests are served, are reduced. Finally, 
Pollack believes that change emanates for one of three reasons: A change in the policy environment; a 
change in the actors; or an improvement in the quality of information. Any one of these events may open 
a policy window, which creates the necessary conditions for a conscious and deliberate move for change. 
In summary, change for rational institutionalists, is faster and more deliberate (Gorges 2001; North 1993; 
North 1971). 
2.3.2 Sociological (Normative) Institutionalism 
With rational choice providing the calculus, on the other end of Hall and Taylor’s scale lies culture, 
represented by sociological institutionalism which regards institutions in much broader terms. In addition 
to the formal rules, norms and procedures inherent in institutions, there are also informal (unwritten) 
rules, practises and moral judgements, in which political struggles are played out (Eriksson 2011, p.13). 
Institutions are socially constructed, and as they evolve, they embody a common understanding of the 
world. This means that even when policy makers seek to change or redesign institutions, they are inhibited 
by these embedded cultural constraints (Thelen, 1999, pg. 386).   
Sociological institutionalism is a response to the rational choice theory that ascribes the primary motive 
of political behaviour as self-interest, which they critique on three fronts: In the first instance, sociological 
institutionalists have noted that actual outcomes display correspondence, despite political actors having 
different relevant interests. Secondly, the clear pursuit of interests is often not possible, given the link 
between reality and policy instruments. Finally, interest-driven theories trivialise the role that culture 
plays in a political environment (Amenta & Ramsey 2010, p.17). Sociological institutionalists point to the 
way education ministries develop in a similar manner in different countries, albeit that local conditions 
are vastly different, or how private firms do the same across industrial sectors, regardless of the product.  
Hall & Taylor (1996, p.945) identify key features distinguishing it from other forms of institutionalism: 1) 
In addition to the formal rules, procedures and norms, the definition of institution is expanded to include 
culture, by considering morals, symbols and cognitive scripts; 2) Individuals who enter an institution 
internalise the norms, which in turn affects their behaviour. Individuals act not simply because of how 
they believe they should act, but also how they perceive or imagine they should act in a given situation. 
This is not to say they are not goal-oriented or rational, but rather do so in socially appropriate ways; and 
3) Change is introduced not necessarily because it advances institutions’ efficiency or their interest, but 







2.3.3 Historical Institutionalism 
   “Those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it.” 
   [This quote is most widely attributed to George Santayana (1863 – 1952)] 
Origins and Features 
This framework, whose key tenet is path dependence, was developed in the 1970s by theorists who 
wanted to go beyond the offerings of structuralism and group theory of politics, which dominated political 
science thinking at the time. It also sought a plausible understanding and explanation as to why political 
institutions, after long periods of stability, were struggling to adapt to social changes arising in the 1960s 
and 1970s. For historical institutionalists, it was the institutional organization of the polity or political 
economy, which influenced behaviour and distinctive outcomes. More especially for these researchers, 
the state warranted greater scrutiny as it ceased to be a neutral broker among competing interests, but a 
myriad of institutions able to structure the outcomes of group conflict. Thus, analysing these complex 
relationships, where political antagonism and competition took place, led to cross-national comparisons 
of public policy – focusing on the relationship between national political institutions and legislators, 
organized interests, the electorate and judiciary – in order to gain a deep and contextualised 
understanding of the politics (Hall & Taylor 1996, p.937). Historical institutionalists pay particular 
attention to the rule structures embedded in political organizations, made up of formal and informal 
procedures, routines, and norms (Béland 2010). In their approach, historical institutionalists are first 
interested in explaining an outcome; and only then do they attempt to understand and articulate 
alternative explanations for the observed outcomes (Steinmo 2000). This is because historical 
institutionalists recognise that institutions are socially constructed, and that as they evolve, they embody 
a common understanding of the world. This means that even when policy makers seek to change or 
redesign institutions, embedded cultural constraints may stand in the way (Thelen 1999, p.386). Historical 
institutionalism considers how institutions and their impacts have evolved over time (Hall & Taylor 1996, 
p.937); such as why a certain choice was made and/or why a certain outcome occurred, which in all 
likelihood is best understood as both a product of rule following and interest maximising (Steinmo 2008, 
p.126), and thus draws from the rational and sociological perspectives. This means that historical 
institutionalism has divergent approaches and applications, all of which are based on the concept of path 
dependency. For Pierson (2000a, p.251), the notion of path dependency implies that: specific patterns of 
timing and sequence matter; large consequences may result from relatively ‘small’ or contingent events; 
actors take action that reinforces stickiness in maintaining the status quo, so as to entrench vested 
interests; particular courses of action, once introduced, may be impossible to reverse; and political 
development often has key juncture points. Thus,  
“(Institutions are) sticky and rigid structures, which lock in actors into a certain policy path.” 
        Eriksson (2011, p.15) 
The implication of institutional development over time, is that political actors are more likely to adapt 
existing frameworks and policies, rather than amend or discard them. In so doing, they create and 
strengthen a path dependent trajectory; the origins of which may stem from a crisis, social pressures or a 
random unanticipated convergence of events. Citing Sanders’ example of the development of railroad 




steadily entrenched by all participants (transportation businesses, investors, trade unions, legislative and 
party politics), who benefitted from the increasing returns of this path. Rather than experiment with 
different approaches to decrease social costs and control participation, the original path of the railroad 
commission became more entrenched and its connection to society even more elaborate to support this; 
resulting in “intransigent resilience” that endured for a long time and aided road transportation’s 
ascendancy. Ultimately, the large amount of vested interests at stake in this path, resulted in all 
participants defending it at the expense of the national interest. Thus …  
“To understand the actions of all these political players, one must take cognisance of the historical 
development of the institution, and the original, distinct culture and problems in which it arose. 
That is the central logic of HI, and to its practitioners the advantage of studying politics in this way 
is understood and non-controversial.”   (Sanders in Rhodes et al. 2008, p.40)    
Hall & Taylor (1996, 938–944) identify four distinct features of historical institutionalism which set it apart 
from other institutionalist approaches. The first is that the relationship between political institutions and 
the behaviour of individual political actors is analysed in relatively broad terms. The second is emphasis 
on the asymmetry of power amongst institutions. Rather than assume a situation where power is equally 
distributed, they recognise disproportionate access to the decision-making process, meaning that some 
lose while others win. Thirdly, as already elaborated above, the concepts of path dependence and 
unintended consequence are stressed. Finally, outcomes are not solely limited to events within 
institutions, with strong recognition that external ideas and beliefs can influence events.  
Historical Compared to Rational Choice Institutionalism  
An explanation of the primary differences between rational choice institutionalism, to which historical 
institutionalism is most closely aligned, is useful. It is true that rational choice and historical 
institutionalists share the same starting point “(of institutions being the) rules of the game in a society, or 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions” (North 1990) and that 
the two approaches overlap in many other ways. Indeed, institutions are the focal point of both 
approaches because they structure political behaviour. Historical institutionalists do not dispute that 
political actors act rationally most of the time and likewise rationalists concede that not all action is 
exclusively motivated by self-interest. The key difference lies in their approach to the science of politics. 
Historical institutionalists’ chief interest is in understanding and explaining real world long-term political 
evolution and outcomes, whereas rationalists focus on specific events which are put under the microscope 
(Rhodes et al. 2008; Steinmo 2000). Rational choice is: “founded on abstraction, simplification, analytical 
rigor, and an insistence on clean lines of analysis from basic axioms (Shepsle in Rhodes et al. 2008), 
whereas historical institutionalism focuses on dense fact-based description and logical reasoning. Quoting 
Pierson, Sanders (Rhodes et al. 2008, p.43) concludes that rationalists take preferences for granted, 
whereas historical institutionalists concern themselves with how these preferences were generated in the 
first place, and how and why they evolved over time. For Steinmo (2000), rationalists try to understand 
the game and how it is played. Historical institutionalists, however, are interested in determining who 
wins, who loses and why. These approaches in analysing institutionalism should not in any way be viewed 
as mutually incompatible. Opting for one over another can very well be based on personal choice or 
temperament, and although differences remain, Thelen (1999, p.370) believes that the walls dividing the 




to isolate or restrict themselves to one approach, but rather to borrow liberally from each, where 
appropriate in answering specific empirical questions. In other words, there are more points of tangency 
than typically assumed. A caveat is raised by Pollack (2009, p.142), who investigated European Union 
integration. While recognising the strengths and benefits of both these branches, he also notes a major 
potential weakness: They both focus on the effect of institutions as intervening variables and do not 
provide a theory, making them mid-level theories. They are however very useful in tracking policy 
pathways, and how institutional traditions and cultures impact the development of policy (DuPont 2013, 
p.89). 
Ultimately, the long-term nature of studies founded in historical institutionalism, naturally lead to the 
examination of the interplay of various factors over an extended period, as well as of key moments or 
events within these extended periods that had particular long-term impact. This makes further 
understanding of the concepts of path dependency and critical junctures, critical to this study, which will 
now be explored in the section below.   
Path Dependency and Critical Junctures 
Emerging in the 1960s from the trend of social science researchers now noting the enduring effects of 
historical decisions, the development of path dependent theories began to grow. Common consensus on 
application of the term has been less straightforward however (Williams 2012, p.60). In this regard, 
arguably, the most accessible and widely referenced definition was provided by Levi (1997) “Path 
dependence has to mean … that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal 
are very high.” Pierson (2000a, p.252) then distinguishes between narrow and broad definitions, pointing 
out that exiting a particular path need not be difficult, but rather that before one can understand the 
significance of the current state, the path taken must be understood.  
At the most basic level, three outcomes exist in self-reinforcing path dependency, where initial actions 
put users on a path of increasing returns that may endure for decades and/or can only be exited at a cost 
(Mahoney 2000). In first-degree path dependency, the initial choice to pursue a certain direction may 
have been innocuous or considered, but is ultimately optimal, although not necessarily uniquely optimal. 
Second-degree path dependence occurs when a decision is made based on imperfect information, which 
was not known or understood at the time. The result is regrettable and has a costly outcome. Third-degree 
path dependence mimics the second type, with the difference that it should have, or could have, been 
known from the start that the results would be sub-optimal. That in other words, the error was avoidable 
(Liebowitz & Margolis 1995). But the authors conclude that although interesting, the theory is incomplete, 
because it assumes that once the error is identified as of sufficient magnitude to take corrective action, 
this will then be done. Although this may very well be the case in the private sector where a company 
either corrects or becomes insolvent, it is however slightly more complex in public institutions, which 
often endure regardless. Mahoney (2000, 512) acknowledges that although path dependency is more 
closely associated to technology development or industry location, it can be applied to political 
institutions because they cannot be changed instantaneously or easily. Similarly, Thelen (1999, 386), 
although having a slightly different take, believes that political institutions are able to adapt, and that for 
those who are disadvantaged by prevailing conditions, the endurance of political institutions means that 
they can bide their time, because future choice points exist. Thus, increasing returns in politics do not 




In taking these arguments further, a distinction needs to be made between technological and institutional 
path dependence, and how technological progress can impose change i.e. become the proverbial game 
changer.  Arthur (1989) notes that technological advances (ergo embraced change) lead to the 
phenomenon of increasing returns, and by extension, path dependency. This means that the more that a 
specific technology is adopted by the market, the greater the experience that is gained and the more the 
technology will be improved – creating a combination of factors that will result in market dominance and 
lock-in. North agrees that path dependence allows for the equal analysis of technological and institutional 
change, because increasing returns are the key to path dependence in both cases. For institutional change 
however, progression is more complex because of the role played by political organizations in the process, 
whose more subjective nature – possibly driven by political objectives that may supersede merely the 
need for operational effectiveness – thus makes them less efficient. And while technological change is 
undoubtedly a source of economic growth, and certainly a driver of the economy, the progression of 
institutional arrangements can also equally produce more efficient markets and in turn result in growth. 
This though requires competition to exist, in the overall economic setting, between institutions and 
organizations, as only then will increased investments be made in skills and knowledge, which will bring 
about both institutional and technological change. Ultimately, as this research will show, such a 
competitive context was unfortunately lacking in the one-sided power dynamics of South African ESI. Local 
MEU’s were hamstrung by regulations which limited their reach, whereas Escom was encouraged to invest 
in technology and skill, knowing it would not face any competition for new markets; with such a lack of 
healthy competitive friction ultimately leading to a bloated, monolithic and inefficient utility (North 1990; 
North 1993; Fuandez 2016). 
In response to criticism that path dependency often just comprises vague notions of history matters and 
that the past influences the future, which may identify the original cause of change where sequenced 
variables are considered, it is thus important to also take path dependent processes of change into 
account. It is therefore necessary to not only trace events back to the original historical events, but to 
demonstrate that these were contingent and not based on prior historical events. Analysing such path 
dependent sequences in detail, then provides an explanation as to why and how certain events unfolded 
and whether outcomes aligned with theory or diverged from it. Two dominant sequences exist. The first, 
is that of self-reinforcing events that exhibit traits of increasing returns, which as the name implies, 
continue to provide benefits; making it harder to transform or opt for previously available alternatives, 
even if these would have been more efficient for the institution. This process is also referred to as self-
reinforcing or a positive feedback process, and stickiness by historical institutionalists. Understanding the 
mechanisms that replicate this behaviour is crucial as a means of identifying ways to reverse or exit the 
path. The second, considers reactive sequences, which are chronologically successive and connected 
events. To qualify as path dependent, the original event must have properties of contingency and must 
be marked by process of inherent sequentiality. The early event unleashes subsequent development, not 
through reproduction, but by setting off a series of tightly linked reactions and counter-reactions i.e. ones 
that move the system in a new direction, without necessarily reinforcing the first move.  
Self-Reinforcing Sequences - Identifying the Starting Point: Critical Junctures, Contingency and 
Counterfactual Analysis: Sceptics of historical institutionalism are quick to state that if one goes back far 
enough, one will undoubtedly find a point in time where choices made cannot be predicted or explained 
by theory i.e: initial choices and outcomes are stochastic (Mahoney 2000, 537). Thus, for path dependency 




of events is considered. As Williams (2012) explains “…not only does history matter, but certain events in 
history wield disproportionate influence on the modern structure of the institution.” Indeed, this 
recognition led to the development of the concept of ‘critical junctures’ - windows of opportunity where 
decisions taken will affect outcomes over the long term, and by implication, complicate and frustrate 
change. Mahoney (2000) suggests that for reactive sequences, this should be the period just before a 
critical juncture, where different options are available – with the process demonstrated in Figure 2-3. 
Indeed, identifying critical junctures allows for meaningful counterfactual analysis21, because available 
and plausible alternatives can be considered (Options A or C), rather than relying on hypothetical ‘what 
if’ scenarios. Here, the research’s starting point, the genesis of electricity generation in South Africa in the 
late 1800’s, is appropriate and credible. Not only is it a natural starting point but there is sufficient reliable, 
primary and secondary research, sources to identify and track the sequencing and timing of influential 
events - specifically the Power Commission Study (1909) which informed the Transvaal Power Act (1910) 
and laid the foundation for the creation of Escom in 1922 (Chapter 6.4.2) 
It should however be noted, that by en large the day-to-day, year-on-year, nature of the functioning of 
most institutions, results in the dominance of incremental, adaptive change; meaning that critical 
junctures are rare events. Therefore, it is important to distinguish these, because change is not necessarily 
the result of a critical juncture (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007, p.368) 
 
          Source: Mahoney (2000, p.514) 
Figure 2-3: Contingency in a self-reinforcing sequence 
Path dependent patterns thus require that the selection process during a critical juncture has an element 
of contingency. This means that based on the available theory at the time, the decision taken (Option B) 
was not expected. This does not however imply that the decision is completely random. Elson (2008, p.15) 
cautions though that if the conditions preceding the critical juncture can predict or explain the results of 
the critical juncture, then the sequence should not be considered path dependent.  
Seen in this light, a working definition of contingency thus becomes necessary. In terms of its correlation 
with critical junctures, Capoccia & Kelemen (2007) draw from Berlin (1974), who explains contingency as 
“the study of what happened in the context of what could have happened” and must display two important 
 
21 A common measure by which critical junctures are assessed, where an alternative option is imagined and attempt to rerun history 




characteristics. Firstly, that different decisions could have been taken, the consequences of which would 
have had important institutional outcomes. Secondly, that the range of plausible options was not infinite. 
These two requirements remove randomness from the situation and offer methodological guidance, in 
that the context of the critical juncture must be re-created, while also identifying the key decision makers; 
determining the real (not hypothetical) choices possible; examining the extent to which alternate options 
were considered; and reflecting on the likely consequences the alternate options could have had. In a 
variant to this, Pierson (2000a) notably explains contingency thus: “large consequences may result from 
relatively small or contingent events”. However, Capoccia (2015) contends that the decisions of some 
actors are more influential than others, and that focusing on powerful actors rather than cumulative small 
events is more useful. The interactions amongst actors and the choices made, create significant scope for 
intentionality, interpretation, and unintended consequences. Finally, Mahoney’s (2000, 513) definition of 
a contingent event is stronger than the mainstream dictionary definition of: the result of events may have 
occurred differently. For him, the events were not expected to take place (unlikely but possible). However, 
he clearly states: “to argue that an event is contingent is not the same thing as arguing that the event is 
truly random and without antecedent causes” (Carr, 1961) . Moving to Institutional Reproduction - Lock-
In: The factors that lead to institutional reproduction are distinct from the ones that created the institution 
in the first place. These path dependent institutions will endure regardless of whether the forces that 
originally created them remain present, as explained below. Indeed, the mechanisms of reproduction are 
based on theory and may be so productive that they create an institutional pattern of lock-in. As Mahoney 
explains: 
“Efficacious mechanisms of reproduction enable an institution to take advantage quickly of 
contingent events that work in its favour, solidifying a position of dominance before alternative 
institutional options can recover.” 
The forces that create a contingent event are essentially historical events, which occur continuously. What 
is of interest to historically oriented researchers is why a particular historical event is able to influence 
events, whereas others, seemingly more pertinent and relevant ones, are not. Analysing the outcomes of 
contingent events that become locked-in, lies at the heart of path dependent research and requires the 
use of a theoretical framework. Due to the influence exerted by economics, the tendency has been to do 
so through a utilitarian explanation of efficiency, but this should be expanded to consider the dominant 
sociological frameworks of functional, power and legitimation explanations. Considering these different 
mechanisms of institutional reproduction not only provides different insights, but becomes crucial if the 





Table 2-1: Typologies of Path-Dependent Explanations of Institutional Reproduction 






benefit assessment of 
actors 
Institution is 
reproduced because it 
serves a function for an 
overall system 
Institution is 
reproduced because it 
is supported by an elite 
group of actors 
Institution is reproduced 
because actors believe it 














empower an elite 
group that was 
previously subordinate 
Institution may be less 
consistent with values of 







Exogenous shock that 
transforms system 
needs 
Weakening of elites 
and strengthening of 
subordinate groups 
Changes in values of 
subjective beliefs of 
actors 
          Source: Mahoney (2000) 
Reactive Sequences: Different to self-reinforcing sequences, reactive sequences transform or even 
reverse previous events. A new sequence is formed, whereby each event in the sequence is both a 
reaction to preceding, and a cause of future events. The early events are paramount to the outcome, 
because a small change can accumulate over time, potentially making the result very different. Reactive 
sequences are best described as knock-on effects of A leading to B, leading to C, then D, etc. 
The fundamental flaw of path dependency, is that the framework it uses to detail long periods of stable 
events and then explain sudden changes in policy paths, is less able to identify critical junctures at the 
point of occurrence, let alone allow for prediction. The implication is that without being able to identify 
critical junctures as they are happening, actors cannot take appropriate action – pointing to the inherently 
retroactive nature of study founded in historical institutionalism. Additionally, it may result in critical 
junctures being incorrectly identified as such, when in fact they were little more than just another event 
along the path (Peters & King 2005; Williams 2012). 
“The punctuation of these path dependencies was triggered by economic factors as much as by 
political factors, hence understanding policy change in a historical institutionalist perspective 
requires careful analysis not only of the ideas that drive the change but also the larger social, 
economic and political context in which these ideas are situated.” 
      Peters & King (2005, p.1297)   
At the same time however, a deeper understanding of critical junctures of the past, may result in greater 
insight being applied to the decision-making processes of the present – at the very least allowing 
policymakers to avoid potential pitfalls and to not repeat old mistakes, because they have been identified 
through retroactive analysis. 
Positive and Negative Feedback Loops 
This approach provides an alternate description of path dependent mechanisms, through the concepts of 
self-maintaining and self-reinforcing structures. The theory is drawn from the natural sciences, which it 
uses to explain how a system moves from an equilibrium to a non-stable state. The most cited example 




explain the theory and will be used in the explanation that follows. Before providing a description of each 
type of loop though, with temperature as the analogy to describe it, it is necessary to list two 
characteristics identified by Knapp (2007, 3–5). The first is that both positive and negative feedback loops 
may operate simultaneously, particularly when various actors have different interests or resources. The 
second is that despite similarities or ability to co-exist, their long-term dynamics and responses to change 
are radically different. 
In terms of a negative feedback, it is described as a self-maintaining or self-correcting mechanism vying 
for a stable condition (homeostasis). Like a thermostat, whose objective is to maintain a set temperature, 
it responds to external forces of hot and cold by acting in the opposite way - switching itself on when the 
temperature drops and off when it rises. Thus, it acts to counterbalance, not reinforce, changes. 
Customary examples include central banks’ standard and universal response to inflationary pressure, the 
tightening of credit policies, or politicians adjusting future policy changes to align with constituency needs 
prior to an election. Baumgartner & Jones (2002) point out that negative feedback is always necessary in 
an equilibrium model and therefore a part of all neo-institutional analysis. Without it, political interests 
“would gather ever-increasing powers until they overwhelmed the entire political system.” Knapp (2007) 
illustrates this from the perspective of vested interests, where elites would move to restore equilibrium 
if their interests were to come under threat. Knapp draws on North’s (1990) seminal work to emphasize 
that self-maintaining structures with common interests may still diverge in development, as actors move 
to exploit the rules. Thus, the system is able to select non-viable structures, be they inappropriate or past 
their usefulness - implying that negative feedback supports institutional survival of the fittest - a state that 
rational choice institutionalism, through its functionalist view, seeks to identify and eradicate (Williams 
2012; Knapp 2007) 
Turning to positive feedback loops, we now consider the concept of self-reinforcement. In contrast to 
counterbalancing, positive feedback is a self-reinforcing process which accentuates or amplifies a trend. 
Observing this process over time will identify the clustering of events, along with large and unexpected 
changes. “Seemingly random initial events can lead to a cascade or a spiral of subsequent events that 
dramatically change the status quo” (Baumgartner & Jones 2002, p.15). Here the multiplier effect forms 
the basis of path dependence theory as decision become locked-in, making their reversal costly and 
complex. Examples of positive feedback include economies of scale and increasing returns (Pierson 2000a, 
p.252). Left unchecked this leads to an unstable system of cumulative advantages and self-destruction 
(Williams 2012; Baumgartner & Jones 2002). In Pierson’s view, political and social structures are far more 
prone to be characterized by positive feedback, producing path dependence, as compared to economic 
structures. Reverting to the analogy to illustrate the point, in a state of self-reinforcement the system 
would be fitted with a reverse thermostat. Such a thermostat would not submit a signal for the heat 
source to be switched off in response to an increase in the temperature, but the opposite. It would turn 
up the heat, increasing the heat even more, and it would shut off the heat source if the temperature was 
low. This means that positive feedback loops can amplify historical events, such that small interventions 
can change events significantly, resulting in multiple outcomes. It is the set point of the thermostat which 
becomes key, as rooms with identical structures, but different set-points (histories), display diverging 
developmental trajectories (Knapp 2007, p.4).             
Even though both feedback loops adopt a different approach, where negative feedback makes use of 




ultimate objective is to resist path changes. An important distinction between the two is noted by Williams 
in her review of Pierson (2000b) where he notes that the primary difference between the two is that while 
the negative feedback loop focuses on maintaining a specific (set) point, the positive feedback loop 
endeavours to remain on the path - and in so doing is thus more prone to institutional shift, which implies 
change. Finally, both feedback types may occur simultaneously. A seemingly counterintuitive and 
counterproductive event, but the research has found several instances of the two co-existing. These are 
detailed in the research where they have been found to exist. In one such example, the 1970s saw a 
reversal of fortunes for the national economy after having experienced over a decade of high economic 
growth (Chapter 6.5.3). Here, a slump in the global economy was compounded by the decision to defend 
apartheid, as international condemnation started to grow.  National government was forced to 
reprioritise its spending, switching from a positive (growth) to a negative feedback loop (averting a 
recession). It would be reasonable to expect that the national utility would automatically follow, or be 
instructed, to support national imperatives. This did not occur and Escom continued amplifying the trend 
of its overly aggressive build programme, placing additional financial pressure on the government. More 
pertinently, a second example can be found in Chapter 7.6.4. when municipal ESI reform that was being 
driven hard by national government in the mid to late 1990s, was about to enter a period of change. Here, 
as we have seen, reform stalled - leading to a long period of homeostasis as local government and Eskom 
battled national government for a better deal or no deal. Eskom, finding itself in a situation of over-supply 
switched to a negative feedback loop to protect its dominant position (monopoly), by ending its new build 
programme and committing to low tariff increases, while accelerating (positive feedback) its 
electrification and driving the ANC’s transformation agenda.  Similarly, the MEU’s who adopted an 
unyielding stance with regards to their approach on the RED’s reform programme, stalled on capital 
investments and essentially kept their operational spend on maintenance at a minimum (negative), 
awaiting a final outcome, which ultimately took over 10 years - creating a mammoth, perhaps 
insurmountable, deficit in capital investments.  However, local government under pressure to deliver 
services, intensified its reliance on EDI surpluses to cross-subsidise its municipal functions (positive), 
exacerbating the limited funds available to maintain the municipal grids (Chapter 7.6.1). 
Punctuated Equilibrium  
A significant part of the evolution of the historical institutionalism as a framework, came with the addition 
of the concept of punctuated equilibrium to the study of institutional change and to notions of positive 
and negative feedback loops and their effects. In the 1950s and 1960s for example, US policy process 
models described decision making as incremental and the political order as stable. Adjustments to rules 
were agreed upon in an orderly fashion by mutual partisan adjustment”. The process was tidy, as 
policymakers were operating within their range of experience, and if needed, incremental changes could 
be reversed. Static gridlock, or political standoffs, then became topical in the late 1970s, at which point 
the first generation policy process models started to be challenged by authors such Cobb, Elder, March, 
Olsen, and later Kingdon, who moved the theory from being one-dimensional to one that was grounded 
in bounded rationality (Jones & Baumgartner 2012, 1–3). The signature characteristics of punctuated 
equilibrium are long periods of relative stability, separated by periods of disjointed and dramatic change 
(Baumgartner & Jones 2002, p.3) i.e. policy processes are non-incremental. In an overview of the process, 
the authors explain (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, chap.1) that policy development reaches a limit, or state 
of equilibrium. By definition, the policy is in a negative feedback, or self-maintaining process. Political 
opposition to such policy may indeed mobilize a reaction and it is possible that the elite may make small 
concessions; but essentially the equilibrium is maintained, changing only slowly, and not by large 




loop, where small inputs transform into major events (amplified) - thus resulting in each change being 
bigger than the previous change, until a new equilibrium is reached. The process is described as the 
logistical S-curve, where policy adoption is slow, then very rapid, and then slow again. The point at which 
the system changes from a negative to a positive feedback is commonly referred to as the window of 
opportunity, triggered by the mobilization of the apathetic, most commonly in response to elections.  
North (1990), held a slightly different view. He argued that change is not as sudden as it may appear. 
Behind the scenes are long periods of intense negotiation; and the example he cites is the development 
of new legislature or policy. The judiciary or parliament may spend months or even years debating the 
merits and negotiating a compromise before consensus is reached. It is possible that an external event or 
new information may break the deadlock, but ultimately this is on the back of long periods of seeming 
inactivity. In essence, however, the two theories describe a similar process. Baumgartner and Jones refer 
to the abovementioned negotiation period as the period of friction that occurs during the negative 
feedback process, which is then unleashed by an event, such as the aforementioned elections, media 
reportage or the drawing of public attention and galvanising of action.  
In 2012, The Policy Studies Journal produced a special issue on punctuated equilibrium. For this, Jones & 
Baumgartner (2012) prepared an introductory paper in which they reflected how their theory and its 
application has evolved, while also  addressing major critiques directed at it, based on the hindsight of 25 
years since its early conceptualisation. In their review, the authors stress that change is not only possible 
during elections, but through policy-by-policy adjustment as well. “This policy by policy adjustment 
process allowed for disjoint policy change to ripple through the system without the need for top-down 
direction (although the model certainly allowed for that).” This would typically occur when the demands 
for change could no longer be contained; that is, the friction was too great. They emphasize, that the 
theory’s foundation is bounded rationality, the basic premise of which is that (ibid, page 3) “decision 
makers are prisoners to their limited attention spans, and the key governor of the allocation to attention, 
emotion.” Thus, after long periods of stasis, when the time comes for policy makers to act, the 
accumulation of bounded rationality and innate resistance to change 22  combines and sometimes 
combusts. The likely outcome then is that the response is usually disproportionate, as the system over-
corrects. What it reflects is a disjointed and episodic event with the appearance that it is a response to 
exogenous event or forces, when in fact it is part of the same process. A critique put forward by Prindle 
(page 14), who supports the theory, is: 1) that a more appropriate and descriptive name is punctuated 
incrementalism; and 2) the model does not address how human choices can be translated into 
“mechanical outcomes without losing the symbolic and emotional processing that is its outcome.” Here 
the authors responded that the latter is a powerful critique, which all working in the field should take 
seriously.  
2.3.4 Comment on Drawbacks of the Three Primary New Institutionalist 
Approaches 
The abovementioned frameworks explain how policy change is affected. However, as Williams (2012, 
p.68) points out, they suffer from two major drawbacks. The first is identifying the point at which 
punctuated equilibrium reverts to a negative feedback state. This is not as straightforward as it may seem. 
 
22 The paper refers to the American political system specifically, which has been structured to make change difficult, but the authors state that 




Disturbing a dominant paradigm which has been in place for many years, even decades, inherently takes 
time in creating and identifying a new equilibrium point. Indeed, it is likely to “test” several new states of 
equilibrium before a commonly accepted point is reached. Thus, while identifying the criteria or 
mechanisms that close the process becomes a meaningful part of analysis, much time and effort can be 
wasted scrutinising false dawns. The second drawback is the ability, or the lack thereof, to distinguish 
between meaningful and symbolic junctures. According to the theory, junctures and punctuated equilibria 
provide a window of opportunity, where for a short period the system is conducive to meaningful long-
term change now taking effect - in essence altering an institution’s path. If agents are unable to recognise 
these opportunities when they present themselves, then any changes achieved will in all likelihood be 
ineffectual, accidental or inappropriate. Similarly, misdiagnosing them may lead to much upheaval, effort 
and cost, but ultimately yield little. The implication is that political agents are only able to exercise limited 
control over institutional change, and then respond to the consequences ex-post. This raises rather serious 
questions about the ultimate utility of the above-mentioned frameworks, if at best they have explanatory, 
but limited predictive power, and at worst, both are questionable. However, the frameworks’ theorists 
have been quite clear on the predictive properties and their limitations: 
“But this is treacherous ground.” Hall & Taylor (1996, p.951) describing the inclination of 
defenders of rational choice institutionalism to believe their models have predictive power. 
“Even when we can rely on models with high predictive power, they are likely to be of limited scope 
and will only represent certain subsets of complex, multi-arena and multilevel interactions that 
are characteristics of real-world processes.”   Thelen (1999 quoting Scharpf) 
“Since the rise of behaviourism, many political scientists have had lofty aspirations about 
developing a science of politics, rooted in parsimony and generalization and capable of predictive 
power. Despite modest achievements over four decades, these aspirations remain.” Pierson 
(2000a, p.266) 
From the mid-2000’s historical institutionalists started to focus on modernizing the theory, with an 
outcome of this process being the critical questioning of path dependency’s true predictive power, 
particularly due to concerns that researchers (wittingly or unwittingly) could influence the empirical 
outcomes through the selective use and order of historical facts (Rhodes et al. 2008, p.53 Sander). 
“….also builds a range of tensions within institutionalism, which are exemplified in its apparent 
lack of predictive power.”   Lowndes & Roberts (2013, p.21) 
In many ways, evaluating the limitations of the selected theoretical framework can be, and probably is, as 
important as assessment of the benefits identified as appropriate for its original selection. Thus, having 
done so above, it is now possible to consider whether these shortcomings are sufficiently material to 
affect or even obstruct what the research sets out achieve. In the case of this study, one can credibly 
argue that they do not, as it is not an objective of the research to identify or predict the next juncture, 
whether symbolic or real. Indeed, the research is already based on the understanding that the broader 
ESI, and more specifically municipal EDI, are both facing a future of significant operational and financial 
challenges, with the unsuccessful decade-long attempted process from 2000 to reform the sector already 




of the development of the municipal ESI (and from 1969 EDI), which to date does not exist, and that 
considers and outlines the dominant issues of its political-economy since their inception, how these were 
dealt with and their consequences. Ultimately thus, while remaining cognisant of their potential 
drawbacks and limitations as predictive tools, the abovementioned theories are deemed appropriate as 
the backbone of the theoretical framework – providing an analytical ‘lens’ through which the past can be 
viewed, and the research findings assessed, with historical institutionalism as the key approach that 
sharpens the ‘research-lens’ focus. 
2.4 Incremental Institutional Change – Historical and Constructive 
Institutionalism 
2.4.1 Overview 
A criticism of the above three perspectives by the discursive (constructivist) institutionalists, is that they 
do not adequately account for endogenous institutional changes and only tend to explain changes as 
exogenous shocks, such as war or similar major crises (Schmidt 2010; Gorges 2001; Peters & King 2005; 
Hay 2006). Multiple, small incremental changes which seem insignificant in isolation, may when grouped 
together, amount to significant reorientation of the programme (Peters & King 2005, p.1287), and the 
conditions under which established cognitive norms and processes are contested, confronted and 
substituted (Hay 2006, p.65) – something they believe historical institutionalism may mask.  
A basic premise of institutionalism and its analytical approaches is that change often “doesn’t come easy”. 
Rationalists operate in the territory of equilibrium, where vested interests have taken hold and extract 
maximum utility in a stable environment. Under these conditions, change brings uncertainty and is 
therefore unwelcome. The rationalists, and indeed sociological institutionalists, struggle to explain why 
political systems would move from one equilibrium to another; and yet human history is replete with 
change and a “theory whose goal is to predict, but which cannot explain change, has some difficulties” 
(Steinmo 2000). The most common explanation provided by these approaches is that of punctuated 
equilibrium – an exogenous black box shock as explained above. Historical institutionalist researchers do 
not dispute that such shocks occur, nor that they can undoubtedly result in change; but do not agree that 
it is the only reason for change. As Thelen and Steinmo put it “the institutions explain everything until they 
explain nothing” (Immergut 2011; Mahoney & Thelen 2010; Hall & Taylor 1996; Steinmo 2000; Amenta & 
Ramsey 2010; Bell 2011). 
2.4.2 Modes of Change 
 
Institutionalists, and more specifically historicists, in recognition of the criticism or weakness in their 
approach, rapidly responded (Béland 2010, p.619). Bell’s (2011) paper with its unambiguous title “Do we 
really need a new ‘constructivist institutionalism’ to explain institutional change?” argues that two 
avenues are available to historical institutionalists. In the first, which identifies institutional stickiness and 
path dependency, he concedes that change is difficult under these circumstances, and by definition may 
rely heavily on an exogenous shock to initiate and explain change. The second approach however, 
identifies active agency within institutional settings, where agents are shaped (though not wholly 
determined) by their institutional environments. So, whereas constructivists emphasize an ideational 




norms and values, thus creating social change, Bell (page 906) argues this is just not feasible. Political 
actors “cannot simply ‘make up’ their realities in ways that are disconnected from the environments they 
inhabit at any given point in time”. Change does take place; but within the context of the institutional 
environment, where political actors’ identities, interests, calculations and choices are shaped.  
In a similar vein, Mahoney & Thelen (2010, 7–20) agree that the three (above mentioned) branches of 
new-institutionalism are very apt at explaining continuity. They have however tended to provide few clues 
about endogenous change, and where change has taken place during so called critical junctures, 
understood as periods of contingency, when for a brief period the usual constraints inhibiting change are 
lifted. In their view, institutions change incrementally over time, and not just in response to an exogenous 
shock. Their basic properties must be defined in ways that provide some dynamic element, which permits 
such change. Because institutions do not operate in isolation and compete for resources, creating tension 
amongst themselves, it is necessary to understand the combined effects of institutions and processes, 
rather than examining one institution or process at a time (Pierson & Skocpol 2002, p.696). Unintended 
consequences, spillover or compromises amongst political actors, means that there is nothing “automatic, 
self-perpetuating, or self-reinforcing about institutional arrangements … On this view, change and stability 
are in fact inextricably linked.” Change can thus occur in numerous ways; not infrequently through shifts 
in the balance of power. Even here however, subtle changes and transitions are ever-present. For 
example, actors disadvantaged by one institution, may partner with another institution to tip the balance 
of power, so as to enact change. Mahoney and Thelen conclude that the very structure of institutions 
contains possibilities for change, animated by the power-distributional implications of institutions. 
Incremental change becomes possible in the “soft spots” that exist between rules, their interpretation 
and/or their enforcement. Four modes of institutional change are identified by Mahoney and Thelen, 
(summarised in Table 2-2). They provide viable alternatives to existing overly rigid approaches, which 
explained stability but not change (Béland 2010).  
Table 2-2: Types of Gradual Change 
Description Displacement Layering Drift Conversion 
Removal of old rules Yes No No No 
Neglect of old rules - No Yes No 
Changed impact/enactment of old rules - No Yes Yes 
Introduction of new rules Yes Yes No No 
1. Displacement: The removal of existing rules and the introduction of new ones 
2. Layering: The introduction of new rules on top or alongside existing ones 
3. Drift: The changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in the environment  
4. Conversion: The changed enactment of existing rules due to their strategic redeployment  
Source: Mahoney & Thelen (2010, p.15) 
Thelen and Mahoney identify two variables to explain incremental change: veto powers of institutional 
actors who aim to maintain the status quo, and the extent to which actors are given discretion to interpret 





   Source: Mahoney & Thelen (2010, pp.19–22) 
Figure 2-4: Factors and Direction of Institutional Change 
Van der Heijden (2014) and (Béland 2007) and (2010) performed extensive literature revues on the four 
mechanisms of gradual change, to identify their origin, assess their viability and provide critique. During 
this exercise, van der Heijden added a fifth mechanism of gradual change (exhaustion), which he believes 
Thelen and her co-authors are reluctant to include – and indeed did not in the book she co-authored with 
Mahoney (2010) – because exhaustion is more akin to institutional breakdown rather than institutional 
change. Van der Heijden’s and Béland’s analysis is summarised as follows:  
Displacement: Existing rules are replaced by new ones and may be done so in an abrupt manner. 
Displacement may result in extreme shifts, as illustrated by revolutions, where there is a sudden 
breakdown of institutions that are replaced by new ones. However, displacement can take place over a 
longer period of time, when new institutions are introduced to compete and eventually take-over older 
institutions. An example of this was the initiation of market reform in China, which was done in a 
measured manner to encourage people to defect gradually, until the original system was obsolete. 
Layering: In this situation, new rules are attached to existing rules, through amendments, additions or 
revisions. The new does not replace the old, but the process leads to gradual change in status and/or 
structure. This approach can be used both intentionally and unintentionally; and can be applied by 
political actors to achieve their objective incrementally, while working within the system; particularly 
when lacking the necessary power to introduce wholesale changes. Deemed amongst scholars to be the 
most commonly used strategy to effect incremental change and be able to do so rapidly; layering is 
effected by adding agency (actors, layers of government), structure (rules, laws, control mechanisms), or 
both – by (sometimes rapid) amendment, as opposed to outright (often time consuming) replacement.  
Drift: This occurs when rules remain as they are, but external factors change, and institutions do not 
respond to the changing social and economic environment. Drift is related to exogenous shock; differing 
in that the change is not sudden but intensifies over time. An example of drift is regulatory ambiguity; 
when institutional rules allow for wider interpretation by those who are subject to them, than what was 
intended by those who set them. A further example is a failure to re-apportion electoral seats in response 
to urbanization, to secure a favourable outcome. The ultimate consequence of drift is to make institutions 
increasingly ineffective and to erode them to the point of obsolescence.  
Conversion: Rules remain the same but are interpreted and enacted in new ways under changing external 




mechanism of incremental institutional change i.e. “layering is the means by which conversion ultimately 
occurs, the two processes are intimately interconnected”. 
[Here the researcher must point out that although the understanding of these four mechanisms has 
greatly contributed to improving knowledge of policy change, it is not certain in many instances whether 
they explain policy change or merely describe “concrete episodes of incremental change without 
explaining them” (Béland 2010, p.621).] 
Exhaustion: Albeit that the result of exhaustion is institutional breakdown rather than change; this final 
mechanism deems inclusion because it is gradual rather than abrupt. “Institutional exhaustion is a process 
in which behaviours invoked or allowed under existing rules operate to undermine these” (Streeck & Thelen 
2005, p.29). It is reached through a process, which allows behaviour that undermines an institution, to 
continue under the existing rules. 
2.4.3 Agents of Change 
For change to occur, it must be driven. The question becomes by who (agent) and why (motivation)? 
Mahoney & Thelen (2010, 22) tackle this by identifying four basic types of change agents. The benefit of 
recognising and categorising change agents greatly aids explanation as each type is associated with a 
specific mode of change, which then provides insight into the strategy used to effect change. In Mahoney’s 
and Thelen’s words (p 23): “different types of change agents emerge in different institutional contexts, 
and where they are successful, specific modes of institutional change are likely to follow.”  
Insurrectionaries: Their primary goal is to actively and visibly eliminate existing institutions and rules; 
mostly linked to the abrupt change of critical junctures, which is their goal. It may take time, but ultimately 
occurs as a direct result of their actions. This agent is linked to patterns of outright displacement.  
Symbionts: Two forms are identified here: parasitic and mutualistic. The first, parasitic, explains actors 
entering an institution to exploit it for their own personal gain. Knowing they are reliant on the future 
existence of the institution, they preserve it, but as a consequence undermine its purpose, or spirit, long-
term. Parasites thrive where institutional maintenance is compromised, such as when there is a large gap 
between the rules and actual practises. These attributes link them with drift. Mutualistics don’t tamper 
with efficiency, but violate the letter of the rules to support its spirit and in so doing derive rewards, such 
as political support. In the short run, this variety of symbionts may appear to strengthen rather than 
weaken an institution – but ultimately, left unattended, will compromise the institution itself.  
Subversives: Having similar objectives to insurrectionaries, subversives work behind the scenes and take 
their time identifying suitable opportunities to remove existing rules or introduce new ones. Subversives 
are most closely aligned with layering, and to a lesser extent, drift.  
Opportunists: As per their title, this group will find the most suitable means to achieve their objectives 
and are thus most likely to adopt conversion as a mode of change.  
Mahoney and Thelen then overlaid the modes of change with the agents (Figure 2-5) - providing even 




parasitic change agent’s work is best concluded where there is a high veto power (retain formal status 
quo) and high enforcement discretion (allowing them to alter the meaning of institutionalised rules).   
 
      Source: Mahoney & Thelen (2010, pp.28) 
Figure 2-5: Institutional Sources of Change Agents 
Ultimately, the evolution of historical institutionalism as a theoretical framework and the broad 
combination of processes and factors now taken into account within this framework, confirms its 
appropriateness to this particular study, given the inherent complexity of issues and longevity of the 
period addressed.   
2.5 Concluding Comment 
By rooting the research in historical institutionalism, it is believed that this research acknowledges the 
sequential nuances and complexities prevalent in institutional evolution, while simultaneously 
recognising the importance of both endogenous and exogenous influences and of both sudden and 
incremental change. Simultaneously it provides a strong foundational framework from which key 
junctures, decisions and contingency events that create path dependency within this evolution, can be 
viewed and analysed. Thus, it is my hope that the research approach adopted and outlined here, allows 
for a multifaceted perspective, because the methodologies adopted have constructively engaged with the 
research material in the letter and the spirit of new institutionalism’s relatively recent cross border 
tradition – one which maximises historical institutionalism’s strengths, minimises its blind spots and 
provides a powerful theoretical framework from which to gain a unique perspective on where electricity 
supply in South Africa finds itself in 2017; and the inherent complexity of what will be inevitably involved 








3 Conceptual Framework   
 
3.1 Conceptualising Decentralised Local Government  
Given the strong focus on local government in this research - particularly the triangular dynamics between 
national government, Eskom and local government that form a key component of this study - the objective 
of this chapter is to provide a working definition of the concepts and terms applicable to the latter.  This 
chapter uses a conceptual framework approach to focus specifically on local government and pays 
particular attention to recurring themes on which the research is based and which directly impact on 
discussions and analyses in some of the chapters that follow. To this end, various key concepts are 
introduced, including the unpacking of local government functions, their funding and the relationship with 
national government, as well as the inherent power dynamics, potential competing interests and 
incongruous individual imperatives, therein. Here, analysis considers the international and South African 
context to provide a frame of reference and ensure that any distortions in the local application of key 
concepts are not overlooked. And while the intention is not to provide critique or assess their suitability, 
it is to provide a common point of reference in their understanding. This then allows for discussions in 
later chapters to flow from a common conceptual point of departure, which minimises risks of later 
misinterpretation of data, by creating a shared conceptual framework on which later discussions with 
particular reference to the research of this study, can soundly be based. We begin with the connection 
between politics and administration; followed by discussions on notions of centralised and decentralised 
government, both of which feed into the analysis of municipal funding models that follows.    
3.2 Politics – Administration linkage 
The politics-administration dichotomy has been a central topic of public administration studies, and dates 
to when Woodrow Wilson first raised the concept of neutral competence in The Study of Administration 
(Wilson 1887). The theory holds that administrators are autonomous and able to apply the principles of 
resource optimization in the execution of their duties. Administrative skills can be learned and thus 
applied, and although an undeniable link exists amongst them, a clear distinction between the sphere of 
politics and that of administration allows administrators to manage the public sector in an efficient and 
independent manner (Koven 1992) (Jacobsen 2006, p.303).   
A more pragmatic approach came to the fore in the 1980s, which held that such a division is not possible 
(Svara, 2001. 180). This view was supported by multiple empirical studies which demonstrated an 
extensive, though varying, intermeshing between the two, influenced by: context; position and role in 
formal structure; demographics and time (Jacobsen 2006, p.303).  
Accepting that the primary concern of public administration is to achieve objectives that are 
predominantly politically determined, and that the two cannot be separated, the question Tӧtemeyer 
(1985, p.1) poses is whether the administrative function complements politics or is subordinate to it. 
Answering his own question, Totemeyer believes that this is determined by the extent to which 
democracy prevails in the country, whereby society holds government accountable through electoral 




requirement, but must be supported by mechanisms ensuring local governors are held responsible to the 
governed for their actions (Blair 2000, p.35).  
3.3 Centralized and Decentralized Government 
“For anyone who might not yet have noticed, political decentralization is in fashion” 
         Treisman (2007) 
3.3.1 Overview and Developments during the 20th Century 
  
At the most basic level, the description of democratic local government is universal: An administrative 
and executive body, presiding over inhabitants of a specific geographic area; elected by the community it 
represents. Local governments vary in size and structure and operate under different conditions based on 
countries’ system of government; but strive to meet their inhabitants’ needs for goods and services, in a 
cost-effective manner (Alao & Owolabi 2015, p.61). In fulfilling these functions, and within the overall 
system, local governments have varying degrees of power to act autonomously and are authorised to 
undertake legislative, administrative and semi-judicial functions. Local government has the power to 
implement policies and programmes, raise revenue, formulate budgets, employ staff and operate going 
concerns to provide services. But local government is subordinate to central government and is generally 
the lowest ‘tier’ of government, where central is the first tier; provincial / regional the second, and local 
the third. Under a federal system, it is more common to have two levels of government of equal power 
(Law 2013, 105–106); and Tocqueville (1840) predicted the following: 
“I am of opinion that, in the democratic ages which are opening upon us … that centralization will 
be the natural form of government”.  
Traditional thinking on political development in the United States, has been that of President Roosevelt’s 
“New Deal” welfare state, introduced during the Great Depression of the 1930s; shifting power from 
individual states to national government and creating centralised, or more commonly called, “big 
government” (Wallis & Oates 1998, p.156). Sparrow (2011) though, takes a different view. The Second 
World War’s most important legacy may be the way it provided legitimacy for, and instilled the populace’s 
acceptance of, an expansive nationalized role for the state. Western Europe adopted a similar model to 
rebuild its economies and as a mechanism to keep tight control in a cold war era with a constant threat 
of war. The Soviet Republics and Eastern Europe adopted an even more centralised model under 
communism, where power was exerted and coordinated by a de-facto political executive, to which all 
provinces and local authorities complied. A similar situation existed under dictatorships, of which there 
were numerous from the end of the Second World War until they started to fall in the period  between 
1970 and mid-1990s. Keynesian economics, which justifies government intervention through public 
policies in the pursuit of full employment and price stability, dominated western economic theory and 
policy after World War II. Manor (1999, p.14) sums up the post-World War II period: “Where Leninist 
principles were rejected, Keynesian approaches usually predominated”. The belief in the centralised state 
was strengthened by the robust advancement of economies managed along Keynesian and Leninist lines, 
when for a 20-year period after the Second World War, leaders pursued the idea of progress – “based on 
the assumption that the earth’s resources were inexhaustible, and that science and technology would 




The boom years that followed the end of the Second World War, sustained the relationship which the 
private sector had forged with centralized (big) government control. This started to change in the 1970s, 
when many advanced economies suffered the stagflation of inflation, slow growth and large public sector 
deficits (Jahan & Papageorgiou 2014, p.53) (Sanderson 2001, p.297). The ability and capacity of ‘big 
government’ to solve all the problems came into the spotlight. The response was for many western 
governments to reduce the size and scope of government. This shift is probably best captured by US 
President Ronald Reagan’s inaugural speech (1981) when he declared “Government is not the solution to 
our problem; government is the problem”. It was in effect calling for a more decentralised approach, with 
power shifting back to individual states. This trend grew, and by the late 1980s / early 1990s, governments 
around the world entered a cycle of decentralising fiscal, political and administrative responsibilities to 
lower level governments (Work 2002; Litvack et al. 1998; Weale 2006; Hood 1995; Heller 2001; Manor 
1999; Treisman 2007). 
“Decentralization has quietly become a fashion of our time. It is being considered or attempted in 
an astonishing diversity of developing and transitional economies – by solvent and insolvent 
regimes, by democracies (both mature and emergent) and autocracies, by regimes making the 
transition to democracy and by others seeking to avoid that transition, by regimes with various 
colonial inheritances and by those with none. It is being attempted where civil society is strong, 
and where it is weak. It appeals to people of the left, the centre and the right, and to groups which 
disagree with each other on a number of other issues”.       
       (Manor: 1999.1)   
Litvack et al. (1998, p.1) cites the introduction of multiparty systems in Africa and South America, the 
deepening of democracy in Asia, the transition to a market system from command economy in most of 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and finally “the plain and simple reality that central 
governments have often failed to provide effective public services”.  
3.3.2 Decentralization 
Decentralization is not a formula or theory easily implemented. Achieving public sector governance and 
reform objectives is largely contextual, as the application varies, and thus decentralization means 
different things to different people (Siddle & Koelble 2013; UNDP 1999; Litvack et al. 1998; Treisman 
2007).  As Manor (1999, p.10) points out, decentralization in India is bound to mean something different 
from decentralization in Botswana.  
A USAID (2000, p.14) publication puts forward the following definition:  
“Decentralization is a process of transferring power to popularly elected local governments. It 
brings about change in the operation of institutions and almost invariably occurs gradually. 
Decentralization requires the existence of elected local governments because local officials do not 
have meaningful autonomy unless they answer to their constituents. Appointed local officials must 
ultimately act according to the interests of those in the national capital who gave them their jobs; 
they are effectively agents of the national government. A local system in which government 
officials are appointed, then, is a centralized system that has not begun to decentralise.” 
This definition is useful, as it recognises the precondition of central government consciously and willingly 




The need for a democratically elected local government, held accountable by its constituents, creates 
legitimacy and autonomy, implying that authority is distributed horizontally rather than hierarchically 
(Totemeyer, 1988. 5). Managing these requirements in a manner that satisfies all actors, is not 
straightforward, especially in the South African context. As noted by the UNDP Programme (UNDP 2009) 
‘decentralization is a process of striking a balance between the claims of the periphery and the demands 
of the centre’. Finally, the definition also recognises that: decentralization occurs over time; is a process; 
and the product of reforms.    
As Siddle & Koelble (2013, p.20) correctly note, a definition for decentralisation is complicated by the fact 
that writers recognise three different types – administrative, fiscal and political. Here, definitions by Siddle 
(2011, p.22) are deemed appropriate: 
• Administrative decentralization: The process whereby the authority to administer and execute 
powers and functions, and the responsibility to deliver services, is transferred from national to sub-
national levels; resulting in a deconcentration of powers; 
• Fiscal decentralization: Revenue from central government and the authority to raise revenue from 
local sources, is transferred from national to sub-national levels; and 
• Political decentralization: The transfer of political power and authority from national to sub-national 
government, involves balancing the exercise of power between various levels of government. Here, 
Siddle quoting Treisman (2007, p.23) identifies three sub-types: Decision-making decentralisation 
implies that at least one sub-national tier of government has the exclusive authority to make decisions 
on at least one policy issue. Appointment decentralisation where government officials of one or more 
sub-national tiers are selected by citizens, without interference from national government. And, 
constitutional decentralisation, allowing second and third tier governments to participate 
meaningfully in central policy decision making.  
At a practical level, decentralization aims to transfer duties to the lowest level of government capable of 
executing them (Work 2002, p.5) (UNDP 1999 quoting Kaul) and can be categorised into three levels: 
devolution, deconcentration and delegation (USAID 2000; Siddle & Koelble 2013; UNDP 1999; Work 2002; 
Litvack et al. 1998; Barrington 1965). Devolution provides the highest level of autonomy and finds itself 
outside direct central government, but still subject to national policies and laws, such as the Constitution. 
Deconcentration transfers power to an administrative unit of central government. Typically, such a unit 
would not have elected officials, and thus would be fully accountable to central government. Delegation 
is a transfer of specific duties under a contractual arrangement.  
A review of South African government (green and white papers, commissions of enquiry)  and academic 
literature on the subject up until the mid to late 1990s, found a tendency for decentralisation and 
devolution to be treated as synonyms, not recognising that the latter is a component of the former. 
Heymans & Tӧtemeyer (1988, p.25) under the heading: The Meaning of Devolution, state: “Devolution of 
power – sometimes also referred to as decentralisation – must be clearly distinguished from 
deconcentration of power.” Atkinson and Heymans, in a later chapter, (1988. 150) state: “It would seem 
that there is confusion in the terminology applied. ‘Devolution’ is generally regarded by political analysts 
as political decentralisation and not simply as administrative deconcentration.” The 1990 committee of 
inquiry into a system of local government (Thornhill 1990, p.8) inherently gets it right when stating what 
devolution means and requires: “Devolution of power must be accompanied by devolution of fiscal 




Government (Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development 1997, p.27) appears to not 
recognise devolution as a sub-set of decentralisation. Under the Section: Decentralization and the 
Assignment of Powers, it states: “National and provincial government are constitutionally permitted to 
devolve (hands on) powers and functions to local government. At present, several national departments 
are in the process of decentralizing functions to local government…”   
3.3.3 Benefits and Shortcomings of Decentralization 
Treisman (2007) sought to determine the effects of decentralisation but concluded that the net results 
were inconclusive. The primary reason was that consequences tend to be complex and obscure, as many 
effects pull in different directions. Table 3-1 summarises the benefits and shortcomings of 
decentralisation.    




Allows government to manage the provision of goods and 
services, which may vary across regions, more cost effectively 
and efficiently 
Administrative, not political, decentralization can achieve this. 
Multi-tier structures are costly and can lead to misallocations. 
Cost benefit analysis is a more appropriate driver – not reform 
Local Competition 
Local government competing for mobile residents and/or 
investment - encouraging performance 
Robust competition amongst municipalities is hard to achieve. 
If it is, its often perverse - resulting in unfavourable outcomes  
Fiscal Incentives 
Increased local revenue grows local economic activity, 
benefitting the nation as a whole  
This decreases the share or revenue of other levels of 
government. The net result is indeterminate 
Democracy 
As local issues are more quantifiable than national ones, 
increased local participation enhances accountability, as 
voters in small groups can coordinate more effectively 
Citizens can be as politically active in a centralised system. 
Multiple government tiers make apportioning blame or credit 
harder, especially when responsibility is shared across the tiers 
Checks, Balances and Liberty 
Strong local government has the potential to keep central 
government in check and protect individual freedoms 
Local government is only likely to challenge national 
government to protect its local interests 
Veto Players and Change 
Increasing the number of actors required to effect policy 
changes, leads to greater stability  
A definite advantage, however it may be counter-productive if 
entrenched policies are deemed ‘bad’ 
Local Information and Policy Innovation 
Better placed to collect local information and act on it In theory, central government should be able to do the same 
Ethnic Conflicts 
Reduces demands for autonomy, promote cooperative 
behaviour amongst groups and lower political stakes 
May increase demands for autonomy, heighten ethnic conflict 
between tiers and intensify conflicts. Benefits can go both ways 
UNDERMINE 
Fiscal Pressures 
 Strong local government undermines fiscal and macroeconomic 
discipline  
Fiscal Coordination 
 Inefficiencies due to coordination failures across levels of 
government 
         Source: Treisman (2007) 
The view of the World Bank is that decentralisation can yield positive (efficiency and improved public 




inter alia by how it is applied, as well as prevailing local conditions (Litvack et al. 1998, p.107). Ultimately 
it is about potential – guaranteeing nothing (USAID 2000, p.8). This is a disturbing conclusion, given the 
vital importance attached to the success of decentralisation by the World Bank (Siddle 2011).  
In conclusion, decentralisation has not proved to be the panacea to reform and transform local 
government operations and strengthen democracy. Mixed views are held on the effectiveness of 
decentralization, while a growing number of studies show that implementation is difficult and that each 
experience is unique and likely to yield mixed results (Agrawal & Ribot 1999; Johnson 2001; 
Meenakshisundaram 1994).   
3.3.4 Political Legitimacy 
Max Weber’s descriptive interpretation of political legitimacy is that it is attained by a regime or 
government (wherein government denotes a sphere of influence be it national or local); whose 
participants’ belief and faith in it, is sufficient to accept its authority and obey its commands; allowing 
them to exert power. Weber identified three sources of legitimacy: 1) Traditional, where people follow a 
social order because it has always been there; 2) Charismatic government; capable of convincing the 
population to place their faith in it; or 3) Its legality is trusted, specifically the rationality of the rule of law. 
For Weber, legitimacy is an important explanatory category for social science, because faith in a particular 
social order produces consistencies more stable than those derived from habitual rule-following or the 
pursuit of self-interest. At a normative level, political legitimacy requires a baseline of acceptability or 
justification of authority and even obligation. On the one end of the scale, citizens accepting compliance 
with the coercive political power exercised by government, will do so as long as it is deemed justified. 
Whereas on the other hand, political bodies can be effective without being legitimate. In other words, if 
their demands are met with sufficient acquiescence, they remain authoritative. The distinction between 
legitimacy and justice is also often blurred (Fabienne 2017). Buchanan (2002) for example believes 
legitimacy is a criterion for minimum justice. This blurring is highly criticised in more modern literature; 
accepting that the two are related but that legitimacy makes weaker demands than justice, and a state 
may be legitimate but unjust, while the converse is not possible.  
“A state is just if it imposes a social order that promotes freedom as non-domination for all its 
citizens. It is legitimate if it imposes a social order in an appropriate way. A state that fails to 
impose a social order in an appropriate way, however just the social order may be, is illegitimate. 
Vice versa, a legitimate state may fail to impose a just social order.”  Pettit (2012, p.130) 
3.4 Overview of Municipal Finance Sources 
3.4.1 A View on the Relationship between National and Local Government 
A second tier of government below the centre, is a feature of all countries, except for micro-states. South 
Africa has had three tiers since 1910 – national, provincial and local23. According to Lemon (2002, p.18), 
although present in least developed countries, there the second  tier is often weakly developed or poorly 
 
23 Chapter 4.3.3 explains the government model adopted under the South Africa Act of 1909, which allowed for the continuation of municipal 
councils (Point 92, page 3) which made their decisions binding unless “varied or withdrawn by parliament of provincial council” (Section V, 93). 
Additionally, municipalities were directly accountable to their resepective provincial councils (Section V, 85 (vi)). These institutional 




resourced, or both - compromising the delivery of public goods and services. Lemon identifies three 
reasons why a modern country requires additional tiers. The first is for administrative reasons. Large 
centralised government is bureaucratic and needs a mechanism to decentralise functions, which can be 
more readily and efficiently administered at local level. The second is the legitimacy that a lower tier of 
government provides by allowing a certain degree of local autonomy. Lemon cites (Dear 1981; Clark & 
Dear 1984) (Rakodi 1986, p.437) who astutely note that a benefit of national government reducing its 
level of control, is that when useful, it can redirect blame for some of its “knotty problems” (Cockburn 
1977), such as service delivery, to subordinate levels of government. Finally, uneven development across 
the country can be addressed by national government exercising organising control, by providing local 
government with some degree of local autonomy and specific mandates. In South Africa, Local Economic 
Development (LED) is a key and recurring ANC policy theme, which inter alia was recognised in: the 1996 
Constitution “promote the social and economic development of the community”; the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (1994); the 1998 White Paper on Local Government which introduced the 
concept of “developmental local government”; the 2000 Municipal Act; the LED Guidelines (2000); The 
National Framework for LED in South Africa (2006); and the Revised National LED Framework 2012-2016. 
The role of local government in South Africa has thus been crucial, both pre and post democratic elections, 
where: 1) Prior to 1994, all local municipalities were required to raise the revenue needed to fund their 
operations; (with this minimal financial support from national government resulting in some autonomy 
and independence, within the context of a highly centralised and autocratic state); and, 2) Post 1994, the 
constitution recognises, and elevates, local government to one of the three spheres of government; 
whose mandate it is to anticipate and address local needs through the provision of specified functions; 
for which they are entitled to collect revenue, and if undertaken satisfactorily, will ensure national 
government legitimacy. In this context, the following definition for local government is deemed 
appropriate:  
“Any government entity having a political and spatial jurisdiction at less than the national scale, 
and having the authority to raise revenues from, and make expenditures on behalf of its 
constituents.”    Dear (1981, p.1280)  
Notwithstanding the argument by Cockburn (1977) that national government is primarily concerned with 
serving the interests of capital, with local government simply as an extension of national government, 
local government’s primary focus is legitimisation, because of its relative proximity to the electorate. This 
is especially more acute in South Africa where local government’s ability to deliver basic services to the 
majority of the population who were very poorly serviced, and even excluded, is directly linked to national 
government’s perceived capacity and capability by the South African electorate. This ultimately leads to 
tension between the two, but local government’s structure, role and mandate allows it to be motivated 
by servicing needs rather than accumulating profit. Conflict between the various levels of government will 
occur even if both spheres are governed by the same political party, and may even go as far as them 
opposing the state (Lemon 2002, p.20). The degree of autonomy or independence that local government 
enjoys, will of course, differ amongst countries and the political ideologies which govern each country. 
Having said that, Rakodi (1986, p.437) citing Johnston (1982) notes that local municipalities are not 
sovereign and would have no existence without national government, so their ability to act independently 




local municipalities exist to provide specific functions, by undertaking local collective consumption service 
projects on behalf of national government; a view shared by (Clark & Dear 1984)..  
In one respect, local government is like business. It provides services to its customers – the residents. For 
these services, local government charges a fee. The distinction between the two however, is that local 
government can also tax its residents for additional revenue (Freire et al. 2001, p.171). Levying taxes is of 
course unpopular with residents, so it is imperative that local government does this in a manner that is 
deemed equitable and reasonable. 
There is a long history of international research into local government structures and financing; generating 
a plethora of economic and policy literature on the subject. For the purposes of this thesis however, we 
focus on international thinking from the mid-1980s, because it was from this time that decades of a cold 
war global political status quo were challenged. Indeed, it was in that period that the communist system 
in Eastern Europe and the USSR began to unravel and fall in 1989; that China relaxed direct political control 
over its citizenry; Keynesian economics shifted to neo-liberal policies; and rapid advances in technology, 
transport and communications irrevocably transformed business and social practices. The combination of 
these factors created the necessary foundations for greater international integration, commonly referred 
to as globalisation, one of who’s knock on effects was the acceleration of the global phenomenon of 
urbanization (Figure 3-1); placing massive and continuous pressure on municipal service delivery.  
 
Source: UN, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision (2004) 
Figure 3-1: Population Living in Urban Areas (1950-2030) 
In South Africa during this period, it became evident to all political parties that the centre could not hold 
for much longer. Apartheid was making its final stand and politicians were sensing that its demise was 
both certain and imminent. Densely populated and poverty-stricken black townships, which had little to 
no access to municipal services, would have to be absorbed into local government, while the urbanization 
rate accelerated from 1990, as people from different racial groups were no longer forced to live in pre-
defined areas (Figure 3-2). This pending change, which unfolded over the better part of a decade, would 
have massive ramifications on the future structure of local government; and it ultimately influenced the 
final outcomes and decisions taken about the role and responsibilities allocated to local government in 





       Source: Turok (2012) 
Figure 3-2: Total Population of Urban and Rural Areas in South Africa (1950 – 2050) 
Seen within this historical context, the rest of this chapter conducts a theoretical overview of international 
municipal funding models over two periods: 1980 to 2000 and 2000 to 2015. The rationale for this is that 
the global and national events described above, led to heightened interest from international 
development finance agencies and academics. They in turn endeavoured to assist and influence the new 
municipal financial frameworks being simultaneously implemented by national governments across the 
world, including South Africa. The direct implication of such focused global interest was that approaches 
varied and evolved relatively quickly; and it would thus be worthwhile to track progression and lessons 
learned. The review of the literature will then allow for the identification of the primary and most used 
revenue sources and approaches and serve as a basis for comparison (in later Chapters) against the South 
African experience.  
3.4.2 Period 1: Financial Theory of Municipal Funding Models (Mid 1980 – 2000) 
Local government has four basic sources of funds, with several variants for each source (Table 3-2). The 
extent to which local government can use these sources rests with national government. For example, in 
South Africa the Constitution (1996 paragraph 228-230) allows provincial government to impose taxes, 
value added tax and general sales tax to fund its activities, but these forms of taxation are specifically 
excluded for municipalities. Additional examples include the United States (see Reynolds 2004, 392–394) 
and the United Kingdom, highlighting that local government’s ability to raise revenue is largely prescribed. 
Thus, by extension, the lower the level of financial self-sufficiency, the greater the ability of central 
government to influence how funds are prioritised and allocated. Examples do exist where the centre 
finances local government almost exclusively, with the latter still enjoying full autonomy, as in the 
Netherlands. Mawhood (1993) however, believes that this is really only possible in industrialised countries 
where democracy is entrenched and the system provides citizens multiple and various means to 




A World Bank publication (Bahl & Linn 1992) concluded that the process of urbanization in developing 
countries would result in greater government intervention, and in turn, increased expenditure. High 
population densities create externalities which can only be attended to by the public sector, such as 
transport, infrastructure services, sanitation, housing, public health and safety. What is certain is that 
municipal expenditures continually increase with population rise. Less certain though, is whether 
municipal revenues increase by a commensurate amount, because the income elasticity of existing taxes 
is bound to decrease as unskilled and semi-skilled people migrate to urban areas. Here, primary municipal 
revenue sources and their influencing factors are shown in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2: Total Revenue Sources of Local Government 
Revenue 
Source  








Size of the economic base of the city: Made up of per capita income level and population size. The economic 
base has the most important influence on the buoyancy and level of tax collections, as it defines municipalities’ 
tax capacity. However, a municipality has limited control over economic and population growth and can only 
partly influence outcomes. 
Relation between the economic base and the various tax bases: The municipality has greater influence here, 
as policy interventions which promote business tend to have a positive knock-on effect on residential property 
prices, on which property rates are based. The ratio between the various taxes is also under local government 
control (property, vehicle, sales etc.) 
Statutory tax rate: Rate is controlled by local government and can be increased, decreased or kept constant. 
Collection efficiency which is defined as the ratio between actual tax collection to statutory tax liability. 
The mix of taxes selected: Local government can determine how available instruments are applied. However, 
the options are generally limited by national government, who are not in favour of duplicate and competing 




Quantity of service per capita and the unit charge for the service. The ability to cover the cost of provision of 
the service depends on the price charged compared to the average cost price of the service. This is influenced 
by two factors – the service and the ability of local government to charge rates that are sufficiently high enough 
to cover the costs of the service. Transportation, municipals parks and zoos are good international examples of 
services which are not able to cover costs, whereas utility services tend to generate surpluses. 
External 
Funds 
Grants and loans: Transfers from national government, which may also be discretionary, are not under the 
control of local government. Certain amounts are guaranteed under constitutional or legislated equitable share 
or revenue sharing schemes, which may have adverse effects. For example, there may be a bias towards rural 
or smaller municipalities so as to compensate them for a limited tax base, which puts greater pressure on large 
cities who are struggling with high rates of urbanization. Furthermore, transfers may be negatively impacted by 
external factors, such as reduced national tax collections because of poor economic conditions. 
Loans Borrowing: Appropriate only for major capital expenditure and should not be relied upon to finance operational 
expenditure. 
         Source: (Bahl & Linn 1992) 
International experience, specifically amongst developing countries, points to major fiscal reform in 
addressing budget deficits as being unlikely, for several reasons. Key amongst these are: An unwillingness 
for national treasuries to relinquish or share their tax base; the fear of untested measures failing; and a 
reluctance of ruling governments to instigate change, who while recognising the need for it, leave it for 
future administrations to deal with. Thus, “gradual and stepwise adjustments of the existing structure 
toward a more desirable state is perhaps the best that can be hoped for.” Bahl & Linn (1992, 60–75). What 
then are the options for local government to close the fiscal gap? Figure 3-3 summarises the choices, 





              Source:(adapted from Bahl & Linn 1992)   




Higher Local Taxes 
The notion that tax collection other than property tax is the exclusive preserve of national government, is 
dispelled outright by Mawhood (1993). For as long as tax can be collected efficiently, it matters little as to 
whether it is done by national or local government, or both. Universally, the most popular municipal tax 
instrument is property taxation. Depending on how the property tax is applied, it can be regressive or 
progressive24, but whichever, it is marginally so. The strength of a property tax is that it is inexpensive to 
collect, uniform in its application, and easily understood by residents because it targets owners of land 
and property who are likely to be more affluent. The tax does have several weaknesses though. The first, 
is that it is not an easy system to administer. A register has to be kept which must be updated regularly, 
as property prices fluctuate, based on renovations or upgrades for example. The second limitation is the 
ability to pay. Families may live in a large house because of their size; not because they are wealthy. In 
contrast, wealthy individuals who occupy small properties, may pay less than intended. Finally, many 
households may be asset rich but cash flow poor, such as pensioners (Solomon 1983; AMEU 1995; 
Mawhood 1993; Reynolds 2004; van Ryneveld 1990). Excessive taxation or non-uniform local taxation, 
may result in affected residents rejecting the taxes through evasion; reduced building activity or relocating 
to a municipality where taxes are lower (disinvestment) – as occurred in Johannesburg in the early 1990s 
(see Chapter 7.4.2 Municipal Finances and the Policy of Rate Relief from Municipal Electricity 
Undertaking Revenue); or a loss of electoral support, as Margaret Thatcher found out in the British poll 
tax debacle of the early 1990s.. 
Other taxes and revenue streams, such as fines and license fees, are available; however these tend to 
exist for historic reasons and suffer from equity effects and inefficiency. They also tend to have high 
administration requirements in relation revenue collected. Their advantage in addition to being available, 
is that they are accepted by the local population. It is therefore up to municipalities to maximise the 
revenue generated from them, which should not be neglected. These taxes are seldom sufficient to fund 
operations however, and local politicians face a backlash if increased significantly.  
User Charges 
The construction and development of utilities, especially in developing countries, usually followed a 
centralised path. This was predominantly because of a greater ability to fund heavily capital-intensive 
projects by central government, as well as: inter alia, cost reduction through economies of scale, the need 
for integrated planning of regional or national supply and assuring standardization, while maximising the 
use of technical resources. An additional benefit was the ability for central government to cross-subsidise 
urban-rural tariffs, as the latter is considerably higher per resident. In many instances, municipalities or 
local agencies took control of distributing to the end-user. This practise was deemed inefficient by the 
World Bank, as under-priced services encourage over-consumption and waste. The primary objective in 
the provision of services had to be economic efficiency and not revenue generation, and on this basis 
promoted the privatisation of these services to reduce the fiscal burden of public utilities (World Bank 
1988). The Bank warned however, changes would need to be managed carefully, as any attempt by local 
 
24 A progressive tax is defined as a tax whose rate increases as the payer's income increases. That is, individuals who earn high incomes have a 






government to charge for services previously provided for free, or at subsidised rates, tends to be 
misguidedly viewed by residents as a pure “revenue-grab”. For many municipalities however, especially 
those with limited or no tax power, the surpluses earned on the trading of services invariably becomes 
the primary source of income; and because it is generally not accessible to other levels of government, 
interference is unlikely.  
Within this milieu, the review by Bahl & Linn (1992) of numerous practises across developing countries, 
confirmed that where electricity is distributed by a national or regional agency, it usually leads to an 
implicit system of cross-subsidies from low-cost urban to high-cost rural consumers and also to high usage 
subsidising low usage households through block rates25; while industrial and commercial users, who are 
subject to load pricing26, tend to subsidise residential users. Where distribution is undertaken by the 
municipality, there is a fixed access or connection charge in addition to a rate / kWh charge (fixed or 
block), but no load pricing. Efficient pricing to fund additional demand during peak consumption periods, 
and to send price signals to consumers, was strongly recommended, but had to be weighed up against 
actual consumption, due to the cost of more sophisticated and frequent meter readings. Also, recognising 
that marginal cost pricing27 would lead to surpluses, municipalities had to thus decide how best to deploy 
the windfall. Two options were identified. The first sees the municipal department delivering the service 
as being “taxed” by its owner (the municipality), or as being required to make a mandatory budgetary 
contribution. These proceeds could then be allocated to the general account or used for specific services, 
such as municipal bus services (Mumbai) or water and sewerage (Cali). The second then uses the surpluses 
to subsidise low end users through a ‘life-line’ rate for a pre-specified monthly consumption amount, or 
to subsidise operational and capital costs in low income suburbs.  
In the absence of privatisation, the review concluded that it was not averse to municipalities generating 
surpluses from electricity distribution, and indeed found it to be a practical and reliable source of revenue. 
However, to the extent possible, utility services must be financed by user charges and fees; while tariffs 
need to be cost reflective and efficient, so as to make it fair and encourage responsible use (McLure & 
Martinez-Vazquez 2000, p.12).  
National Transfers 
Centralising revenue collection may have the advantage of simplifying taxation for government and 
citizens; but will more than likely compromise local government, because it creates a level of dependence 
that tends to serve the priorities of national, not local government. Through national transfers, local 
government - denied access to a wider range of revenue instruments - can thus legitimately claim a 
portion of nationally collected revenues and does so, under an equitable share arrangement and 
infrastructure grants. The manner in which the share is calculated is often intended to address specific 
weaknesses and shortages; particularly given that the burden of providing for the poor who cannot afford 
services is unevenly distributed between municipalities; albeit that there are compelling reasons for 
 
25 With increasing block tariffs, the rate per unit of electricity increases as the volume of consumption increases. Consumers face a low rate up 
to the first block of consumption and pay a higher price up to the limit of the second block, and so on until the highest block of consumption 
26 Pricing strategy wherein the service provider charges a higher price during peak demand times. Peak-load pricing allocates the cost of 
capacity across several time periods when demand systematically fluctuates. 
27 Marginal costs include every cost incurred to bring that one more unit to the market. If producing one more kWh requires building a new 





providing these services, including imperatives of perceived legitimacy. And for that reason, this approach 
was adopted in South Africa. The Constitution (1996) mandates local government to deliver specific 
services and functions, and then allocates an equitable share of national revenue to it, so as to ensure it 
has financial resources to execute its obligations. The formula - designed to be objective, transparent and 
beyond manipulation - is purposefully skewed towards smaller municipalities, which have a lower revenue 
collection potential (as the poor cannot afford to pay for services, let alone taxes); and also to provide the 
poor (not all of whom are indigent) access to basic services (see FFC 2012) (National Treasury, 2017). Here, 
the objective would be to to assist provincial and local government, whose constitutional mandate 
compels delivering specific functions, with the financial means to execute developmental government to 
redress past inequities by making services more accessible and affordable, and thus legitimise national 
government.   
Concluding Comment 
Recognition that municipal revenue would come under increasing pressure, existed from the outset, 
primarily because of high urbanization rates, and especially for South Africa which experienced a spike 
after the fall of apartheid that had inhibited movement of people (as detailed in Figure 4-3 above). How 
to mitigate it was less obvious. Developing countries, and specifically South Africa, which received 
significant technical and advisory support from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund from 
1990 (Seekings & Nattrass 2015, p.7), espoused a neo-liberal economic approach. It was based on 
developing business friendly policies, which would ultimately lead to competitive markets and efficiencies, 
and in turn to greater prosperity.  At municipal level, this entailed: privatising or outsourcing functions; 
forging private-public partnerships; focusing on cost recovery and value-for money, and on customers 
rather than citizens; and ultimately, on promoting competition – which if introduced for services, 
(electricity being a prime candidate), would decrease prices and make them more accessible to the poor. 
Fiscal decentralisation at local government level meant that local revenue collection had to be maximised, 
for several reasons: Firstly, it would provide a level of independence from central government and in turn 
strengthen democratization. Secondly, it would provide the financial means for local government to 
execute its mandated functions more equitably and in the manner required. Finally, it would provide 
greater transparency, allowing constituents to hold office bearers to account.  
3.4.3 Period 2: Financial Theory of Municipal Funding Models (2000 – 2015) 
   “Wherever possible, charge.”  Bird (2000) 
As predicted in period 1, the pressure on municipalities, and their (in) ability to administer their functions 
and provide services, continued to grow as urbanization intensified. This strain has been exacerbated by 
a greater emphasis on the need to check environmental degradation and preserve natural resources 
(which has reached crisis point in many cities), together with a growing backlog of infrastructure demands 
(Martinez-Vazquez 2015, p.14).  
By mid-2005, as many as 75 developing countries had followed the example of their industrialised 
counterparts and implemented fiscal decentralization policies put forward in the 1980s, to improve 
service delivery and reduce poverty (Slack 2009, p.14). It is thus worth noting the outcomes. Here, a 
starting point is that almost always, the process of fiscal decentralization has two consequences: In the 




budgetary authority, but almost always without taxation authority, which central government retains. The 
second outcome, a natural consequence of the first, is that revenues under local government control 
rarely matches expenditures (Slack 2009; Bird 2001; Bird 2011) 
A review of literature around fiscal decentralisation and local government revenue sources to fund 
municipal functions from 2000 on,  (Farvacque-Vitkovic & Kopanyi 2014; Slack 2009; Bird 2001; Martinez-
Vazquez 2015; Dewees 2002; Freire & Stren 2001; Bird 2011; Bird 2000; Boyle 2012; Bahl & Smoke 2003), 
cites the same primary revenue sources, albeit that they vary across countries: Local tax (primarily 
property); user fees and charges; intergovernmental transfers; and where allowed, private sector loans. 
The authors strongly support the requirement for local government to generate as much revenue as 
possible from its own sources and should comply with two basic principles: 1) The service or function 
provided must be clearly linked to the revenue source; and 2) Services should be financed by their 
beneficiaries. Under these conditions, private services supplied by local authorities are thus excludable. 
For example, if a consumer does not pay for the service, they can be cut off. Pure, or non-excludable, 
public services on the other hand, such as street lighting and firefighting, should be financed from local 
taxes. Under the strictest definition, redistributive and spill-over effects exceed the mandate of local 
government; but if responsibility lies with local government, it must be funded from inter-governmental 
transfers, and not from user fees or local taxes (Figure 3-4).  
 
         Source: (Slack 2009) 
Figure 3-4: Financing Tools for Municipal Functions and Services 
The authors were unequivocally united on the need for efficient, cost-reflective pricing for private goods 
(such as water and electricity), because provision of these services creates ideal opportunity for 
municipalities to secure a reliable revenue source, through user fees and charges:  
“The most obvious, and in many ways the most sensible recommendation that can be made with 
respect to revenue structures at any level of government, is to employ user charges wherever 
possible”      Bird (2000).  
In developing countries’ contexts (but not exclusively), private services are often subsidised and sold at 
below cost. Such practises are discouraged however, as they misallocate resources, send incorrect pricing 




end users can of course be supported using targeted mechanisms. Indeed, to the greatest extent possible, 
the financing tools listed in Figure 3-4 should aim to conform to as many of the economic principles listed 
in Figure 3-5 as possible, although this is not always to be expected. For example, an equitable tax system 
may not be simple to administer, while a politically acceptable tax may not offer the level of transparency 
necessary. Likewise, high levels of cross-subsidisation are likely to compromise accountability.  
 
Figure 3-5: Public Finance Principle for Local Government Revenue 
Local Taxes 
It is advisable, where possible, for municipalities to have a mix of taxes, as this provides more options and 
greater flexibility to respond to changes in the economy, expenditure needs, political and other factors.  
“International experience tells us that the most responsible and accountable local governments 
are those who raise their own revenues and set their own taxes. Unless local governments can 
alter the tax rates, they will not achieve local autonomy or accountability”          Slack (2009) 
Bird (2000) identified six characterstics of a good local tax. Table 3-3 compares these against an older 
(Moak & Hillhouse 1975) and more recent global assessments (Martinez-Vazquez 2015), as well as an 
analysis undertaken by Bahl & Smoke (2003), specifically on the South African sub-national revenue 
system. The sources have been specifically selected to be forty years apart, to ascertain the extent to 
which academic thinking has evolved over time. The comparison shows that the principles have changed 
little. However, Bird, Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2015) caution that taxes should not be used to achieve 
wider government objectives, as these are better pursued by central government alone. The priority at 













The tax should be relatively immobile so that local governments can vary the tax 
rates without losing a significant portion of the tax base 
 ✓  ✓ 
Buoyancy - rates changing in proportion to the economic base ✓  ✓ ✓ 
The tax yield should be adequate to meet local needs, increase over time as 
expenditures increase, and be relatively stable and predictable 
✓ ✓ ✓ Implied 
The tax should not be one that is easy to export to non-residents  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
The tax base should be visible to ensure accountability  ✓  ✓ 
Taxpayers should perceive the tax to be reasonably fair (equitable) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
The tax should be relatively easy to administer ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
The tax should be relatively efficient, causing low distortions in economic activity     ✓ 
Being politically acceptable ✓  ✓ ✓ 
The tax should not interfere with domestic or national commerce (neutral) ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Source: (Martinez-Vazquez 2015; Bird 2000; Bahl & Smoke 2003) 
In terms of property taxes, economic efficiency principles dictate that property owners who are most 
inelastic should pay the highest rates. Businesses are undoubtedly more portable than households and 
should thus attract lower property tax rates. Additional taxes, subject to central government approval, 
include: personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, payroll taxes (such as the RSC levy which was 
abandoned by National Treasury in South Africa in 2005), general consumption taxes, vehicle taxes, and 
hotel occupancy taxes. 
User Fees 
User fees are viewed as a potential, rather than reliable and stable revenue source, while services should 
be charged at appropriately set rates; which people are willing to pay. Three types of user fees and charges 
exist: 1) Services fees - also referred to as nuisance fees, including: dog, marriage and business licenses, 
charging for copies and other similar services; 2) Public prices - revenue received over and above the cost-
recovery from the sale of private goods such as electricity, water and admission to recreation facilities; 
and 3) Specific benefit taxes - Compulsory levies applied to individuals (or corporations) assumed to 
benefit as a group from certain services. Examples include special assessments, supplementary property 
taxes, improvement taxes etc.  
To comply with economic efficiency theory, user fees should be set at a competitive private level, with no 
subsidy. If one is necessary, it should be accounted for separately. This is often difficult in practice, as local 
government must ensure equity for all its citizens. Here there are opposing views. Bird (2000) states: 
“attempting to rectify fundamental distributional problems through inefficiently pricing scarce local 
resources is almost always a bad idea, resulting in little if any equity being purchased at a high price in 
efficiency terms”. Conversely, More (1999) argues that in societies where there are disparate income 
levels (inequality), a user fee, regardless of the level it is set ay, excludes people at the margin. Public 
goods and services are meant for all residents and equity should be prioritised over efficiency by adopting 
a functionalist approach. Kessides & Valbonesi (2009) assessed the impact of privatisation and market 
liberalization reforms on the affordability of public utility services of low-income households in developing 
countries. Popular theory in the 1990s held that privatising monolithic state-owned utilities to reverse the 




a viable and pragmatic solution. Aligning tariffs with costs was a necessary outcome. Concerns as to how 
this would impact low income households, because of private companies focusing on the most profitable 
customers, were then balanced as best as possible by governments. But the reality was that tariffs would 
have to increase continually to fund investment to expand and maintain electrical systems. The trade-off 
for many families was energy poverty; having to choose between energy, food and medicine, to make 
their homes liveable during cold winters and hot summers. In analysing twenty years of the effects of 
privatisation policies, the study found that the impact on the poor was grossly underestimated. 
Ultimately, it meant that default was about the ability, and not the (un)willingness, to pay higher utility 
tariffs; and the report concluded that an effective affordability analysis must be an integral part of every 
utility’s reform programme, especially during economic downturns.       
With both taxes and benefit charges / user fees available as funding options to local government, it is 
perhaps useful to interrogate the fundamental distinction between the two. At first sight, they appear to 
have similar characteristics, as proceeds are used to fund public sector functions and services. As More 
(1999, p.242) points out: “What is the difference between a tax and a fee? Not much, except that fees are 
regressive while at least some forms of taxes (the graduated income tax and, to a far lesser extent, the 
property tax) are progressive.” Simplistic examples, such as personal tax (to fund general public sector 
activities) and a parking entrance fee (to offset direct costs) are easy to understand, because application 
of the proceeds is transparent. Public confusion and outrage result when proceeds are indirect and 
opaque, such as an excise tax on plastic packets to fund environmental programmes; or fees incorrectly 
labelled for political reasons, such as campaign pledges not to increase taxes, (notwithstanding the fact 
that additional government revenue was always necessary), which is then sourced through increased and 
/ or new user fees. Here a detailed study on the subject by Duff (2004) provides a balanced assessment: 
Benefit taxes and user fees are just one additional mechanism for government to raise revenue; and when 
used appropriately can deliver efficiency, accountability and fairness. They can however become 
regressive when used for pure public goods and redistributive transfers. The research concurs with the 
allocation of revenue sources shown in Figure 3-4. 
National Transfers 
On occasion such transfers are necessary, but should be avoided where possible, as they can affect local 
decision-making authority, because conditional grants for example, must be spent in a specific manner. 
They can also lead to inefficient local government decisions, as the incentive for accurate cost 
management is lost. A further concern is that of accountability, particularly when multiple sources of 
external funding exist for a specific service or function, as ownership can be easily assigned to one of the 
funders. Finally, transfers can be erratic and unpredictable, which makes long term planning difficult, 
while the unexpected loss thereof could result in the need to increase local taxes and user fees or to 
reduce expenditures. This is never popular with local constituents (Slack 2009). Capital grants on the other 
hand are often necessary, because sub-national governments are responsible for major capital projects, 
but often lack the authority or the investment grading to source external loans (Martinez-Vazquez 2015). 
Direct Borrowing   
As cities grow, the nature and size of capital infrastructure projects grows proportionally. Local 




distributed over time. It is therefore necessary for central government to permit sub-national government 
to develop an effective borrowing mechanism, controlled through clear rules (Martinez-Vazquez 2015). 
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has sought to provide a conceptual framework in promoting common understanding of key 
concepts around the various tiers of government, their dynamics, functions and funding. From the 
discussions in this chapter, it is clear that local government provides a level of immediate legitimacy to 
central government through the direct provision of local functions and services to the electorate 
(appropriately so, as local government is best placed to understand and respond to needs of the 
community) while providing both a buffer and a conduit between citizenry and central government. 
Strong and independent local government also strengthens democracy. At the same time, local 
government’s limited capacity to directly raise revenue, coupled with South Africa’s central government 
over-arching objective to maximise municipal self-reliance, creates very particular tensions, many of 
which we will see playing themselves out in the research that follows. This scenario is made all the more 
complex by the fact that local government, burdened with imperative of self-reliance and public service 
delivery, with limited revenue and human resources, often has to rely on central government transfers – 
directly impacting on power dynamics between the two, with relatively strong risks of central government 
funding being non-discretionary or “coming with political strings attached”. And as we shall see in later 
chapters, it is the potential incongruities in policies around local government functions, their funding and 
institutional arrangements embedded thereby, which strongly speak to the crises that municipal EDI and 
local governments face today.       
Ultimately, the institutional arrangements which determine the power wielded by the various tiers of 
government within a country, tend to endure, but are not necessarily permanent. The research has shown 
that they are influenced by national and international political events. The Great War for example led to 
greater political instability in Europe, the rise of communism in Russia, the Great Depression and Second 
World War, which saw a prolonged period where big government was the order of the day. The fall of 
communism ushered a period of economic growth underpinned by globalisation, and with it a universal 
call for, and a move to, greater autonomy for lower tiers of government. The reasons were clear and the 
benefits were bound to outweigh any disadvantages. But, as with most things related to politics, outcomes 
vary at best, and at worst, may even take a country backwards. Indeed, as elaborated at the start of this 
chapter, the founding fathers of old institutionalism (study of formal legal arrangements of political 
institutions - Chapter 3.3) had widely divergent views: de Tocqueville predicting highly centralised 
government; and Woodrow Wilson believing, almost naively one could say, that bureaucrats could 
execute their duties unencumbered by politics. By the mid-2000’s a more balanced assessment of 
decentralization concluded that an “elixir it ain’t” and must be introduced and managed carefully, if 
national government and citizens are to reap its purported benefits. Poor or half-hearted implementation 





4. The Evolution of Central, Provincial and Municipal Government 
Administration in South Africa 
4.1  Introduction  
The development of government, and especially local government, must be understood as the context 
within which municipal ESI developed in South Africa. This chapter thus traces the evolution of 
government in South Africa, to provide context and high-level perspective to the detailed analyses of 
particular actors and factors discussed in later chapters. To fulfil such a role, this chapter bores down into 
sufficient detail to provide the requisite foundation to support the research topic, while ensuring it does 
not become a topic itself. The historical narrative of this chapter therefore seeks to broadly examine the 
overall fortunes of local government under the three defined time periods selected for this study; with 
the purpose of extracting the prevailing national political dynamics for each period, together with how 
policy decisions were delegated down to local government, as well as their impact and manner in which 
the third tier responded. To achieve the objective of overall context, the national and provincial 
government sections deal almost exclusively with internal matters for each time period and do not delve 
into knock-on effects across tiers. The consequences of decisions and actions taken at the higher-level 
manifest in the local government sections.   
Ultimately, given that this chapter is a context-providing review, it is understood that it is not undertaken 
in sufficient detail to draw in-depth conclusions or outcomes identified in historical institutionalism. 
Indeed, at the behest of the research literature warning against hasty extrapolation, such advice is 
heeded. Prognostication is not its purpose. Context provision is; with later chapters fulfilling a detailed 
analytical role. In this chapter however, where the evidence is deemed satisfactory, or displays 
characteristics particular to the approach of historical institutionalism, observations may be seen as 
worthy of consideration, albeit inconclusive for now, until interrogated in detail in later chapters.       
4.2 Government Prior to 1910 
The origins of local government with an elected council go back as far as 1836; but forms evolved 
differently, dependant on particular British and Dutch influences (Tsatsire & Nealer 2009). Local 
Government was initially influenced by Dutch rule28 (1652 to 1795 and 1803 to 1806) and then by the 
British (1795 to 1803 and 1806 to 1910), both of whom left deep impressions on the tradition and 
structure of local government. The former deeply impacted the system of rural and early town 
government, first when the Cape was initially colonised, and once again when the Dutch Voortrekkers 
ventured inland past the British colonial frontiers in 183629, establishing the two Boer Republics of the 
Orange Free State and Transvaal. The British on the other hand, influenced the development of urban 
municipal government, starting in the Cape Colony which then spread to all four provinces. Vosloo & Jeppe 
(1974) identify three forms of government during this period: 
Rural Government: The inland migrations under the Dutch made it increasingly difficult to administer local 
affairs in outlying areas. Thus, for each new council, a magistrate (Landdrost) and councillor (Heemraden) 
 
28 The Dutch established a trading post on the Cape Peninsula (now Cape Town) in 1652 which quickly developed into a colony. The Dutch ruled 
until the British seized the colony in 1795 during the Napoleonic wars. The Dutch recovered the territory after the Treaty of Amiens in 1803 but 
the territory was surrendered back to the British in 1806.  





were appointed; based on the Dutch ‘heemraad’ system dating back to the 13th Century, which was 
replicated in all new districts until the British took over in 1827, when it was abandoned. The new system 
then divorced judicial ambit from other functions of rural administration. In 1836 municipal councils were 
created for towns, and road boards and school commissions were set up to perform the non-judicial 
functions of rural government. The system was revived in 1855, but ultimately abolished when the two 
Boer Republics were conquered by the British in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902.  
Town Government: Following a petition for political reform to allow burghers (citizens) greater 
representation, a committee consisting of three officials and three burghers was created in Cape Town by 
the Dutch in 1792. The British, who ended Dutch rule in 1796, replaced the existing municipal committee 
with the ‘Burgher Senate’ consisting of six burghers appointed by the governor, one of whom the senate 
would elect as chairman. Under this system, municipal powers were extended, and new forms of taxation 
introduced. Dutch rule was restored in 1803 and the new Commissioner-General planned to emulate the 
democratic spirit of late eighteenth-century Europe, by replacing the self-selected oligarchic burgher 
senate with a popularly elected council.  This proposal was rejected by the governor, but the senate’s 
powers were extended and functions increased. The significance of this institution was a symbol of self-
government by Cape colonists.  
Municipal Government: With the British re-occupying the Cape Colony in 1806, the Anglicisation of 
institutions began. The burgher senate was re-instated with the objective of introducing popular local 
representation in 1827. The posts of landdrost and heemraden were eliminated in 1828, and judicial 
functions separated from other government roles. The Municipal Ordinance Act was passed in 1836, 
which set up local government for towns in the form of a board of commissioners, elected by households 
for a period of three years. Rates were levied annually by a public assembly; and the ordinance was 
essentially a framework within which municipal regulations were drawn for differing organizations and 
powers, to meet the needs of each municipality. This home rule measure allowed each local community 
to frame its own constitution in accordance with its own circumstances. The ordinance was adopted by 
Natal (1847), and with minor variations, even by the two Boer Republics – Orange Free State (1856) and 
Transvaal (1877). Since it borrowed heavily from the English Municipal Corporation Act of 1835, it formed 
the basic framework for the subsequent introduction of typically British terms and practises such as 
mayor, town clerk, councillors, standing committee systems, by-law powers and the concept of ‘municipal 
corporation’. 
The second Anglo Boer war ended in 1902 and under the Treaty of Vereeniging, the Boer states of 
Transvaal and Orange River Colony (Orange Free State), lost their autonomy and agreed to come under 
the sovereignty of the British Empire; on the understanding however, that they would be given self-
government in future.  
4.3 Creation of the Union of South Africa (1910 - 1948)  
The South Africa Act of 1909 was an Act of the British Parliament, merging the two British colonies and 
the two defeated Boer Republics, to create the Union of South Africa. The Act allocated national 
government executive authority over provincial government, which in turn presided directly over local 
government (Government 1909 Section 85(vi)).  
4.3.1 Central Government:  
Central authority was vested in the national legislature (parliament), its executive institutions and the 




the courts were not empowered to test the validity of parliamentary legislation adopted by 
constitutionally prescribed procedures. The House of Assembly was by far the most important unit in the 
legislative structure, with bills that appropriated revenue or imposed taxation, originating in the house; 
and the political party with majority support, gained control of the entire governmental structure. The 
judiciary was established and functioned in terms of acts of parliament, while court hierarchy consisted 
of appellate, provincial, local and circuit divisions of the supreme courts, as well as special courts and a 
variety of local courts for the various magisterial districts, together with special courts for “Bantu”30 
matters. Police fell under the state, while local governments had their own traffic police (Vosloo & Jeppe 
1974). 
The national convention of 1908 to formulate consensus on the formation of the Union of South Africa, 
came under severe strain regarding the issue of non-white political rights. The Cape Province supported 
the extension of the non-white franchise rights, but the other three provinces favoured the restriction of 
all rights. It was decided to maintain the existing status quo in each province, with the important condition 
the United Party would not permit non-white electoral candidates (Vosloo & Jeppe 1974, p.33). This 
decision effectively formalised racial segregation as policy and was the first of many that further 
entrenched segregation, such as the 1913 Land Act that prohibited black people from owning land. This 
meant that they could not own property in the 93% of the country designated as white and could only 
acquire land in the remaining 7% - categorized as “reserves”. The allocation was increased to 13.7% in 
1936 (Cameron 1993, p.418). The Native Affairs Act (1920) then created tribal based district councils; The 
Natives Urban Areas Act (1923) regulated the presence of blacks in urban areas by creating township on 
the outskirts of towns; The Local Government Act (1926) denied citizenship rights to Indians, (followed by 
an unsuccessful effort to repatriate them in 1927); and, The Natives Trust and Lands Act (1936) created 
African reserves, effectively formalising white and black rural areas (History of South Africa 2011b)  
For a brief period during the Second World War, several commissions were appointed to review “native 
policy”. The intention was to reform the above-mentioned policies, but turned out to be “promises rather 
than performance” (Legassick 1974, 6–7), as evidenced by the passing of the Natives (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act (1945), which bound local authorities to set aside and create separate townships and 
hostels for the non-white population under their area of jurisdiction. 
4.3.2 Provincial Government 
The provinces, or second tier of government, created by the South Africa Act of 1909 were a new creation. 
Indeed, their retention of the same borders as the original states, must not obscure the fact that they in 
no way retained any of their legislative powers. Rather, their coming together created a new and single 
legislative union, with provinces formed to deal with specific functions and administrative duties, 
entrusted to them by central government (Cloete 1978, p.3).  The Act of Union was the country’s first 
constitution and created a sovereign parliament, which effectively meant it could not be challenged – 
Section 59 stated: “Parliament shall have full power to make laws for the peace, order and good 
governance of the Union”. Under this arrangement, if anything stood in the way of its ideology, 
consultation was a privilege, not a right (Craythorne 2002, p.16).  
To fulfil the mandate given to them, provincial governments were given legislative authority, but their 
ordinances would only be of effect if they were not “repugnant” to an Act of Parliament (Government 
1909, sec.86). Thus, any matter placed under provincial jurisdiction did not result in full autonomy, as they 
 
30 Abantu (or 'Bantu' as it was used by colonists) is the Zulu word for people. The SA government replaced the word natives with bantu in the 
1960s, but as the word became despised by black people due its association with apartheid the government slowly started replacing it with 




were not excluded from the jurisdiction of parliament. If parliament legislated, any provincial legislation 
in conflict would cease to have effect (Cloete 1978, p.4). This meant that parliament, could and did, 
legislate different laws for each province to achieve its objectives. 
Provincial authorities controlled hospitals and roads; fish and game matters; control of trade; recreation 
and cultural amenities; the control of local authorities; and primary and secondary education for whites. 
The state president also appointed an administrator for each province, whose ultimate responsibility was 
to ensure policies applied by provincial government were in line with those of central government.  
4.3.3 Local Government  
The formation of the Union brought together two colonial systems: Dutch and British. To simplify matters 
and promote cooperation, it was decided to retain the existing local system already in place, which would 
henceforth fall under provincial government. Thus, the creation of provincial councils, intended as a 
measure of local government, did not alter the existing system of local government (Cloete 1978, p.6). 
Central government would from time to time pass Acts impacting on local government, particularly in 
respect to racial segregation, but ultimate control remained with provincial government. To manage local 
government, each province would pass local government ordinances that provided directives regarding 
the powers and duties of local authorities. All provincial ordinances were subject to the approval of central 
government and by-laws passed were subject to the approval of the provincial administrator. Under this 
structure, central government could control local government affairs without dealing with them directly. 
Local government taxing and borrowing, accounting procedures and the appointment of key personnel, 
fell under provincial control. Capital projects had to report to central treasury. As there was no central 
department responsible for local government, individual local authorities were forced to deal with 
individual government departments, depending on the nature of the matter (Vosloo & Jeppe 1974).  
During this period, black people resided almost exclusively in rural areas where local government was 
well-nigh non-existent (Sithole & Mathonsi 2015, p.11). 
Period Summary 
Although the Union of South Africa introduced three levels of government, it was a unitary form of state, 
where central government had supreme power over the entire territorial state. Under this system, all 
other levels of government were subordinate, owed their creation and continued existence to central 
government, and the powers they possessed were determined by it (Hanekom in Heymans & Tӧtemeyer 
1988, p.17). The high level of centralization was a continuation of how things were done; and Macmillan 
(1917, p.17) lamented the common South African tendency towards an excess of centralisation, which 
resulted in local government’s power and real responsibility being incomplete or non-existent. This 
practice would be tightened even further as the National Party (NP) implemented its political and 
economic ideology when it came into power. 
4.4 The Rise and Fall of the National Party and its Grand Apartheid 
Project (1948-1994): 
4.4.1 Central Government: National Party’s Policy of Separate Development 
Accession to power in 1948 by the newly formed NP on its apartheid manifesto to formalise “separate 
development” based on racial lines, marked the rise of Afrikaner nationalism. However, it is not accurate 




p.124) notes the distinct difference between the two. Apartheid consisted of the government’s racial 
policies and ideologies, while white supremacy is the overall power structure, which was partly 
maintained by apartheid.  Some form of separation existed from the time white settlers arrived in 1652 
and it is fair to conclude as Vosloo does, that “in the period 1910-1948 the great majority of white South 
Africans, whatever their political affiliations, had accepted white supremacy as the basis of policy” (Vosloo 
& Jeppe 1974, p.34). What apartheid did was to modernise and codify racism in the context of a modern 
state.  
A consequence of the NP’s uncontested rule since it first came into power in 1948, was that the executive’s 
authority over time began superseding the legislature’s. Under the Westminster model, final authority 
lies with a sovereign parliament, but gradually cabinet came to initiate all decisions, with parliament 
simply endorsing them. Although Heymans & Tӧtemeyer (1988, p.37) recognise that the decline of 
parliamentary authority is a likely outcome in many countries following the Westminster system, in South 
Africa it was accelerated for three reasons: First, the ruling party enjoyed an outright majority for an 
extended period, enabling it to influence matters in its favour. Secondly, white voters wanting to maintain 
their privileged position, afforded extensive authority to the executive. Finally, government was successful 
in convincing the white electorate that the country could come under siege at any point and that they 
“knew best” how to protect them; requiring a “particular style” of government. The consequence was 
that cabinet often took key decisions without even consulting parliament. Heymans cites invading Angola 
in 1975; activities to destabilise neighbouring states during the 1970s and 1980s; and declaring two states 
of emergencies (1985 and 1986) as key examples. By the 1980s, decision-making was highly centralised 
and effectively limited to the few members of the State Security Council, reporting directly to State 
President PW Botha, who also controlled access to it.  
Before ending in 1994, the NP’s administrative rule can be broken down into three phases. During the first 
ten years or so of power, the focus was on segregationist policies and regulations. Once this was achieved, 
emphasis started to shift towards a developmental phase (Vosloo & Jeppe 1974, 36–39), beginning in the 
late 1950s and ultimately taking the 1976 Soweto riots to convince government that existing policies were 
untenable. The third phase was neo-apartheid, as termed by Cameron (1993: p419): “the 1980s saw the 
NP retreat from strict apartheid”, wherein party reformers realised the need for political and economic 
reform, to ensure greater national stability.   
Phase 1 Segregationist Policies (1948 -1960):  
The primary segregationist outcome of maximum separation between whites and non-whites, was 
achieved through three ancillary objectives. The first, was to prevent further biological integration of the 
different races; the second, to regulate points of contact amongst races; and, thirdly, to ensure total 
domination of the political system by excluding all non-whites from it. Laws passed, inter alia were: the 
Prohibition of Mixed marriages Act (1949); Immorality Act (1950), which made mixed race sexual relations 
an offense; the Population Registration Act (1950), which classified individuals according to race; the 
Group Areas Act (1950) that segregated neighbourhoods; the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 
(1953), which required races to use separate public amenities such as hospitals, transport, restaurants, 
theatres and the like; the Extension of University Act (1959) that required separate universities for whites; 
and the Industrial Conciliation Act (1956), which split workers unions along racial lines. From the mid to 
late 1950s, regulations were passed to end any existing participation by non-whites in political institutions 
(Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1956 and the Promotion of Self-Government Act of 1959). This 
almost endless list of punitive and inhumane laws targeting black people had significantly negative 
financial, logistical and social implications for local governments, who were required to enforce them with 




administrator, had little interest in the views and beliefs of the local community and furthermore provided 
almost no financial support to deal with the consequences and impacts of these laws. Sithole & Mathonsi 
(2015) notes that national government’s view was that segregating people on racial lines, forcefully if 
necessary, meant that white municipalities had no obligation, and thus no financial burden, to provide 
services in areas inhabited by black people. This was to have long-lasting consequences for local 
government in future; particularly in placing local governments under immense pressure to integrate 
hitherto underserviced black areas when they were subsumed into neighbouring previously ‘whites only’ 
municipalities under South Africa’s first democratic government.    
Phase 2 Developmental Phase (1960 -1976):  
Having excluded non-whites from all spheres of political, economic and public participation, the NP 
government turned its attention to creating alternative opportunities for them. The objective of the 
developmental phase was to create separate, subordinate, national and local institutions for all non-white 
groups and then build social and economic development areas within non-white allocated areas. Under 
the Promotion of Self-Governing Act (1959), ‘bantu’ territories were proclaimed for the eight identified 
black ethnic groups (north and south Sotho, Tswana, Xhosa, Zulu, Swazi, Venda and Tsonga - Figure 4-1). 
Referred to as “homelands”, these territories were recognised as independent and given a measure of 
self-government.  All black people were required to become a citizen of one of the homelands under the 
Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (1970), which the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, 
Mr Connie Mulder explained was: “to enable the so-called urbanized bantu person to find a home for his 
political aspirations with the people to whom he belongs”. But in truth, its purpose was to strip all blacks 
of their South African citizenship (History of South Africa 2011a). As no homelands existed for coloured 
people, they would develop in parallel, but separately, to whites in the same areas. The Coloured Persons 
Representatives Council (1968) was set up to manage coloured affairs - economic, education, local 
government, social welfare and other issues, but always subject to the approval of the state president. 
Schemes to repatriate Indians, of which there were many, were abandoned in 1955 and Indians were 
officially accepted as a population group in 1961. The South African Indian Council was established in 
1964, with central government managing it in a similar manner to that of the Coloured population.  
 




The South African economy (analysed in Chapter 5) experienced a high growth period in the 1960s. Annual 
GDP growth was between 6 and 8 per cent during the 1960s. In fact, between 1962 and 1966, South 
Africa’s real growth rate was second only to Japan (Johnstone 1970, p.124 quoting Financial Mail - 6 
September, 1968. page 833). Indeed, during these “golden years”, government, capital and the white 
population must have believed that the system of apartheid was secure and would remain unchallenged 
(Nieftagodien 2014).  
Although spatially separated, each of the four recognised population groups fell under the direct control 
of a local government – all of which were created by provincial authorities who defined the scope of their 
local jurisdiction – with vastly disparate levels of service provision and expenditure along racial lines 
(Cameron 1993, p.417). The Soweto riots which took place on the 16th of June 1976, were a decisive 
historic turning point. Government finally realised that the Verwoerdian31 myth of all Africans being 
“temporarily sojourners” in white urban areas was untenable (Lemon in Smith 2002, p.5). The economic 
and political costs of government policies were now evident, and to find solutions, several commissions 
of enquiries were formed: The Theron Commission (1976) identified problems of legitimacy and financial 
organizational viability; the Yeld Committee (1978) found financial unviability in coloured areas, while in 
the same year the Schlesbusch Committee suggested the political failure of the system. The Slatter 
Commission (1979) identified the same issues in four Indian areas in the Transvaal and Natal (Smith 2002, 
p.3). The Committee of Inquiry into the Finances of Local Authorities (Browne 1980) distinguished 
between the “need” and “ability to pay” for general and trading municipal services amongst the three 
population groups, where white local authorities generated large surpluses, while coloured and Indian 
were not; with little prospect of the situation improving over the 12 year forecast period to 1990. The 
inquiry attributed the coloured and Asian32 communities’ inability to pay, to average lower family income 
and higher number of persons per dwelling. It was clear that under these circumstances, viable local 
authorities for coloureds and Asian would not be possible and it was recommended that:  
‘In order to establish viable local authorities for Coloureds and Asians, as recommended by the 
Yeld and Slatter Committees, a system of regular transfer payments from White to Coloured and 
Asian authorities should be introduced, whereby the payments would be equal to the calculated 
need minus the ability to pay of Coloured and Asian authorities. The necessary arrangements 
should be made with the Department of Finance for the ongoing calculation of such transfers, on 
the basis of statistics, which are collected for this purpose on a uniform basis.’    
Browne (1980, p.83)  
The Browne inquiry distinguished itself from previous government reports, not because it noted the 
failure of the system for the first time, but because it created the basis for the creation of RSC, detailed 
below. Prior to Browne, the failure of the separatist system had been analysed but only noted by previous 
official inquiries.   
The Croeser Working Group played a prominent advisory role in the 1980 formulation of the President’s 
Council, or PC, on local and regional management systems. Many of the recommendations were 
legislated, resulting in the extensive reorganisation of local government (Todes & Wilkinson 1986, p.60). 
The PC, effectively a constitutional think tank, was first suggested by the Schlebusch commission which 
 
31 Hendrik Verwoerd was the South African Prime Minister who served from 1958 until 1966 (assassinated). Verwoerd was one of the primary 
architects of apartheid. 
32 The term Asian is used in the Browne report, whereas all the other sources and reference documents refer to Indian. Chinese people suffered 
from discrimination during apartheid, and were often classified as Coloureds, but sometimes as Asians, a category reserved for Indians. In the 
1970s, in an attempt to attract foreign investment, Taiwanese Chinese, Koreans and Japanese were categorised as ‘honorary whites’. Chinese 




proposed constitutional reform for the white, Indian and coloured populations (Heymans & Tӧtemeyer 
1988, p.35). The Joint Report of the Committee for Economic Affairs and the Constitutional Committee of 
the President’s Council on Local and Regional Management System in the Republic of South Africa was 
commissioned in 1982, as well as the Council for the Coordination of Local Government Affairs (CCLGA) in 
1983, by the Promotion of Local Government Act. Their terms of reference were to recommend new local 
and regional government structures for whites, coloureds and Indians. Blacks were not included. Both 
councils recommended greater autonomy for local authorities, to be achieved by the delegation of power 
to lower levels. 
Phase 3 Neo-Apartheid (1976 – 1994) - Duplicating rather than Sharing Reticulation 
Infrastructure:  
Under increasing international and local pressure to reform, and to stabilise the country, the NP realised 
that both political and economic reform was necessary. It acted by formally acknowledging and accepting 
the recommendations of the PC for the maximum devolution of power to local authorities as a policy 
priority. Reform was introduced with the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983 which 
abandoned the Westminster system and introduced the tricameral parliament to provide limited power-
sharing to Indians and coloureds. This was based on the findings of the Theron Commission (1977) which 
was set up to advise on constitutional reforms. Black people were excluded, as per Section 93 
(Administration of Black affairs):  
‘The control and administration of Black affairs shall vest in the State President, who shall exercise 
all those special powers in regard to Black administration which immediately before the 
commencement of this Act were vested in him’   (Constitution Act 110 of 1983) 
Exclusion of the black population was argued on the basis that each ethnic group had its own homeland, 
which Indians and coloureds did not, and that the Act addressed this shortcoming. The NP’s motive 
however was to gain support from the coloured population, and to a lesser extent the Indian population, 
so as to reduce the likelihood of alliances with the black population (Cameron 1993, p.419). The tricameral 
system consisted of three houses: Assembly (white); Representatives (coloured); and Delegates (Indian). 
The Act made a distinction between “own affairs” and “general” affairs. Each house, or race group, was 
given the power to decide exclusively on “own affairs”, made up of matters such as housing, education, 
health and local government. The State President retained the executive authority to decide as to whether 
an affair was to be classified “own” or “general” (Constitution Act 110 of 1983, sec.16(1)). Although local 
government fell under “own affairs”, the rights and status of local government were not enshrined in the 
constitution and the State President reserved the right to arbitrarily change local government status from 
“own affairs” to “general affairs”. The constitution did not apply to any existing legislation pertaining to 
local government, thus the structure of the new system ensured that the ruling party retained overall 
control. The function of local government technically became the function of central government 
(Cameron 1995, p.419), which would be controlled by a department of local government in each of the 
chambers; conditional on their financially viability: 
‘Separate local authorities to be constituted for the various population groups wherever possible 
but subject to the requirement that effective financial arrangements should be made to ensure 
the viability of these authorities’.   (Constitutional Guidelines 1982, p.9) 
Having excluded the black population from the tricameral system, but simultaneously recognising and 
accepting that black people were permanent inhabitants in “white” areas, far-reaching reforms were 
introduced to change the status of black people within urban areas (Christopher 1997, p.318). Prior to 




and provided limited services. As part of government’s reform process, where devolution became a 
priority, Black Local Authorities Act (BLA) were created in 1982 and structured under the Black 
Communities Development Act of 1984, with amendments in 1986. These Acts supposedly replicated the 
existing government structures administering white areas, so in theory BLAs were granted the same 
powers and authority. This meant that BLAs were now required to operate on a cost recovery basis i.e. 
the principal of financial self-sufficiency applying to all local authorities (Cameron 2002; Bekker & Jeffrey 
1989; Solomon 1983; Horwitz 1994). To finance themselves, local authorities raised revenue from 
property taxes and the provision of services, such as electricity, water and refuse removal. National grants 
provided as little as 4.2% of capital and operational expenditure in 1978 (Solomon 1983, p.28). It was 
however not realistic to even contemplate that BLAs were going to match white municipalities in their 
ability to fund their activities. Having almost no existing infrastructure from which to raise revenue from 
the provision of electricity, the higher tariffs that would have to be charged to establish an electricity 
distribution, would be unaffordable to these poorer residents (Horwitz 1994, p.8). The only alternative 
was for BLAs to significantly increase charges for rent and services. In response residents protested, 
boycotted payments and there was violence in many areas. Many black councillors resigned and many 
BLAs collapsed (Cameron 2002, p.117). Non-payment of services was not only an affordability issue, but 
also a form of political protest against apartheid, with residents in the BLAs viewing these structures as 
politically illegitimate and an extension of the policy of separate development (Tsatsire & Nealer 2009, 
p.137; Heymans & Tӧtemeyer 1988) (Poto in Heymans & Tӧtemeyer 1988, p.101).  
National government’s obsession with separate development ultimately resulted in the duplication of 
infrastructure, services and manpower; all of which was inefficient and expensive: 
“Among other things, the law obliged racially-based local authorities to become separate 
electricity supply authorities. Sometimes a new non-white supply authority was created simply by 
separating the electricity network of the new authority from that of the mother municipality of 
which it had been an integral part. The effect of this process was to separate naturally integrated 
networks, or for new supplies to be created irrespective of the cost of establishing these networks. 
But mostly, separating off the administration of black urban areas from white cities meant that 
black areas were left without services at all.”  Horwitz (1994, p.10) 
These inefficiencies were identified by the Browne Commission in 1980, which recommended the creation 
of a joint services commission to provide services on a cost-effective basis and advocated that local 
government income be redistributed to Indian and coloured communities via a system of transfer 
payments. Imposing a levy on white ratepayers to fund infrastructural and environmental upliftment in 
coloured and Indian areas was unlikely to be popular with the white electorate and could result in a loss 
of electoral support. Indeed, the (white) United Municipal Executive (UME) immediately opposed it 
(Humphries in Heymans & Tӧtemeyer 1988, p.109). Recognising that BLAs were not viable and in crisis, 
the department of finance responded by establishing the Croeser Working Group in 1982, which ratified 
the main findings of the Browne Commission and proposed a more complex and indirect funding model 
that in effect “was little more than fiscal laundering”. A regional services levy and regional establishment 
levy, to be paid by white affluent commercial and industrial sectors, was the basis of funding for the RSCs 
(Smith 2002, p.4). 
RSCs addressed the general affairs component of the Constitution Act of 1983 and the RSC Act (1985) had 
three objectives: 1) To promote efficiency by providing bulk services in a more cost-efficient manner; 2) 
To provide a forum for multi-racial decision making; and 3) To offer new sources of income for the 
development of infrastructure in areas of greatest need – namely black townships (Cameron 1993, p.421) 




RSCs under the newly created Primary Local Authorities (PLAs), which effectively created a metropole. 
Included under these 21 functions were bulk water and electricity supply, sewerage, roads and storm 
water drainage and the maintenance of infrastructure, services and facilities. In 1986 it became necessary 
to amend the Act to include “own affairs”, because the existing Cape Divisional Councils that the RSC took 
over, handled both “general” and “own”; unlike in the Transvaal and Orange Free State where the RSCs 
were newly created bodies. RSCs were funded through two new taxes; the first being a services levy - a 
tax on wages and salaries of all employers in the RSC region; and the second, an establishment levy which 
charged a tax calculated on the turnover of a business in the RSC region. The tax rates charged were 
determined by the Minister of Finance and it was compulsory for the RSC to spend the proceeds on 
specific functions – prioritised to areas where the greatest need existed, black townships  (Cameron 1993; 
Heymans & Tӧtemeyer 1988; Smith 2002; Bekker & Jeffrey 1989; Solomon 1990).       
“Perhaps the most important result of this Act will be an effective redistribution of income, wealth, 
development and influence in a region from white to black, coloured and Indian communities, with 
the direct participation of these communities.”   Financial Mail (23 August 1985). 
The Department of Constitutional Development rejected the scepticism shown by many about the viability 
of RSCs. Du Toit (in Heymans & Tӧtemeyer 1988, p.75) for example questioned how RSCs could ultimately 
succeed, because of the racially segregated structure upon which they existed. The Department argued 
that race was not the issue, but access to finance, which RSCs were set up to address. The abolition of 
development boards, (which had a long history of disputes with local councils), and of influx control (both 
in 1986) were also seen by national government as additional actions to ease the political and economic 
programmes of BLA. This did not transpire, and the political and economic situation became increasingly 
unstable.  
By the mid-1980s, the reforms introduced to increase the political and economic rights of all non-white 
citizens appeared to have had the opposite effect. There was a marked escalation in political resistance, 
popular and violent township protest, and rural uprising. The Botha government also had to deal with the 
insurgency increasing from the country’s national borders and international pressure in the form of 
economic and trade sanctions. On 20 July 1985, President P.W.  Botha announced that violence in the 
country showed that "ordinary law and order was inadequate” (History of South Africa 2011c). A State of 
Emergency was declared; giving greater power to the police, the military and the president. The 
government could implement curfews controlling the movement of all people and prevent the media 
from covering any unrest or entering an area declared as an area of unrest. The state of emergency also 
gave the president the power to rule by decree, without constraints of the constitution or parliament. But 
this did little to improve the situation. Operating under a nationwide state of emergency with strict 
restrictions, sent the country to the precipice of civil war. The political and economic situation continued 
to deteriorate, characterised by violence, industrial action and international pressure to end apartheid; 
all of which put P W Botha under intense strain. And the pressure for actual and meaningful change was 
not limited to those who sympathised with the non-white majority. Within his own party, a group of 
reformists who realised that apartheid was no longer tenable, had formed and were led by F W de Klerk. 
A meeting between de Klerk and Zambian Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda had been scheduled for August 
1989, to which Botha was opposed. After a cabinet meeting, Botha announced his resignation on the 15th 
of August 1989. De Klerk, already the leader of the NP, won the national elections that took place 23 days 
on; becoming State President in September 1989. Just four months later, in his presidential speech at the 
opening of parliament, de Klerk announced wide ranging reforms effectively ending apartheid; heralding 




Within the period from the declaration of the state of emergency by Botha, to the implementation of 
reforms by de Klerk, government’s efforts to reform local authorities led to a major investigation into the 
feasibility of replacing the current legislation, which provided for different systems and structures of local 
government, with a uniform act i.e. to devise uniform legislation for local government. In October 1986 a 
committee of enquiry was appointed under Professor Stassen and work commenced in August 1987. In 
the foreword by Dr Thornhill, who took over as chairman in January 1989 after the resignation of Stassen, 
and after whom the report was named, he notes “It became quite apparent early in the investigation that 
a single act for local government in South Africa would not be feasible” and the study was extended to 
investigate the total system of local government (Thornhill 1990, p.4).  
The report, guided by statements made on local government by the State President in May 1990, 
identified four models (Table 4-1): 
“Above all, any new system of local government will also have to be established through 
negotiation … Any model will have to take into account the existence of various communities in 
the same area. It will have to be affordable and promote administrative rationalisation … I 
sincerely believe that the status quo cannot be maintained. There is an inescapable need for a new 
system or systems of local government.’   
Thornhill, p. Footnote 19 (1990, p.22 Footnote 19) 
FW de Klerk as the new State President, outlined an approach for local government adopting a new 
dispensation. A prerequisite was that it would be negotiated by all members in the local community, to 
ensure there was consensus. Noting that “too much variety could lead to chaos” an orderly process was 
necessary, to avoid any disruption in the provision of local services. A general legal framework which 
offered a few alternative models, but within which all local communities would have to operate, would 
be made available, allowing a local authority to choose the most relevant model to meet its needs33.   
Before presenting its proposed models, summarised in Table 4-1, the report identifies ten points of 
departure on which the investigation was based and suggests that these should be used as the basis for 
any future negotiations.  Key amongst these:  
• Local government is recognised as independent form and tier of government, with executive and 
legislative powers. The autonomous fiscal powers of local authorities are a critical determinant of 
local authorities;  
• Elected, autonomous local government must be protected by the constitution; 
• The system must ensure that it is non-discriminatory, minorities are protected and group domination 
is prevented. It cannot treat people differently and / or function on a racial basis; 
• A new system means the maximum devolution of power and functions to the lowest effective 
decision-making level, with minimum administrative control from central government. This was to be 
done in conjunction with devolution of fiscal sources and financial responsibility, to ensure there were 
sufficient sources of income; 
• Local authorities had to be administered efficiently and cost-effectively to ensure that “under no 
circumstances the provision of essential services is disrupted”; 
• Existing and new sources of income must be used in a non-discriminatory manner to 1) Promote 
economic development; and 2) Eliminate historical disadvantages urgently and systematically.     
 




Table 4-1: Proposed Models of Local Government – Thornhill Report 1990 
Model Description 
Separate local authorities Racially separated local authorities within own areas of jurisdiction, subject to 
financial viability or the extension of jurisdiction to achieve financial viability. This 
option effectively allowed for the continuation of the existing racially segregated 
model, subject to the condition of financial viability 
The local services council Based on the existing RSC model. Autonomous local authorities within the same 
geographical area which were not sufficiently viable, would co-operate on an equal 
basis on certain issues. Local authorities of all race groups could participate, but it 
recognised that the most likely point of departure would have to be the existing 
areas of jurisdiction, which at the time were on racial lines. Revenue could be 
sourced from the existing RSC levies and surpluses from joint services shared.  
The community government model A joint local authority for a city, with the option for local communities to establish 
neighbourhood management committees, on a non-racial, geographical basis, to 
administer common interests. This entailed devolution within a local authority to 
an institution, with the objective of participatory local government. The 
neighbourhood committee would only have decision making autonomy in its area 
of jurisdiction on own functions, as determined in the local negotiation process. 
The simple majoritarian model Dividing the city into wards which included all residential areas and all races. The 
division could be along financial and/or number of voters. This model could be 
constructed with or without the protection of minorities  
The last item covered in the Thornhill report was the creation of the RSCs and the role they had played 
until that time. The report made comments about the future of RSCs (Thornhill 1990, 60–61), noting that 
RSCs would have a role to play in any new system of local government. Where a new institution of local 
government could not be created through negotiation, the RSC would be able to provide services to the 
area it served, as it functioned as an extension of local government. RSCs had important developmental 
goals and it was essential that their sources of income were used for this purpose. The report recognised 
that RSCs at that time were constituted from race-based local authorities and that this would need to 
change, by constituting them on the future model the local community had chosen. Finally, RSCs provided 
a mechanism for national government to fund projects that fell outside the local authority areas of towns 
and cities. The report, appraised by van Donk and Pieterse (Pillay & Du Toit 2006, 120), found it to be 
nothing more than a subtle attempt to re-inscribe white domination; a charge vehemently rejected by 
Thornhill during his interview34, pointing out that a balance had to be struck between developing non-
racial local government and the political climate and ideology at the time.               
Recognising that the country’s major (white) cities would be significantly larger once the townships were 
incorporated, government re-commissioned Thornhill a year later to complete a second study on key 
issues relative to municipal government of metropolitan areas. With the somewhat unoriginal title of 
Thornhill II, the report unsurprisingly reiterated the previous report’s points of departure as prerequisites 
for efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy:  
“Maximum devolution of power to the lowest effective level of decision making, maximum 
devolution of government functions to the local government level and minimum administrative 
control, together with devolution of fiscal sources and financial responsibility, while the devolution 
of functions requires the corresponding devolution of the necessary funds and/or sources of 
income.”   (Thornhill 1991)   
 




As non-negotiable pre-condition for legitimacy, metropolitan government required the equal treatment 
of all population groups (Thornhill 1991, p.4). The report explained that metropolitan government was a 
global phenomenon set up to deal with very densely populated urban areas, a situation which had now 
materialised in South Africa. It was necessary for the report to distinguish between RSC and metropolitan 
government, as both were absorbing smaller municipalities. The latter did not include rural areas and was 
an extension of local government, established to ensure the coordination of local government services in 
existing highly urbanised communities. RSCs on the other hand, were a “regional” type of local authority, 
created to obtain joint decision making and to re-distribute specific sources of revenue. RSC functions 
could be absorbed in metropolitan areas by the relevant metropolitan body, in which case the RSC would 
be abolished or transformed, with its income sources being transferred to the new metropolitan council 
(Thornhill 1991, p.40). The report identified five models: 1) Co-operative agreement – where local 
governments voluntarily co-operated to address issues via a technical committee on which they would be 
represented; 2) Councils of government – a confederal solution where a council representing local 
authorities would be established to deal with identified problems. The report noted that this model 
aligned most closely with RSC; 3) Amalgamation – suited to a large city with an adjoining region, to create 
a combined area; 4) Incorporation – the abolition of all existing local authorities and combining them to 
create a new, and much larger, metropolitan government; and 5) Two-level federation: local government 
duties split into two categories: straightforward functions would remain with local government, while 
others for reasons of efficiency or effectiveness, would be undertaken by a metropolitan government. The 
report felt that incorporation (Model 4) and two-tier government (Model 5) were most suited to South 
Africa, but once again urged that any final solution had to be the result of negotiation. Cameron (1993, 
p.429) states that government’s response to the second report was much the same as its response to 
Thornhill I. “The findings were noted and the report circulated for comment”. However, Thornhill 
disagreed35, stating that the findings of the second report formed the basis of the Local Government 
Transition Act (LGTA) of 1993 (Act 209 of 1933), which became entrenched in the interim constitution, 
ultimately leading to local government becoming an independent sphere of government.  
Period Summary 
One of the final acts of the NP government may have been to finally realise its long-held policy ambition 
of decentralising power to local government. This shift in policy was initiated by several studies and 
commissions of inquiry undertaken in the late 1970s and early 1980s and led to the promulgation of the 
1983 constitution, increasing the powers of black local government (Black Communities Development Act, 
1984) and several other reforms - the most notable being the introduction of the RSCs. This marked a 
major shift from the policy of centralization which had been in effect since Union, characterised by 
mechanisms giving national government direct control over local authorities and indirectly through 
provincial administrators. The extent to which the ruling party in the early to mid-1980s was sincere about 
decentralization may never be known because it was in a constant state of national crisis defending 
apartheid. Thus, all reform measures came with central government veto power, which immediately 
generated mistrust, insincerity and legitimacy issues. For example, the minister of finance was responsible 
for setting and changing the levies which funded the RSCs. In fairness however, government rarely 
interfered and never with the RSCs, but its built-in safety mechanisms meant that reform programmes 
were regarded in the same light as all programmes introduced by an apartheid dispensation  (Cameron 
1993; Heymans & Tӧtemeyer 1988; Todes & Wilkinson 1986; Pillay & Du Toit 2006; Bekker & Tomlinson 
1986; Tsatsire & Nealer 2009; Pieterse & van Donk 2008; Smith 2002; Bekker & Jeffrey 1989). The process 






Attempting to implement the decentralization programme against the political backdrop of the 1980s, 
also meant its constant marginalisation by the need for centralized power to control civil unrest. So even 
though the NP’s objective may well have been the decentralization of power, viewing centralised control 
in a post-apartheid government as a potential danger, the need to retain power received a higher priority:  
“The National Party is well aware of the enormous power wielded by a highly centralised state and 
is deeply concerned about the black majority assuming control of such an apparatus”  
Bekker in (Heymans & Tӧtemeyer 1988, p.30) 
In the final analysis, the government’s decentralization programme was designed by the NP in an elitist 
fashion to ensure that although it shared power, it retained control (Cameron 1995, p.412). Ultimately, 
the programme delivered little devolution and was limited to deconcentration and delegation (Cameron 
2002, p.119).    
4.4.2 Provincial Government – Towing the (National) Party Line 
The first order of business for the NP after winning the 1948 elections was to consolidate its position by 
centralising state control. This was not straightforward, as the election was won by a minority, resulting 
in the NP ruling through a coalition in parliament. The party had no governing experience and faced 
significant resistance from opposition parties in the bigger cities (Adler 1990, p.168). Once the NP secured 
majority control at national and local level however, it restructured provincial government to comprise of 
three elements: an administrator, an executive committee, and a provincial council. The administrator 
was appointed and dismissed by central government; the executive committee was elected by the 
provincial council, and from 1970, provincial elections were held simultaneously with general elections, 
electing the same number of representatives for each province’s council, as that province had members 
of parliament (MPs). Provinces presided over local authorities, who they regulated and controlled through 
provincial ordinances (Young 1990, p.223). This structure allowed national government to have its policies 
implemented with minimum interaction between it and local government. Fundamentally, the provincial 
administrator was local government’s decisionmaker.  
“Nearly all decisions taken by a local authority have to be agreed to by the Administrator. All 
regulations, all changes to town planning schemes, even the staff regulations of a municipality 
must have his approval.”     (Rees in Various 1979, p.5) 
Provinces oversaw local government finances, where strict control was exercised in line with national 
government requirements. The close relationship that provinces held with the national government did 
not however mean that they enjoyed any additional privileges. All power resided in the centre. This was 
achieved by curbing almost all provincial taxing abilities, making them almost exclusively reliant on 
funding transfers. In 1971 a new subsidy formula was announced, with provincial powers to levy personal 
and income tax being transferred to central government, while its contribution to provincial expenditure 
was raised to 82%. The loss of financial autonomy was supposedly compensated by central government 
not imposing conditions as to the purposes for which the financial grants could be spent (Vosloo & Jeppe 
1974). An additional example of national government constantly undermining its stated policy priority of 
devolution, was the decision by the National Treasury to supplant the provincial authorities of their 




reason, which if left unchecked could lead to excessive inflation that could “break the back of the 
economy” (Cameron 2002, p.119). 
4.4.3 Local Government – White Local Authorities (WLA) 
From Union in 1910, local government structures in South Africa were designed to institute the national 
policies of the ruling government in the urban environment (Tsatsire & Nealer 2009, p.133). To deliver on 
its election manifesto of separate development after coming to power in 1948 – which had to in effect be 
implemented at local government level – the NP moved quickly to centralise the powers and functions of 
local government even further. Existing regulations were repealed and replaced with new legislation to 
separate the different cultural groups. The few non-white councillors in the Cape Province were not going 
to continue under apartheid, and were removed by splitting the voters’ role and placing them in newly 
created and inherently powerless management committees (Craythorne 2006, p.10).     
The new government also oversaw the expansion, bureaucratisation and consolidation of power of the 
civil service in the 1950s. This was in line with international economic thinking of Keynesian theory, 
advocating an interventionist state. This policy had already started prior to the 1948 elections and would 
probably have been ramped up regardless of election outcome, but the NP now added its segregationist 
flavour. A policy of preferential access to jobs for white Afrikaners was installed, resulting in a gradual 
deterioration in the capacities and skills of the civil service, as powers were given to increasingly 
incompetent and less qualified personnel. Afrikaners at the time were (significantly) less educated than 
their English-speaking white colleagues, and the NP’s policy of job reservation successfully sought to evict 
English speakers, as experienced and skilled people left the public for the private sector. The situation 
came to a head when in parliament in 1968, the official opposition noted “the virtual collapse of 
administration in many spheres”. Other findings included critical staff shortages in the National Treasury 
and important government departments, with countless instances of under qualified individuals in senior 
positions. National government committed to acting, but ultimately nothing was done (Posel 1999, 
pp.100–105); and the Association of Municipal Electricity Undertaking conference minutes during this 
time, raised management concerns management about losing staff, many of whom considered taking 
positions at their counterparts in Rhodesia (AMEU Minutes 1950 – 1960). Curiously however, favouritism 
shown in hiring Afrikaners in the public sector, by no means implied that these jobs came with privileges. 
“Despite the placing of Afrikaners in the ‘sheltered employment’ on a large scale in the civil service 
after 1948, the government that made the appointments lorded it (sic) over the employees, often 
treating them with contempt.”      Posel (1999, p.99)    
In 1961, when unilaterally seceding from the British Commonwealth, government changed South Africa 
from monarchy to republic. The new constitution (Constitution Act 1961) was the country’s second and 
retained the existing levels of government – the two tiers of national and provincial government – with 
provincial councils retaining the powers to make ordinances in relation to classes of subjects, which 
amongst others included: municipal institutions, divisional councils and other local institutions of a similar 
nature  (Constitution Act 1961, sec.84f(i)). Thus, local government powers, rights and functions were not 
guaranteed under the constitution and control of local government continued to fall under one of the 
four provincial administrations, each with its own ordinances. And while the form and structure of WLA 




cities, racial legislation, the power that provinces held over local government and the lack of skilled labour 
(Hammond-Tooke 1977, 9–13).  
By the 1970s, the objectives and functions of a typical large municipality in South Africa could be grouped 
by Hammond-Tooke into four categories (Table 4-2) - representative of all large municipalities in the 
country in 1977, with some minor regional differences. For example, Johannesburg operated a municipal 
public transport service, still in effect in 2015, whereas Cape Town’s always outsourced the function.  
Table 4-2: Objectives and Functions of Municipalities (1977) 
Category 1: Social Objectives Category 2: Physical Objectives 
• Protecting public health – health, food, water, noise and air 
pollution, dumping, litter  
• Refuse: Removal, treatment and disposal 
• Slums: Housing unfit for human living 
• Health: Facilities 
• Cultural facilities: Libraries, museums, theatre, galleries 
• Recreational facilities: swimming pools, sports fields etc. 
• Parks: Open spaces, nature reserves 
• Aesthetics: Control advertising, masts, buildings 
• Heritage: Protect historical, architectural  
• Emergency services: Firefighting and ambulance  
• Housing: Local authority housing schemes 
• Infrastructure (roads and water): All aspects  
• Town planning: Zoning and uses for land  
• Urban renewal schemes: Planning and execution 
• By-laws: Safety and resident interests  
• Water: Supply and distribution of water 
• Electricity: Supply and distribution  
• Transport: Bus and other forms  
• Parking: Control of traffic, safety and provision of parking 
• Markets: Fresh produce etc. 
• Licenses: Control of licenses motor vehicles, animals 
• Crematoria and cemeteries 
Category 3: Financial  Category 4: General 
• Revenue: Set and collect rates, tariffs, fees and loans 
• Budget: Expenditure and allocation of priorities in spending 
• Grants: In support of services 
• Land: Acquisition, selling or leasing of land  
• Training: Municipal staff  
• Polling: Delimitation of wards  
• Representation: Inter-government cooperation 
        Source: Hammond-Tooke (1977) 
Notable omissions from the list of functions were education (primary, secondary and tertiary), hospitals 
(including child welfare, addiction, the aged) and police. Table 4-3 lists their status in 1977. This 
arrangement remained intact until the 1996 constitution, which came into effect after the country’s first 
democratic elections and covered in greater detail in later sections.  
Table 4-3: Non-Municipal Functions (1977) 
Function Responsibility  
Primary and secondary school Provincial  
Tertiary (colleges and universities) National (Department of National Education) 
Hospitals Provincial 
Preventative (inoculations, awareness etc.) - Local  
Hospitals (welfare) National (Department of Social Welfare) 
Police National  
Abattoirs  Provincial  
Non-white race groups Matters dealt exclusively by respective national government as per central policy  





4.4.4 Local Government – Black Local Authorities (BLA) 
As stated in 3.3.1, legislation of the Union of South Africa increasingly classified communities along racial 
lines. The Black Urban Areas Act of 1923 allowed for segregated urban areas and required black advisory 
committees to advise WLA responsible for administering black townships. The black advisory committees 
had no powers to act and all decisions affecting the townships were made jointly by the WLA and the 
national department of native affairs. From 1923 blacks were also: Only allowed into white areas for 
labour purposes; required to live in segregated areas; not allowed to own property and categorised as 
“temporary” visitors in white areas. Also, as township housing was regarded as “temporary”, it was sub-
standard. This did not stop blacks from moving to white urban areas and residing in townships to seek 
employment, as conditions were far worse in the homelands. Forced to address the permanent nature of 
occupation, the NP passed the Group Areas Act (1950) which allocated residential areas by race. But 
government insisted that each area populated by a different race group be governed and administered 
separately, even if that meant municipal services overlapped or were duplicated.  
Replacing the advisory committees, Bantu Councils were created in 1961, with the only difference being 
that in the new structure, WLAs were in charge and delegated powers. In 1971, national government took 
the administration of the councils away from WLAs and gave it to the newly created Bantu Affairs 
Administration Boards, which black councils had the option of joining. Taxation and finance remained with 
the WLAs, meaning that townships had no economic activity and thus little revenue to build infrastructure 
and provide services. The black community in the townships mobilised in protest. Black civic organizations 
which had by now formed, successfully convinced residents not to pay rent or service charges, making 
townships financially unsustainable. Finally, national government introduced the BLAs (Black Local 
Authorities Act 102 of 1982) that reported to the respective provincial administrator, with policy in the 
form of legislation coming from central government, and the principle of financial self-sufficiency 
applying. Trading licenses were not issued for townships, so all economic activity took place in white 
controlled areas, meaning taxes were exported to these. This left BLAs to survive through revenue from 
sorghum beer production, liquor sales in the townships, levies on white employers of black labour in some 
areas, and residents’ payments for services rendered, mainly rentals and fees. With black people not 
allowed to own property, a property tax could not be charged and BLAs were doomed from the start. 
Without a tax base to collect revenue to administer the township, services were sub-standard at best. 
More importantly BLAs had no legitimacy with the local population and were rejected outright. By the 
early to mid-1980s their officials were violently attacked on numerous occasions and their structures 
effectively collapsed (Tsatsire & Nealer 2009, pp.134–140) (Cameron 1995, p.300). 
Within this context, RSC revenue was used to provide much needed infrastructure to the areas where it 
was needed most, in the hope that it would appease black sentiment. And even though RSC funds did find 
their way to the intended recipients, with over 80% of the annual budgets of the various RSCs spent in 
black areas (Cameron 1993, p.424), problems persisted. The inability of BLAs to generate meaningful 
revenue meant that a greater proportion of the funding had to be allocated to subsidize BLA operations, 
or more accurately to keep bailing them out, which reduced capital infrastructure spend. More 





“…they were not able to address the fundamental structural failings of apartheid local government 
and were therefore subject to political opposition from the majority of the black population”  
       Pycroft (1996, p.237) 
Regardless of these drawbacks, the RSC mechanism proved to be resilient and levies used to fund local 
government were only eliminated in 2005, more than 10 years after the first democratic elections of 1994.  
4.5 A New Constitution, Spheres of Government and Democracy 
(1993-1996) 
By 1990, the NP had committed to democratic elections and the negotiation of a new constitution with 
all political parties. A first, or interim, constitution was negotiated in 1992 and 1993 (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act of 1993) which came into effect later that year. This interim constitution was 
developed to support the transformation period needed to end apartheid, and would be the basis for a 
final constitution - The Constitution of the Republic of Routh Africa Act 108 of 1996, which was adopted 
on the 8th of May 1996. 
4.5.1 Interim Constitution 
The NP insisted on constitutional power-sharing to protect minority rights – allowing for a government of 
national unity (GNU), wherein political parties gaining more than 20 seats in the national assembly would 
receive cabinet seats. The GNU was formed after the April 1994 national elections and would exist until a 
final constitution had been agreed. The interim constitution made provision for a three-tier system of 
national, provincial and local government, as well as nine provinces to replace the existing four.  
The NP’s strategy to protect minority interests, and more specifically its white electorate’s interests, was 
manifested through maximum decentralisation to local government. Realising that it would lose the 
national elections, strong local government could provide some checks and balances of black controlled 
government by winning local elections in existing and economically influential WLAs. The African National 
Congress (ANC) ideology, on the other hand called for a highly centralised approach, which it believed was 
a more effective form of administration. A centralised approach was also seen as a mechanism more likely 
to ensure redistribution of wealth and reversal of apartheid inequities.  
Ultimately, the ANC and NP compromised, but the interim constitution provided for autonomous local 
government. Key select outcomes of the interim constitution affecting local government, included: 1) 
Historic debts of BLAs and individual debt being written off, on the understanding that black civic 
organisations would encourage residents to resume payments. This did not materialise, and payment 
levels actually decreased after the agreement; 2) Existing local government funding instruments - the 
power to levy property rates, fees, taxes and tariffs - as well as receive inter-governmental grants, 





4.5.2 Final Constitution 
‘The Constitution is the supreme law of the republic, law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, 
and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled’  
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
The mutually agreed interim constitution allowed for national elections and a transition towards full 
democracy, with the requirement that a final constitution, voted in by a two-thirds majority, had to be 
put in place within two years. The drafting of the final constitution still allowed for public and other 
interested parties (technical experts, lawyers and academics) to participate, but in reality, unless these 
submissions aligned with the major political parties, and the ANC in particular, they had little influence on 
the final outcome (Cameron 1997, p.2). The drafting of the final constitution focused on outstanding 
issues, such as sections rejected by the constitutional court as being inadequate. This included the chapter 
on local government which was deemed to be too long and vague.  
The final constitution adopted the principle of co-operative government (Chapter 3: Section 40), where 
government consists of three spheres (national, provincial and local) which are “distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated”.   Section 41 states, inter alia, that all three spheres must:  
• Respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the other 
spheres; 
• Not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the constitution; 
• Exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the 
geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere; and 
• Co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by: 
o Assisting and supporting one another; 
o Informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common interest; 
o Co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another; 
o Adhering to agreed procedures; and 
o Avoiding legal proceedings against one another. 
The concept of co-operative governance was not included in the interim constitution; representing a 
fundamental shift away from the three-level hierarchical inter-governmental system in place since 1910, 
which had ultimately put municipal function under the authority of the provinces. Henceforth, 
municipalities were ubiquitous over the entire territory of the Republic, each with the “right to govern, 
on its own initiative, the local affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation” 
(Section 151.1 and 3). The next section (152.1b), lists one of local government’s key objectives as: “to 
ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner.” Local government objectives 
are further protected in Section 151.4 which states that national or provincial government may not 
impede or compromise a municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions and 
must support and strengthen its functions so it can perform its duties (Section 154.1). Section 156.1 then 
gives local government the executive authority to administer services listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and 
Part B of Schedule 5, which include electricity and gas reticulation (Schedule 4 Part B). The net effect was 




Although provision was made for inter-governmental grants from national to provincial and local 
government, the principle of self-financing for local government was maintained. Section 229 (municipal 
fiscal powers and functions) thus allows municipalities to impose: 
• Rates on property and surcharges on fees for services provided by or on behalf of the municipality; 
and 
• If authorised by national legislation, other taxes, levies and duties appropriate to local government or 
to the category of local government into which that municipality falls; but no municipality may impose 
income tax, value-added tax, general sales tax or customs duty. 
The NP continued to push for maximum decentralisation, contrary to ANC ideology, and with the ANC 
acutely aware it was about to inherit highly centralised government structures and could immediately 
proceed with implementing its redistribution programmes. The question thus arises: Why did the ANC 
support the elevation of local government in the final constitution to the extent that it did? Cameron 
(2001, p.110), citing Yacoob, points to the emergence of a local government empowerment lobby during 
negotiations; and with the ANC securing the 1994 national elections, the pro-local government lobby 
within its ranks, was supported by strong technical arguments, and of course the existing view of the NP; 
now the official opposition. Reflecting on the local government chapter of the constitution, Zac Yacoob36 
explains it is as ‘a settlement, not between political parties, but a settlement between different tendencies 
which existed in all political parties”. Cameron expounds on the factors of change in ANC policy. Firstly, 
with the creation of non-racial boundaries, the threat of many white controlled municipalities had largely 
dissipated. Secondly, cities could not be seen merely as service delivery agents. The bulk of the country’s 
GDP is generated within cities, requiring them to foster cultural, economic and social development. A third 
reason was that strong local government allowed for greater public participation as a means of 
empowerment; in line with the objectives of the constitution, which calls for participatory governance. 
The fourth reason seems self-serving: The ANC won seven of the nine available provinces in the 1994 
elections, but took control of most of cities and towns in the remaining two, with strong support in urban 
centres; so strengthening local government appears to be a mechanism to strengthen its own political 
powerbase. Finally, the decision  to consolidate the country into nine provinces from the previous four, 
meant provinces were entirely new creations, with limited or no administrative capacity; and even though 
local government itself went through a disruptive reorganisation, it was in a better state than provincial 
administrations. The limited capacity of provinces also contributed to the thinking around defining 
municipalities’ jurisdictional ambit, when the final constitution was drawn up.   
4.6 New Beginnings? (1997 -2014) 
4.6.1 Establishing Democratic and Decentralised Local Government 
With the establishment of the framework for a new constitutional process and a transition to national 
democratic elections, focus shifted to local government. Removing well entrenched, decades-old 
structures, was not seen as a straightforward task. Communities were clustered along racial lines, as were 
services and local government skills. Transforming local government would require the demarcation of 
 
36 Zakeria Mohammed "Zak" Yacoob (born 3 March 1948) is an anti-apartheid activist and a former Justice of the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa. He was appointed to the bench in 1998 by Nelson Mandela. Yacoob was one of the seven members of the Independent Panel of 
Constitutional Experts. The panel was established in terms of section 72 of the interim constitution, with the mandate to advise the Constitutional 




existing municipal boundaries to make them inclusive and representative, and to redistribute political 
power. Such a process would inevitably result in winners and losers, making it a highly emotional and 
contested issue.    
The Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF) was created in 1992 and led to the Local Government 
Transition Act (1993), which established a national framework adopting a three-phase approach for the 
transition of local government. The phases were anchored around the 1995 and 2000 local government 
elections (Pillay & Du Toit 2006; Tsatsire & Nealer 2009; Pycroft 1996). Cameron (2001) summarises the 
three phases as follows: 
• Pre-interim phase: Covered the period between the first national elections in 1995 and the first local 
government elections in 1995/6; 
• Interim phase: Began after the first local government elections and ended once the final constitutional 
model for local government had been implemented in 1997;  
• Final phase: Began after the final constitutional model in 1997, to prepare for the 2000 elections, 
which would require the identification of the three municipality types as defined in the final 
constitution (1996).  
Under the 1996 constitution, Category A municipalities have exclusive municipal executive and legislative 
authority in their area of jurisdiction. Category B municipalities share municipal executive and legislative 
authority with a Category C municipality, within whose area it falls. Category C has municipal executive 
and legislative authority in an area that has more than one municipality (more detail on the operational 
structure of municipalities is provided later in this chapter). This more flexible approach was borne out of 
several disputes taking place under the interim constitution, which had espoused fixed categories of 
metropolitan, urban and rural local governments (Cameron & Alvarez 2006, 4–6).   
4.6.2 RDP and GEAR 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was adopted by the government of national unity 
after the 1994 elections, to address issues of social inequality and justice; intended as an integrated and 
sustainable programme, to be implemented by civil society. The plan was structured so as to balance the 
funding needed to pay for urgent and very necessary reconstruction and development, with the 
imperative of growing the economy to provide the financial resources needed to pay for the programme.  
Here, the RDP gave local government an expansive mandate to meet its primary objectives, such as a 
single tax base, participatory government, cross subsidisation of local government and the cancellation of 
outstanding debts owed by BLAs. The white paper on local government consolidated RDP principles into 
a vision for the development of local government (Powell 2012, p.14). 
Just two years later, the ANC introduced the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) initiative, 
whose stated objective was to build on, and not replace, the principles of the RDP (Manuel 2006) (Gelb 
2006, p.2). This viewpoint has however been hotly debated, with GEAR seen as having a far more centrist 
economic foundation and being yet another, further, move away from the ANC’s left of centre ideology 
(Weeks 1999, p.796). GEAR’s five-year programme targeted a GDP growth rate of 6% in its final year, with 
an average of 4.2% over this period (1996 - 2000) - the minimum rate needed to construct a competitive 
economy required to create 400 000 jobs per annum, address inequality and extend service delivery. The 




expenditure as fixed proportions of GDP, cutting back on government consumption expenditure and for 
wage increases to be kept in check.  The state would henceforth take a stronger role in coordinating fiscal 
and budget policy. GEAR would reform the budget process, intergovernmental fiscal system, financial 
management and accounting practises over its five-year duration. Capital payments to municipalities were 
fused into the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (1996) and the equitable share formula 
for local government introduced in 1998, was to be used to fund the roll-out of services to indigent 
households. The changes to municipal finance under GEAR were introduced simultaneously with the 
drafting of the white paper on local government (Powell 2012; Weeks 1999).  
4.6.3 Green and White Papers on Local Government  
Introducing democracy to local government would require a complete overhaul of the existing system. 
This could not be achieved all at once, and certainly not in a fragmented and dysfunctional system. 
Maintaining stability was required for negotiations to take place, so it was essential that service provision 
continue. This provided justification for all existing legislation to be maintained until abolished or 
amended (Thornhill 2008, p.494). The transformation process was not straightforward or quick. It 
required a review and assessment of the existing situation, the identification of items to be addressed and 
then, the formulation of policy to achieve the desired objectives. Typically, such a process consists of five-
stage process: Stage 1 requires the ruling party to decide on the overall vision, goals and direction of key 
issues. Stage 2 then requires the relevant ministry to formulate green and white 37  papers. Stage 3 
necessitates that the green paper be debated in parliament; and only once consensus is reached can a 
white paper be issued by the ministry. In stage 4, the appropriate ministry formulates law (bill) to achieve 
the white paper policy objectives. The draft bill is then reviewed by parliament, the public and cabinet. 
Only when the final bill is signed by the president, does it become law. The fifth and final stage is 
implementation and/or subordinate legislation to provide further detail; with all three spheres of 
government responsible for implementing government policy. The green paper on local government was 
released in October 1997.  
“The next local elections, to be held in 1999, will usher in the final phase and signal the start of the 
transition process. The white paper will therefore not only establish what local government will 
look like after 1999, but it will also indicate what systems, institutions and practices require to be 
put in place in preparation for the final phase.”        
Foreword by Minister Moosa, (Green Paper on Local Government 1997) 
With the 1999 local elections fast approaching, the ministry had limited time to consider and adopt public 
comments. In its response, the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE 1997) stated: “It is difficult 
to make well informed comment on these (issues raised by the paper) in the short time allowed for public 
comment since its release”. Indeed, the white paper was released in March 1998, just six months after the 
green paper; and its intention was transforming local government. So, it is necessary to understand what 
was envisaged, before attempting to assess the outcome. 
 
37 A remnant of the British system, a green paper is a discussion document developed by government and experts and identifies key issues as well 




Developmental Local Government 
The constitution commits to improving people’s lives, within its available resources. The white paper thus 
set out developmental government as a vehicle to help address past inequalities, and saw this as the new 
role local government was expected to play (Nel 2001, p.1011). Four developmental outcomes were 
identified: 1) The provision of household infrastructure and services; 2) Creation of liveable integrated 
cities, towns and rural areas; 3) Local economic development; and 4) Community empowerment and 
distribution. The first outcome dealt with the traditional functions of local government; service delivery, 
while the remaining three were new additions. The white paper’s intention on services (Local Government 
White Paper, 1998. 27) is of primary relevance to this study and therefore interrogated in more detail. 
The White Paper recognised local government’s obligation and responsibility to provide household 
infrastructure and services. It specifically names water, sanitation, local roads, storm-water drainage, 
refuse collection and electricity as the services which would improve people’s lives and foster opportunity 
to become productive members of society. The priority and starting point was the provision of basic 
services to those who had little or no access to them. The envisaged funding for these capital projects 
would come from grants from the consolidated municipal infrastructure programme, cross-subsidisation 
of existing services and private sector involvement.  Operational costs would be financed from the 
equitable share of national revenue to which local government is entitled. To ensure sustainability, the 
level of investment would need to match the ability of the various communities to pay for these services. 
Transforming local government to meet service delivery requirements required new approaches and 
mechanisms, summarised in  
Table 4-4.  
Table 4-4: Summary of administrative systems to meet service delivery requirements – White Paper on 




Guideline Action Points / Items to Consider 
Principles for 
service delivery 
• Accessible to all, easy and convenient to use 
• Setting appropriate tariffs, determining appropriate service levels, and cross-subsidisation 
• Suitability, ease of use, timely, responsiveness, convenience and safety  
• Council responsible for quality, affordability and accessibility 
• Holistic approach to address other policy objectives 
• Financial, environmental and social sustainability 
• Effective and efficient usage of resources 
• Service costs must not disadvantage business to subsidise domestic users. Transparent rates must be provided 
• Must comply to constitutional principles which govern public administration 
Approaches to 
service delivery 
• Recognising that existing capacity is white (schooled in rigid authoritarian and outdated management practises), 
together with the need for transformation (available but under-skilled black human resources), mechanisms for 
reform and performance improvement to address these shortcomings, are outlined 
• Separation of service delivery units from the council to increase accountability   
• Horizontal cooperation between municipalities 
• Access external expertise and experience through partnerships 
• In sourcing, external specialised services, but not solely based on price. Must consider training, employment, 
quality, health and safety 
• Public-private partnerships are suited to large-scale capital investment projects, where: project is long term; 
partner invests in and maintains equipment; and municipal risk is decreased 
• Privatisation not allowed for core municipal services and specifically water, electricity and waste.  
Service delivery 
options 
Municipalities should focus on finding the most appropriate combination of options to meet their policy objectives, 





To be effective, municipalities must develop the following capacities: 
• Strategic: Ability to address additional or new demands with a flexible and open approach 
• Integrating: Directing capacity and resources from inside and outside 
• Community: Understanding their needs to ensure they are relevant but must meet quality standards 
Training The existing system, controlled by two boards, is outdated and ineffective. A new flexible training system is being 
designed. Henceforth, councillor training is the responsibility of SALGA  
Labour 
Relations 
The need to transform and create a motivated workforce is recognised, but labour interests cannot supersede service 
delivery. The SA Local Government Bargaining Council is seen as the designated forum to manage the relationship 
between labour, management and councils    
Other spheres o National government wishes to avoid prescriptive approaches, but constitutionally can intervene if required 
            Source: Local Government (1998) 
Achieving the four developmental outcomes would require significant changes, and the white paper 
identified three interrelated approaches to assist municipalities: integrated development planning (IDP) 
and budgeting; performance management; and working together with local citizens and partners.  
The first tool, IDPs, is a mechanism for short, medium and long-term planning. IDPs are incremental plans 
which recognise that not everything can be planned in year 1 and that circumstances change.  They 
provide a comprehensive framework for municipalities to identify and plan their developmental 
mandates. The paper states unequivocally that IDPs must be developed and managed internally, so as to 
strengthen strategic planning, build organizational partnerships between management and labour, and 
enhance synergy between line functions.  
Performance management is a mechanism to ensure that plans are being implemented, are having the 
desired impact and resources are used efficiently. Both national (fixed) and local (relevant) key 
performance indicators are proposed; providing national government an assessment tool of how local 
government is performing. 
The third and final tool, working with local citizens and partners, is a key tenet of decentralization that the 




continuously engage with citizens, business and community groups.”  Four different levels of interaction 
with the electorate and stakeholders were identified: political accountability (voters); input into planning 
processes (citizens); quality and affordable services (consumers); and mobilising resources and providing 
assistance (partners).   
Co-operative Government 
The white paper reinforced local government’s elevation to a sphere of government, no longer 
subordinate to, and a function of, national and provincial government. The paper recognised the complex 
nature of government and the need to strike a balance between independence and cooperation. It went 
on to outline the roles and responsibilities of the national and provincial spheres in their dealings with 
local government, which if leveraged would strengthen local government to fulfil its mandate. The 
expectation of the paper was that programmes undertaken by the other two spheres would be 
implemented in a manner that would help build local government capacity (Siddle 2011, p.70). 
Conversely, the ability, and the circumstances under which national and provincial government have the 
constitutional authority to intervene in the instance of non-performance were clearly outlined. The paper 
also advocated cooperation between municipalities.  
National policies from various ministries were summarised, to provide an overview of the country’s policy 
direction and the impact this would have on local government, as – “…local government is increasingly 
being seen as a point of integration and coordination for the delivery of national programmes” (page 9). 
Allocating functions and services to local government also demonstrated how government intended to 
execute its policy of decentralisation. Section 2 of the Paper (ibid, pages 40 – 47) outlines national and 
provincial initiatives to improve conditions for South Africans; the most relevant of which for this study 
was the one provided for the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME). The proposed transformation of 
the electricity industry was noted, and more specifically, how this reform would impact on municipal and 
Eskom reticulation activities. The allocation of reticulation, as it has developed over many years, had 
created the situation where both (Eskom and relevant municipal electricity undertaking) reticulated to 
different parts of the same municipality. In addition, many municipalities were losing their licences due 
to their inability to pay Eskom their bulk electricity supply accounts. The envisaged regional electricity 
distributors (REDs) would combine Eskom and municipal reticulation into autonomous structures. The 
reliance that all, but especially the larger, municipalities had on electricity sales for revenue, cash flow and 
the well-established practise of cross-subsidising non-viable municipal services from “municipalities 
profits on electricity supply”, was recognised. To compensate for this loss of revenue, the paper envisaged 
that “Municipalities will be allowed to levy a tax on the sale of electricity which should in aggregate 
improve their income from electricity” (ibid, page 45). However, it was conceded that the loss of the asset 
base would negatively impact their credit ratings and borrowing ability. The summary concluded by 
stating that the details of the proposed restructure were still being discussed and that local government 
must participate to ensure its interests are represented.   
4.6.4 Assessment of the Local Government White Paper 
The white paper was keenly anticipated, but once examined, most felt that although it was well-written, 
it failed to recognise the magnitude of the task at hand and did not provide an adequately detailed policy 
framework for municipalities to adopt their most basic objective – service delivery. On the positive side, 




rushed and short); being articulate; providing a complete overview of local government under apartheid; 
being ambitious and holistic in the way it encompassed multiple issues; for its call to simplify municipal 
processes; the recognised need to monitor delivery by instituting performance management of staff; and 
for ultimately providing national government with a  vision for local government, which in turn influenced 
future municipal legislation (Craythorne 2006; Bernstein 1998; Venter 2007; Pieterse & van Donk 2008; 
Pieterse 2002). Critique was far more detailed and scathing.  
The biggest criticism was that the paper failed to acknowledge local government’s state of crisis; and on 
that basis, it would be difficult to deliver on the proposed outcomes, let alone provision of basic services 
to municipalities’ inhabitants. And although the paper raised and recognised many of the issues plaguing 
local government, the concluding statements to each showed little appreciation for the magnitude of the 
problem: On finance (17), “…and many municipalities are financially stable and healthy despite these 
problems”. On administration (17) it conceded that “front line workers remain deskilled and 
disempowered” but failed to provide a solution other than that support and investment is required. The 
glossing over of fundamental weaknesses in local government prompted strong words. (Simkins 1998) 
published an article titled “Paper a muddled response to critical queries”, focusing on its financial aspects 
and articulating the failings; concluding that an opportunity was missed. Bernstein (1998, p.302) found 
the description of the state of local government finance “casual and inadequate”. Savage (2008, p.288), 
recognises the failings of the paper and pointed to: a lack of available data at the time; it not being possible 
to fully anticipate the effects of the transformation programme, and policy debates reflecting “irresolvable 
tensions”. On development, the policy messages were “contradictory and lacking in substance” (Schmidt 
2008, p.22). Comparing his analyses of democratic decentralization programmes in countries in Africa, 
Asia, Eastern Europe and South America, Manor (2001, p.8) states that the he has “never seen such a 
wildly unrealistic set of tasks imposed upon local authorities”. The most damming conclusion drawn was 
that the white paper and comments by national ministers at the time, “de-elevated” local government 
from a sphere to a tier; encouraging centralisation rather than decentralisation of power and functions 
(Bernstein 1998; Siddle 2011; Schmidt 2008; Manor 2001). 
4.6.5 Performance of Local Government from 1998 
Restructuring Local Government  
The first order of business was to restructure boundaries. The Municipal Demarcation and Municipal 
Structures Act (27 and 177 of 1998) was passed, wherein Act 27 created a demarcation board to 
determine the boundaries of new municipalities (284 were created) and Act 177 established structural, 
political and functional institutions for metropolitan, district and local municipalities. To meet the 
requirements of the constitution (1996), which called for “wall to wall” municipalities, three categories of 
municipalities were introduced:  
• Single tier - Category A municipalities (Metropolitan Municipalities). A metropolitan municipality has 
exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in its area; and 
• Two tier local government in Category B (Local Municipalities) and C (District Municipalities), where C 




Figure 4-2 shows the country’s provincial and district borders and the eight metropolitan municipalities 
(Category A). Table 4-5 lists the categories and number of municipalities. Table 4-5 and Figure 4-2 show 
the status after the 2011 municipal elections, which largely reflects the original number of municipalities 
created in 1998, with the only major difference being that of Mangaung and Buffalo City in 2011.  
 
Figure 4-2: Map of South Africa with 8 metropolitan municipalities, provincial and district borders (2011) 
Table 4-5: Categories of Municipalities (2011) 
Category  Number  Notes 
A 8 Largest cities >500k inhabitants 
B 226 Fall intro districts & share power and functions with them 
C 44 Cover entire country (excluding metros) approximately 4-6 Category B municipalities in each 
district 
Objective of Category A and B is to ensure that communities, especially disadvantaged ones have access to goods and services 
As early as 1998, local government policy and institutions demonstrated the friction of competing national 
objectives. While the constitution and RDP mandated local government to undertake capital 
infrastructure spending for service delivery, intergovernmental fiscal policy would require compliance 
with GEAR targets, resulting in a reduction in spending and centralising policy to National Treasury. 
Redistribution by 1998 was deemed a national (not local) responsibility and proposed the withdrawal of 
the RSC levy (abolished in 2003). This further limited the role local government could play. The equitable 
share formula to fund local government through national transfers predicated that only 10% would be 
needed. The remaining 90% would be self-financed - which immediately meant that local government was 
underfunded - and although transfers were made to local government in lieu of the RSC levy, they were 
lower amounts (Professor Thornhill). Finally, the repeal of the Profession of Towns Clerk Act (1996), for 
reasons of transformation, which till then had required qualified professionals as municipal managers, 
created an unregulated environment and compromised performance, as politicians took centre stage. 
This manifested in a failure to recognise professional municipal officers; with lack of professional 
development and job insecurity leading to high turnover rates, and low barriers to entry (Mashatisho 
2014, p.5). This view is shared by Mr M Pomeroy, head of municipal electricity undertakings at the 
Johannesburg Municipality who resigned in 1996 (joined 1959) citing constant political interference38. 
 
38 Interviewed January 27, 2017. At the meeting Mr Pomeroy stated that this practice continued and most of his colleagues left. His replacement 
was not sourced from the department but replaced by a senior official who was without a portfolio at the time. This impacted staff morale as 
deserving and competent employees were overlooked and also resulted in declining performance of the undertaking as the new head was 




Recognising the damage that the Act was causing, National Treasury reversed it in 2007, but by this time 
local government was being asked to do more with less, due to its declining skill base. Of seemingly even 
greater consequence was the loss of skills and structure which had been built up over many decades. In 
hindsight, perhaps a more orderly transformation process could have been considered.  
Local Government under Pres. Mbeki’s First Term (1999 – 2004) 
The second national democratic elections (1999) saw President Mandela step down to be replaced by 
President Mbeki. Local government elections were held in 2000. Although many stalwarts remained, the 
new dispensation brought new faces who wanted to make their mark - realising that the honeymoon 
period after the 1994 elections would not last forever and the black electorate was waiting for its living 
conditions to improve. The new government identified two priorities to complete the restructuring of 
local government. The first, was the establishment and induction of the new municipalities, which would 
be done in three phases. Phase 1 (2000-2002) would see all administrative requirements being finalised. 
The second phase would allow time for consolidation, and from 2005 on, the focus would be sustainability. 
The delays were immediate and it became clear that the process was underestimated and would take 
much longer than expected. The second priority was the completion of new policy, legislation and 
frameworks. Worth mention because they relate to local government, include: 1) Free Basic Services 
(FBS): Pre-defined free quantities of water, electricity, sanitation and refuse services targeting the poor. 
2) The Municipal Systems Act (2000): Regulated planning, service delivery, performance monitoring and 
public participation; 3) The Municipal Finance Management Act (2003):  Financial management, 
accounting, supply-chain management, reporting and budgeting; and 4) The Municipal Property Rates 
(2004): Property evaluations and taxing.  
Although programmes and legislation were put in place to manage local government, the fault line 
between public expectation and local government’s ability to deliver, was deepened by national 
government demands. This is well demonstrated by the FBS Free Basic Electricity (FBE) programme, 
whereby municipalities would distribute free electricity and receive a compensatory grant from national 
treasury. The legislation allocated a subsidy of 50kWh for self-targeted households39, and required local 
authorities to keep a register of applicants. Qualifying households must demonstrate that they meet the 
minimum income threshold and provide evidence that they both own and are full time residents of the 
household receiving FBE. In practice however, many local authorities do not keep registers, resulting in 
most houses receiving FBE, regardless of whether they qualify or not (Nzimande 2008b; Bantsijang 2013). 
Local Government under Pres. Mbeki’s Second Term (2004 – 2008) 
The second Mbeki term (2004) came with contradictions. On the one hand, the ANC extended its 
domination across all three spheres of government and took control of the Western Cape and KwaZulu 
Natal provincial government, now administering all nine provinces (until then it controlled seven), and 
tightened its grip on the areas it already controlled. On the face of it, and according to the ANC itself, the 
results represented an overwhelming expression of confidence in the party, and specifically from the poor, 
 
39 Self-targeted is defined as: ‘Households that are "poor" generally have a low demand for electricity. Their needs could adequately be met by 
restricting the current drawn from the supply to about 10 Amperes (increased to 20A). These households would consume the FBE at no cost and 




(Mbeki n.d.). Notwithstanding, a tactic the ANC had used so effectively during apartheid, now began being 
applied to them. After a 10-year break, mass protest action (excluding industrial action) resumed. 
Recognising that inequality was growing, Mbeki identified local government as a major role player in his 
corrective strategy. The inter-governmental relations framework (Act 13 of 2005) aimed to improve and 
promote relations between the three spheres of government, by: 1) Formalising interaction and 
communication between national departments and local government; 2) Executive mayors being given 
direct representation in provincial inter-governmental forums; and 3) District and local executives 
accessing a direct forum to improve their communication and relations.  
Within this context, the successful bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup also required major infrastructure 
projects; potentially was what was needed to dent the country’s stubbornly high unemployment rate 
(>20%) by creating new jobs and opportunities. However, national government underestimated local 
government’s ability to deliver what was required, which stemmed primarily from grossly miscalculating 
the effects that transformation and other issues had had on local government performance. A two-year 
intervention (2004 – 2006) was devised. Herein, Project Consolidate and Siyenza Manje were formalised 
programmes of national and provincial government oversight of local government performance as 
allowed and required by the constitution, but which until that time had not been exercised. As a result, 1 
124 technical experts were sent to 268 municipalities by 2008, to support financial management and 
infrastructure planning and training (Powell 2012). Regrettably, these efforts amounted to little, as in his 
2009/10 assessment, the auditor general stated: “despite an abundance of technical tools to support 
municipalities … the results were only fractionally better than the previous year.”    Cabinet then adopted 
the five-year strategic agenda (5YSA) in 2006, following a review of the first five years. It was found that 
expectations for transition were too ambitious and the mismatch between national policy objectives and 
local government’s ability to implement them was widening. Three imperatives were identified: First, local 
government would have to improve performance and accountability. Second, a national capacity building 
initiative was needed to improve skills, and finally, all three spheres of government required improved 
policy coordination, monitoring and supervision. Simultaneously, the populace had started losing patience 
and protest action had gathered momentum.  
Commonly referred to as “service delivery” protests because their cause was the perceived lack thereof, 
and seen as a common revolt against “uncaring, self-serving, and corrupt leaders of municipalities”, 
protests gained notoriety for their remarkable ability to quickly escalate into violence and the destruction 
of property. Underpinning all the protests: a growing frustration at the injustice of persistent inequality 
(Nleya 2011; Reddy & Govender 2013; Alexander 2010). The escalatory nature of protests, and the opaque 
way in which police present statistics, which many believe is done purposefully to mask the true numbers, 
make it difficult to produce definitive numbers. For a detailed explanation see (Alexander 2010; Newham 
n.d.). Table 4-6 lists political gatherings recorded by the South African police for the period 2005 to 2008. 
Not all are related to service delivery protests per se and the numbers are questionable. For example, the 
number of just 4 protests in Mpumalanga during 2008 is undoubtedly dubious, if the previous and 
preceding years are considered.  Figures put out more recently by the Institute of Race Relations, (Table 
4-7) also sourced from police records, are notable for the increase in unrest-related (violent) protests. 
Indeed, both sets of figures point to increasing dissatisfaction with local government, where after a brief 
reduction during the Zuma ascendancy and election (2007 - 2009) the numbers increase once again, with 




Table 4-6: Gatherings by Province (Violent) (2005 - 2008) 
Province 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Gauteng 1 932    2 205 1 888 1 451    7 476 
Western Cape    557       511    577    642    2 287 
KwaZulu Natal 1 891    2 529 1 774 1 146    7 340 
Limpopo    660       915    665    642    2 882 
Eastern Cape    754    1 383 1 626    733    4 496 
North West 1 108    1 341 1 159 1 502    5 110 
Free State    506       728     713    483    2 430 
Mpumulanga     295       336    337       4      972 
Northern Cape    301       489    427    400    1 617 
Total 8 004   (10) 10 4337  (35) 9 166  (2) 7 003  (27) (83) 34 610 
Peaceful 7 382    9 577 8 486 6 304  31 749 
Unrest-related    622       860    680    699     2 861 
        Source: Alexander (2010) 
Table 4-7: National Gatherings (2011 - 2014) 
Province 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Peaceful Incidents 11 680 10 744 10 517 11 668 
Unrest-related 
Incidents 
      971   1 194   1 882   1 907 
Total 12 651 11 938 12 399 13 575 
       Source: Mackay (2015) 
The final act of the Mbeki government was to initiate a review of the white paper on local government 
and to develop a white paper for provincial government. A discussion document to discuss retaining, 
abolishing or reforming the provincial system was developed, with widespread support for abolishing the 
two-tier local government system. The process was disrupted when Mbeki lost the ANC leadership in 2007 
and resigned in 2008.  
Local Government under Pres. Zuma’s First Term (2009 – 2014) 
A first order of business of the new administration in 2009 was a ministerial name change; the Ministry of 
Provincial and Local Government would henceforth be known as the Ministry of Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs (COGTA). All existing programmes were put on hold and the local government 
turnaround strategy (LGTS) was introduced, based on an assessment of local government that found the 
system as a whole as “showing signs of distress” comprising of: huge service delivery backlogs, breakdown 
in council communication with citizens and of accountability to them, political interference, corruption, 
fraud, bad management, increasing violent service delivery protest, factionalism in parties and depleted 
municipal capacity. The LGTS required all municipalities to adopt turnaround strategies in the IDPs. As 
with previous attempts, the LGTS yielded poor results. An interim report by  Deloitte (2012, p.4) noted 
inter alia that: “Funding for proposed interventions was limited; With limited capacity to undertake 
existing functions how could it be possible to turn things around?; Interventions to date were ‘quick fixes’ 




from transformation fatigue, with cynicism about yet another intervention. Research conducted by Idasa40 
in 2011, found that as many as 80% of respondents were dissatisfied with the municipal services they 
received (Reddy & Govender 2013, p.86). 
Local Government under President Zuma’s Second Term (2014 - 201641) 
Zuma secured a second term, albeit with a lower majority; and his first move was a cabinet reshuffle, 
transferring the minister of finance, Pravin Gordhan, to minister of COGTA. In the state of the nation 
address of 2014 the president reiterated government’s commitment to developmental local government, 
and that despite achievements “much still needs to be done”. Building on the recently published national 
development plan, the back to basics (B2B) campaign was then launched. Municipalities were rated: top, 
middle and bottom; with each category representing roughly one-third of municipalities. The campaign 
identified characteristics of municipalities in each category and how bottom and middle municipalities 
could improve and stabilise. The campaign is noteworthy for its simple, direct, approach and its honesty 
in targeting the middle and bottom tiers. The COGTA minister was moved back to his original post of 
finance minister in December 2015, in what can only be referred to as a presidential blunder, when the 
incumbent finance minister (Nene) was replaced for no apparent reason by a junior and unknown member 
of parliament (D van Rooyen); causing financial free fall that necessitated another cabinet reshuffle just 
four days later, which put Gordhan back as finance minister, van Rooyen as COGTA minister and left Nene 
in the wilderness. The status and progress of the B2B is not known in late 2016, but the electorate finally 
spoke at the 2016 municipal elections: While the ANC retained its overall majority nationally, it lost 
significant ground to the opposition parties and lost its majority in four (of nine) metropolitan councils: 
Cape Town was retained by the Democratic Alliance (DA) opposition party; Nelson Mandela Bay, 
Johannesburg and Tshwane have opposition mayors (DA) under coalition agreements with other parties; 
and Ekurhuleni is run by the ANC, but under a coalition as it did not secure an outright majority.  
“Angry about corruption, unemployment and shoddy basic services, many ANC supporters have 
turned to the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) - making a switch that was unthinkable only a 
few years ago when the party was still seen as the political home of wealthy whites”. 
       Source: Brock (2016) 
An opposition party take-over guarantees nothing though, but closely contested elections do however 
serve to strengthen democracy and accountability – two primary ingredients of decentralization.  
4.7 A Historical Institutionalist Perspective   
South Africa opted for a highly centralised governmental system in its first constitution in 1910; becoming 
more acute over time as the policy of white supremacy was entrenched and formalised through legislation 
under apartheid – supported by swelling the ranks of the civil service with members of the NP Afrikaner 
electorate, who were poorly educated and under-skilled. Structural arrangements remained however, 
and local government was still compelled to comply with ordinances of the presiding provincial 
 
40 The Institute for a Democratic Alternative to South Africa, a long standing and highly respected NGO working on democracy and governance 
shut down in 2013 after 27 years due to a lack of funding. Its reports are no longer available online but regularly cited  





administrator. Enjoying little autonomy, with no direct access to national government and being required 
to be self-funding, further eroded its skill base. Unsurprisingly it was in a perennial state of crisis, which 
multiple official commissions of inquiry (1960 to 1980) confirmed. National government finally acted in 
the early 1980s by announcing its policy of decentralisation, in a belated attempt to provide new, and 
improve existing but inadequate, services to the black population. Decentralisation existed in name only 
though, as even genuine attempts by national government to reform the system were invariably 
scuppered by political unrest and the NP’s desperate attempts to cling on to apartheid. In truth, the 
reverse of decentralisation was true. The system became more centralised.  
Eventually, a negotiated political settlement with the ANC brought new hope for local government, now 
elevated by the constitution to a sphere of government – an equal partner with protected functions and 
revenue sources. An ambitious white paper on local government suggests sincerity of intent, but twenty 
years on and several large-scale national interventions to address shortcomings later, there is little to 
suggest that local government has the skills base, autonomy or funding to implement what was mandated 
by the white paper and envisaged by the RDP. Instead, the effects of affirmative action (necessary, but in 
practice difficult to achieve, because the required handover faced resistance given its threat to the existing 
white workforce, and had to deal with the impatience of the new workforce), combined with excessively 
high numbers of cadre and political appointments (destructive in their focus on political pliability as 
opposed to the requisite skills), has led to a decline in the availability of skills in local authorities. Taking 
this one step further, strong parallels can be drawn between this and the purging of local government 
staff by the NP in the 1950s and 1960s, to replace them with Afrikaners. Indeed, the outcomes are similar 
– a decline in performance and discontent of rate-payers which almost led to a commission of inquiry. 
Similarly, continuous nationwide service delivery protests are the order of the day. This comparison, 
although seemingly valid, has a major proviso: under apartheid these actions were taken to propel a 
supremacist ideology, whereas in post-apartheid South Africa, it is an overdue and necessary act to create 
an inclusive and racially representative workforce. A potentially positive outcome may be that in the same 
way that Afrikaans employees grew into their local government roles and the system shifted more so 
towards meritocracy, so too will the employees who have been appointed in this young democracy also 
rise to truly ‘inhabit’ their roles. An additional and material difference has been the introduction of “wall 
to wall” municipalities which has delivered poor results – with rural municipalities being barely functional, 
and the better funded metros struggling simply because they are just too big 42. Siddle and Thornhill’s then 
both shared the view that the experiment failed, requiring urgent major reform at local government level. 
 “It is the neglect of timely repair that makes rebuilding necessary.”   Richard Whately     
At national level, the ANC abandoned its left-leaning political ideology in favour of neo-liberalism, which 
did not deliver the economic benefits expected. Inequality and deep poverty persists; but is this because 
of economic ideology, or much like decentralisation, cannot be implemented selectively?  
In applying the neo-institutionalist frameworks for institutional stability and change (Chapter 2) to the 
historical context outlined in this chapter, long periods of stasis have been punctured by two instances of 
dramatic change, which occurred in 1948 and 1994. These “punctuations” in themselves should not have 
been unexpected, as they were the culmination of friction building within the system. The events and 
 




outcomes that transpired are thus now analysed through the historical institutionalist lens – respectively 
focusing on the three time periods discussed in this chapter. 
Union of South Africa up to 1948 
Period Summary: The creation of the Union heralded the birth of a new country, whose organizational 
structure was heavily influenced by its colonial patrons, and to a large extent, masters. The new state 
adopted the existing British political system, with minor influences from the Dutch as first colonial power 
and via the governance of the now integrated Boer republics. This was achieved through layering (the 
introduction of new rules on top or alongside existing ones). Its power structure was fundamentally based 
on the tenets of white supremacy with centralized governance. The white English-speaking community 
(British ancestry) and Anglo-Afrikaners (ala Smuts), both of whom were urbanized, controlled 
government. Afrikaners were marginalized, poor and resentful but enjoyed greater privileges than non-
white people. Black people resided almost exclusively in rural areas where local government was almost 
non-existent. Figure 4-3 shows the structure of the political system during this period with political control 
(blue) and funding flows (green).  
Objective: To maintain and entrench the incumbent political system benefitting a ruling elite and 
moneyed minority; to the economic exclusion of the newly urbanized Afrikaner and (almost total) 
exclusion of the native population - forced into the economy only as labour. 
Verdict: Negative feedback loop, where the controlling party sought to maintain new-Union equilibrium; 
but ultimately challenged by the economically excluded (Afrikaner) white population, resulting in the NP 





Figure 4-3: Evolution of South Africa’s Political System analysed through New Institutionalist Theory (1910 
to 1948) 
National Party Rule (1948 – 1994) 
Period Summary: Seen as a clear electoral mandate and emboldened by limited, seemingly surmountable 
resistance, the first half of NP rule saw the formalization and extension of legislated racism (apartheid). 
White supremacy was further strengthened and deepened through layering. The tide turned in the 1970s, 
politically punctuated by the Soweto uprisings of 1976. An obstinate NP however retained control through 
force - leading to greater political centralization. Attempts to retain supreme power by extending multi-
racial rule led to unworkable political concessions in the 1980s, such as the new tricameral system and 
black local authorities, a duplication of existing WLAs.  
Finally conceding apartheid was untenable, the NP entered into open political negotiations prior to the 
1994 democratic elections, after a short period of ‘quiet diplomacy’ with the ANC via a still imprisoned 
Nelson Mandela – a contingent event. These intense background negotiations, which preceded a point of 
punctuated equilibrium, satisfy the two requirements (Chapter 2.3.1) of a critical juncture, where: 1) It 
was possible for different decision to be taken (clearly that option existed, as a large part of the white 
electorate did not want apartheid to be dismantled); and, 2) Available options were not infinite – which 
they weren’t.  
Objective: The NP sought to protect white minority rights during negotiations. A primary focus, which 




Verdict: Positive feedback loop. The 1948 election victory provided an amplifier effect to racist policy 
frameworks. The process overreached (overheated) as “demands for change could no longer be 
contained” and reversed after a contextually brief period of negotiation – second punctuation. The 
political structure during this period is shown in Figure 4-4.   
 
Figure 4-4: Evolution of South Africa’s Political System analysed through New Institutionalist Theory (1948 
to 1994) 
Democracy (1994 to 2017)  
Period Summary: The 1996 constitution adopted co-operative government, consisting of three spheres 
(national, provincial and local). No longer hierarchical, the constitution specified and protected each 
sphere’s functions, jurisdiction and revenue sources. Based on an urgent need to elevate the lives of those 
marginalised under apartheid, government prioritised the development of new policies, strategies, 
economic plans and employment equity frameworks. Existing rules were replaced with new ones 
(displacement) and local government was tasked with the duty to provide households with basic services 
(water, electricity, refuse etc.) – illustrated in Figure 4-5. Thus, although the overall structure and form of 
the local government system was retained, it experienced significant incremental change over a relatively 
short period of time: WLA’s and BLA’s merged, systems were integrated, boundaries were redrawn and 
service delivery prioritised – a national government commitment implemented by local government, with 
two centres of power sharing responsibility. Poor performance would create disjuncture between the two 
however; consequently bringing government legitimacy into question. Local government then becomes 




opportunity to correct. This window of opportunity is not indefinite however, as questions regarding 
legitimacy soon surface and often escalate.  
Objective: Developmental government achieving service delivery through local government, employment 
equity via regulation & economic growth through national economic strategy (RDP, NDP etc.).  
Verdict: Negative feedback loop – The ANC found itself caught between long-held left leaning ideology 
and pre-proclaimed economic and social imperatives, a global move toward neo-liberalism (which it 
ultimately adopted over the former) and the constraints of a negotiated settlement. Once again, the 
system found, and still finds itself, in a self-maintaining state – acting to counterbalance, not reinforce, 
changes. And with inequality growing, the political system is building “friction”, which based on 
observation, is likely to lead to the next punctuated equilibrium.  
 
Figure 4-5: Evolution of South Africa’s Political System analysed through New Institutionalist Theory 
(1994 to 2017) 
Concluding Comment 
This chapter tracked the development of the three tiers of government in South Africa, with final focus on 
the restructuring that took place post 1994 and policies by the new government to reverse centuries of 
white domination and ingrained local government inequities. Its stated purpose was to provide an 
overarching context – a sufficiently detailed explanation of the overall political environment impacting on 
local government, so as to be able to meaningfully bore down to particular issues such as local government 
finances in the chapters that follow. The next chapter now thus focuses on how local government finances, 




5. Local Government, its Finances and the Role of Electricity 
“We are, most of us, profoundly uninterested in municipal affairs” 
       Maud (1938, p1) 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 outlined the political development of local government within a broader governmental context 
- hierarchical and centralised from inception. Municipalities were required to comply with and implement 
ordinances issued by the provincial administrator, (in turn directed by national government), without 
dissent or question, regardless of the beliefs and views held by their constituency. The low political 
standing of municipalities was made more difficult by national government’s requirement to be almost 
entirely self-funding; even with only one primary source of local taxation, the property tax. Financial 
assistance from the National Treasury was negligible. In 1979 for example, subsidies from central 
government constituted just 4.7% of income for the City of Cape Town (Solomon 1983, p.58). And 
although the 1996 Constitution elevated local government and protects municipal revenue sources 
(Chapter 4.5.2), the principle of self-sufficiency, or self-funding, remains. For reasons to be expounded 
upon, the financial needs of municipalities have grown since inception of democracy, whereby they are 
unable to balance their budgets without national grants. From 4.7% in 1979, the City of Cape Town in 
2014 required 14.7% (operating and capital budget) (City of Cape Town 2015, p.128). In 2003 the national 
average had increased to 8% (Bahl, 2003) and in 2015, the Treasury reported it climbing to 25% (National 
Treasury 2015, p.78).   
Indeed, in understanding core tenets of municipal funding relevant to this research, discussions in Chapter 
4 are preceded by in Chapter 3, which amongst others reviewed mainstream economic and academic 
thinking; advocating decentralised local government and financial self-sufficiency, and driven primarily by 
the collapse of communism in the east and a move to reduce government’s participation in the economy 
in the west (Chapter 3.3). Using these events as the starting point, as it coincides with the dismantling of 
apartheid, the first part of this chapter then tracks the evolution of South African municipal finances since 
democracy, to ascertain the following: The extent to which municipalities did, or did not, adopt such 
thinking (Chapter 3.5); how they have fared; the contribution of user fees to municipal budget; and to 
identify inconsistencies between the theory and application thereof.  
5.2 South African Local Government Finance under Democracy 
5.2.1 Period 1: 1994 - 2003  
Beyond the euphoria of peaceful transition, even from a local government finance perspective, South 
Africa’s conversion to democracy caught the attention of the world. This was particularly because it came 
at a moment in history when the new government could be encouraged to adopt fiscal decentralisation, 
as all developing countries were at the time. In truth though, major South African cities had never relied 
on centralised support through national transfers; always required to generate their own revenue, albeit 
only used for the benefit of the white population. Chapter 7 of the constitution, with 14 articles, mandated 
developmental local government, which now meant undertaking and financing a much wider and inclusive 




this mandate, while requiring the other two tiers of government to provide tacit support (in theory 
anyway). Reform for local government had arrived; and global decentralization enthusiasts had a best 
practise example unfolding, to which they could lend support, refer to at conferences and publicly 
recommend; which they certainly did. See Bahl & P.J. (2003), Cameron (1996), Cameron (1997), Cameron 
(1999), Bahl & Smoke (2003).  
The first local democratic government elections were only held six years after the 1994 national elections, 
in 2000. By then, South Africa’s initial successes towards fiscal decentralisation43 were already being 
lauded- 1) A constitutional and legal framework had been created; 2) Inter-governmental relations which 
reduced hierarchical arrangements, were in place; 3) The number of municipalities had been reduced by 
two-thirds by the municipal demarcation board; and 4) Key elements of a local government revenue 
system were operational. These four achievements were major milestones which most countries were 
still grappling with and meant that South Africa’s progress was being closely monitored by many 
governments and economists. The process began experiencing challenges however, and to take longer 
than expected - “given the complex political, institutional, and fiscal environment that prevails”. A detailed 
case study led by two internationally renowned academics on the subject was undertaken and published 
in 2003: Restructuring Local Government Finance in Developing Countries – Lessons from South Africa 
(Bahl & Smoke 2003), to assist both the country and analysts working on fiscal decentralisation in other 
countries. The study concluded that for South Africa to meet the substantial role given to the local sphere 
of government, difficult choices would have to be made. The researchers overview is summarised in Figure 
5-1.
 
43 As per definition: Revenue from central government and the authority to raise revenue from local sources, is transferred from national to 





Source: Bahl (2003) 




When looking at the above assessment within the context of this thesis, the four previously identified 
revenue sources (property tax, user fees, national transfers and loans) are covered in Chapter 3. Thus, of 
particular interest now are utility / user charges for electricity and two new potential sources – excise and 
motor vehicle taxes.  
Utility / User Charges 
Municipal reliance on the revenue derived from user charges, especially electricity, is a paramount issue 
for three reasons: First, is the magnitude of the surpluses that accrue after bulk purchases and other 
operating costs have been paid, which can then be used to fund other activities. Second is the large 
cashflow that these sales provide. Indeed, most municipalities’ debt ratings would be affected without 
them. By way of example, gross utility receipts constitute more than a third of total local government 
receipts, which is greater than property tax collection. [It must be noted however, that this is the case for 
25% of municipalities - metropolitan and larger cities. 50% operate at the break-even mark and the 
remaining quarter operate at a loss. Given South Africa’s high urbanization rate however, (Figure 3-2), 
where the percentage of the urban population has gone from 53% in 1994 to 58% in 2003 and then 
jumped to 65% by 2016, these metropolitan and large city figures are now beginning to apply more and 
more to the majority of the population.] Finally, municipalities use electricity supply as a credit control 
tool, because all municipal charges (property tax, water, electricity, refuse collection) are bundled into 
one bill. Electricity supply is only reconnected if the entire outstanding debt is paid. 
Although a reliable revenue source, user charges violate three primary characteristics of a good local tax 
{Table 3-3): 1) User charges are a hidden tax, making them non-transparent. The knock-on effect is that 
local accountability is compromised, as voters cannot hold officials responsible if they do not know how 
and where taxes are used; 2) User charges are transportable. Many users do not reside where the 
electricity is consumed; and users, more especially businesses who contribute most to the surplus, may 
move their operations or residence to a better priced municipal distributor; and 3) The consumer price of 
electricity is overstated by the amount of the implicit tax, which varies from municipality to municipality 
– not only affecting efficiency, but with potential impact on national and domestic commerce. 
In 2003, when it was expected that municipal EDI would be regionalised and privatised (Chapter 7.5.4), it 
meant the possibility of municipalities losing one of their most productive revenue sources; threatening 
their economic viability. Finding a replacement was thus a priority, and perhaps keeping the status-quo  
was an even bigger priority.  
Utility Excise Tax 
A utility excise tax was seen as a viable replacement for the surpluses that would be lost from the 
privatisation / regionalisation of municipal distribution systems under the REDs initiative. The major 
advantage of an ad valorem on electricity sales would be the large customer base, making the revenue 
buoyant, as it would grow with consumption. Rates could also be scheduled to suit the requirements of 
local government, by offering rebates and incentives. Additional advantages were identified, such as that 
migrating from an implicit to an explicit tax, meant that the tax can be levied regardless of whether a 
surplus was generated or which municipal entity distributed the service. Likewise, once accepted, it could 
be introduced to other municipal services like water distribution and waste collection. In addition, an 




which presides over the area, regardless of service provider. It would also be straightforward to administer 
and collect by being included in the exisiting bill, requiring minimal additional effort; and finally, it resolves 
the concerns held by local government on the loss of revenue from restructuring, while complying legally, 
as the constitution allows for the use of an excise tax.  
A major concern of adopting an excise tax however, is that it may be deemed to be regressive and would 
affect low income households disproportionately. An excise tax, set at a rate to achieve existing surpluses, 
would have little impact on tariffs, but would now be visible to consumers, making it politically unpopular. 
Under such conditions, the call for the provision of relief to low income households would be strong.  
Motor Vehicle Taxes 
The revenue from the annual renewal of motor vehicle licenses accrues to provincial government, but 
there is ample justification for municipalities to access this revenue source; and if not outright, to then 
receive a share of the proceeds. Vehicle taxes display most of the characteristics of a good tax, such as 
equity and adminstrative ease, while being both revenue productive and buoyant. Local roads must be 
maintained and taxes should help offset such costs. Additional options for revenue include congestion 
charges, parking charges, fuel taxes and tolls. Such measures could help reduce pollution and congestion. 
- In 2009, metropolitan municipalities started receiving a portion of the national fuel levy to assist with 
road maintenance (Figure 5-3), as recommended by the authors (Bahl and Smoke).  
5.2.2 Period 2: 2004 -2015  
Alhtough the exercise undertaken by Bahl and Smoke cannot be repeated for the ensuing period (2004 – 
2014), it is worth looking at how local finances have developed since 2003. A review of National Treasury’s 
Annual Budget Review44 (NT) publications for the period 2004 to 2015, shows four underlying trends. The 
first, is a steady reduction in the percentage of own revenue generated by local government. For example, 
in the early 1980s, Solomon (1983) calculated national transfers to be in the order of 4% for the City of 
Cape Town, as a relatively representative figure of the national average. Another study a decade and a 
half later in 2000 by Bahl (Figure 5-1) found that the national average had doubled to 8% - with transfers 
being highest for district municipalities, less for municipalities and lowest for metropolitan cities. In the 
same order, national transfers in 2016 were 80%, 37% and 19%. Figure 5-2 clearly illustrates this trend, 
where for the period from 2003 to 2016, national transfers have quadrupled and the local government 
percentage of national budget has increased more than two and half times. Some, not all, were planned 
such as the decision to terminate the RSC levy on the 1st of July 2006. The loss of revenue to municipalities 
was compensated by increasing national transfers, which in 2006 resulted in the perentage of total 
national budget transferred to local government increasing from 4.9% to 6.3% 45 , with national 
government making greater use of non-discretional funding. The second trend was the realisation and 
tacit acceptance of sub-optimal performance at local government level. This is evidenced in the tone of 
the NT commentary, which in the early 2000’s - although recognising the challenges of amalgamating 
municipalities (843 to 284) and being pragmatic about the task of transforming them to meet their service 
delivery mandate -  was positive and ambitious. This gradually transformed to one of concern, and even 
alarm, about continued poor performance, mismanagement and growing backlogs. In 2004 an additional 
 
44 The reports are published annually and sourced from the National Treasury website www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/  




R750 million per annum was made available to municipalities by NT, to prioritise in-house capacity 
building (Budget Review, 2004.162). In 2007, continued capactiy constraints in municipalities saw NT 
launch the Siyenza Manje project to strenghten engineering and project management expertise. The initial 
budget allocation was R742 million (Budget Review, 2007.147), which was expanded to include financial 
management; costing R1.45 billion by 2011 (FFC 2011, p.5). And in 2014 “While much has been achieved 
in the rollout of municipal infrastructure…. Significant work needs to be done, both to eradicate backlogs 
in access to services, and to ensure that services are properly operated and maintained over the long term. 
……there has been widespread waste and inefficiency.” (Budget Review, 2014.101). In 2016, NT then 
announced a (another) review to determine what could be done to improve perfromance. These 
interrelated trends coalesce in the growing exasperation that despite over a decade of annual double digit 
percentage increases in funding to municipalities, the financial status of local government remained 
precarious or had worsened – the 2011 Budget Review (page 59) had a section titled “Vulnerable cash 
position of municipalities”. Municipal finances were perhaps more of a concern and less of an issue while 
the national economy was growing up to 2010, albeit by far less than required; but the sustained pressure 
of low (<1%) and negative GDP growth since 2010, has meant that national resources have to be carefully 
managed. Once again, reforms were put in place, but with a greater focus on financial efficiency 
“Municipalities can improve billing and revenue, reduce water and electricity losses and enhance 
maintenance” and “Municipal standard chart of accounts, in pilot phase, will promote transparency and 
accountability” (Budget Review, 2016.83). The final trend identified, is the growing impact of higher 
electricity tariff increases on sales from 2007 onwards. Initially this resulted in a windfall for municipalities, 
as the increases, which came off a low base, took some time for users to respond to. By 2016 however, 
significantly lower surpluses were generated, amidst a depressed economy and consumers now having 
taken measures to reduce consumption, “Recent increases in the costs of bulk electricity and water have 
reduced the surpluses municipalities generate from these services” (Budget Review, 2016.92). This issue is 
dealt with in greater detail in the Johannesburg case study (Chapter 7) – with the primary reasons for 
smaller surpluses including reduced consumption due to the magnitude and frequency of the tariff 
increases, and the higher bulk tariffs being charged to municipalities, now impacting expenditure and 





Source: Author derived from National Treasury  
Figure 5-2: National Transfers to Local Government (2003 to 2016)  
 
Source: Moore (2012)  
Figure 5-3: Breakdown of National Transfers to Local Government (2007 – 2013) 
In recognising the financial and skill deficiencies of municipalities, central government has taken various 
measures. Amongst others, it: Revised the equitable grant formula to favour smaller and district 
municipalities, to compensate for the more limited revenue raising opportunities now available to them; 
allocated a portion of the national fuel levy to metropolitan cities to fund road maintenance; expanded 
conditional grants for infrastructure projects (electrification, water, transport, urban settlements, rural 
roads) to ensure service delivery projects are prioritised. Indeed, conditional grants in 2016, as a 



















































step further and introduced indirect transfers46; while after a long battle, municipalities succeeded in 
preserving one of their two primary revenue sources (electricity surpluses) when REDs was withdrawn. 
Metropolitan electricity networks were strengthened by national government as part of the World Cup 
2010 project, which in the view of Dr de Beer postponed the crisis facing the muncipal EDI (Chapter 7.5.4
 RED’s (So Close, Yet so Far), ISMO and ADAM (Much of the Same).   
Despite these developments, by 2016 local government had not achieved the fiscal decentralisation 
objectives identified in the empirical research, and if anything, the reverse is occuring. Indeed, additional 
and new own revenue sources have yet not been identifed and introduced, while annual shortfalls are 
“plugged” by electricity surplus and national transfers, (which the treasury has had to increase every year 
– even more so since surpluses decreases due to reduced consumption). And while municipal 
performance has been a major cause of concern for national government since 2000, with several 
strategies implemented to try and address the issue, success has been limited at best. For example, in the 
Attorney General’s June 2016 media release on local government audits, it was reported that 
municipalities had improved over the last five years, with 54 receiving clean audits, compared to just 13 
for the previous period. If one considers however, that there are 278 municipalities, then 54 of 278 
demonstrates just how poor the overall performance is. Of greater concern was the finding that: “In 2014-
15 the AGSA rated the financial health of 92% of the municipalities as either concerninng or requiring 
intervention (82% in 2012-13)”. This was made apparent by: Net deficits, with current liabilities exceeding 
current deficits; an inability (or taking too long) to collect revenue; and not paying creditors on time 
(AGSA). On this evidence, the issues of inadequate skills and financial resources faced by local government 
since formation of the Union, continue in the 21st Century. Despite constitutional mandates attempting 
to elevate and reform local government, and sincere, concerted, efforts to manifest this, it has not 
occurred, as indirectly predicted by Bird (2011) in his paper, Subnational Taxation in Developing Countries:  
“The “best” package for any particular country of subnational government is likely to be not only 
context specific and path-dependant, but also highly sensitive to the balance struck between 
different political and economic factors and interests.” 
In 2016 the tenuous nature of revenue from municipal services was publicly raised by the then 
Johanneburg mayor Parks Tau, when he called for an official review of local funding sources. Even as 
SALGA President, and joined by other local government leaders, Tau continually raises the issue. At the 
heart of the municipal finance review argument is local government’s developmental mandate, which 
must overcome the spatial segregation legacy of apartheid and the high urbanization rate of indigent 
people, in the form of “land invasions, mushrooming of informal settlements and proliferation of backyard 
dwellings.” Here, the unavoidable consequence is revenue earmarked for infrastructure development 
being redirected. Additionaly, the expectation of extracting meaningful revenue for services provided to 
unemployed and low income earners, is unrealistic. Indeed, even those who do pay, consume less than 
the costs incurred to service them. Thus, the 9% of overall national revenue which is transferred to local 
government (Figure 5-2) is insufficient, and SALGA has called for legislative changes – particularly singling 
out, “changing NERSA’s and ESKOM’s unfettered rights to impact on municipal infrastructure and finance 
management” (SALGA 2017; Tau 2017; Naki 2016).  
 
46 Under this approach, a national department undertakes a function on behalf of the municipaity (or province). No funds are transferred and on 
completion the infrastructure is ceded to sub-national government who then holds operational and miantenance responsibility. Such projects 




Municipal finances also  featured prominently at the 2017 Chartered Institute of Government Finance, 
Audit and Risk Officers (CIGFARO) conference. Here, in a top down explanation, the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission (Mabugu 2017) noted the impact of the protracted economic slowdown on public finances 
(income down by R352 billion for the period 2009 to 2016, of which R24 billion would have accrued to 
local government), putting pressure on all government expenditure. Regardless, structural changes were 
deemed necessary to maximise revenue generation. Five were listed: 
1. Reform existing tax instruments: Such as increasing or broaden VAT rate; 
2. Introduce new taxes: Carbon tax, local business tax and land value capture; 
3. Enhance tax administration and close loopholes: Address base erosion and profit shifting; 
4. Efficiency: Reduce public sector wage bill, improve municipal efficiencies (reduce electricity and water 
losses, resolve debt issues) and improve inter-governmental coordination; and     
5. Combinations of the above. 
The CIGFARO president stated that the association would not support the implementation of any new 
taxes unless the current fiscal mechanisms had been maximised.  
National Treasury’s (Fanoe 2017) presentation then focused on the Division of Revenue Act and explained 
it was specificially designed to benefit smaller rural muncipilaties without revenue raising abilities of 
metros – and thus receive twice the allocation per household compared to what is transferred to metros. 
The speaker noted the popularly quoted perceived factors contributing to municipal failures,  such as 
underfunding, unviable municipalities, governance failures, the desgin of the inter-governmental system 
or national government itself – all anecdotal in her view. The facts on the other hand, it seems mirror the 
sentiments expressed in the interview with Siddle and Thornhill (Chapter 4.7) as well as the Auditor 
General’s findings, and were that municipalities collectively underspend each year, with their share of 
total national revenue actually being substantial at 24% (9% transfers plus own revenue sources); and that 
ultimately it is mismanagement, lack of internal controls, leadership challenges, and massive water and 
electricity losses which need immediate remedial action. 
5.2.3 Municipal Finance Practise compared to Municipal Finance Theory 
As already outlined, theoretical understanding around municipal funding frameworks recognised that 
municipalities with limited revenue sources were left with little choice but to rely heavily on user charges 
– making them particularly attractive because these sources are not accessible to the other tiers of 
government, making interference unlikely. This practise, theorists noted, allows for accountability, as 
residents can vote new political parties into power, if dissatisfied with service levels. There are however 
two disadvantages: The first, especially when revenue is constrained, is the strong tendency to maximise 
surpluses for general purpose use – at the expense of the service itself, with maintenance and new capital 
investments as typical first casualties. In effect, the user charge practice provides a subsidy from those 
who use the service to those who do not; a crude redistributive technique often missing the target group 
entirely. Secondly, tariff structures which are not carefully considered can have material consequences: 
Here, for example, quantity / volume discounts place the burden on low users and are thus regressive. 
Marginal pricing is also problematic, because it is difficult to define costs properly and it may still be 
difficult to determine the appropriate charge even if costs are defined correctly. For example, electricity 
tariffs which are deemed too high by users, will result in reduced consumption, and for those who can 




funding model under pressure; all of which now occurs in a strained economic environment that only 
serves to further compound the effects (Solomon 1983; Mawhood 1993; Reynolds 2004; van Ryneveld 
1990; Sioshansi 2014). Here thus, it seems evident that the theoretical projections were accurate, as these 
outcomes have materialised. 
The second, and more important issue however, is a problematic dichotomy in objectives. Theory states 
that the municipal priority should be efficiency, with broader developmental goals left to national 
government. And therein lies the rub for local government in South Africa. The Constitution and White 
Paper on Local Government (see  
Table 4-4) calls for developmental local government to address past inequities and apply a holistic 
approach to achieve other policy objectives, such as job creation47. Yet sustainable financial practise, 
efficient usage of resources, transparent tariffs etc. are equally promoted. This contradiction places local 
government in an untenable financial situation, as the political imperative of development is always likely 
to take precedence over sound financial management – thus confirming the concerns and scepticism that 
met the local government white paper when it was issued – as detailed Chapter 4.6.  
In many ways, the long-standing municipal practise of cross-subsidisation funded from user fees, which 
served WLA authorities ably for decades, was seized upon after 1994 to fund the extension of municipal 
services to previously excluded and marginalised residents. Simultaneously, ineffective and inefficient 
local government has increased overall municipal funding requirements. This means that proceeds from 
what is seemingly an inexhaustible source of revenue (which it is not) increase disproportionately 
annually. Ultimately thus, the amplification of this trend points to a positive feedback loop; the expected 
consequences of which are listed above, with the actual impact analysed in the Johannesburg case study 
(Chapter 7).  
5.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to extend the discussions around municipal funding and functions in 
earlier chapters, now into South Africa post-1994, as to allow for an informed discussion of the role of 
electricity in the next chapter, and a comparison against, the case study of Johannesburg. Indeed, the 
post-94 period is particularly pertinent for South African local government, because it is one that is 
affected both by the challenges of the past and of the future - local government now elevated to full tier 
of government, with a new developmental mandate to address past inequities but still hampered by the 
timeless challenges of limited income-raising streams - which speaks directly to the Johannesburg case 
study.  
Thus, with much of the focus of this chapter falling on gaining an international perspective, it is interesting 
to note as a good starting point for this conclusion, that a survey of international literature on local 
government functions and finance in developed and developing countries, found that even though these 
are more likely to be weakly constituted and under-resourced in the latter, they are necessary in both.  
And while the allocation and implementation of local government functions does vary from country to 
 
47 It is common practise for political parties contesting municipal elections to make job creation a campaign pledge. For example: Our manifesto 
recognises that jobs are created by small businesses and not by government (www.enca.com/south-africa/damanifesto-promises-recipe-sa-





country, they invariably face similar challenges. Most notable of these is that they ultimately have to yield 
to central government decisions (funding cuts, policy changes etc.) and have limited revenue raising 
instruments available to them, as they are generally barred from using national tax instruments to raise 
revenue. Property tax is by and large the only tax they can claim as their own, which although reliable, 
tends to be inequitable due to its bluntness. The research has shown that there are sound economic 
reasons for avoiding tax duplication between tiers of government, but the effect on local government 
finances has been to place them in a precarious position, as national transfers undoubtedly compromise 
autonomy and are of the first expenditure items to be cut during periods of national belt tightening. Thus, 
it is not unsurprising that local government, which is expected to provide public benefit services for which 
it cannot recoup costs (libraries, public parks, recreation centres), will seize upon revenue generating 
opportunities where they present themselves, as has been the case with electricity - and it is that which 
will now be further explored through the prism of historical institutionalism, with the focus on South Africa 
as context, in later chapters. We begin with an in-depth analysis of the economic history and the role of 



















6. Economic History and the Role of Electricity 
“Economies rarely get rich on agriculture alone” 
        Allan Beattie, 2009 
6.1 Objectives and Structure of the Chapter 
At its core, the research seeks to determine whether the challenges faced by municipal EDI can only be 
fully understood within the context of how it evolved in tandem with, and continues to be influenced by, 
two factors: 1) Government structures (national and provincial); and 2) The national ESI and its role and 
contribution to the development of the economy, of which municipalities form only a part. And while it is 
of course true that the ESI of every country is the lifeblood of its economy, for South Africa this is perhaps 
even more so. Here the state’s entire economic development and industrialisation strategy was largely 
premised on cheap and plentiful energy, especially low-cost electricity, in providing a competitive 
advantage. Indeed, the crucial extent to which the system was dependant on cheap abundant electricity, 
has ultimately had costs borne by the entire economy (Mohammed 1997). In providing context, Chapter 
4 reviewed the evolution of government; Chapter 5 considered municipal functions and the funding 
thereof; and this chapter explores the broader political economy of South Africa from an electricity 
perspective. These chapters (3, 4 and 5) highlight the inter-related nature of ESI to its context and 
demonstrate that it cannot be viewed in isolation – thus providing the conceptual foundation for detailed 
analysis of the South African municipal ESI in the following chapter. 
This chapter commences with an international example, which provides a basis for analysis. It compares 
and evaluates the fortunes of two nations sharing similar conditions at independence two centuries ago, 
but ultimately had very different economic outcomes. The focus is then brought back to South Africa and 
the research presented in the now familiar time periods. The approach used to present the historical 
research for each time period, in the inter-related spirit of this work, is done in two parallel streams. The 
first articulates the economic development of the country, and the second traces the national ESI. The 
analysis provides a first-hand example of the complexities associated with neo-institutionalism, 
approached through historical institutionalism. 
As the development of the national electricity generation, transmission and distribution system and its 
role in the political development of the country has been adequately recorded, see (Marquard 2006; 
Christie 1984; Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000; Fine & Rustomjee 1996; Steyn 2001), the research that 
follows relies substantially on this existing secondary research for context, but augments it in two ways: 
Firstly, the narrative is relayed from a MEU’s perspective, which to date has not attracted much attention 
from academic researchers and historians – providing key perspective from a hitherto underrepresented 
sector in the South African ESI. Secondly, the existing research is complemented with primary research 
findings. The research also considers and evaluates change from a historical institutionalism perspective, 





A historical comparison of the development of the American and Argentine economies (Beattie 2009) to 
determine why two countries with similar economic potential and prospects when becoming independent 
in 1789 and 1816 respectively, has led to America being a global superpower, while Argentina keeps 
moving from one financial crisis to the next; concluded that it was down to choices made. Both nations 
had large tracts of land occupied by a small number of resistive native people, ultimately defeated by 
superior firepower. With the land secured, both nations focused on building an agrarian economy. Natural 
resources, abundant in both countries, could only be exploited in the next stage of development, while 
labour shortages were resolved by migrants from Europe. But that is where the similarities ended, as their 
choices took them on very different paths. Argentina handed out large pieces of land, creating a small 
elite of exceedingly wealthy landowners who exported their produce. By 1882, the first freezing plant was 
built in Buenos Aires for the shipment of meat to England (Maddison 2007, p.102) and by 1914 Argentina 
had an annual growth rate of 6%. In fact, over a 43-year period it posted the fastest growth in the world, 
making it amongst the ten richest - behind the US, Britain and Australia but ahead of Germany, France 
and Italy. European immigrants streamed into the country and by 1914 more than half of Buenos Aires’s 
population was foreign born. The economy was built, almost exclusively, on exportation of meat and 
grains to Britain. A combination of factors - the outbreak of the First World War; Britain’s decision to sign 
preferential trade agreements with commonwealth countries; the vested interests of its landowners; the 
flight of capital; an uneducated and unskilled population; and a failure to modernise - led to economic 
decline (Economist 2015). President Peron, during his first two terms in office (1946 – 1952), tried to 
reform the country under his programme of economic independence, but the results were mixed at best. 
For example, the inadequate electricity grid was expanded by only 25% but hydroelectric power 
generation leapt from 45 to 350 MW. Economic instability led to military dictatorships (five since 1930) 
and ineffective governments; while Argentina’s 2001 $100 billion sovereign debt default is the world’s 
largest. 
Conversely, America handed out small parcels of land to families, who undertook intensive farming and 
invested capital surpluses to increase productivity, leading to exports and foreign currency inflows. The 
ensuing economic growth attracted skilled workers from Europe. The US government used the economic 
surpluses, and foreign capital investment, to substitute labour for capital and is so doing migrate from an 
agrarian to a manufacturing and then a service economy (Beattie 2009; Baldwin 1956). As with Argentina, 
the US also faced problems. There was the civil war (1861 – 1865); the decision to break up exploitive 
monopolies, created in the 1880 and 1890s, through legislation; the stock market crash of 1929 followed 
by the Great Depression; and the cost of participating in the Second World War; but it nonetheless 
emerged from these as the new global superpower. Beattie concludes that ultimately the difference 
between the two came down to selections made and America’s ability to adapt to new circumstances. 
New Zealand, Australia and Canada are additional examples of countries which have succeeded because 
of prudent decision-making.  
Economists broadly agree that a country’s ability to create or attract capital for local investment is what 
ultimately leads to economic development. Conversely, countries which do not, or choose not to, as 
illustrated in the Argentinean example, find themselves in a vicious cycle of poverty. And although each 
country will follow a different road to industrialisation, it is possible to make certain generalizations 




catapulted it from a poor backwater to a sought-after destination for entrepreneurs and skilled migrants. 
Initially, industrialisation led to high growth rates which peaked in the 1950s and 1960s, but then the 
country’s economic fortunes began to unravel. South Africa’s economy has been intensely scrutinized by 
academics over the decades, both locally and internationally, with the focus of the debate being the 
relationship between apartheid and capitalism. In an ideologically polarised world of east versus west 
during the Cold War era, academic analysis and comment followed suit. South Africa’s segregationist 
policies which had a direct, if not overwhelming, influence on the economy, meant that an area which 
ordinarily would have been dominated by economists was ultimately shared with political writers. The 
former were represented by political economists (liberals) and the latter by radical writers in the 
structuralist Marxist tradition (Nattrass 1991, pp.654–656) and henceforth referred to as revisionists. The 
“liberal-radical” debate, as it came to be known, resulted in little direct engagement. Nattrass attributed 
this to revisionists often being alienated by terminology and methodology used. In response, economists 
regarded history and sociology as unscientific and held contempt for Marxist analysis. This led to intense 
discourse, on theoretical and ideological grounds, on how apartheid could be removed, but at the expense 
of empirical research. Nattrass concedes though that this was not the sole reason, and that additional 
non-related factors contributed to the lack of engagement. Nonetheless, two separate accounts of South 
Africa’s industrialisation developed and existed until the mid-1980s, which when views softened, allowed 
for greater cooperation between the two camps (Nattrass 1991; Verhoef 1998; Saunders 1988).   
The core issue in the ‘liberal-radical’ debate was thus: Revisionists contended that capital accumulation, 
which facilitated the growth of the South African economy to the extent that it did, was a direct 
consequence of state policy, namely the supply of cheap labour and other protectionist policies, and that 
there were “no important contradictions between political developments and the requirements of capital 
accumulation” (Nattrass 1991, p.655). The liberal economists’ view was that capitalists immediately 
recognised the long-term damage of the government’s segregationist policies, but had little choice but to 
operate under the prevailing conditions. And while conceding that the system created short run profits 
for some, it was clear it distorted and impacted negatively on capitalistic development. By their account, 
capitalists were not implicit in the apartheid system. 
6.3 Economic Development up to 1910: How the Discovery of Minerals 
Changed Everything 
6.3.1  Economic Development: Setting the Scene 
Feinstein (2005, p.1) attributes South Africa’s economic development to the “unique endowment of 
human and natural resources….. Other countries possessed one or two of the distinguishing features, but 
only in South Africa were all of them present together.” The first was the presence of a large indigenous 
population, estimated at over 1 500 000 at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The second, was a 
significant number of European settlers from the outset. In 1820 there were 30 000 settlers, 
predominantly based in the Cape Province. By 1865 there were 250 000 settlers spread across all four 
provinces (Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal), with the number growing to over 1 100 000 at 
the start of the twentieth century and reaching 1 300 000 by 1913 (Maddison 2007, p.579). Such large 
European settlement in territories which had a large indigenous population was not the norm and was 
not experienced in India, most of Asia and the rest of Africa. From the outset, settlers and the indigenous 




controlled water, natural resources and land. The third, and final, feature was the variety and quantity of 
natural resources (gold in particular), but this was not known of until their discovery much later. There 
were other countries, most notably in South America, which had large indigenous populations and 
minerals, but not to the extent found in South Africa.  
Until the discovery of minerals, South Africa was a backward country with minimal economic prospects 
(Feinstein 2005, p.2) (Lumby & Coleman 1983, p.100) (Nattrass 1981, p.23). The economy relied almost 
exclusively on agriculture, but the land offered difficult agrarian opportunities: low grade soil; insufficient 
and irregular rainfall; disease; pests and wild animals; and land disputes with the indigenous population. 
The discovery of diamonds and gold towards the end of the nineteenth century was the catalyst which 
combined these three features and shaped the development and structure of the South African economy. 
By being able to convince foreign nationals to invest part of the capital surpluses locally, South Africa 
developed secondary industries and did not get trapped in a cycle of extraction benefiting only a few 
‘Randlords’ who controlled the diamond and gold mining industries (Nattrass 1981, pp.162–163), as was 
the case with elite landowners in the Argentinean experience. The discovery of minerals completely 
transformed South Africa; and for well over 100 years - although waning in influence in the 21st century - 
minerals have dominated the economy, influenced government policy and allowed for the transformation 
from a solely agrarian to an industrialised economy.  
Table 6-1 compares South Africa against three African countries, as a means of demonstrating how 
economic power on the continent shifted to South Africa after the discovery of minerals. 
Table 6-1: Railway, Population and GDP of selected African countries (1820-1913)  
Country  1820 1870 1913 
Length of railway line in service (km / million population) 
South Africa N/A 0 2 300 
Egypt  N/A 168    359 
Ghana  N/A 0    165 
Morocco N/A 0     84 
Population (000) 
South Africa  1 550  2 547 12 144 
Egypt   4 194  7 049  12 043 
Ghana   1 374  1 500  5 111 
Morocco  2 689 3 776 1 870 
African Total 74 236          90 466       124 697 
GDP (million 1990 $) 
South Africa    643 2 185  9 857 
Egypt  1 992 4 573 10 950 
Ghana     570    693 1 595 
Morocco 1 156 2 126 3 630 
African Total          31 161          45 234         79 486 
Per Capita GDP (1990 $) 
South Africa 415 858 1 602 
Egypt  475 649   902 
Ghana  415 462   781 
Morocco 430 563   710 
African Average 420 500   637 




Agriculture to Mining: Benefitting from Cheap Labour  
Having been dispossessed of their land, the indigenous population was no longer able to farm 
independently; allowing white settlers to control the labour supply, which they duly exploited. African 
farm workers were little more than slaves. The white farmers did minimal work and effectively became 
plantation owners, not doing much more than “ride about the country” (Feinstein, 2005 p. 50, quoting the 
Natal Native Affairs Commission). From 1850 agricultural prospects improved, and so too the need for 
additional labour, as demand for wool and other products grew in the Cape and abroad. The British colony 
of Natal started importing labourers from India to work on the sugar plantations, as the farmers were able 
to convince the governor that they could not find adequate local labour. Over 150 000 indentured Indians 
came to South Africa between 1860 and 1911, before the practise was stopped by India. The supply of 
labour reached a crisis point when diamonds were discovered in the 1870’s and gold in the 1880s. Labour 
shortages continued as Africans were unwilling to work for what was being offered or to succumb to the 
settlers. Labour contracts were entered into with neighbouring countries and as early as 1898, 60% of the 
workforce was from Mozambique (Nattrass 1981, p.137). Government and employers responded to the 
labour shortages by introducing three mechanisms to induce the African population to work. The situation 
was summarised succinctly by the Holloway Commission:  
“In the past, difficulty was experienced in obtaining a sufficient supply of labour for the industries 
of the country. The native in a tribal reserve … felt no urge to go out to labour. Not accustomed to 
anything more than his simple wants of tribal life he had really no incentive to work for more. The 
European Governments, wanting labour for their industries, decided to bring pressure to bear on 
the Native to force him to come out to work, and did this by imposing taxation” 
     Native Economic Commission (quoted in Feinstein. P 55)         
The first instrument was a hut tax, levied irrespective of income. Second was the enforcement of pass 
laws. These were used to restrict movement and to bind labourers to employers, which ensured their 
“loyalty” and stopped them from pursuing more lucrative opportunities. The third tool, was the 
continuous reduction in available agricultural land for Africans (Feinstein 2005, pp.47–59). 
By 1911, mines were competing strongly for agricultural labour, with over 260 000 Africans employed by 
mines compared to 360 000 who worked on white owned farms. Three practises, which developed in the 
diamond fields, were transferred and entrenched in the gold mines: 1) Skilled labour was for the exclusive 
preserve of highly paid white employees and manual work was done by lowly paid African employees; 2) 
African staff were recruited as short-term migrants; and 3) They were housed in closed compounds 
(Feinstein 2005, p.63). In 1915 the per capita income of whites was 11 times higher than Africans (Holborn 
2013, p.10) (Bhorat 2001, p.2) (Feinstein 2005, p.13) (Nattrass 1981, p.139). 
The economic benefits from the discovery of diamonds were revolutionary – capital requirements were 
limited, the mining equipment unsophisticated, labour was performed by Africans for minimal wages, and 
the profits were mammoth. These factors allowed the diamond industry to develop through the 
reinvestment of surpluses and by 1938 foreign investment was calculated at less than £20 million 48 
(Lumby & Coleman 1983, p.171). The individual diamond claims were consolidated into a few small 
companies, most notably De Beers Consolidated Mines under Cecil John Rhodes, who by 1879 controlled 
 




the world’s supply of diamonds. The gold reefs discovered in the Transvaal (1884) were unlike any others 
in the world that were easily accessible alluvial or veins of metal ore. The Transvaal reefs had an 
unprecedented uniformity and continuity in their length and breadth, but they were not easily accessible 
or to be found in rich veins. Massive areas containing minute quantities of gold were embedded in hard 
rock quartz, extending at an angle from the surface to depths of a few thousand meters. Extracting the 
gold necessitated substantial quantities of labour. The difficulty and high cost of mining gold in the 
Transvaal meant that the industry’s formation was very different to that of diamonds. Owners of small 
claims soon realised that they were not able mine viably and before 1900 the industry consolidated into 
nine gold mining houses which controlled the Witwatersrand basin. A notable feature was that most of 
the gold being mined was not being used for industrial or commercial purposes, but to back international 
currencies. The gold price was fixed at US$20.67 per ounce from 1834 until 1934. Gold producers could 
not drive up the price, as was done with diamonds, and thus there was there was no need to compete or 
enter into monopolistic practises to influence the price. The only way mines could increase profitability, 
was to manage costs, of which labour was the biggest (Ross 2008, p.72) (Feinstein 2005, pp.93–95) 
(Trapido 1971, p.55). Here, the discovery of substantial coal deposits in Boksburg (Witwatersrand) in 1887 
was also of major significance for the successful exploitation of gold, as it lowered transport costs (Lumby 
& Coleman 1983, pp.176–177). 
The economic impact of mineral resources can be seen in the country’s exports, which went from £2 500 
000 a year to over £44 000 000 in less than 50 years. Table 6-2 illustrates how mining kick-started the rest 
of the economy by creating new markets. Of course, the export figures do not reflect domestic 
consumption, but do suggest that increased demand from the mines created economies of scale for the 
previously struggling agricultural sector. The increased production exceeded local demand, which was 
then exported.    
Table 6-2: Annual average exports in £ million (1850 -1909) 
Year Agricultural 
& Other 
Diamonds Gold Total Gold 
(% of total) 
1860-64 2.32 - - 2.32 - 
1865-69 2.62 0.01 - 2.63 - 
1870-74 4.22 1.03 - 5.24 - 
1875-79 4.36 1.90 0.04 6.30 0.6 
1880-84 5.13 3.42 0.02 8.57 0.2 
1885-89 3.69 3.72 0.3 8.71 3.5 
1890-94 4.98 3.82 4.15 12.94 32.1 
1895-99 6.2 4.52 11.29 22.01 51.3 
1900-04 7.02 5.14 7.00 19.16 36.5 
1905-09 10.29 7.23 27.30 44.82 60.9 
       Source: South Africa Year Book, 5 1922 page 692-3 
The “Poor White” Problem 
The state and business controlled African labour as a highly cost-efficient labour source, but were however 
unsure of how to deal with the large number of destitute and uneducated Afrikaans people who first 
started coming off the land from 1900 until the Second World War. Partible inheritances and a deep 
suspicion of urban life, alien to the Afrikaner, had kept them on the land for many generations. But 




Boer War (1899 – 1902), resulted in the land not being able to support families – forcing them into the 
towns, where English speaking whites controlled skilled labour and Africans dominated unskilled labour. 
Afrikaners were unemployable and unable to live amongst their fellow whites, but also unwilling to 
compete with Africans for manual labour. The mining industry was also unwilling to employ Afrikaners as 
unskilled labourers, as they would not be able to pay them what the Africans were earning and could not 
justify pay differences between the two for the same work. Such a situation would either lead to massive 
pay increases or unrest, both of which business would best avoid. Bottomley (1993) estimated that by 
1924 one in four Afrikaners had become “poor-white” and this increased to one in two a decade later. 
The “poor-white” problem would thus dominate church and state attention for the next 50 years as 
programmes and legislation, detailed in the previous chapters, were introduced. The labour division up 
until democracy in 1994, which was oft explained as skilled whites and poorly or unskilled Africans, was 
indeed not based on race 100 years previously. Unskilled labour consisted of both races and evolved to 
the present situation. (Nattrass 1981, 57–58) (Bottomley 1993, pp.1–2) (Lumby & Coleman 1983, pp.23–
24) (Feinstein 2005, pp.83–85) (Clark 1994, pp.42–50). An early example of this was the South African 
mine workers’ union, formed in 1892 and revived in 1902 after the South African War. Open only to white 
workers, its focus was the maintenance of wages at the highest possible level.  
“In the peculiar circumstances of the South African mining industry, the protection of wages was 
seen as a constant struggle to prevent the mine owners from subverting the privileged position of 
the white miner through the advancement of unorganised black labour.” 
 (Lumby & Coleman 1983, p.24) 
6.3.2  Supplying the Gold Mines with Electricity  
The development of the ESI took a somewhat unique but understandable path in South Africa. As the 
mines needed large and concentrated quantities of power, large generation focused on satisfying this 
demand and paid little attention to residents, especially in towns and cities where there was no mining 
activity and subsequently fewer financial resources and private capital interest (Cape Town, 
Bloemfontein, Durban and even Pretoria). Local authorities, whose major functions were the provision of 
trading and other services such as electricity, water, gas supply and roads, effectively came to own and 
operate regional utility companies.  Siemens and Halske won the first concession to build a commercial 
power station to supply Johannesburg and Pretoria in 1894, ceded to the Rand Central Electric Works 
Company a year later. Rand Central’s interest though was in supplying the mines, and building operations 
only commenced when they received the permission needed to sell to the mines. First power was 
generated in 1897. The practise of mines building their own power stations continued for the next two 
decades (Eberhard, 2007:3). In 1906, the Victoria Falls Power Company (VFPC) was formed with the 
original intention of supplying Transvaal and Rhodesia with hydro-electric power, but the urgency for 
power after the Anglo-Boer war, delayed the project. In the interim it was decided to supply the 
Witwatersrand from steam plants using local coal.  Ultimately it was accepted that the Victoria Falls 
“during the dry season could only produce one tenth of the minimum energy produced by Niagara Falls. In 
addition, the transmission-line energy-losses on the 1 100 km route to the Rand would be far too high” 
(Christie, 1984:30). VFPC purchased Rand Central Electric Works and the General Electric Power Company 
in 1907 and by 1915 had four thermal power plants with an installed capacity of more than 160 MW 
(Eskom 2009). The rapid growth and success of the VFPC to supply power to the mines, changing its name 




not go unnoticed by business and national government who observed that it “might perpetuate a powerful 
monopoly” (Conradie and Messerschmidt, 2000:44). This threatened the interests of several important 
groups in the Transvaal (Christie 1984:38) and led to the appointment of a Power Companies Commission 
in 1909. Marquard (2006: 144) summarises the Commission’s findings as: 1) Conceding that there are 
significant economic advantages to the large-scale production of electricity; 2) Private investment could 
facilitate this; and 3) Supply by the private sector would lead to a “virtual monopoly in a commodity which 
has become practically a necessity of modern civilisation”. After a careful review of the findings the 
Transvaal government decided not to act against the VFTPC. In truth it was not able to finance or oversee 
the building of a large power company, so it allowed the industry to remain in private hands, thus 
attracting foreign investment, while exercising control through mandatory licences issued by the minister. 
This oversight would allow for equitable supply, public benefit and safety. In return, expropriation would 
be possible after 37 years (later extended to 42), a period considered sufficient for investors to generate 
adequate gains on their invested capital (Marquard, 2004:146) (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000, 44–45) 
(Horwitz 1994, p.2) (Christie, 1984:44) (Mountain 1994, p.65). This was achieved through the Transvaal 
Power Act (Act 15 of 1910), written hastily and passed just three days before the province was 
amalgamated into the Union of South Africa, which became the basis of government electricity policy in 
the new Union of South Africa. Requirements of the Act included: The establishment of a Power 
Undertakings Board, which had the authority to license public power undertakings and their supply area; 
a concession allowing public roads to be used for electricity reticulation; and an obligation for licensees 
to charge uniform rates. Uniform rates meant regulated prices according to a supervised rebate system 
of annual “surplus” profits, which were re-distributed to consumers on a pro-rated basis of their 
consumption (Horwitz, 1994:2).  
As Christie (1984:43) points out, the Commission Report which led to the publication of the Bill (precursor 
to the Act) pandered to the requirements of the gold mining industry, and only then considered 
compromises to satisfy the needs of lesser groups such as the coal mining industry and municipalities. 
Indeed, a proposal in 1907 for Johannesburg municipality to build a power station which would have 
absolute monopoly of supply within its jurisdiction was rejected outright by Rand Mines who believed 
that ratepayers would be tempted to tax the mines for the relief of rates (ibid:35). Thus, the Act regulated 
all power companies supplying electricity to others, but bypassed municipalities who would continue to 
be regulated by the Provincial Administrators as per the provincial ordinances of 1905 (Mountain 1994, 
p.65). The Act did however introduce the concept of an electricity “undertaking”, defined as the 
generation and distribution of electricity in a specific area – for which local authorities were not required 
to apply for a license in their jurisdiction. Other private sector parties could apply for a license, subject to 
not being vetoed by the local authority. Section 5 of the Power Act excluded large users from the local 
authority’s area of jurisdiction - mines, railways and government operations. This provision meant the 
local authority could not veto such undertakings being supplied by other power generators, which gave 
VFPTC, and later Eskom, access to its primary consumer base.  
Ultimately, the Transvaal Power Act was responsible for regulation until it was superseded by the 
Electricity Act of 1922, while with regards to licenses and their attached conditions, the Transvaal Power 
Act was “effectively preserved” until 1995, as all subsequent legislation recognised the existing licensing 
conditions between Eskom and local authorities. Here, all electricity infrastructure was required to 




6.3.3 A Historical Institutionalist Perspective and Identification of the First Critical 
Juncture  
Albeit that major towns and mines were investing in electricity for their power requirements, the 
technology was still very much in its infancy, displaying all the hallmarks associated with an industry in 
the early stage of development. The Act, informed by the previous year’s Power Companies Commission 
and hastily passed just three days before Union, established the following path dependent processes for 
ESI: 1) Its allowance for expropriation, created the foundation for a national vertically integrated utility; 
2) Cross subsidisation arose as a financial consequence of uniform tariffs; 3) Municipal right to generate 
and distribute in their area of jurisdiction, eliminated competition, as private companies would have to 
apply for a license; and 4) Municipalities could not supply large users (mines, government and railways) 
even in their jurisdictional area, thereby limiting their revenue sources and compromising their ability to 
operate efficiently.  
When seen in this light, the Act appears to be a significant turning point that led to the path dependent 
process which continues to influence municipal ESI today – particularly because these are the windows of 
opportunity where decisions taken affect outcomes over the long term, and by implication, complicate 
and frustrate change. Thus, in applying the historical institutionalist framework in such an exercise of 
critical juncture identification, requires: 1) Identifying the appropriate starting point (critical juncture); 
and, 2) That the analysis considers the sequencing and timing of events that gave rise to the path 
dependent and self-reinforcing process. Thus, satisfying these two requirements necessitated that the 
research commence with the concessions issued to the first commercial power plants in 1894, i.e. when 
commercial electricity was first generated, and then tracking relevant ensuing events, until the theoretical 
conditions for a critical juncture are satisfied.  
Given the seemingly seminal role the Transvaal Power Act of 1910 appears to have played within such a 
context, it is thus identified here as potentially being the event which gave rise to the first critical juncture 
(starting point); with the remainder of the research then tracing subsequent events up to 2017, to identify 
additional critical junctures.  
6.4 The Union of South Africa (1911-1948) 
  “Our gold mines could be described with greater accuracy as gold factories” 
   John Hammond (1895), Conspirator of the Jameson Raid (Blainey 1965, p.359)   
6.4.1 Creating the Economic Rules of the Game  
The four states which came together to form the Union of South Africa, did so because they realised it 
was the only way in which mining could be expanded. In return, and to avoid an over-concentration of 
political and economic power in mining, it was agreed to allocate a primary national government function 
to each province. Legislature was allocated to the Cape (Cape Town), the Orange Free State 




nothing left to offer Pietermaritzburg (Natal) the province was compensated financially and made the 
agricultural capital of the country, which in reality amounted to little49.  
The newly formed Union relied heavily on the revenue derived from the gold mining industry, which was 
charged a tax to fund the administration and development of the four previous states that were now 
provinces. This included transport, education for the white population, and other services. Any disruption 
in the revenue from the gold mines would impact heavily on the Union as a whole (Lumby & Coleman 
1983, p.186). Having achieved a five-fold increase in dividend payments in the period 1902 to 1912, the 
gold mining industry came under pressure with the outbreak of World War I, which raised operational 
costs with a simultaneous drop in the rate of output. A brief upturn after the war increased the demand 
for gold, but only for a year, and by 1920 several marginal mines had closed. A low-grade mine commission 
was appointed and recommended costs could be cut by hiring African workers for certain semi-skilled jobs 
reserved for whites through various regulations first started in 1898. The white miners would accept pay 
cuts but not dilute the white to African workers ratio. A strike followed in early 1922 which quickly became 
politicised. Government’s response was brutal and over 230 people died. With the strike crushed, industry 
retrenched 2 000 white workers, started using Africans for semi-skilled jobs and introduced new 
equipment which greatly improved productivity. Immediately mines reaped the benefits and profits 
returned. But there was a price to pay. The force shown by the government shocked many and resulted 
in greater support for the Nationalist Party (NP) in urban areas, which up until then had been lacking. The 
NP, which represented rural Afrikaners, formed a pact with the Labour party, which was supported by 
poor English-speaking workers from the cities. The PACT government won the 1924 elections on a ticket 
of Afrikaner nationalism and assuring whites that they would not have to compete with Africans for 
unskilled jobs. The PACT government also pledged to embark on a determined policy of industrialization, 
which it viewed as a mechanism to address poverty and unemployment amongst the white population. 
The “civilised labour” policy recognised white trade unions but not black ones. The Industrial Conciliation 
Act of 1924 and the Wage Act of 1925 restored the previous racially biased policies and regulations, first 
started under President Kruger in the previous century. (Nattrass 1981, p.163) (Lumby & Coleman 1983, 
pp.186–189) (Feinstein 2005, pp.80–84) (Bottomley 1993; Archer 1989).  
Developing an Industrialization Policy 
Some of the first industries were founded as early as 1910, with the number of factories increasing from 
550 to 1 500 in the period 1890 to 1910 (Lumby & Coleman 1983, p.198). Industry benefitted when 
European factory output declined significantly with the outbreak of the First World War, leading to 
increased local and international demand. Local industry also benefitted from the introduction of a tariff 
in 1915 to disadvantage competing imports. Consolidation and state ownership of the South African 
Railways (SAR) was followed by the decision in 1922 to create the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) 
to develop the country’s ESI and provides further evidence of the government’s commitment to 
industrialisation. In her research on industrialisation in South Africa, Verhoef (1998, pp.17–19) concluded 
that rapid industrial production occurred after the introduction of import substitution50 by the PACT 
government in 1924. State intervention in the economy was intensified by the PACT government, and in 
 
49 Explained by Professor Thornhill (9 March 2016) 
50 Import substitution industrialization (ISI) is a trade and economic policy which advocates replacing foreign imports with domestic production. 




1928, Hendrik van der Bijl, having set-up Escom, was asked to create the Iron and Steel Corporation of 
South Africa (ISCOR), to further exploit the country’s rich coal and iron-ore deposits.    
Much of the manufacturing sector focused on the needs of the mining industry, and foreign exchange 
earned from the sale of gold, financed the importation of capital goods and materials to develop this 
sector. In 1929 the government’s mining engineer estimated that gold extraction, a wasting asset, would 
continue to decline until it ceased to play a meaningful role in the country’s gross national product. An 
industry study a year later, recommended the urgent need for the mining industry to contain costs. With 
a fixed gold price, gold producers had limited options and faced a tough future. International events 
intervened when in 1931 Britain left the gold standard and devalued its currency. South Africa, too proud 
to follow suit, kept the value of its currency but reversed its decision in 1932 when the economic cost 
became too great. The effect and relief was immediate and the gold price went from 84s to 125s. In 1934 
the US devalued its currency and the gold price increased by around $14 to $35 (140s). The lifeline thrown 
to the gold mining industry led to a six-year expansion, as marginal and loss-making mines were once 
again economically viable and existing mines expanded. Over £80 million of foreign capital entered the 
country (Lumby & Coleman 1983, p.191). On the back of the gold mining boom, so too did the 
manufacturing sector flourish, growing at 9% per annum in real terms from 1936 to 1951 and recovering 
fully from the slump in demand precipitated by the 1929 international great depression, when the value 
of output had fallen by 19% in nominal terms, and 7% by volume. In addition, the decision in 1933 to exit 
the gold standard and devalue the currency benefited local manufacturing, because the price of imported 
products increased. A cycle of cumulative expansion ensued as employment and wage levels increased, 
which fuelled consumer demand. By 1939 the output volume was double that of the previous 1929 peak, 
and employment had increased by 60%. New opportunities were created with the outbreak of World War 
II, and this time round the manufacturing industry was better prepared and equipped to capitalise, which 
it did. Within 10 years (1939 – 1949) gross output doubled to £400 million (Feinstein 2005, p.123). The 
biggest transformation during this golden period for manufacturing, was the transition and evolution of 
the engineering sector. From supplying basic equipment and undertaking repairs for mines, the industry 
developed mass production lines to service the mines with more sophisticated equipment, while starting 
to manufacture electrical goods and munitions from ISCOR’s high grade steel. 
In 1939 General Smuts was voted back into power, opting to stay the course of the industrialisation policy 
initiated by his predecessors. For the third time van der Bijl was called upon to set up a new state entity. 
The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) was set up in 1940 to “facilitate, promote, guide and assist” 
the development of industry by the private sector, through the provision of loans or the acquisition of 
shares. Tariff protection intensified and expanded. No longer was it necessary to demonstrate market 
potential for the tariff to be granted. Henceforth, specific industries would qualify if pre-determined 
criteria were met. Industries which benefited included agricultural implements, electric motors, the 
manufacture of yarn and cloth, pulp and paper, certain chemicals and sheet glass. Manufacturing during 
this period shifted to a production or assembly line system characterised by limited, repetitive and 
specialised activities. The implication though was a greater requirement of unskilled labour and a 
reduction in the need for skilled white labour. But South Africa’s industrialization policy appeared to be 
working. The economy was growing, jobs were being created and the country was transforming to an 
industrialised state. The growth of the economy and the protection of white jobs can be seen in Table 6-3. 
However, the foundation on which the manufacturing sector rested was not sound for two counteractive 




the market, which was just not big enough to accommodate meaningful economies of scale, compounded 
by the purposeful exclusion of the black population, resulting in sectors being dominated by a few 
companies, and often just one, creating an oligopolistic market. The second was a low level of efficiency, 
a consequence of operating in a market where products are protected by tariffs and import quotas. 
Feinstein (2005, pp.128–130) argues that a system based on discrimination and inequality was carried 
from the agricultural to the mining sector. These two sectors could operate on a low productivity and low 
efficiency basis, but such an approach could not support the development and sustainability of secondary 
sectors, such as manufacturing and construction. In the first place, the minerals were absorbed 
internationally, meaning that mining companies had little regard for the size and prosperity of the local 
market. For manufacturing companies, who could not sell internationally due to their inefficiency, the 
local market was their life blood. Low wages paid by the mining and agricultural sectors constrained 
incomes and by default shrank the size of the local market. Additionally, most labour hired for farms and 
mines was unskilled and there was no perceived benefit to training or loyalty. This was not the case in 
manufacturing where well trained and motivated staff could and would improve productivity.  In 1938/39 
the net output per employee in manufacturing was 70% of that attained in New Zealand and Australia and 
less than 60% of the Canadian figure (Feinstein 2005, pp.131–133). A final item of concern was the impact 
that the tariff policy to protect the manufacturing sector was having on the gold mining industry, which 
was providing all the foreign exchange to purchase capital equipment and raw material for the 
manufacturing industry. Arguing against the tariff policy, Laight (1955, p.217) noted: “despite all 
sophisticated evidence to the contrary, a policy of tariff protection can be expected to raise the price of 
these goods upon which duties are imposed and indirectly, the general level of prices and wages”. Thus, 
mines were paying higher prices for locally manufactured goods. This increased their cost base but could 
not be passed onto the consumer as the price of gold was fixed. Ironically, the competitiveness of the 
industrial sector, or lack thereof, directly impacted the profitability of the mining sector on which it relied, 
and which it was specifically created to replace. (Feinstein 2005; Nattrass 1988; Bonner & Posel 1993; 
Lumby & Coleman 1983; Nattrass 1981; Archer 1989; Laight 1955) 
Table 6-3: Output and Employment in Industry (1916/17 – 1948/49) 
 Gross value of output (£m) Number of employees (000)  
Census year Current Prices At 1938/39 
Prices 
Total White African Whites (% of 
total) 
1916/17 49.5 39.4 124 46 78 37.2 
1924/25 84.2 66.7 192 71 121 37.1 
1929/30 111.8 98.1 218 91 127 41.6 
1932/33 91.0 91.4 192 87 105 45.3 
1938/39 199.6 199.6 352 145 207 41.1 
1948/49 674.6 402.2 668 225 440 34.1 
Source: Feinstein (2005)  
6.4.2 Consolidating the Electricity Supply Industry to Create a State Monopoly 
The Establishment of a Municipal Association for Electricity  
Local authorities continued developing their electricity supply infrastructure to supply residents with 
power; and up until 1922, the industry was made up of private and municipal enterprises (Horwitz, 




legislation, regulation and standardisation, and a diverse range of provincial acts and municipal bylaws 
governing the electricity supply industry. Different supply voltages were used across the country and many 
consumers were supplied with direct current (AMEU 1995, p.11) (Steyn 2001, p.62). To address this, 22 
engineers from 17 municipalities came together to form an association to cater for the needs of municipal 
electrical engineers. The Association was formed in 1915 and named the Association of Municipal 
Electrical Engineers (known in 2016 as the Association of Municipal Electricity Undertakings, AMEU). The 
second conference, attended by 31 members, met in 1917 and discussed a wide range of topics, inter alia: 
product standardization, the conservation of energy resources, but most notably, to promote the 
standardisation of income derived from electricity sales. The Association from inception voiced its 
disapproval of the local government practise of electricity surpluses contributing to the relief of property 
rates, referring to it as “licensed robbery” (AMEU 1995, p.16).  
A Fork in the “Track”: How the South African Railways (SAR) Irrevocably Changed the National ESI  
The next major landmark after the Transvaal Power Act of 1910 was the 1922 Electricity Act, the result of 
two reports, both undertaken by Merz and McLellan. The railways had considered different schemes to 
electrify the railroad since the turn of the century, but these were not implemented due to technology 
deficiencies, a lack of large-scale generation and the outbreak of World War I. By 1916 though, all railway 
lines from the four provinces and the harbours had been incorporated into one entity, the South African 
Railways (SAR), which provided focused impetus to finally achieve electrification. Sir William Hoy, the 
general manager of SAR, thus commissioned Merz and McLellan (MM) in 1917 to conduct a study on the 
possibility and viability of railway electrification in South Africa (Marquard, 2004:146). The study identified 
key routes, but its biggest contribution was the broader question of electrification in South Africa and the 
economies of scale that could be achieved by supplying both railways and industry. This led to MM being 
appointed by Prime Minister Jan Smuts in 1919 to undertake a second report on the electricity industry 
as a whole. The Merz report, as it came to be known, warned against a fractured electricity supply which 
was believed to have constrained economic growth in England (Horwitz: 1994:3), and recommended a 
centralised approach to regulate and unify electricity supply in the country. The government appointed a 
committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Robert Kotze (who undertook the 1909 Power Commissions 
study and participated in the drafting 1910 Transvaal Power Act) to review the findings and propose what 
action should be taken. The committee supported the Merz findings and recommended an even more 
ambitious programme. For example, Merz followed the English model whose aim was to control and 
regulate the electricity industry, while the committee drafted legislation, authored by Kotze and Hendrik 
van der Bijl, recommending a commission be set up to not just oversee, but run, the electricity industry. 
Persistent mining and municipal power-worker strikes, working conditions, the implementation of racial 
policies and the effects of the Great War, all needed to be considered by the Prime Minister. But the real 
conundrum was set by the railway’s Sir Hoy, who stipulated that while SAR had no intention of building 
its own power stations, it was averse to procuring power from private suppliers or electricity undertakings 
(Jacobs 1941, p.18). The railways needed a reliable power supply, which was not certain from strike prone 
municipalities from 1918 - later culminating in the Rand Rebellion, the election loss and the new 
government’s civilized labour policy (Horwitz 1994, p.3). In addition, Hoy did not believe that municipal 
tariffs would be as “it might be” (Christie 1984, p.55), meaning that Hoy, beyond possible unreliability, 
also regarded municipalities as potentially expensive; and thus was not willing to build railway lines where 
the electricity supply was municipal. The trajectory to these future events was in full motion at the time 




demand for power from a publicly owned utility more likely to convince the Prime Minister to implement 
the recommendations of the committee. This took the form of the Electricity Act of 1922 and in Horwitz’ 
view reflected the call to secure reliable and cheap electricity supply, particularly for mining and railway 
electrification.   
The objectives of the Act were to be achieved through the creation of the Electricity Supply Commission 
(Escom), whose mandate was to supply electricity to “Government departments, the South African 
Railways and Harbours Administration, local authorities, companies and other persons carrying on 
industrial undertakings or to any persons whatsoever in the Union” (Electricity Act 42 of 1922, Section 
3:476). The Act also called for the creation of an Electricity Control Board (ECB) to license and regulate 
electricity undertakings. In future, all electricity undertakings would require a license to generate and 
supply electricity. Exempted from obtaining a supply license were any government departments and local 
authorities supplying within their area of jurisdiction. The Act established the general principle that 
Escom’s undertakings “be carried on neither at a profit nor at a loss” (Electricity Act 42 of 1922). The Act 
thus set up the institutional structure for the creation of a large, single supplier of electricity for large 
industry and rural areas, but had to recognise the existing municipal producers who would retain the right 
to decide on urban generation and distribution. The Act, whether by design or not, protected the revenue 
stream municipalities enjoyed from the surplus derived from their MEU’s. It also gave them the flexibility 
to abandon their MEU’s by entering into pooling or other agreements with Escom, which many did. 
Furthermore, the right to expropriate power stations after 38 “plus two years” was confirmed. Wide-
ranging powers such as the granting of water rights, and expropriating land and streets for reticulation 
and distribution, were given to Escom. Finally, the Act accorded Escom “expert status” on request. This 
implied that any extension to an existing or application for a new power station by a municipality could 
be referred to Escom by the provincial administrator. This gave Escom the ability to influence the final 
decision of a licence application process, based on its own vested interest. If a MEU planned to increase 
its generation capacity by an amount exceeding 10% of its existing generating capacity in any 12 month 
period, the Act required an Escom evaluation to ascertain whether Escom itself could supply ratepayers 
more advantageously (Electricity Act 1922, sec.38). The provincial administrator was not bound by 
Escom’s recommendation, and in 1936 in advising the Johannesburg Municipality, MM consulting 
engineers believed adjudications would be fair (McLellan 1936), as there was a precedent of the 
administrator adopting decisions contrary to Escom recommendations. This turned out to be an overly 
optimistic assessment, as Escom recommendations “invariably carried the day” (Conradie & 
Messerschmidt 2000, 74–75).  
VFTPC Expropriation and the Rise of Escom 
The newly formed Escom wasted no time in exerting its authority. The VFTPC application to build a major 
power station in Witbank was immediately opposed by Escom, even though Witbank had large quantities 
of coal, and technical advances in long distance transmission made such a plant viable. Escom argued that 
the VFTPC would make large profits at the expense of mines and industry. A compromise was reached 
whereby the plant would be owned by Escom, but designed, built and operated by the VFTPC, who also 
agreed to share mining revenue with Escom. The plant was completed in 1926 and although very lucrative 
for VFTPC as no capital outlay was made, was the beginning of the end of its operations in South Africa. 
All future power stations were built on this basis, until expropriation was invoked, and its assets sold to 




time. The expansion of the SAR network provided the base load needed to make Escom’s regional 
undertakings viable. Thus, by 1948, Escom was the main supplier of bulk electricity in the country 
(Marquard 2006; Horwitz 1994; Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000).  
Merz and McLellan: Electrical Engineering Consultants Extraordinaire!  
It is worth pausing here to recognise the role played by MM and its significant influence on the ESI in 
South Africa during these early years. The firm was founded by Charles Merz and William McLellan in 
Newcastle upon Tyne in 1902. The partnership was instrumental in designing the United Kingdom's first 
three-phase electrical supply network on Tyneside, and continued to advise Commonwealth countries on 
setting up their own networks for the next century.  Table 6-4 provides a timeline of the firm’s most 
important projects in South Africa, largely managed by Merz up until his death in 1940 by a bomb from a 
German air raid at his home in London. McLellan had died in 1934. What makes their contribution all the 
more remarkable, was that their services were sought by national government, municipalities 
(Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban amongst others), the Electricity Control Board, SAR, Escom and 
VFTPC. Assignments overlapped and it is difficult to see how this did not create a conflict of interest, by 
creating (certain) opportunities for additional work. There is little doubt from all the literature that they 
were very highly respected by all their clients and appear to have had the best interests of the country’s 
ESI at heart. The consultancy operated in South Africa until 2010, when its operations were bought by 




Table 6-4: Timeline of Major Work undertaken by Merz McLellan (MM) – 1918 to 1940 
Year Description of Work  
1918 Contracted to report to South African Government on electrification of railways 
1919 Railway electrification report presented by Merz to General Smuts and Sir William Hoy (SAR) 
Firm appointed to report on electric power supply for the Union (Merz Report) 
1920 Appointed to consider first electrical scheme for the railways (Maritzburg to Durban). Work postponed for technical reasons 
1921 Appointed to electrify Glencoe section of railway (Maritzburg). Construction commenced in 1922 
1922 Subsequent to 1920 power report, the Electricity Act of South Africa passed 
1923 Consulted on the formation of the Electricity Commission (Escom) and Electricity Control Board (ECB) 
Supplemental agreement with High Commission (electricity) signed 
VFTPC appoint MM to represent them for the new Witbank generation license application to ECB 
MM broker the heads of agreement between VFTPC and Escom, which is approved by ECB 
SAR appoint MM to electrify suburban railways in Cape Town 
MM advise on the structure of the Cape Town Electricity Undertaking and construction of power station 
1924 MM appointed by Escom to construct Salt River and Congella power stations 
Agreement for Witbank power station between VFTPC and Escom concluded in London by MM 
Electrical engineer of Durban, after a visit to London, appoints MM to undertake a study on how best to replicate the Cape 
Town arrangements 
Heads of agreement (prepared by MM) signed between Durban Municipality and Escom   
1925 Construction of Congella power station started and Colenso station completed 
1928 Escom cancel agreement for MM to operate the Salt River power station. Construction contracted was unaffected 
1932 Merz invited to South Africa to finalise the pooling agreements between Escom and Cape Town 
1933 Chairman of Escom (v d Bijl) enters into a new retainer and general advice agreement with MM  
VFPTC seek advice on construction of a new power station on Klip River (Johannesburg)  
1934 Escom invite MM (Merz) to visit South Africa to discuss Klip River power station. Heads of agreement between Escom and 
VFTPC signed. MM and VFTPC jointly designed and built the power station 
1935  Final Klip River and Witbank supplemental agreements signed in London 
MM advise Cape Town Municipality on tender to build the new Table Bay power station 
Permanent office in SA. Meetings held with all the major MEU’s, Escom, VFTPC, national government, ECB and the railways 
        Source: Merz and McLellan archives 
6.4.3 A Historical Institutionalist Perspective 
Political and Economic Overview 
Union saw the Boer Republics being able to sway events to entrench white supremacy, achieved through 
the introduction of new, and amendment of existing laws and regulations, to marginalise all non-white 
people (displacement and layering). By example, regulations first started in 1898 to protect white jobs, 
were constantly amended and added to, as new job opportunities arose (Chapter 6.4.1). The amplification 
of increasing white socio-economic benefits (increasing returns) was self-reinforcing, as the elite group 
sought to maximise its position. Unsurprisingly, its path was quickly entrenched and gained strong 
momentum. This is demonstrated by government’s futile attempt in 1922 to limit and challenge the 
privileged status of unskilled white workers, to improve industrial competitiveness. Indeed, the so called 




resulted not only in the immediate purging of reforms, but the tightening thereof. This period can thus be 
characterised as a positive feedback loop.  
Electricity Supply Industry 
When viewing events through the lens of historical institutionalism, Chapter 6.3.3 identified the Transvaal 
Power Act (1910) as the critical juncture, or starting point, which shaped the country’s ESI legislative and 
operational framework until 1995; with certain remnants still in effect in 2017. Here then, in Chapter 6.4, 
we considered the next period (1910 – 1948) and the factors that led to institutional reproduction, or lock-
in. In other words, we explored the question of what it was that occurred during this period that allowed 
the contingent event of the Act of 1910 to gather sufficient momentum, to the extent that other plausible 
alternatives were not considered, thus allowing its state of dominance to be consolidated and to endure.  
Seen in this light, it is important to note that the Transvaal Power Act did not lead to immediate change, 
but set the foundation. As Pierson (2000) states “large consequences may result from relatively small or 
contingent events”. In our context, this consequence was the creation of Escom twelve years after the 
passing of the Electricity Act (1922), in an example of punctuated equilibrium. As Baumgartner and Jones 
(2002) explain, the signature characteristics of punctuated equilibrium are long periods of relative 
stability, separated by periods of disjointed and dramatic change. Tracing the historical events, we see 
that the amalgamation of the four provinces and outbreak of the World War I had a depressing effect on 
the economy. During this period the municipal ESI began consolidating its operations, such as forming the 
AMEE (AMEU) and standardising operational practises etc. With the war coming to an end and a greater 
demand for gold, the economy started to expand. By this time the SAR had consolidated all the railway 
lines from the four provinces into one entity and it could now look towards electrifying the railroads. MM 
were commissioned to propose how best this could be achieved. This period was one of stasis, a negative 
feedback loop, where the status-quo was maintained. But, the combination of the MM report 
recommending centralised supply and SAR’s pronouncement that although it had no interest in 
generating power, it would not take supply from municipalities, emboldened Kotze and van der Bijl to 
push for the formation of the electricity supply commission (Escom), which would not oversee, but run, 
the ESI – the punctuated equilibrium of the Electricity Act (1922). This Act thus reinforced the path chosen 
by the 1910 Power Act, in an example of layering - the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside 
existing ones. The municipalities (targeted institutions) had limited ability to insist (level of enforcement) 
that SAR take power from them within their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the characteristics of the political 
context (SAR’s decision, recommendations of the MM report) provided the veto capability needed to push 
through additional powers to the newly formed Escom, at the expense of the MEU’s.  Kotze and van der 
Bijl, as per Mahoney and Thelen’s typology are thus categorised as subversives – displacing an institution 
without circumventing rules, or resorting to conflict or force (insurrectionaries). Marquard (2006) came 
to the same finding in his explanation (detailed above) that the Power Act was effectively preserved until 
1995, implying it was not removed (displacement) or that the existing rules were changed due to their 
strategic redeployment (conversion).  
From this point on then, we witness Baumgartner’s “dramatic change” of a positive feedback loop. We 
see Escom develop from a zero base to take control of the ESI - made possible by a conducive legislative 
framework and national objectives of the newly developed industrialisation policy. These shift events 




expropriation in 1948 (as detailed above - 6.4.2). Although not immediately evident while Escom was busy 
frying the proverbial bigger fish of the VFTPC, the 1922 Act would also have dire consequences for the 
MEU’s, as explained in significantly more detail later.  
For now, in analysing the new era of the positive feedback loop - a self-reinforcing process which 
accentuates or amplifies a trend - it is evident the process ramped up over time and that its 
implementation was not as dramatic as its creation. Indeed, changes were incremental in nature and 
achieved by giving institutional actors the discretion to interpret or enforce institutional rules to achieve 
their objectives (Mahoney & Thelen 2010). For example, Escom was consulted and afforded the 
opportunity by the provincial administrator to comment and even object to new MEU power plant 
applications; while Escom’s response was based on its ability to meet demand and little else, which the 
administrator more often than not followed. This inconsistent approach had major financial implications 
for the MEU’s and ultimately brought about an instance of conversion, with government and Escom 
making use of all the types of gradual change (Chapter 2.4) in its achievement. Here, examples include: 1) 
Drift, where the impact of existing rules is changed due to shifts in the environment; effected by 
disallowing VFTPC to build a new plant in Witbank on the grounds of excessive profits, but approving the 
application when Escom was given a controlling stake; and 2) Displacement, (the removal of existing rules 
to replace them with new ones), by denying VFTPC water access rights, but approving these for Escom.  
In the section that now follows, the way Escom turned its attention to the MEU’s - having essentially 
disposed of VFTPC - is detailed.     
6.5 The Apartheid Years (1948 – 1994) 
6.5.1 Apartheid Economics: Boom to Bust 
The era of formal segregationist policies under apartheid, is a tale of two stories. The first, is the NP’s 
election success, which was achieved without any clear understanding, even within itself, of what 
apartheid actually meant, other than to continue and strengthen the existing segregation policies - which 
it did. This was exacerbated by the strong global economic growth following the end of the second World 
War that the South African manufacturing industry capitalised upon; the discovery of new and rich gold 
fields in Orange Free State; and a 40% increase in the price of gold from the devaluation of the British and 
South African currencies – whose combination contrived to mask the weak foundations on which the 
country’s economy was built. Under apartheid, the country was always on borrowed time both politically 
and economically, albeit behind a temporary mask. The second part of the story starts in the early 1970s, 
when the mask began to slip and the system began its slow but inevitable collapse, culminating in the 
country’s democratic elections in 1994. 
The Golden Years of Gold (1948 to Early 1970s) 
The manufacturing industry was better established and diversified when war began in 1939. The 
disruption of imports during the war created opportunities for local manufacturers to develop new 
capacity and to strengthen their position. During, but especially after the war, the surge in global demand 
for goods, was not easily satisfied by countries whose factories were idle, destroyed or converted to 




and manufactured items, but simultaneously itself was a big importer of capital goods for the 
manufacturing and mining industry. Even a capital inflow of R580 million in 1947 and 1949 was insufficient 
to offset the deficit on the current trading account. Government did not stall when the British devalued 
their currency in 1949 and followed suit immediately, while the higher gold price increased the value of 
exports. This was still insufficient to cover the balance of payments, as capital goods and immigrants 
continued to enter the country. Import restrictions were imposed as an additional measure to reduce the 
balance of payments deficit, which also aided the manufacturing industry. Government acknowledged 
that these actions were short term solutions and that in the long-term exports would have to be increased. 
Manufacturing was expanded, particularly in metals, engineering, textiles and chemicals. (Nattrass 1981, 
pp.164–169) (Lumby & Coleman 1983, pp.220–225) (Bonner & Posel 1993, pp.43–45)  (Feinstein 2005, 
pp.165–172) (Clark 1994, p.134). 
South Africa’s contribution to the war effort was supplied by state corporations grasping the opportunity 
to bolster local industry. During this process, the conditions under which state corporations were forced 
to operate exposed their limitations, which together with the expanding markets enjoyed after the war, 
provided van der Bijl insight on what could and could not be achieved. A new basis of operation for state 
corporations was decided upon by van der Bijl: monopolisation of the markets and fragmentation of the 
workforce, achieved through the physical decentralization of industry. In this way, the state could control 
markets and labour (Bonner & Posel 1993, p.77) (Addleson 1990, p.102). To this end, the IDC started 
supporting the creation of consumer industries to create work opportunities and reduce the cost of living. 
Textile manufacturers were favoured and had the added advantage of lower capital costs compared to 
the “commanding heights” industries of Iscor and Escom.  
An additional modus operandi of the IDC was to create monopolies in the industries in which it invested, 
crushing local competition by being the lowest cost producer. This was to be achieved by locating the 
factories in rural areas which would secure cheap (black) labour, as whites were unlikely to settle in these 
areas for unskilled to semi-skilled job opportunities. Electricity would be supplied by Escom and not the 
local municipality, further reducing input costs. The placement of the factories also served the political 
objective of segregation, by creating job opportunities for African workers in homelands and out of the 
white areas (Bell 1973, p.252) (Ratcliffe 1979, p.264). Government believed that rural labour forces were 
less likely to be politically influenced by the large working class in the cities, but this ultimately made little 
difference, as wages were so low and conditions such that many left their jobs to seek better opportunities 
in the cities. In the final analysis, government’s decentralization policy, which disrupted free market 
forces, manipulated labour and created massive costs by using resources ineffectively and inefficiently, 
outweighed any benefits of a more geographic distribution of industries (Verhoef 1998, p.19).  
IDC activities were not limited to medium sized enterprises however, and two investments in the 1950s 
dwarfed all previous undertakings. The first was FOSKOR (Phosphate Development Corporation) which 
manufactured industrial fertilizers, and then SASOL (South African Coal, Oil and Gas Exploration) set up to 
convert coal into gas and then gas into petrol. These projects were too large for the private sector and 
also strategic - providing perceived protection against sanctions. By 1973, the IDC had a portfolio of assets 
valued at R484 million; and the development of state corporations is summed up by Clark (1994, p.163)   
“By 1960 South Africa’s state corporations were firmly implanted in a socioeconomic system that 
carefully protected the interest of the white electorate and the dominant mining industry at the 




supported industries – such as Kruger’s – in which the they now held a measure of control through 
investments and close business relationships.’’ 
A sustained period of economic expansion was crowned by the “great boom” of the early 1960s. The 
“boom” followed another balance of payments crisis (1960/61), the biggest since the Second World War. 
This crisis was not economic but was precipitated by political concerns: South Africa declaring itself a 
Republic; the Sharpeville massacre (1960) and other political protests; the imposition of a state of 
emergency; and political and military events in Rhodesia and the Congo. Vast sums of money were 
withdrawn by foreign investors, but this was short lived. Confidence was restored, the economy 
recovered, and foreign money was again entering the country to cover the balance of payment shortfalls. 
The country’s GDP grew at an average rate of 5.6% per annum in the six years from 1960 to 1965 (Lumby 
& Coleman 1983, p.227).  
Two additional features marked the 1960s. One was the mechanisation of mining activities as mines 
replaced steam with electricity; made possible by Escom’s new power plants which provided reliable and 
affordable electricity. The second feature was the expansion of the financial sector and the rise of 
Afrikaner capitalism, which became a reality during this period. Government moved all its accounts to 
Volkskas bank and other Afrikaans owned financial institutions, while Sanlam, an insurer established in 
1918, acquired many companies at rock bottom prices in 1960 when foreign companies sold in a rush to 
leave the country. Anglo American, the country’s largest mining company accepted the political benefits 
of partnering with Afrikaans companies and sold a large stake in one of its mining houses to Federale 
Mynbou, a Sanlam subsidiary.  The Rupert family’s Rembrandt Corporation, which had done well selling 
wine and brandy during the war years, expanded into cigarette manufacturing, making use of Afrikaner 
nationalism and cultural symbols (Feinstein 2005, pp.176–179). The diversification of the economy was 
evidenced by the manufacturing sector contributing more to the country’s GDP than the combined 
contributions of the mining and agriculture sectors for the first time in 1954 (Table 6-5). 
Table 6-5: Contribution of Commodity Production to GDP (1948-70) 
Year Agriculture  Mining Industry Ratio of share of industry to 
share of agriculture and mining  
1948 16.4 10.0 23.3 0.88 
1954 16.1 10.4 26.4 1.00 
1960 12.4 12.7 26.6 1.06 
1965 10.1 11.0 30.4 1.44 
1970 7.9 9.0 30.8 1.81 
           Source: Feinstein (2005) pg 144 
However, these results were largely driven due to a period of sustained global economic growth following 
the end of the war and the discovery of substantial new gold and other minerals (coal, uranium, copper, 
iron ore and platinum). The country’s fortunes turned in the early 1970s for three reasons. The first, was 
the reduction in gold output as mines aged; reducing the much-needed foreign exchange to import capital 
equipment. The second, was the global oil crisis and increasing political hostility to apartheid. The final, 
and undoubtedly the most fundamental, was the country’s low level of efficiencies and the high costs of 
production in the industrial sector, which were first created when the labour model used on the farms 
and mines was imposed on the industrial sector - complicated further by government policies of 




looked to the industrial sector for future growth and prosperity, it became evident that the sector was 
not self-supporting or independent, and had a low competitive capability (Feinstein 2005, p.202) (Lumby 
& Coleman 1983, p.227) (Verhoef 1998; Nattrass 1981; Clark 1994; Laight 1955). 
Apartheid’s Inevitable Collapse: (Early 1970s to 1994) 
By 1970, South Africa’s industrial structure had experienced significant sophistication. Large sums had, 
and were being, invested in the country’s infrastructure; with over 5 000 kilometres of tarred roads 
delivered by the late 1960s and a further 6 000 kilometres commissioned; dedicated rail lines serving the 
mining industry being built; while Eskom was in the middle of one of the world’s biggest new build 
programmes, with 3 500 MW under construction in 1969 and plans to add a further 25 000 MW by 1979 
(Marquard 2006, p.155). Manufacturing too had progressed beyond the first phase of producing 
consumer goods, to now producing intermediate and capital goods. However, two factors meant it was 
unable to achieve autonomous growth and independence from the mining, and to a lesser extent, 
agricultural, sectors: continued reliance on imported goods and raw materials to deliver a final product, 
and limited international demand for its products. Thus, the industrial sector continued to rely on the 
foreign revenue earnings from the primary sector. In 1975 the surplus from agricultural exports was R456 
million and R2 212 million from mining. The deficit for the industrial sector was R3 913 million. South 
Africa’s current account balance is shown in Figure 6-2 below, depicting the current account deficits during 
the 1970s, with surpluses attributed to increases in the gold price, in mid-1973 and 1978 - 1980 when the 
gold price exploded (Simkins 1999, pp.20–22). Mining and agriculture could not cover the foreign 
exchange deficit; and the pursuit of industrial development, and ultimately job creation, expanded the 
industrial base but failed to create independent industrial development (Lumby & Coleman 1983, pp.235–
235). The 1970s global phenomenon of stagflation reduced international trade, and during this time, 
South Africa had a strong, overvalued currency, which offset the large increases in the gold price (average 
price: $35 in 1967; $154 in 1974; and $615 in 1980 – peaking at $850 – see Figure 6-4. Imports, however, 
and especially oil, went up as international prices rose and South Africa itself entered an inflationary cycle, 
going from around 3% in 1970 to over 13% in 1974, while the Rand retained its value (Figure 6-1). These 
events created a double whammy: On the one hand gold earnings remained static while import costs 
increased and on the other hand the strong currency meant that South African exports became more 
expensive, thus less competitive, resulting in established trade levels dropping. The net result was 





         Source: World Bank and Infaltion.eu51 
Figure 6-1: Rate of Inflation and US$ / ZAR Exchange Rate, 1960 - 1990 
The 1971 Reynders Commission, appointed to investigate export trade, concluded that: the small size of 
the domestic market offered limited opportunities; being a signatory to General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which promoted “open” international markets, meant it was expected to liberalise its local 
markets; the policy of import substitution had reached its limits and could impact negatively on the price 
of goods for consumers, mining production, agriculture and on exports (Ratcliffe 1979, p.266); and finally, 
capital inflows could no longer be relied upon. These factors would collectively place further pressure on 
the balance of payments. The economy, it concluded would have to re-orientate from import substitution 
to the promotion of exports  – “the country appears to be confronted with a fundamental choice: a lower 
rate of economic growth or more intensive efforts to increase exports” (Reynders 1972, p.18). The findings 
signalled the formal shift from an inward to an outward industrial policy. Market orientated trade policies 
were accelerated after the two-tier gold market eased balance of payments constraints in 1969. These 
actions instantaneously highlighted the inefficient state of local manufacturing, after decades of 
protectionist government policy (Ratcliffe 1975, p.45), which masked skill shortages, high costs and low 
productivity. If South Africa was to maintain, let alone increase, its exports, its Industry needed structural 
reform. The answer was seen to be in the greater beneficiation of primary products and developing the 
capability to produce more sophisticated products to more easily compete on world markets. 
Government targeted specific sectors; most notably chemicals, textiles and the motor vehicle industry, 
which received incentives, tax subsidies and other support mechanisms. A failing of the Reynders report, 
and ultimately the outward looking or export orientated strategy, was the cursory treatment of the 
fundamental weaknesses of the South African manufacturing industry (listed by Ratcliffe above). As 
summarised by Feinstein (2005, p.193), with the global economy in recession and growing concerns about 














































































































































































also strong empirical evidence at the time to suggest that export incentives do not necessarily result in 
increased export or manufacturing volumes (Feinstein 2005; Verhoef 1998; Addleson 1990; Lumby & 
Coleman 1983; Nattrass 1981; Laight 1955; Reynders 1972; Ratcliffe 1975; Ratcliffe 1979; Bell 1975; Smit 
2009; McCarthy 1988). 
The dominance of the mining sector in the overall economy also made change in strategy more difficult. 
Industrialisation had taken a very particular form, which evolved and became entrenched as time passed. 
This phenomenon, unique to South Africa, was developed and termed the “Minerals Energy Complex” 
(MEC) by Fine & Rustomjee (1996). Under the MEC, South African industrialization was driven by mineral 
extraction and energy generation. Downstream sectors and linkages amongst them, including financial 
services, developed to support the MEC.  
“…what will be termed the MEC lies at the core of the South African economy, not only by virtue 
of its weight in economic activity but also through its determining role throughout the rest of the 
economy.”    Fine & Rustomjee (1996, p.5)  
Freund's  (2010, p.18) economic historiography of South Africa under the MEC, points out that Fine and 
Rustomjee focus on heavy industry and energy rather than mining, as it is these services which ultimately 
determine the price of mining itself. With South Africa using the bulk of its coal to generate electricity and 
40% of that generation being used for mining operations (at the time of writing in 1996), the country was, 
and had always been, highly energy intensive. South Africa’s electricity usage per capita in 1996 was 
comparable to that of the United Kingdom; but when considering that in South Africa less than 20% is 
used by the residential sector, it is immediately evident that the entire system evolved around minerals: 
“…the MEC has left the economy with both strengths and weaknesses. The strengths arise out of 
the productive and infrastructural capacities that have been built around its core sectors. The 
weaknesses arise from the failure of this to be vertically integrated forward into the rest of the 
economy.     Fine & Rustomjee (1996, p.252) 
Once again fortune intervened in 1971 when the gold price moved from a fixed ($35) to a price set by the 
market. The price increased steadily for the rest of the decade as global investors hedged against 
international inflation and geopolitics, but benefits to the balance of payments were largely offset by the 
strength of the Rand. The economy received a brief respite when the gold price rocketed to US$850 in 
1980 and a positive current account balance was possible (Figure 6-2). The price quickly retreated and 
remained range bound ($300 to $400) until the early 1990s (Figure 6-4). The economy entered a thirteen-
year period of stagnation (1981 – 1994), due to factors including: a weak global economy and high oil 
prices; international condemnation of apartheid, epitomised by P W Botha’s infamous “Rubicon” speech 
in 1985, which led to massive disinvestment and to international banks freezing further loans - forcing the 
government to suspend debt repayments; political unrest and frequent labour disruptions; and a gold 
mining industry in decline. Drastic actions were taken to meet the terms of the international debt 
repayments. This was done by sacrificing growth and retaining a surplus on the current account, while 
high duties were levied on imported goods and interest rates were increased to reduce aggregate 
demand. Exports were promoted by allowing the Rand to depreciate sharply (Figure 6-2). (Feinstein 2005, 





       Source: Smit (2009) South African Reserve Bank 
Figure 6-2: Current Account Balance and Capital Flows as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (1950 
– 2005) 
Concluding Comments on the Political Economy under Apartheid 
Despite political unrest, South Africa could participate in the international post-war boom and grow its 
economy in the two decades after World War II. By 1970 real per capita income had grown by 70%. Real 
GDP grew on average by 4.2% and 5.5% per annum in the 1950s and 1960s respectively. During this 20-
year period, inflation averaged a reasonable and healthy 3.1%. The turning point came in the early 1970s. 
The NP, buoyed by the economic growth and its entrenched position as the ruling party, continued with 
its political and economic policies, oblivious, or perhaps arrogantly ignoring the signs that the tide was 
turning. GDP volatility increased, with lower growth at an average 3.3% per annum and inflation averaging 
10.3%. By 1980, the economy stagnated and retreated for the next 15 years.  Figure 6-3 shows inflation 
and GDP growth rates for the period 1961-1993. By 1994, the real per capita GDP was 16% lower than the 





Source: World Bank and StatsSA 
Figure 6-3: GDP Growth Rates and Inflation Rates (1961 – 1993) 
Research undertaken by Moll (1991) which questioned whether the apartheid economy did indeed grow 
“exceptionally quickly”, second only to Japan from 1945 to 1970, found this not to be the case. Under 
Moll’s approach, an economy is deemed successful if it grows in accordance with its potential, and fails if 
it grows at a lower rate. By recalculating GDP growth rates (1948 to 1990) to account for the productive 
capacity of the gold sector, rather than total ounces produced, the figures were compared to the growth 
rates of 20 countries displaying similar attributes to South Africa. Total Factor Productivity, or the 
efficiency of the economy, was also assessed. His findings are summarised below:        
Economic growth after 1948 was only fractionally faster than before, despite highly favourable 
external economic conditions. South Africa's comparative output-growth record is poor, and its 
record in terms of the growth of manufactured exports and total factor productivity verges on the 
disastrous. Any one of these indicators would not be decisive, but taken together, they make a 
powerful case. It is tempting to conclude in fact, that rather than moving into a slump or crisis in 
the 1980s, as is often argued, the South African economy has suffered from a prolonged economic 
slump since the 1940s - a fact concealed until the 1970s by its incredibly favourable resource 
position… it seems the apartheid economy did in fact fail.         Moll (1991, pp.289–290) 
Identifying reasons as to why this occurred, Moll considers the liberal-radical debate and accepts that 
apartheid labour policies benefited from inefficient low-productivity sectors and firms reliant on cheap 
labour, at the expense of high productivity firms not reliant on cheap labour.  However, economic growth 
is not exclusively determined by labour issues. All state policies link to and influence economic growth, 
and not all decisions which contributed to the country’s economic failure were linked to apartheid. A stark 
warning is given to economic policy makers in the 1990s: “poor state economic and social policies over the 
next decade or two could both perpetuate poverty and slow growth and reduce the chances of South Africa 
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Similarly, Nattrass (1993) analysed the empirical relationship between wages and profit between 1939 
and 1960 to determine the extent to which the radicalist assertion held: Namely that the apartheid labour 
system drove down the wage bill, allowing profits to rise. The radicalists conceded that although white 
wage growth was a problem for capitalists, the downward pressure on African wages more than 
compensated for the upward pressure on white wages. The research analysed the trend in wages and the 
share in profits, with the findings summarised in Table 6-6. 
Table 6-6: Analysis of Wages (1939 - 1960) 
Period Finding Finding  
1939-1946 Profit share 
decreased 
Many white workers joined the war effort and African labour was able to gain on white wages 
at the expense of profit share 
1948-1955 Profit share 
increased 
Decline in African wages compensated for the increase in white wages, however government 
policies (price controls, skills shortages and imports) affected profitability and the rate of 
profitability declined in the manufacturing sector 
1955-1960 Profit share 
declined 
Both white and African wages increased sufficiently to erode the rate of profit. The 
profitability in the capitalist sector was negative. 
       Source: Adapted from Nattrass (1993)  
6.5.2 The Development of the National Electricity Supply Industry under the ‘Nats’ 
Described by Marquard (2006, p.151) as “Escom moves to centre stage”, this period consists of four 
distinct phases. The first sees Escom consolidate its position. Market dominance then allows Escom to 
dictate terms and take control of national generation and transmission; but external and internal 
instability negatively affect Escom’s standing and the utility goes into decline. The fourth, and final period 
witnesses the restoration of Escom.   
Phase I: Market Domination and Consolidation (1948-1957) 
1948 brought profound change. It started with the National Party narrowly winning the national elections 
against a by now ageing and uninspiring Jan Smuts. Barely two months later, Bernard Price, chairman of 
VFTPC, who was instrumental in the success of the company and fiercely resisted its expropriation, died. 
Hendrik van der Bijl, the man who delivered cheap electrical power and cheap steel died in December of 
the same year (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000, 106–107). 
The mining sector was expanding rapidly with the discovery of new gold fields, as well as the global 
demand for uranium (found in the gold ore structures) and new technology which allowed deeper mining. 
The manufacturing and industrial sectors were also growing, which meant large quantities of power were 
needed, and Escom responded. During the period 1952–1959, eight new power stations went into 
commission and additional capacity was added to six existing stations. The company designed and built 
four of the new stations, made possible by ex-VFTPC’s staff. Escom’s total generating capacity grew from 
1 217MW (1945) to 2 052 MW (1954) and 3 297 MW (1959) – a growth of 170% in 14 years. Supplying the 
mines with cheap and reliable power was the utility’s number one priority, a key reason why industry 
supported the expropriation of the VFTPC, as the latter operated on a non-profit basis. The mining 
industry was able to influence Escom’s investment decisions - a practise which continued until the 1980s 
- achieved through frequent high-level meetings to discuss the industry’s needs. Escom could not build 
fast enough and demand often outstripped supply, resulting in power outages. These were managed by 




plants owned and operated by the municipalities. Municipal power during this decade was valued by 
Escom and there was a good working relationship between the two, evidenced by the fact that Escom did 
not object to any municipal building applications for power stations referred to it by the Provincial 
Administrator, notably Johannesburg’s Orlando (pre 1948) and Kelvin A and B (post 1948) power stations 
(Eskom Heritage n.d.) (Marquard 2006, 152–154) (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000, 105–119)  (Steyn 
2001, 70–73) (Christie 1984, p.155).  
By 1949, ten plants were being built and five upgraded; sites, water and coal had to be secured with new 
transmission and distribution networks – all in remote areas. Securing local capital, which was needed for 
other essential projects, grew too great, and Escom looked towards accessing international loans, but 
subject to government guarantees. The Escom Loan Agreement Act passed in 1951 provided this security. 
Government-backed security was strengthened even further in 1958 when a provision to the Loan Act 
allowed the Minister of Finance to guarantee Escom loans and give creditors the comfort of a “first charge 
on all revenues and assets of Escom.” International loans in excess of US$50 million were quickly secured, 
providing much needed relief to local capital markets (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000, p.112)        
Phase II: Eskom Takes Control (1957-1972) 
Escom’s build programme continued unabated and generation moved to the Eastern Transvaal where 
large coal fields had been identified. The tried and tested 30 and 60 MW generation for plants exceeding 
1 000 MW gave way to 100, 125 and then 200 MW units. Escom’s concerns about water availability saw 
the introduction of the more expensive and less efficient dry cooling technology, which used 8 million 
litres less water per day per 200 MW unit, and its ability to adapt plants to local conditions brought 
international acclaim. The late 1950s started poorly for Escom, demand dropped significantly as many 
mines became uneconomical, but the decision to continue with the build programme was vindicated, for 
two reasons: The first, was the announcement that technology advancements now allowed for gold ores 
at depths of over 1 500 metres to be mined. The second, was the sale of bulk electricity to municipalities. 
From 565 million units to 47 municipalities per year in 1945, sales increased fourfold to 2 051 million units 
in just ten years. Over a decade (1961 – 1970), Escom’s electricity sales increased by 105%. An important 
development during this period was Escom’s effort to build a nationally inter-connected system. The 
operational dynamics of long-distance line losses, system stability and the different generating costs, 
needed to be reconsidered. With coal costing R7 a ton in the Cape and just R2 per ton in the Eastern 
Transvaal, transmission won the day and large power stations, which supplied the entire country, were 
built as close as possible to where the coal was mined. The national grid was completed in 1972 (Conradie 
& Messerschmidt 2000, 113–143). 
International capital became increasingly scarce and expensive from 1970 as condemnation of apartheid 
grew, compounded by the 1973 oil crisis. Parliament responded by allowing Escom to create a Capital 
Development Fund (CDF), allowing it to deposit up to 3% of the value of outstanding debt from annual 
revenue, a move supported by Treasury as it relieved pressure from the capital markets. The money was 
invested in Escom stocks, and the way in which it was handled effectively, meant that consumers paid the 
contribution to the CDF, as well as the interest on the contribution (Horwitz 1994, p.10) (Conradie & 




Escom, unlike other government-owned enterprises, enjoyed significant autonomy; not required to report 
directly to any national ministry. The only requirement, as was the case with all parastatals, was to keep 
its tariffs low for the sake of economic expansion (Horwitz 1994, p.11). The culture of continuous 
expansion, which created economies of scale, had been shown to be the most effective way to reduce the 
price of electricity. Markets were needed for the ever-increasing supply coming on-line, and Escom turned 
its attention to municipalities, where demand was growing. By its own reckoning, Escom was the 
designated national generator of electricity and it was no longer prepared to support or abstain from 
objecting against new municipal generation applications submitted to Provincial Administrators. The 
1960s were when the “right of supply” battle (Chapter 7) was fought between Escom and the large 
municipalities, who owned and operated their own generation plants. Escom, with the tacit support of 
national government, won. Henceforth, municipalities would retain their distribution rights but would no 
longer be permitted to build any new generation plants. This arrangement remains in place in 2017.    
Phase III: Escom’s Golden Years quickly turn to Crisis Years (1973-1985) 
The early 1970s was when Eskom’s core technology model came of age – the national grid was completed; 
mine mouth power plants became the standard approach, allowing for construction of ever larger plants, 
further reducing generation costs; and, most importantly, the centralisation of national planning of 
electricity expansion. These significant achievements led to hubris. Continuous expansion, already a 
mantra, was further entrenched and its growth rate of 9%, a doubling of capacity every eight years, was 
maintained – 10 000 MW were to be added between 1971 and 1980. The downturn in the global, and 
more specifically, the local economic and political climate from 1973, did not deter Escom’s build plans. 
Econometric models used to forecast future demand provided wildly different results and it was decided 
to rely on experience and build at a rate of 7-8%. The base was no longer small, and achieving this target 
meant bigger and more complex plants, rendering the recently installed 350 MW plants too small. Escom 
didn’t flinch and went to work. After all, it had successfully overcome its engineering challenges up until 
then. But the successes of the past were not easily replicated and the power stations being built were 
plagued with technical problems and accidents, resulting in additional costs (funded by increased tariffs) 
and delays (resulting in shortages and blackouts). Indeed, the decision to continue building at Escom’s 
historic growth rate, was based on a policy to become energy independent and still on growing a highly 
energy intensive mining sector  (Eberhard 2015, p.2).  
   
      Source: Spiral Calendar52 
Figure 6-4: Price of Gold in US$ per ounce (1970 -2013) 
 




Low electricity prices, to stimulate economic growth, could no longer be sustained, and tariffs started 
increasing steeply from 1975, by up to 30% and 45% in nominal terms per annum (Steyn 2003, p.1). By 
1977, electricity cost 166% more in nominal terms than it did in 1971. The uncertainty of external financing 
following from the 1976 Soweto riots, at a time when capital expenditure had to be maintained, led Escom 
to substantially increase the contributions to the CDF. These went from 5.7% of gross income from 
electricity sales in 1973, to 29.7% in 1982; implying that almost a third of the tariff went towards funding 
future expansion (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000, p.228) (De Villiers 1984, p.14). And whereas sales 
grew at 10.19% per annum between 1967 and 1974, the figure dropped to 7.83% in 1982 (De Villiers 1984, 
p.5). A feature of Escom’s approach to tariffs was the absence of a fixed cycle or set date for increases. 
For example, tariffs would remain fixed for periods exceeding one year, followed by two increases in short 
succession (Table 6-7). This played havoc with municipal and end user-budgets; a source of contention, as 
explained in the next chapter. 
Table 6-7: Escom Tariff versus Consumer Price Index (1973 - 1985)   
Month & Year of Increase CPI Increase (%) Electricity Increase (%) Months Since 
Previous Increase 
April 1973 4.67 7.5 - 
April 1974 9.82 1.1 12 
January 1975 11.38 16.2 9 
April 1976 14.60 15 16 
September 1976 4.46 13 6 
January 1977 3.05 25 4 
January 1978 11.24 14.5 12 
January 1979 11.70 4.1 12 
July 1980 21.90 7.3 18 
January 1981 7.42 5.5 6 
January 1982 14.18 13.1 12 
July 1982 7.64 6.6 6 
January 1983 6.21 14.5 6 
January 1984 10.31 6 12 
January 1985 13.89 10 12 
September 1985 11.75 10 9 
January 1986 8.13 10 4 
Source: Baasch (n.d.) 
With South Africa’s political and economic fortunes in decline, large electricity tariff increases became 
untenable and national government was forced to take action. Escom’s practises were the subject of two 
commissions of inquiry. The first was in 1977 when the Minister of Economic Affairs asked the Board of 
Trade and Industries (BTI) to investigate the “suitability of the tariff policy and structure applicable to the 
supply of electricity in South Africa” from Escom and municipalities on economic growth. The Inquiry found 
that both were under-regulated and the ECB lacked sufficient capacity. The ECB was enlarged and its 
budget increased, while the board raised grave concerns regarding Escom’s archaic accounting methods, 
lack of budgeting and management control, and the excessive use of the CDF. Turning to municipalities, 
the level of profits on electricity tariffs (used for the relief of rates), was noted. Subsequently, the ECB 
started an informal process of reviewing municipal electricity tariff increases to assess the level of profits, 
with the objective of limiting these to 10%. The ECB had no jurisdiction over municipalities however, and 




municipal tariff policies (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000, p.229; Marquard 2006). Steyn's (2001, pp.80–
94) analysis concluded that Escom was able to undermine the BTI findings as the inquiry had 
misinterpreted its accounting practises. Escom responded to the high tariff increases, not by reducing the 
contributions to the CDF – but by running at a loss, which was carried forward to be recovered in future 
years. This tactic only bought time, and in 1980 high tariff increases were resumed (Table 6-7). Between 
1979 and 1982, the bull-run on gold and the uncharacteristically cold winters increased demand, and 
Escom had to resort to planned and unplanned power outages. Escom’s response was that more capacity 
was needed and developed plans to treble its capacity to 70 000 MW at a cost of R65 billion (Steyn 2001, 
p.79). The plans were announced in 1983, but by then the bull-run had ended and demand had 
normalised. A meeting between State President PW Botha and Escom’s chairman, the seriousness of 
which was misunderstood by the latter, led to government capping the announced tariff increase to 14.5% 
and the announcement of the second inquiry to investigate the supply of electricity, under Dr De Villiers 
(after whom the report came to be known). The inquiry would address concerns regarding increasing 
electricity tariffs and amounts of capital required for the provision of electricity. The inquiry however 
concentrated solely on Escom, did not consider municipalities and proposed a structure which bypassed 
the existing ECB (Marquard 2006, p.133); with the report accepted in toto by Cabinet on 20 November 
1984. The inquiry identified seven far reaching recommendations to reform the ESI - effectively Escom. 
The recommendations (De Villiers 1984) and their implications are summarised below: 
1. New Management Structure: Henceforth a two-tier structure of a board of control and a 
management board. Additionally, an electricity council was formed (financed by a levy on the 
electricity tariff) to formulate policy, strategic planning and high-level control. The management board 
would be accountable to the council and manage the operational affairs of Escom; 
2. Maximum Utilization of Resources: Tariffs could not rise too rapidly and the conservation of 
electricity had to be promoted, so as to stall new generation plants and benefit the economy; 
3. Improved Operational Performance: The capital cost/MW had to be reduced, such as standardising 
operations, water conservation and anti-pollution standards, and sourcing local products; 
4. Load Forecasting: Escom’s econometric modelling, developed in 1973, was no longer relevant and 
henceforth government and interest groups would participate in energy planning53; 
5. Accounting Practises: Operating “neither at a profit or a loss” was no longer appropriate and was to 
be replaced with sound accounting principles;54;  
6. Amendment of the Act: For the recommendations to take effect, Electricity Act 40 was amended.   
Escom’s reputation suffered further in 1984, when a senior official defrauded the company of R8 million 
(US$3.6 million, equivalent to over $10 million in 2018), the biggest single act of fraud in the country’s 
history. 
 
53 The inquiry was particularly scathing about Escom’s planning process, continuing to base its build programme on a load growth of 7% even 
when its internal studies found it was too high (Steyn 2001, p.84). The report believed that 5% was a more accurate reflection. Both were overly 
optimistic and never materialised; growing at an average of 4% between 1982 and 199153 (Marquard 2006; Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000) 
(Horwitz 1994, p.13) 
54 With income cover of at least 1.05 and an asset / liability ratio of 3:2. Its debt management driven tariff policy was viewed as “the worst of 
both worlds – bad principles and bad practice” by Kantor (1988) and dismissed as unworkable by the Eskom financial team a few years later 




Phase IV: Regeneration (1985-1994) 
P W Botha summoned Johan Maree in 1985, selecting him because of his vast financial and business 
acumen in both private and public enterprises (rather than opting for engineering expertise). Appealing 
to his sense of national duty, Maree was persuaded to take the post of chairman of the newly formed 
electricity council. Maree, with Escom veteran Dr Ian McRae, who at the same time became the chief 
executive, were tasked with reviving the utility.  
The two executives were supported in 1987 by two new pieces of legislation, the Eskom Act 40/1987 and 
Electricity Act 41/1987. These, inter alia, created: a new name, “Eskom” (a combination of the English 
Escom and Afrikaans Evkom); highlighted Eskom’s function to supply its consumers with electricity in the 
most cost-effective manner; eliminated the CDF and Reserve Funds; allowed Eskom to set tariffs, subject 
only to an appeals process; and confirmed it could now operate at a profit, but was not obliged to pay 
taxes. Eskom became accountable to the Minister of Public Enterprise, who happened to also control 
energy at the time, but only until 1990 when the two were separated. The ministry’s objective was to 
privatise state owned enterprises; but with the fall of P W Botha (who supported the international trend 
of privatising state assets) and the start of secret negotiations with the ANC, this initiative was dropped.  
Changes were immediate – new management and accounting practises, and scaling back on investments 
to increase capital holdings. The utility transformed from an engineering-dominated management culture 
to a more balanced and commercially oriented one. Between 1986 and 1989 over R2 billion was 
eliminated from its budgets and the workforce reduced from 66 000 to 40 000 by 1993. Given the political 
turmoil engulfing South Africa, the combination of cost savings and improved management could not have 
come soon enough and eased the tension between national government and the private sector. The 
above achievements were important and allowed the new management team to achieve its over-arching 
objective and now infamous quote of “keeping government out of the engine room”. Politicians were 
appeased by favourable comparisons when benchmarked against international utilities, and entering into 
a price compact in 1991, which allowed an initial 9% increase, followed by a cumulative 20% reduction 
over the next five years (Marquard 2006, p.172) (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000, p.254) (Steyn 2001, 
p.110). 
In a more balanced assessment, Steyn (2001, chap.5) agrees that the reforms visibly improved governance 
at Eskom. However, the long-standing practise of over-investing in power plants was not stopped, just 
delayed; and although the other cost cutting and governance measures helped, it was ultimately the time 
delay that improved Eskom’s financial state. Tariff increases coincided with the rate of annual capital 
expenditure reducing by 50% after 1985 and precipitated a virtuous cycle of financial recovery. The 
contracts for the construction of the new plants paid little attention to deferment clauses, which would 
have been difficult to execute, while the attractive financial terms were unlikely to be re-negotiated, given 
the political climate and international sanctions. Of the six power stations being planned prior to, or during 
the De Villiers commission, only one was cancelled (Lekwe) and only because government ultimately 
refused to permit further borrowing. In fact, Eskom proceeded twice with the 4 000 MW Majuba. 
Construction of the first three units commenced even though Eskom was acutely aware of the looming 




close the colliery supplying the station due to previously undetected diagonal faults elicited strong internal 
opposition55.   
Years of over-investment in generation plants finally overtook demand and Eskom’s total sent out rating 
in 1991 was 36 228 MW against a peak demand of 22 342 MW. Even a generous reserve capacity of 20%, 
Eskom’s stated figure at the time, implied an overcapacity of 8 100 MW, or 40%. The first half of the 
decade saw no growth in consumption, and for only the third time in Eskom’s history demand declined 
by 0.4% in 1992; all while new stations were coming online. Thus, started a programme of 
decommissioning older and more expensive / less efficient plants; and by 1991 six plants with more than 
5 000 MW of generation capacity were ‘mothballed’, which could still be operated economically if 
required. In 1997, notwithstanding its efforts to electrify black households, Eskom estimated that the 
surplus capacity could last up until 2010  (Horwitz 1994, p.13) (Steyn 2001, 113–122) (Conradie & 
Messerschmidt 2000, p.260). More needed to be done to soak up the excess supply, and a marketing 
department was established in the mid-1980s. A secondary function was to promote and repair the image 
of Eskom. Under intense pressure from national government to extend supply to farmers in outlying 
border areas, Agrelek was conceived in the 1980s. The high costs of extending supplies to remote areas 
could never be recouped and had to be subsidised by other users. Agrelek’s success stemmed from its 
ability to persuade new users under the programme to switch to electricity for all their power 
requirements, such as crop spraying; drying; and irrigation pumping. Eskom used Agrelek as a blueprint 
and introduced Industrelek (Industry), ElektroWise (Households), ElektroServe (Service and Hospitality), 
and UtilitiMark (Bulk Resellers). Long term supply agreements were entered into with five municipalities, 
which displaced 940 MW of municipal generation, at discounted rates. This was under the guise of making 
the country more competitive through cheaper electricity costs. Industry was also offered discounted 
tariffs to increase their electricity consumption and capital expenditure. The cheaper tariffs would apply 
for as long as Eskom had surplus supply, expected to last in the region of ten years. Finally, Eskom entered 
into long term supply agreements with large energy intensive users in ferro-alloy and aluminium sectors, 
which would later come back to haunt Eskom56; most notably an aluminium smelter in Richards Bay in 
1991 and a second one in Mozambique in 1997 (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000, pp.285–287) (see Jaglin 
& DuBresson 2016).  
Eskom did little to comply with the De Villiers requirement to implement energy conservation. Curiously, 
Conradie & Messerschmidt (2000, p.253) state:  
“Eskom had also started implementing the De Villiers Commission recommendation to help 
customers’ conserve energy. Although this seemed in conflict with the newly emerging problem of 
surplus capacity, it was seen as an opportunity to increase the number of people with access to 
electricity without over-investment in new capacity.” 
 
55 In addition to the findings in Steyn’s report, informal discussions with Eskom employees confirmed the strong internal opposition to proceed 
and that many felt it was McRae’s legacy project and he would not be talked out of it. The three units created a tipping point, as any new 
construction was now so far into the future that skills could not be retained, and experienced and competent employees were leaving the firm 
in search of new opportunities  
56 The two smelters consuming as much as 5.5% of Eskom’s total generation, became controversial when the country suffered blackouts and 
increases of over 300% in 5 years, but the smelters continued paying the tariffs agreed to in the 1990s. At the 2014 tariffs the smelters would be 
uneconomical. The cost to Eskom was estimated at R11.5 billion in 2014. Although there were initial benefits, the net effect has been a cost to 




Given the lengths Eskom had gone to attract new clients, to convince new users and to provide incentives 
for users to switch to electricity regardless of efficiency implications57, this assessment at best is an 
outdated interpretation of energy conservation, and appears to only pay lip service to official policy. 
National Electrification Programme 
Living conditions for black people were dire during this period, and a trip to a township by Ian McRae in 
the early 1980s as Head of Operations at Escom, appalled and convinced him that such levels of poverty 
would constitute the greatest threat to a peaceful transition. Something had to be done. Thus followed 
multiple undercover and at the time illegal, meetings with the ANC (McRae 2006). In 1989, when McRae 
was chief executive of Eskom, he announced the utility’s commitment to “electricity for all”, which 
included a scheme to assist municipalities with the electrification of black townships. As political events 
started to unfold, and it was clear that the country was moving towards a political transition, Eskom 
declared a target of connecting one million homes over a period of five years. Eskom’s decision to act in 
advance of political events was bold and there is no reason to question its sincerity58, as this strategy also 
aligned with Eskom’s business interests for two reasons: Firstly, supplying a new untapped market during 
a period of massive over-supply would help reduce the ever-expanding reserve margin; and secondly, it 
was essential to forge strong relations and build trust with the government in waiting for Eskom to retain 
organizational autonomy (“keep them out of the engine room”).  (Marquard 2006; Conradie & 
Messerschmidt 2000; Steyn 2001; McRae 2006; Bekker & Marquard 2008).  
Electricity for all was easier said than done though. Eskom was a bulk supplier with limited distribution to 
rural / semi-rural 59  and farming communities. Additional supplementary issues included: regulation, 
which added costs; access to communities; vandalism and theft; post payment resulting in unaffordability 
and non-payment; cross-subsidisation; and political resistance. The results were mixed. On the positive 
side, aerial bundled conductors were approved which reduced installation costs dramatically; 
Readyboards 60  with pre-paid meters allowed users to better manage their budgets; and access to 
communities improved while political resistance lessened, as projects yielded results and trust was built. 
Conversely, scepticism remained, especially from provincial administrators who believed a precedent for 
free electricity was being set. Electricity bills were also bundled into municipal bills and became the target 
of rent boycotts. As early as 1988, Soweto was already R10 million in arrears. Eskom dared not cut supply 
to Soweto for fear of the political and international fallout (McRae 2006, 88–93). But the most contested 
area and ultimate Achilles heel, was Eskom’s old foe, the municipalities. Having taken the initiative, Eskom 
was initially able to target highly populated urban areas, which had the greatest potential for low cost 
connections. As the electrification initiative gained acceptance and became an imperative, the process 
started to formalise. For example, the National Electrification Forum (NELF) was formed in 1993, at which 
Eskom came to an agreement with the ANC that it would electrify 2.5 million homes between 1994 and 
1999 (Bekker & Marquard 2008, p.17).  But with the municipalities now involved, Eskom started to find it 
increasingly difficult to access urban townships controlled by municipalities.  
 
57 Interview with Anton Potgieter, employee at Eskom from 1985 -2002 and member of the Eskom marketing team 
58 A dedicated electrification division was established in the distribution division, with an electrification manager appointed in each of its divisions 
to ensure the achievement of targets (Steyn 2001, p.112) 
59 With the exception of Tygerberg (Cape Town), Sandton and Midrand (Transvaal) which started out as farms but had become urbanized over 
time 




“Having publicly committed itself to clear connection targets, Eskom, instead of undertaking the 
politically costly step of reducing its commitments and calling on the municipalities to commit to 
appropriately higher connection targets, increased its connections in rural areas, where it had 
access.”  Steyn (2001, p.113) 
Rural areas had lower densities, higher poverty rates and consequently much lower consumption levels, 
so the benefit of increased connection according to Davis, the former Eskom Director of Finance, was 
questionable and the public funds could possibly have been used in a manner that provided greater 
benefit (Steyn 2001, p.113). 
6.5.3 A Historical Institutionalist Perspective 
Political and Economic Overview  
South Africa’s economic and industrialization policy of import substitution, in many ways replicated the 
approach used by the agricultural sector: low productivity and low efficiency, counterbalanced by low 
wages. Indeed, with the added support of cheap electricity tariffs and an abundant supply, the application 
of this strategy to the mining sector, although not ideal, proved feasible. As a blueprint to develop 
sustainable secondary industries however, it was a bridge too far. The local market was too small to 
support meaningful manufacturing, and the combination of low productivity levels and the costs of 
reaching distant markets, meant most industries were uncompetitive and marginal. Here, rather than 
evaluate its industrialisation programme, to introduce the reform needed to improve quality and 
competitiveness, government opted to persist with its flawed approach by continually adding new layers 
of legislation and support. This was only possible because whenever it appeared that reform could no 
longer be avoided, the country’s mineral resources would once again deliver the foreign currency needed 
for the economy to survive - providing a lifeline to the existing system. Be it the discovery of massive gold 
fields in the Free State, international events which drove up the price of gold, the discovery of large 
deposits of other minerals, or geo-political events inflating commodity prices, it always meant that 
minerals remained the cornerstone of the economy. In truth, real reform would have interfered with the 
implementation of the apartheid project, which was the priority.  
Thus, the period up to 1970 can be categorised as that of layering - of policy and regulation, inter alia, 
tariff protection, subsidies, tax rebates and price supports, together with the exploitation of black labour 
(through regular introduction of additional legislation to subvert them) and low electricity tariffs - 
constantly added to support local manufacturing. The second period (1970 – 1994) is best described as 
falling under the influence of drift and some layering: Drift, because in recognising the structural frailties 
of its industrialization programme - articulated in no uncertain terms by Reynders - government’s 
attempts to migrate to an outward looking economy bore little success. It was a case of “too little too 
late”, because by then global stagflation, international pressure to end apartheid and local unrest meant 
little would or could be achieved. Indeed if one is to accept that drift means, “rules remain as they are, 
but external factors change and institutions do not respond to the changing social and economic 
environment”, then the apartheid government’s actions indeed correlate; because in attempting to 
preserve apartheid, economic policy became even more protectionist and insular, to the extent that 




goods and interest rates increased to reduce aggregates. This thus points to a classic case of the layering 
process - made up of compounding measures.     
Electricity Supply Industry  
1948 was a watershed year for two of the protagonists of this research, Escom and national government. 
Here, the latter was tasked through an electoral mandate to deepen segregation, while the former - 
having expropriated the VFTPC - had the daunting task of creating a new ESI landscape to satisfy the 
unquenchable demand for cheap energy. And whereas the NP’s political fortunes during their 
uninterrupted rule until 1994, was a tale of two halves, it was less straightforward for Escom, which had 
four distinct periods, as has been detailed above. Indeed, the utility experienced significant change, both 
incremental and punctuated, during this 46-year period – thus providing rich material for historical 
institutionalist analysis. 
From 1948, Escom’s competencies and abilities were immediately called upon to meet the ever-increasing 
demand for electricity, the complexity of absorbing VFTPC and building new power stations. Indeed, 
Escom was often not able to meet demand, forcing it into planned supply scheduling and unplanned 
blackouts, which were partly mitigated by entering into long-term supply agreements with the 
Johannesburg MEU. This can be seen in the City’s 1952 Annual Electricity Report (Table 6-8). 
Table 6-8: Johannesburg MEU’s Eskom Electricity Sales and Purchases (1948 – 1952)  
Year Units Purchased (from Escom) Units Sold (to Escom) 
1948  7 739 256 
1949  55 680 406 
1950 230 244 89 299 330 
1951 323 464 99 147 827 
1952 82 885 169 899 354 
These figures demonstrate the extent to which Escom relied on the Johannesburg MEU and how this 
lucrative revenue stream benefited the municipality, creating a mutually beneficial working relationship. 
The supply shortages also sent strong economic signals to both parties to expand their generation, which 
were pursued. However, the playing fields were not equal. Municipal applications for new power plants 
required the provincial administrator’s approval and could be referred to Escom, who could influence the 
outcome. Escom applications, however, were not subject to such oversight or veto conditions. Between 
1948 to 1957 Johannesburg submitted three applications which were approved, suggesting that these 
were evaluated on their merit; and notwithstanding Escom’s right to object, were independent. During 
this period of high and growing demand for electricity (1948 to 1957), Eskom and the MEU’s were 
investing heavily in new generation plants (positive feedback loop of continuous expansion). The severity 
of national shortages also necessitated cooperation between Escom, the MEU’s and national government, 
as witnessed by the approval of Johannesburg’s and other MEU’s power plant applications.  
Between 1957 and 1962 however, the commissioning of Escom’s new power stations coincided with a 
slowdown in both the economy and electricity demand. Escom decided to continue with its aggressive 
construction programme regardless, but realised that demand from the mines could not continue to grow 
indefinitely. New markets were needed, and it was at this time that Escom started eyeing municipal 




transmit throughout the country on completion of the national network and centralised planning of its 
operations; targeted for 1970 and achieved in that year. As it turns out, the economic slowdown was short 
lived, but this strategic shift in Escom soured the relationship between itself and the MEU’s, especially 
Johannesburg which had its own ambitious expansion plans. Here Escom succeeded in having the 
Johannesburg’s MEU application to build a new 1 000 MW plant rejected three times by the provincial 
administrator, which resulted in the next critical juncture – with these events explored in detail in the 
Johannesburg MEU case study (Chapter 7.4.2). Suffice to say here that the outcome was acrimonious and 
soured the relationship between the two for decades to come.  
In the application of theory to this time period, historical tracing of the 1960s identifies several factors 
and points to possible observations regarding change. The first, is the presence of conversion (changed 
enactment of existing rules) with regards to the inconsistent approach adopted by the provincial 
administrator in the granting of municipal generation licences – particularly since the outcomes were 
heavily influenced, if not determined, by Escom. Secondly, there is also clear displacement 
(insurrectionaries replacing existing rules) in the instance when all MEU’s agreed in 1968 to relinquish 
their rights under the 1910 Transvaal Power Act and to not to build new power stations, which remains 
the case in 2017. Thirdly, we witness the clear amplification of Escom’s positive feedback loop of 
continuous build, whose key objective of taking complete control of the country’s electricity generation 
was ultimately achieved. In this regard Escom received the tacit support of national government via the 
provincial administrator’s decisions and the recommendations of the Borckenhagen report (Chapter 7.4). 
Fourthly, in the area of electricity generation, during this period we see MEU’s being forced to shift from 
a positive to a negative feedback loop, until their existing power plants were shut down due to age and 
MEU’s were eliminated completely from the sphere of generation. No longer able to generate, 
municipalities turned their full attention to their distribution business; required to make up revenues lost 
from generation. Finally, Escom’s continuous build mind-set became so entrenched that the practise itself 
became path dependent, whereby overly optimistic growth projections were defended regardless of 
evidence to the contrary.       
For Escom in the period that followed, the 1970s brought early successes (detailed in Phase III); but they 
were soon overshadowed (somewhat) by the next downturn in the global and local economy. Not to be 
deterred, Escom continued on its well-established path of maintaining its unrealistically high demand 
growth forecasts of 7% per annum, regardless of clear economic and political realities. Ultimately this 
could not be sustained, especially with its external (foreign loans) and internal (national government, 
private sector and reduced sales) funding increasingly drying up as the decade progressed. The only option 
was to increase tariffs – frequently and excessively; to the ire of the public, business and national 
government – thus resulting in the appointment of three commissions of inquiry into the effect of the 
tariff increases. In all of this, Escom somehow always seemed to find a way to obfuscate the deeper truths 
of situations through the mechanism of conversion, where “Rules remain the same, but are interpreted 
and enacted in new ways under changing external conditions, to serve new ends”. For example, Escom’s 
original mandate to operate at neither a profit nor a loss resulted in the creation of the perverse incentive 
of encouraging capital expenditure to nullify profits; fully exploited in purloining profits that would 
otherwise have to be returned in the form of lower tariffs. This practise also had the added benefit of 
masking operational inefficiencies. Eventually, the last of the inquiries into Escom, the De Villiers 
commission (1984), proposed tough reforms which national government adopted through the 




Eskom, was now accountable to its shareholder - national government - and at face value the new 
regulations bear all the characteristics of displacement “The removal of existing rules and the introduction 
of new ones”. Henceforth, Eskom had to operate as a company, comply with generally accepted 
accounting standards, improve efficiencies, reduce its workforce numbers, and operate on a profit motive. 
Which it did, but not to the extent envisaged or required, as Steyn (2001) observed. Of course, some 
medicine was taken, such as reducing its work force; but its ability to play a smart strategic game allowed 
it to continue its well-trodden path of continuous expansion - managing to build five of the six power 
plants planned, with the final one commissioned in 1995 – thus persisting with a positive feedback loop.  
The next section now traces the consequences of such an extraordinarily long period that was dominated 
by the positive feedback loop of continually building new power plants – an (inevitable) overcorrection.   
6.6 Democracy – At Last! (1994 – 2015) 
6.6.1 Economic Development  
Having won the country’s first democratic elections with an outright majority, and now in full control, 
albeit within a government of national unity at the start, (April 1994 to February 1997), the ANC was able 
to completely transform existing economic policies. We now look at how the political economy has 
developed, and fared, under the ANC government.    
By 1994 the South African economy had been ravaged by the NP’s futile attempts to protect apartheid. 
Massive amounts had been spent on defence and on creating and supporting mostly uncompetitive 
“sanction-busting” industries. These covert activities led to endemic corruption and were topped by 
reckless spending and personal enrichment during apartheid’s final death throes between 1990 – 94, 
particularly by inflated contributions to civil servants’ pension funds (Williams & Taylor 2000, p.27). The 
ANC inherited an economy in crisis: GDP had shrunk for three consecutive years (1991-1993); GDP per 
capita and investment rates were declining; there was a negative balance on the financial account for nine 
consecutive years; the budget deficit was 9.5% of GDP and public sector debt was 64% of GDP. There was 
little room for additional spending (Roberts 2006, p.1). 
On his release from prison (February 1990) Nelson Mandela stated: “The nationalisation of mines, banks 
and monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC and a change or modification of our views in this regard is 
inconceivable” 61 . But by 1994, the ANC had adopted a neo-liberal economic policy whose primary 
objectives were to lower and manage inflation, reduce the budget deficit and support trade liberalization. 
How did ANC policy shift from left-leaning wholesale nationalisation to orthodox macroeconomic policy 
in just four years? 
Deciding on a Developmental Ideology: The Reconstruction and Development Programme 
In 1989 the ANC had no formulated political and economic policy. The latter relied heavily on the 
principles of the 1955 Freedom Charter; more about redistributive slogans rather than any coherent plan 
aligned with any specific economic ideology. Its vagueness allowed the ANC to formulate alliances with 
various interest groups. The ANC realised that it needed to develop a detailed economic policy to respond 
 




to concerns of, and pressure by: the ruling NP with which it was negotiating; the local (white) business 
community; and the international community, led by the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, which espoused neo-liberal economics. Economic policy development commenced with the draft 
ANC Economic Manifesto (not adopted), conceived at the Harare conference, April - May 1990, and the 
ANC’s “Ready to Govern” document of May 1992. However, the rhetoric remained vague and called on 
the need for “reconstruction” and “redistribution”. These terms were not defined and the reader could 
infer “anything from extensive state intervention to conventional market driven structural adjustment” 
(Nattrass 1994b, p.346). Although nationalisation remained firmly on the agenda, references to South 
Korea were interpreted as a softening of traditional Marxist economics towards state intervention. A 
tussle ensued amongst the members of the so-called tripartite alliance, made up of the ANC, the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of the South African Trade Unions (COSATU). 
Grassroots activists in each organisation continued to advocate radical economic policy of nationalisation, 
curbing the power of large national business and limiting the extent of foreign investors’ influence. Work 
commissioned to develop economic policy between 1991 and 1993, included the Macro-Economic 
Research Group (MERG) and the industrial Strategy Project (ISP). MERG provided an alternative approach 
to neo-liberal economics and aimed to demonstrate that organizational, technical and infrastructural 
capacity existed. The creation and development of manufacturing exports was its vehicle for economic 
growth. Having agreed to rule in a government of national unity for three years under the interim 
constitution, the ANC was very aware that the NP in its final years of rule had come to represent big 
business interests. Coupled with direct pressure and courting from local business itself and the 
international community, the ANC settled on the investor-friendly neo-liberal leaning Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) as its official economic policy going into the 1994 elections. The RDP 
contained many of the ideas, targets and forecasts of the MERG, but fell short in the view of trade 
unionists. (Williams & Taylor 2000; Habib & Padayachee 2000; Nattrass 1994b; Carmody 2002; Nattrass 
1994a)   
Successful implementation of the RDP was of such importance, that the RDP office was placed within the 
Presidency and the South African Year Book (1995) stated that it was the most significant policy document 
since the 1955 Freedom Charter (Masilela & Mthiyane 2014, p.63). The RDP’s central tenet was that the 
redistribution of income would result in increased demand and thus higher economic growth, which in 
turn would redress economic imbalances. The RDP consisted of five interlinked policy programmes. At its 
core, and its first priority, the RDP targeted building one million houses, providing basic services of water 
and sanitation to all, electrifying 2.5 million homes, and providing health services, transport and other 
basic services (ANC RDP 1994, sec.1.4).  As with previous ANC policy, the text in the RDP was vague and 
broad (Williams & Taylor 2000). This was quickly seized upon by various interest groups, and as Dexter 
(1995) of the SACP noted “the RDP had become all things to all people”. This was due to the multitude of 
revisions to satisfy all the negotiating parties at the time (Nattrass 1994b; Adelzadeh & Padayachee 1994).  
The idea of a super-ministry was quickly disbanded when bureaucrats of the NP and ANC objected to their 
plans having to be submitted to an office that could veto their programmes, if they did not align 
sufficiently with the RDP (Masilela & Mthiyane 2014, p.63). The RDP’s failure to provide specific guidelines 
and timetables resulted in uncoordinated policy implementation, even though the RDP itself called for a 
coordinated approach (Adelzadeh & Padayachee 1994, p.16) (Gelb 2007, p.20).  Nattrass' (1994b, p.359) 
assertion at the time that many of the demands made by the RDP were impractical and unaffordable, 




approach to macroeconomics (Williams & Taylor 2000; Habib & Padayachee 2000; Weeks 1999; Carmody 
2002; Seekings & Nattrass 2002; Adelzadeh & Padayachee 1994; Gelb 2006). Many academics warned 
against the inappropriateness of following a World Bank and IMF neo-liberal approach, with Adelzadeh & 
Padayachee (1994) most notably among these: 
“Any serious and honest analysis of South Africa’s history, its stage of development and of current 
local and global conditions would suggest that a strategy of development based on an essentially 
neo-liberal, free-market ideology, or the magic formula of privatisation, liberalisation and 
convertibility will be singularly inappropriate”. 
One shining light of the RDP programme is the national electrification programme. South Africa’s first 
census covering the entire population was undertaken in 1996 and found that 97% of white households 
had electricity, while only 25% non-white households were electrified. A 1990 estimate put the figure at 
less than 30%, but by 2000 the electrification figure was over 60% (Bekker & Marquard 2008). Universal 
electrification was targeted for 2014 and although this was not achieved, the 2011 national census 
reported that 93.2% of households used electricity for lighting.   
From RDP to GEAR to ASGISA 
By 1995 there was widespread disappointment with the impact that the RDP was having. While 
considering appropriate measures on how to stimulate the economy, either through fiscal expansion or a 
currency devaluation, international markets obliged and the currency devalued by 18%, triggered by 
domestic political uncertainty (Gelb 2007, pp.20–24). In 1996 the South African government then 
introduced its new macro-economic policy, the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
framework, which would increase annual growth by an average of 4.2%, create 1.35 million jobs by 2000, 
increase exports by 8.4% and significantly improve social structures. The policy was heavily criticised for 
being developed by a small team of technical experts who did not consult or share their economic models. 
By committing to conservative fiscal policies, trade liberalisation and moving from consumption to 
investment spending, the policy aligned with international consensus of ‘sound economic policy’ and 
confirmed South Africa’s commitment to a neo-liberal path to development (Williams & Taylor 2000, 
p.33). Under GEAR, Carmody (2002, pp.258–259) found the government’s approach to globalisation to be 
contradictory. On the one hand, a much tighter fiscal policy than that proposed in GEAR was pursued and 
tariff reductions exceeded those required by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yet on the other, the 
Labour Relations Act introduced stricter market regulation. The combination of losing long held tariff 
protection with higher labour costs, at a time when India and China entered the global trading system on 
a large scale, highlighted just how uncompetitive and unsuccessful South African industry was at exporting 
goods – an industry enabled by gold mining  (Freund 2010) “which grew behind tariff barriers and 
languished there” (Nattrass 1994a, p.520). Trade liberalisation it was believed would make the country 
more competitive in the global market place; creating the jobs that mining would inevitably shed  (Habib 
& Padayachee 2000, pp.249 – 252). And indeed, some successes could be attributed to trade 
liberalisation: A 0.7% of GDP investment in research and development led to evidence of innovation 
amongst firms, with many operating according to best practise. Additionally, non-commodity-based 
energy intensive manufactured export, benefited from the country’s low electricity tariffs. This 
competitive advantage allowed the production of the aluminium cluster of alloy wheels, catalytic 
converters and tanks to grow strongly (Carmody 2002, p.268). However, GEAR did not even come close 
to meeting its objectives. Plans to rapidly privatise state owned enterprises stalled as investors did not 




private investment in generation, and the sale of parts of Eskom, in order to liberalise the market (Energy 
White Paper 1998a). Reform appeared possible in 2000, but government’s offer was too unattractive for 
investors, and continuous resistance from organised labour resulted in the opportunity being lost 
(Eberhard 2005b, p.5317), forcing government to stand as guarantor for a > 10 GW new build programme. 
GEAR’s targeted average GDP growth rate of 4.2% (1996 – 2000) averaged 2.8%62, despite an acceptable 
inflation rate of 7.9%. On GEAR’s failure, Weeks (1999) concluded that fiscal contraction and high real 
interest rates were the cause. Carmody (2002, p.256) research found that by 2002, more than half a 
million jobs had been lost, in contrast to the 600 000 to be created. The growth that did take place in the 
manufacturing sector during the 1990s did not add to employment and this actually fell, in a process of 
jobless growth (McCarthy 2003, p.174), as can be seen in Figure 6-5. Hodge (2009) however, argues 
convincingly, that the main reason for the persistently high and rising rates of unemployment during the 
1990s, was the large increase in the labour force and not declining employment, which in fact grew 
steadily, especially after 2000. Regardless, the fact remains that total unemployment went up and not 
down during this period.  
 
Source: McCarthy (2003) 
Figure 6-5: Total employment in the Manufacturing Sector (1990s) 
In 2003, President Mbeki stated that inequality and poverty persisted and that there were two economies. 
A “staircase” needed to be built between the first and third world economies that existed in the country. 
The Accelerated Shared and Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) would link the two. When 
launched in 2006, the ASGISA policy framework set a GDP growth target of 6%, which would halve the 
population living in poverty by 2014. This would be achieved by infrastructure projects amounting to 5% 
of GDP per annum for five years, with a matching focus on skills development and education. Additional 
employment would be created by targeting the tourism and business outsourcing sectors; both labour 
intensive export sectors with opportunities for small and medium sized businesses. ASGISA was supported 
by the Expanded Public Works Programme and the first five-year Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP). 
ASGISA however came under immediate scrutiny for offering little that was new, being overly optimistic, 
failing to create consistency amongst ministries and having inadequate financial resources (Gelb 2007; 
Bell 2006; Davies & Van Seventer 2006; Frankel & Sturzenegger 2007; Hausmann 2008; Nattrass 2008). 
 




Ultimately, ASGISA never got off the ground, as President Mbeki was replaced in 2008 by President 
Motlanthe and then President Zuma in 2009.  
Shortly after ASGISA was launched, the South African government requested the International Panel on 
Growth, referred to as the Harvard Group, to evaluate and advise it on the economy (Hausmann & Klinger 
2008). Using its diagnostics approach, the Group evaluated the state of exports and found them to be 
grim. GDP per capita in 2004 was only 40% higher than it was in 1960 and exports per capita for the same 
period were only marginally higher, with an annualised growth rate of only 0.64% per annum. South 
Africa’s exports per capita performed poorly against other resource based economies – Canada, Malaysia, 
Australia and Argentina (Figure 6-6), which is a rather depressing finding if the evolution of the Argentinian 
economy detailed earlier, is considered. The poor performance of the economy was attributed to the 
inability of mining to keep up with population growth, and while there was some manufacturing expansion 
in the 60’s and 70’s, it has been largely stagnant since then (Fedderke 2001). Government was advised to: 
strengthen manufacturing industries whose outputs were likely to be internationally competitive; 
prioritise exchange rate targeting (as opposed to inflation targeting); address the skills shortage through 
immigration; continue with fiscal restraint; and introduce greater flexibility in the market, such as labour 
reform. The findings were largely rejected on the basis that the focus of the research was too narrow 
(selective) and a thinly veiled attempt to support and legitimise the incumbent government’s existing and 
failing neo-liberal policies. The Harvard Group exercise amounted to little, particularly given the removal 
of President Mbeki from office during the final stages, which critics concede probably impacted on the 
Group’s commitment to the veracity of the findings and recommendations (Nattrass 2008; Fine 2009).  
 
Source: Hausmann and Klinger (2006) 





Despite political rhetoric and economic policies specifically developed to create jobs and reduce 
inequality, South Africa’s economy did not create sufficient job opportunities and its true foreign 
exchange earnings continued to be highly reliant on mineral resources, especially due to the continued 
weakness of export-oriented manufacturing (Rodrik 2008); which although more sophisticated with  new 
export products listed previously, lagged behind comparable countries  (Nattrass 2008, p.11). Changes in 
sectoral outputs and trade from 1990 also led to a “skills twist”, where new specialised jobs were created 
for highly skilled individuals, while unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, which were needed most, declined 
(Gelb 2007, p.26). 
A New President with a New Set of Ideas 
The 2009 elections brought in President Jacob Zuma who introduced a planning commission in the 
Presidency. A new ministry, the Economic Development Department (EDD) was created and mandated to 
develop policy for the Department of Trade and Industry. This created the possibility for conflicting policy 
development and issues of where the balance of power would lie (Nattrass 2008, p.12). Masilela & 
Mthiyane (2014) attribute such a “super-ministry”, similar to the one set up in 1994 for the RDP, as an act 
undertaken by government when a change in socio-economic policy is “heated”. Choosing Trevor Manuel 
however, the previous minister of finance who implemented neo-liberal policies, confounded the ANC 
left. Nattrass (2008) also questioned whether Manuel would have any power over labour policy, which he 
didn’t in his previous role as finance minister and feared that there would be little coordination amongst 
the ministries. As the government was supposedly moving from monocratic government (Mbeki) to 
ministerial government with greater autonomy (Zuma), with ministries developing and implementing 
their own strategies, it is difficult to understand how this would work practically, particularly given the 
issues that led to the abolition of the RDP office in the Presidency during the mid-1990s.  
Three major strategy documents were produced: The Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) by the DTI; the 
New Growth Path (NGP) by the EDD; and the National Development Plan (NDP) by the National Planning 
Commission. A review, not critique, undertaken by the Centre for Development and Enterprise (Kaplan 
2013) found that although all three prioritised employment growth and some alignment, significant 
differences existed between the IPAP and NGP on one hand and NDP on the other. As the differences 
underpinned and informed different policies proposed by each, it was crucial that the most appropriate 
policies were selected, if government policy was to be coherent and effective. The policy interventions 




Table 6-9: Key Policy Interventions of Zuma Presidency (2009) 
Policies IPAP NGP NDP 
Exchange Rate • Unqualified support 
for depreciation 
(devaluation) 
• More competitive (strengthen) 
• Requires  
o fiscal restraint  
o accord on wages & prices 
• No nominal devaluation 
• Conditions for effective 





• Expanded DFI’s 
• Investment subsidies 
• Expanded DFI’s 
• Investment subsidies 
• Development bond 
• State-owned bank for rural 
areas 
• None advanced 




• Wide ranging 
industrial policy, with 
emphasis on 
beneficiation 




o Green economy 
o Tourism 
o High level services  
• Protect sectors with long 
term prospects 
• Short term support for areas 
effected by cyclical 
downturns 
• Financial sector 
• Retail and business services 








Target: 2 447 000 direct 
and indirect by 2020 
• Productivity accord 
• Tighten sub-contracting, labour 
broking and outsourcing 
• Support for workers in 




Target: 5 000 0000 decent jobs by 
2020 
• Youth wage subsidy 
• Wage restraint 
• Regulation and subsidy to 
labour placement sector 
• Ease dismissal procedures 
• Migration policy reform to 
attract foreign skills 
 
Target: 11 000 000 by 2030, which 
is decent work over the long term 
Source: Kaplan (2013) 
Employment Equity and Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (EE and BBBEE) 
Inequity of employment opportunities and personal economic development was a key legacy of 
apartheid; needing to be urgently addressed by the first democratically elected government, to ensure 
that political change also brought tangible financial transformation. Addressing the domination of whites 
in the workplace, and specifically white males, where job reservation was ensured by statutory 
discrimination, was an immediate priority for the GNU; with the 1995 White Paper on the Transformation 
of the Public Sector as an obvious starting point, which set targets to 199963. Post 1999, the workforce 
needed to demographically replicate broader society; and a long-term labour strategy was needed to 
entrench reform and transformation in the labour market, which was the objective of the Report of the 
Presidential Commission to Assess Labour Policy. The Report recognised that a balance “needed to be 
struck between measures to protect workers and promote equity, and the need to promote efficiency and 
labour market flexibility” (National Treasury 2008), and resulted in several pieces of legislation, namely:  
The  National Economic Development and Labour Council Act (1994); The Labour Relations Act (1995); 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act (1997); Employment Equity Act (1998); and the Skills Development 
 
63 A minimum of 50% black representation at management level; with 30% of new recruits to be female; and a 2% representation in the 




Act (1998). The Employment Equity Act made provision for non-discrimination and commenced the 
process of redressing past inequities by providing preferential access for black people64, women and 
people with disabilities through affirmative action, defined in the Act as, “measures designed to ensure 
that suitably qualified people from designated groups have equal employment opportunities and are 
equitably represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a designated employer.” 
In 2001, the department of labour reported that the implementation of employment equity had been 
“slow but steady”. Thompson & Woolard (2002) interrogated government’s employment equity 
performance for the period 1995 – 2001 and found that great strides had been made in improving the 
representation of different race groups in the public sector workforce. By example, senior management 
positions occupied by black people in government went from 37% in 1995 to 55% by 2001. Indeed, efforts 
to transform the three tiers of government and state-owned enterprises (SOE) intensified from 2000 
onwards, and in 2016 broadly reflected the economically active black population (Table 6-1065). This, 
however, has not been the case in the private sector – now increasingly a major thorn of emotive 
contention between public and private sectors. In this context, the different perspectives on employment 
equity, a major national debate, are succinctly captured in the findings of a detailed study commissioned 
by the Department of Labour (Bezuidenhout & Lewins 2008); showing two contending arguments. One; 
that continued racial imbalance in the private sector persists, and that an unwillingness to implement 
national government policy and legislation is hindering employment equity; with high levels of 
unemployed, mainly African graduates, bearing testament to this. This is then countered by the private 
sector, which points out that: 
“…the major obstacle to employment equity is the lack of skill among designated groups 66 . 
Companies that have aggressively implemented targets, such as Eskom, have had to suffer the 
consequences of rising levels of incompetence.”                 Bezuidenhout & Lewins (2008, p.64) 
The research finds evidence to support both viewpoints, but notes that progress at the national level has 
been uninspiring – pointing to a one size fits all approach; government opting to pursue high profile cases 
without the necessary supportive base of general enforcement in place; the prevalence of poor reporting 
systems67; a tendency to fixate on top and managerial positions, or as the report puts it, “professional and 
elite classes in society”; and a lack of genuine engagement. In short, the public and private sectors, were 
both found to be wanting. 
 
64 The Act defines “Blacks’’ as a generic term for Africans, Coloureds and Indians. 
65 For the purposes of this analysis, the percentages listed in the table are the sum of male and female, black, Indian and coloured people. In other 
words, everyone except the white population. 
66 The country’s education system continues to deliver highly uneven school and tertiary graduates, determined by the institution attended. 
Several universities lost their accreditation for a Bachelor of Commerce by industry bodies in the 1990s (Bezuidenhout). In 2017, 17 universities 
that offer LLB were reviewed, four of which were served notice that if standards were not improved accreditation would be withdrawn 
www.derebus.org.za/withdrawal-accreditation-response-universities/.   
67 This was experienced first-hand by the researcher who found the pre-2008 Commission for Employment Equity reports to be inconsistent and 




Table 6-10: Workforce Profile of Black People in Government, SOE’s and Private Sector 
Category Sector 2009* 2012 2013 2015 2016 
 
Top Management 
All Government  79% 85% 87% 86% 85% 
State Owned Enterprises ** 66% 70% 79% 76% 
Private Sector 26% 28% 30% 26% 28% 
 
Senior Management  
All Government  68% 77% 79% 84% 82% 
State Owned Enterprises  60% 65% 72% 72% 
Private Sector 32% 33% 32% 34% 36% 
 
Professionally Qualified 
All Government  76% 82% 83% 83% 82% 
State Owned Enterprises  61% 65% 69% 73% 
Private Sector 42% 45% 49% 48% 50% 
 
Skilled Technical 
All Government  83% 89% 90% 91% 89% 
State Owned Enterprises  76% 77% 77% 79% 
Private Sector 62% 67% 72% 71% 73% 
Economically Active Black Population 88% 88.5% 88.5% 90% 90% 
*As annual changes are incremental not all years are shown  
**2009 CEE figures for SOE are included under private sector 
       Source: Department of Labour (2016) 
The challenges and critiques of government as burgeoning employment equity employer, appeared to 
then be reinforced by President Zuma's actions in 2009, when he increased an already oversized cabinet.  
A study (Bhorat & Pillay 2015) noted that public sector employment under the expanded public works 
programme (EPWP), increased by more than half a million between 2008 and 2014, and grew fastest in 
2009, suggesting that it offset, purposefully or not, the effects of the global economic downturn. Most of 
these were unskilled (sweepers, cleaners and farmhands) and semi-skilled workers (police / traffic officers 
and care givers). Few skilled jobs were created. Average wages in the public sector are higher than those 
in the private sector, which is worrying for the authors. They warn of the dangers of following a policy of 
public sector job creation in an environment where the economy is not able to create new jobs and where 
the private sector is actively avoiding new employment. This exercise did increase the levels of 
employment equity, which has improved markedly since 2008, as can be seen in Table 6-10. 
Beyond employment equity, is the wider concept of “broad based black economic empowerment 
(BBBEE)” legislated into law in 2003. It is a policy framework that seeks to facilitate the greater economic 
inclusion and advancement of people discriminated against under apartheid – supported by and 
intertwined with other laws, such as the employment equity act, with many overlapping aims and 
functions between the two (Horwitz & Jain 2011). A company measures their compliance by way of a 
BBBEE scorecard; and different scorecards apply to different types of companies. Due to a widely held 
concern, not without merit, that many companies were merely complying with BBBEE - resulting in 
insufficient transformation - the codes were revised in 2013. Table 6-11 lists the BBBEE categories pre and 







Table 6-11: BBBEE Codes 
BBBEE Codes (2003) Revised BBBEE Codes 
Ownership (20 +3 bonus) Ownership (25) 
Management Control (10 + 1 bonus) Management Control (absorbs EE) (15 + 4 bonus) 
Employment Equity (15 + 3 bonus)  
Skills Development (15) Skills Development (20) 
Preferential Procurement (20)   
Enterprise Development (15) New Enterprise and Supplier Development (absorbs PP) (40 + 4 bonus) 
Socio-Economic Development (5)  Socio-Economic Development (5) 
Total Points = 107 Total Points = 118 
Three categories are identified, based on the size of the company, (2003): 
• Exempt micro-enterprises: Turnover of R10 million (R5 million) are not required to have a scorecard, 
but must demonstrate that they fall into this category; 
• Qualifying small enterprises: R10 – R50 million (R5 – 35 million). Until 2013, firms could choose four 
of the criteria (each worth 25% of points), but from 2013 five criteria must be used; and  
• Generic enterprises: Greater than R50 million (R35 million), all criteria apply. 
BBBEE scoring to determine level or status are shown in Table 6-12 
Table 6-12: BBBEE Levels 
BBBEE Status 2007 2013 Recognition Level 
Level 1 >100 >100 135% 
Level 2  85-99 >95-100 125% 
Level 3 75-84 >90-95 110% 
Level 4 65-74 >80-90 100% 
Level 5 55-64 >75-80 80% 
Level 6 45-54 >70-75 60% 
Level 7 40-44 >55-70 50% 
Level 8 30-39 40-55 10% 
Non-compliant <30 >40 0% 
Compliance with the BBBEE Act is entirely voluntary for the private sector. However, it becomes a 
requirement if a private company responds to a public tender or enters into a private public partnership).  
At a more strategic level, the state has created opportunities for black owned firms through corporate 
incorporation, the reassignment of mineral rights and targeted programmes such as the black 
industrialisation programme. However, the allocation of government contracts has seemed to mostly 
favour a select few, creating black elites. Surrendering political power in 1994 did not mean that the white 
elite did the same with economic power, and it has been strongly argued that while a black middle class 
has undoubtedly been created, the white elite have “captured” or have merged with the politically 
connected black elite to retain power; allowing inequality and chronic poverty to persist. Unsurprisingly 
the first targets were proclaimed in the mining sector and black business heavyweights are at the heart 
of the MEC, while highly paid black executives run state owned enterprises (Fine 2009, p.27)  (Gelb 2007, 
pp.5–7) (Seekings & Nattrass 2015) (Baker & Phillips 2014, p.797) (Freund 2010, p.21). More recently, a 
louder chorus of voices pointinz to mounting evidence that despite vigorous implementation of BBBEE, 




and damages the reputation of legitimate black business people, leading to increases in the cost of goods 
and services.  There is little doubt however that the private sector has not responded adequately to 
BBBEE, thus exacerbating its weaknesses and providing its critics the opportunity to misinterpret its 
intentions (Makgetla 2006, pp.73–89) (Yudelowitz, 2017). 
6.6.2 The National Electricity Supply Industry: To Restructure or to Reform? 
Setting the Scene 
Leadership change at Eskom and the South African democratic transition coincided in early 1994, when 
the uncertain and volatile political situation during that period prompted the Eskom board to replace 
McRae before his scheduled retirement in August 1994. In April 1993 Eskom announced that Allen Morgan 
would succeed McRae in March 1994, a month before elections (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000). 
Thereafter, following the elections, reforming the ESI was a high on the agenda of the ANC, as was 
eventually formally formulated and outlined in the 1998 Energy White Paper. Due to the inter-related 
nature of the ESI and the far-reaching objectives of the proposed reform, which included municipalities 
and their distribution networks, this section confines itself to Eskom. Municipal and broader ESI 
developments are covered in detail in the next chapter.  
New Energy Policy and Corporatisation of Eskom – Running to Stand Still 
In December 1998, the DME issued the Energy Policy White Paper68 which listed the following objectives 
for the ESI: to continue with the electrification programme while ensuring access was provided at 
affordable rates; improve energy governance through increased government coordination and planning; 
stimulate economic development through enabling legislation; enable the introduction of greater 
competition, with key objectives being cost-reflective tariffs and regional distributors; and to promote 
energy efficiency through an integrated planning approach. 
“Government will establish transitional processes that will lead up to the establishment of 
independent regional electricity distributors.   ……realising the goal of universal household access 
to electricity.   …….electricity tariffs to become increasingly cost-reflective at all levels of the 
industry.   …….Eskom will be restructured into separate generation and transmission companies 
      (Energy White Paper 1998b, p.11)   
The energy policy aligned with government’s newly adopted neo-liberal macroeconomic policy, which 
aimed to attract private investment so as to create a competitive environment, and also driven by 
concerns with the single supplier model - monopoly power. This stance was in stark contrast to pre-
democratic policy which valued state provision of low cost energy and security of supply at any cost – the 
former to fuel its energy intensive industrialisation policies and the latter to support the state, both of 
which were typified by the nuclear build programme, Eskom’s continuous build programme and the SASOL 
coal to oil programme (A Eberhard 2007, p.31). Ironically, government now firmly supported privatisation, 
but labour and trade unions were vehemently opposed to disposal of state assets and wanted to retain a 
 
68 The White Paper was heavily influenced by the findings and recommendations of the Electricity Restructuring Interdepartmental Committee 




vertically integrated power utility to provide low cost electricity to the poor. Distribution, they stated, 
could be rationalised but into one national distributor (A Eberhard 2007, p.32). 
In 1998 government passed the Eskom Amendment Act, which vested Eskom’s equity to the state, 
repealed its tax-free status and formed it as a limited liability company with share capital. The Eskom 
Conversion Act (2001), created holding companies for its generation, transmission and distribution 
businesses. The intention was to transform the legal status of Eskom to one that would allow it to list on 
the stock exchange. From 2002, Eskom would be required to pay dividends to its sole shareholder and a 
newly established board was comprised almost entirely of big business representatives, academics and a 
sole representative from the Department of Public Enterprises (McDonald 2009, p.76).  
The private sector was targeted to generate 30% by 2004, and government signalled its intent by 
contracting consultants to design an electricity market and an exchange for bilateral contracts and 
financial hedges. Eskom’s lost revenue would be recouped from its entry into the continent. Figure 6-7 
represents the future structure of the ESI as envisaged by decision made in a 2001 cabinet meeting 
(Eberhard 2005b, p.5315) 
 
        Source: (Eberhard 2005b) 
Figure 6-7: Proposed ESI Structure Based on 2001 Cabinet Decision 
Eskom had little choice but to comply with its shareholder’s instruction and started ring-fencing its 
operations. Internally however, it was a different story. After many decades of being the only game in 
town and controlling ESI, it wasn’t going to go down without a fight. Intense lobbying against the changes 
was conducted at the highest echelons of government, while externally, public statements were designed 




“Eskom has the lowest electricity price in the world, and excellent technical performance when 
benchmarked against the rest of the world. We need clear objectives as to why we are going this 
route.”     Chalmers (2001)   
In this, Eskom found an unlikely ally in organized labour, who objected to the proposed reforms on the 
ideological standpoint of anti-privatisation and embarked on national strikes against government’s plans 
and the lack of transparency. The lead union (COSATU) estimated that over 5 million participated in the 
action. Eskom’s consumers were also strongly opposed to the privatisation plans (Ashe 2002; Coetzee 
2010), while fate also played a role. The California energy crisis and Enron’s failure in late 2001 was a 
godsend which strengthened the anti-reform cause. Ultimately the political cost of forcing change was 
too high and NT announced the postponement of the privatisation programme, citing the poor global 
economic environment. Shortly after the 2004 national elections, government announced that it would 
no longer seek to establish a wholesale market for electricity and would not be selling Eskom assets, but 
it would seek private sector power producers to build and operate up to 30% of new supply; but even in 
these projects Eskom would be allowed to hold a majority share. In 2005 it was announced that tenders 
would be issued for Independent Power Producers (IPPs) leading to strong interest from international 
energy companies and financial institutions. However, private sector investments into new generation did 
not materialise due to inappropriate legislative frameworks and stubborn resistance from many 
stakeholders, most notably those who opposed privatisation in 2002. During this period of policy 
uncertainty no new investments in generation were made and Eskom’s reserve margin continued to 
decline – falling below the international accepted norm of 15% to single digit (~5%) in 2004 (Figure 6-9). 
Something had to give, and it did when demand outstripped supply and the first blackouts were 
experienced. (McDonald 2009; Eberhard 2000; Eberhard 2005b; Pickering 2010; Chettiar et al. 2009; 
Kessides & Maurer 2007) 
National Blackouts and Eskom – “There is no Crisis!”  
“We shouldn’t frighten ourselves too much. Yes, indeed, there was a problem….but there is no 
crisis. Whatever needs to be done to make sure that the economy grows and new investors come 
into the economy is being done. We shouldn’t be holding out as threats to local and foreign 
investors that something disastrous is going to happen…” 
 President Mbeki addressing Parliament after the 2006 blackouts in the Western Cape 
It should not even be contemplated that the national blackouts came without warning. As far back as the 
mid-1990s Eskom notified government that the existing fleet of power stations would be inadequate by 
2007 and to avoid a supply shortage construction would need to start before 2000 – as recorded in the 
1998 Energy White Paper; a tacit acknowledgement. With a government moratorium in place, Eskom 
could not act, but by 2005 it became evident to government that not only was the private sector not going 
to invest in new power plants under the existing framework, but also that the entire electricity system 
was under serious threat and imminent collapse. The restrictions were lifted and Eskom was instructed to 
construct the 4.8 GW Medupi and equally sized Kusile coal-fired baseload power station, the first coal-
fired power stations to be built in two decades. Construction of Medupi only started two years later in 
2007 due to planning and permit approval delays, which immediately underlined Eskom’s loss of expertise 




persistent increasing strain, started to crack. The first signs manifested in the Western Cape towards the 
end of that year and the chronology is summarised by Jaglin & DuBresson (2016) in Table 6-13.   
Table 6-13: Chronology of Blackouts in the Western Cape  
Date Event 
11 November 2005 Switch failure at Koeberg power plant resulting in a regional outage lasting several hours  
16 November 2005 Precautionary shutdown of unit 2 of Koeberg plant due to a fire near high voltage lines 
23 November 2005 Unit 2 shutdown due to a coolant test showing it is no longer fit for purpose  
25 December 2005 Koeberg Reactor 1 badly damaged due to a faulty installation causing a long term shut down  
18 February 2006 A shutdown of a coal power station in the north east of the country has a knock on effect 
resulting in Koeberg Unit 2 shutting down, resulting in a 5 hour blackout for the province and 
intermittent outages for the rest of the week 
28 February 2006 Technical problems lead to the entire Koeberg plant being shut down. The entire province is 
without electricity for several hours followed by a week of scheduled blackouts 
8 March 2006 Blackouts continue despite Eskom assurances that things were back to normal  
When asked in Parliament to comment on the power outages in the Western Cape, President Mbeki 
recognised there was a problem, but stated that it posed no crisis and that the upside was economic 
growth through infrastructure expansion. In the president’s view, the blackouts did not have any adverse 
effects on investment (CDE 2008, p.12).  
The blackouts in Cape Town were just a sign of things to come. In November 2007 the country ran out of 
power. It is of course true that if construction of new power plants had been started timeously, the 
additional supply would likely have averted the crisis, but an overlooked fact however, is that demand 
never exceeded supply. Eskom’s full generating capacity at the time was 39 GW, and demand never 
exceeded this amount. When the crisis broke, as much as 25% of Eskom’s generating capacity was not 
functioning (Fig 2010). The crisis was further exacerbated by low stocks of coal supplies, low quality of 
coal, logistical coal supply issues, heavy rains, insufficient maintenance of power plants and poor planning 
and demand forecasting – issues which were raised by the World Bank in a 2007 public report (Chettiar 
et al. 2009; Kessides & Maurer 2007). Power stations which were being run at full capacity finally gave in 
and load shedding was implemented nine times in November and December 2007. There was a respite 
during the traditional December holiday when many industries close, but as soon as the country went 
back to work so too did the outages. National rolling blackouts commenced in January 24, 2008 and it 
took Eskom a fortnight to stabilise the grid, after which blackouts were less frequent but continued until 
June. Cabinet declared a national emergency, while the effect on the economy was immediate and 
devastating. Mines were forced to shut down for five days to avoid a nationwide blackout and were 
required to reduce their consumption by 10-20% before they could resume operations. Exacerbated by a 
global economy leaning towards recession, mining production suffered, falling by 22%. The country’s 
biggest gold producer expected power shortages to cut production by 400 000 ounces ($363m) and the 
second largest miner forecast that running on 90% power would reduce production by 15-20% annually 
(MacNamara 2008). Thousands of people were retrenched, and all industries and businesses suffered 
massive financial losses – especially cold-chain operations, tourism and service industries. It is estimated 






New Build Programme 
Having kept infrastructure investment to a minimum while privatisation was being considered, Eskom had 
catching up to do. Its total capacity expansion programme included lengthening and strengthening 
transmission lines, improving substation capacity, development of new baseload, improving pumped 
storage and peaking capacity, the re-commissioning of mothballed capacity, and the refurbishment of 
existing operating capacity, which would add 17.1 GW of generating capacity to the existing fleet (Eskom 
2012). But these investments would only yield results in the medium to long term. To deal with the day 
to day crisis of insufficient supply, 1 GW of diesel turbines were installed in 2008/09, with an additional 1 
GW added in 2014/15, while its Demand Side Management programme, which existed only in name up 
until that time, was ramped up, with a dedicated division finally formed and given adequate human and 
financial resources. However, shortages persisted and blackouts became the norm. There was a short 
respite due to a doubling of efforts to stabilise the grid during the 2010 Soccer World Cup, and aided by 
reduced demand due to a slump in the economy caused partly by global financial crisis fallout and partly 
by electricity shortages. The system remained on borrowed time as maintenance was neglected once 
again and the 2008 experience was repeated in June 2013: The reserve margin dropped to 0.2%; four 
“power emergencies” (rotational load shedding due to severe system constraints) were declared between 
November 2013 and March 2014; scheduled load shedding commenced in March 2014 and  the entire 
system came close to collapse on June 30, 2014; on October, 30 Eskom’s biggest clients were instructed 
to reduce consumption by 10%; and January and February 2015 saw the introduction of weekly load 
shedding, allocated a number (1 , 2 , 3 and 4) to better communicate the severity of the shortage to the 
public. In total there were 56 days of load shedding between January and April 2015 with a warning from 
the Minister that load shedding would be with us for the next 18 months (Jaglin & DuBresson 2016, 72–
75) (Government of South Africa 2014).  
Funding the New Build Programme 
The financial consequences for Eskom were as severe as the technical. In addition to the capacity 
expansion programme, the two coal power stations being constructed had massive budget overruns, 
costly gas turbines operated for long periods and high remuneration packages increased the cost to 
company of personnel, to name but a few of the rising expenses that now had to be funded. In contrast, 
from 1990 until mid-2000’s Eskom operated a fleet of power stations which had been paid off. Electricity 
tariff increases were kept low as per the price compact, as had always been the case during times of 
plenty; with no provision made for new power stations. In real terms, the electricity tariff decreased 
during this period (Figure 6-8); but when in 2005 funds were needed for capital investments, Eskom 
defaulted to the practise adopted in the 1970s and increased its tariffs substantially. Between 2007 and 
2015, tariffs in real terms increased by 170%, and would have been higher if NERSA had not capped the 
requested tariff increases69.  
 
69 In 2013 Eskom applied for a 16% annual average tariff increase for a five-year period but was capped at 8% by NERSA. This figure was revised 




   
         Source: Statistics South Africa and Eskom 
Figure 6-8: Nominal Annual Eskom Tariff Increases and Inflation Rate (1993 – 2016) 
Ironically, perhaps predictably, the electricity crisis created the conditions for IPP’s to enter the market 
with Renewable Energy (RE) generation. In 2009, NERSA approved a Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff 
(REFIT) for certain RE technologies70, followed by the draft selection criteria “scorecard” for REFIT and 
held public hearings to discuss the same. In 2011, the REFIT programme was taken over by National 
Treasury and the Department of Energy who changed the procurement method to a competitive bidding 
process, but with a much larger ambition. Additional mandatory criteria were introduced, namely job 
creation, local content, local economic development and black ownership. This, the Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP), in contrast to the previous attempt a 
decade earlier to privatise generation, was well received by the private sector. By September 2016, 6.376 
GW of RE had been procured from 102 IPP’s, 2.738 GW of which had been connected to the national grid 
(IPP Office 2016). This contrasts with Medupi and Kusile which were plagued by cost overruns and delays. 
In January 2007 Eskom stated that Medupi was expected to cost R56 billion, with the first unit (800 MW) 
to be commissioned in mid-2011, while the first unit was only actually commissioned in 2015 and the 
budget had increased to R105 billion (Crookes 2015). This revised figure excludes interest and a more 
accurate figure is Eskom’s original estimate of R125 billion. As at December 2016, no additional units had 
been commissioned. 
Eskom in Crisis – Again 
Having created the regulatory framework, government failed to enforce Eskom’s paying of annual 
dividends as a profit-making company - effectively sending weak and ambiguous signals to the private 
sector on the possibility of effective partnerships and confirming that no real strategy was in place (Jaglin 
& DuBresson 2016, p.67). There has also been continuous political interference. Between 2005 and 2017, 
the chairman of the Eskom board has been changed six times and its CEO ten; the Department of Energy 
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has had five ministers and the Department of Public Enterprise, three. The Eskom board and senior 
management have seen similar wholesale changes occurring on a regular basis. These events have led to 
a lack of continuity, stability and confidence at best and near catastrophe at worst. Here, Eskom’s crisis 
can be split into two parts – pre and post Zuma’s appointment as President in 2009.   
Between 2000 and 2005, when Eskom could do no wrong. This instilled a false sense of infallibility with 
government and Eskom management. The failed privatisation programme, during which Eskom made 
minimal capital investments while awaiting an outcome, was the turning point. In Jaglin’s view, Eskom’s 
management made the situation infinitely worse due to a litany of poor decisions and choices. The first, 
was the lack of a recognised leader, able to control and command the support of not only management, 
but also of technical and engineering personnel. Employees focused on their rivalries, deferred 
responsibility by blaming each other and sought political support to address technical failings, most 
notably the lack of security of supply and future planning, as pointed out in a detailed report submitted 
to the Department of Public Enterprises (see Wilson & Adams 2006). A second issue was Eskom’s 
aggressive and unapologetic drive to exceed national affirmative action quotas, which entailed the large-
scale removal of qualified white managers and technicians. Eskom (correctly) prided itself at being at the 
forefront of employment equity, which was started under the previous leadership in the early 1990s. 
Technical and management positions occupied by blacks went from 5% in 1993 to 50% in 1997 when 
Maree retired (Jaglin & DuBresson 2016, p.22). In truth, Eskom’s motivation at that time was both self-
serving, recognising that while Eskom performed, government would find it hard to intervene, and also 
borne of a genuine sense to address the inequities of practises under apartheid. An aggressive short-term 
quantitative employment equity target introduced in 1997 required 50% of management to be occupied 
by black employees. In 2006 the next phase of transformation was introduced – henceforth the 
recruitment of white male technicians, including temporary appointments, was prohibited and the 
promotion of white employees was frozen. Employment equity targets were revised upwards, namely 
65% black senior executives, of whom 40% needed to be female. These targets were met well in advance 
of the scheduled date, and achieved during a period when Eskom was reducing its overall staff numbers 
(Jaglin & DuBresson 2016, p.68). Transformation and overall downsizing inevitably meant that white staff 
members were sacrificed, many of whom were highly skilled and experienced. Morale and loyalty 
amongst white employees dropped, and those who could leave voluntarily, did. The trade union Solidarity, 
whose membership is almost exclusively white, conducted an internal survey amongst its Eskom members 
in January 2006 and warned of a looming skills crisis (Styan 2015, p.91). The low output of black, and 
especially black female, technically skilled graduates most of whom had limited experience, compounded 
the skills drain at Eskom. In the midst of an employment purge, it is also highly probable that white staff 
at Eskom were unlikely to over-extend themselves when it came to training and the transfer of skills to 
those in waiting. The existence of a skills crisis was initially rejected by Eskom management, but in January 
2008, at the height of the national rolling blackouts, there was nowhere to hide, and the CEO (Maroga71) 
confirmed that there were 848 skilled vacancies. To alleviate the situation a national and international 
recruitment drive was initiated, and the moratorium on hiring white staff was lifted, and ex-employees 
were asked to re-join the organization, with little success (Fig 2010). By now, Eskom was fast losing its 
long-held aura of being a highly regarded employer for skilled staff, morale was low and those who could 
leave, across all races, did. The third facet was the requirement that procurement, and more specifically 
 
71 Written reply by the Minister of Public Enterprises Alec Erwin to a parliamentary question asked by an opposition party in March 2008, on the 




the supply of coal, be diverted to emerging, black owned small to mid-sized suppliers, under significantly 
shorter contracts than the existing norm of 40 years. The consequences included reduced quality of coal 
supplies, deterioration of road networks due to old and poorly maintained trucks being used instead of 
the railways and irregular deliveries that created inventory management difficulties, while stock also came 
at much higher prices. Contracts with new suppliers were poorly negotiated and often forced through 
Eskom’s legal team or outsourced when the legal team refused to sign off on contracts72. Eskom, who had 
employed an internationally respected management consultant (Susan Olsen) in 2006, when advised of 
the pending crisis, terminated her contract. This development only came to light in 2009 when the official 
opposition released the leaked report (Hogg 2009).  
 “The technical argument carried little weight in comparison to the political priority.” 
        Jaglin & DuBresson (2016, p.70) 
Maroga presented his 25-year vision to the Eskom board in the form of an open strategy paper on the 
22nd of October 2009 (Politicsweb, 2009). The strategy begins by rambling on about historic events that 
brought Eskom to the position it is in – starting at the very beginning when the Commission (Escom) was 
established in 1922 to serve the nation by not operating at a profit, the capital development fund (1972), 
the DeVilliers commission (1984), the energy white paper and privatisation (1998), the 2001 conversion 
act and electricity pricing policy of 2008. The next section is a tirade on the pervading culture of “white 
supervision mentality” and the next half of the strategy lists proposed actions and outcomes to transform 
Eskom.  The 8 000 word strategy finds no space for personal introspection or accountability, and if 
anything, the CEO deflects shortcomings and critique, either to circumstances “The past three Chief 
Executives of Eskom all served during a period of excess capacity” or white supervision – referring to the 
leaked Olsen report “The manner in which the Olsen report was given status and attention is one example 
of white supervision mentality.” Maroga resigned in November 2009.  
The second period, under the Zuma presidency, appeared to be more of the same. But it wasn’t. It was 
coordinated and sinister; and the Eskom crisis up to 2009 provided the perfect ruse to loot state resources 
on a grand scale. To do so, a continuation of the chaos surrounding the utility, namely general corruption 
and inept management, was necessary in order to distract South Africans from what was really going on.   
“Instead, more and more information is coming to light that seems to corroborate claims that a 
coordinated political project of state capture has been underway, whereby governance structures 
are systematically repurposed to serve corrupt interests.”  Eberhard & Godinho (2017) 
Within this context, the period 2010 to 2014 is characterised by: constrained supply; the continued exodus 
of skilled staff, (3 297) leaving Eskom with 3 716 skilled staff vacancies in 2015; contested power plant 
maintenance contracts; and operational mayhem, such as operational tenders awarded to suspect service 
providers. The primary focus however was the weakening of governance structures. Competent board 
members were replaced with lackeys and the revolving door of CEO’s and Board chairpersons and 
members allowed graft of the highest order to take place with no accountability. For a detailed account 
see (Eberhard & Godinho 2017) (Styan 2015; Jaglin & DuBresson 2016)   
 




In August 2014 cabinet announced the appointment of Tshediso Matona as the new CEO of Eskom, who 
would start in October. Matona, a respected government bureaucrat, was carefully selected to address 
Eskom’s financial and generation woes, having chaired the interdepartmental task team set up by the 
Department of Energy, Treasury and Department of Public Enterprises to find solutions to Eskom’s 
problems. Nationwide load shedding commenced a month after Matona took over, and less than six 
months into his role he was abruptly suspeded with four other executives by the chairman of the board, 
a week after initiating an audit into Eskom tender processes. The board denied that the audit and the 
suspension were linked and stated the “inquiry, not an investigation, into the poor performance of 
generation plants, delays in bringing plants on-stream, the high costs of primary energy, and cash-flow 
problems” and “there is no intent or suspicion of wrongdoing, there are no charges against them. There is 
no malice, there is no wrongdoing that is under consideration” (SAPA 2015). Matona disputed his 
suspension and in May 2015 parted ways with Eskom after a settlement (undisclosed) was reached 
between the two. In August 2015, President Zuma apologised personally to Matona for the manner in 
which he had been treated, an action which confused many, as Eskom’s chair (Tsotsi) had insinuated that 
he had the president’s blessing prior to suspending Matona (Letsoalo 2015) - This was clarified by Matona 
during the 2017 parliamentary inquiry into the mismanagement of funds by Eskom, stating that President 
Zuma did not call to apologise but to discuss future career options (le Cordeur 2017a). Public outcry over 
continous blackouts, the perilous state of the electriicty supply system, management turnover and high 
annual tariff increases, took its toll; and during the Matona CEO fiasco, the board appointed the 
international law firm Denton to ascertain the reasons for the Eskom crisis. Just two months into their 12 
month contract however, the firm was stopped from completing the work by the new Eskom chairman 
(Ngubane), who after receiving an initial draft stated that enough information had been collected for 
corrective action to be taken internally – saying that its findings were broadly in line with what the new 
Eskom board had already ascertained, and was in the process of correcting (Ryan 2017). The report was 
initially kept under wraps, but under extreme public pressure and a realisation that it was about to be 
leaked, a heavily censored version (protecting names and removing details) was made public in 2017. The 
report found that payments were made without invoices, large contracts (R30 billion) were given to 
companies with no “footprint in the industry” and that staff benefitted unduly from such transactions (le 
Cordeur & Myburgh 2017). 
Brian Molefe was then appointed as the Eskom CEO and given the same mandate as his predecessor – 
addressing the ongoing blackouts and financial crisis at Eskom. His influence appeared to be immediate, 
the blackouts ceased and stability returned.  After his departure, Paton (2017), correctly pointed out that 
it had not, and that the utility was possibly in a worse state than when he arrived. Indeed, under Molefe’s 
control, transparency ended and the means with which the system was stabilised was not publicly 
available. For example, industry analysts approached the courts in 2016 to gain information, which prior 
to his appointment had always been disclosed (Ensor 2016). The secrecy surrounding Molefe’s 
management decisions also make it difficult to analyse his role in ending blackouts. Evaluating external 
events does provide some insight though: Several years of weak economic growth led to a long term, if 
not permanent, reduction in electricity demand, as users went out of business, reduced operations or did 
not invest in new projects – industry, mining, agriculture and transport were at pre-2007 demand levels. 
At the same time, new generation was continually being added by Eskom (phase 1 of Medupi added 800 
MW, Ingula pumped station added 1 GW by 2016 and there were other contributions). The REIPPP 
programme was also adding supply on a regular basis during his tenure (2.78 GW by 2016), and Eskom’s 




well timed than anything else, while the excessive praise he received for ending blackouts is at best 
contentious, but in truth unwarranted. Matona, when given the chance to publicly provide his version in 
the 2017 parliamentary inquiry and being asked if loadshedding would have ended without Molefe, 
provides the most plausible explanation: 
“I was confident that I could achieve. He could not have done that alone. He found a team fighting 
this war and the plans. He achieved the objective, so I don’t think Brian would himself claim these 
exceptional capabilities. He acknowledged the work that had been done before he was there. This 
is not a competition between Brian and I.”     Matona, Parliamentary Inquiry: 7 November 2017    
Molefe resigned under a cloud in December 2016 when a report implicating him with graft was issued by 
the public protector (Public Protector 2016), while a now stabilised Eskom did what it has always done – 
take centre stage – and not necessarily in the most postitive way. Indeed, the acting CEO announced in 
January 2017 that Eskom no longer needed renewables, in that they were too expensive; and would thus 
not sign any additional purchase agreements with the successful bidders under the government backed 
REIPPP programme. Industry experts and academics immediately questioned Eskom’s simulation model 
(le Cordeur 2017c) and Eskom’s stand will force government to act or face the prospect of legal action.  
  “Eskom views the REIPPP Programme as a loss of market share” 
  Eskom executive at a presentation to the Energy Intensive User Group, January 201773 
Then, in June 2017, the chairperson of the board, Ngubane, resigned and the acting CEO, Matshele Koko, 
was suspended in July 2017 for awarding a lucrative contract to his stepdaughter. Shortly after, the CFO 
Anoj Singh, brought to Eskom by Molefe, was also suspended on corruption charges. Other senior officials 
have also been implicated and suspended. The utility is once again operating with an acting CEO and a 
new board. Indeed, what has become clear in all of this, is that the level of orgainised fraud and corruption 
uncovered by the public protector in her state of capture report is as endemic as reported to be. 
Parliament has thus ordered an inquiry into the alledged state capture of three of South Africa’s SOE’s all 
finding themselves in a similar scenario - Eskom, Trasnet and Denel - to commence in September 2017.  
Figure 6-9 summarises the major events of the ESI for the period 1994 to 2016.    Note:  2012 was the last 
year Eskom provided its reserve margin to the public. Public reporting of the utility’s system performance, 
even in its annual financial statements, decreased as it entered a new cycle of blackouts from 2013.  
 









6.6.3 A Historical Institutionalist Perspective 
Political and Economic Overview 
After 46 years of overt domination by the NP - implemented through policy, regulation and force - one 
may have expected the ANC’s immediate and outright rejection (displacement) of the institutional 
framework that was ultimately developed to support the apartheid system and which comprised a 
complex set of sub-systems. This was not the case however; and on closer inspection perhaps it is not 
completely unsurprising, especially when considering the maelstrom of competing interests and 
ideologies. Indeed, politically and economically, the ANC faced a herculean task when coming into power; 
dealing with both external and internal factors and priorities. Externally, what was once a liberation 
movement, now had to make the transition to political party and ultimately to ruling government, as a 
member of the GNU. Within this process, it also had to balance the need to revive a fragile and battered 
economy against meeting the expectations of an electorate that not only sought political, but also 
economic, redress. Of course, such a process by its very nature of being a constant ‘balancing act’, had to 
thus deal with the competing interests of the various members of the tri-partite alliance, which itself 
spanned a broad political spectrum. Internally, this resulted in ideological ructions within the alliance; and 
here it is also important to note that although the removal of formal apartheid was not in dispute, the 
real battle was being fought over the economic philosophy that underpinned it. A primary intention then 
of the GNU appears to have been the defence of vested economic interests, and quite possibly for the NP 
to use the opportunity while working with the ANC, to demonstrate and promote the merits of existing 
policy – indeed where necessary, to influence shifts to the now in vogue neo-liberal approach, which many 
‘centrists’ within the ANC were embracing. This possibly made internal disputes more pronounced and 
debilitating; and even more difficult for the status quo to be displaced. The GNU’s influence may also have 
been less impactful than this, especially since it lasted less than three years and given government’s track 
record after its dissolution in 1997. 
When examining the post-GNU period, it becomes clear that although government policy may have made 
bold transformative statements or gestures, more than anything, the limited change that has occurred 
since then, has been through layering. For example, employment equity and BBBEE at face value may 
seem nothing short of outright displacement; but the manner in which this was applied was not new. All 
that truly changed was that one priority group was replaced by another, creating a new set of elites – with 
little benefit passing through to the greater populace, as evidenced by the high levels of unemployment 
and inequality persisting since 1994. Likewise, grand plans to privatise SOE’s amounted to little - by and 
large remaining firmly under government control - with the limited exception of Telkom (the state-owned 
telecommunications company, which was only partially privatised). Indeed, the structural weaknesses of 
the economy that the ANC inherited, not only remain, but have been put under even greater strain as 
policy continues seemingly along the same trajectory74. Ultimately, based on the review and analysis of 
the literature, changes to the political and economic environment appear to have been painfully 
incremental (here we exclude the removal of formal segregationist legislation and policy, which did occur 
under displacement).  
The net effect of these developments, thus appears to be one of layering, where new rules are being 
attached to existing ones, but I would argue that layering has occurred at such a slow pace that it has 
 
74 In reaching this conclusion, the research considered GEAR, ASGISA, the White Papers on Energy and Local Government, Industrial Policy and 
the more recent NDP, which to various degrees, have dealt with similar issues as discussed in this chapter and sought to rectify many of the key 
weaknesses identified by the researcher herein; but most of whom show signs of either being relatively unrealistic or inappropriate, or of having 




yielded to drift, where external factors change and institutions do not respond to the changing social and 
economic environment, making institutions ineffective and eroding them to the point of obsolescence. This 
is evidenced by a parastatal in varying states of crisis, a stagnant economy, growing inequality, the rise of 
populist politics and an electorate openly voicing its dissatisfaction in protest action and social media fury.  
“The ANC simply adopted existing government policy and deracialised them resulting in limited 
transformation and reform.”   Seekings & Nattrass (2015) 
Applying the typology provides an additional mechanism to confirm this assertion. Mahoney and Thelen 
(pp. 24) explain symbionts, the change agent for drift, as “actors [who] exploit an institution for private 
gain even as they depend on the existence and broad efficacy of the institution to achieve this gain.” They 
elaborate, further explaining that institutional maintenance is neglected due to the gap between rules 
and practises for personal gain, which undermines the institution over the long run and contributes to its 
decline (pp 67). An accurate and apt assessment of the state of national government in 2018.  
Electricity Supply Industry 
Within this overall political and socioeconomic context, Eskom has once again followed a somewhat 
different path through this milieu, for its own advantage; and it has been a story of two halves. In the first 
half, the early 1990s until 2000 or so, the utility’s primary objective was to “keep government out of the 
boiler room” which it ultimately achieved through careful planning.  
In 1990, Eskom was by no means in a comfortable space; and although its operations and finances had 
begun to stabilise under Maree and McRae’s leadership, its future was far from certain. Also, meeting 
with the ANC without the NP’s approval was a bold, albeit dangerous, move that could have very easily 
backfired. Likewise, there was no guarantee that the ANC once it came into power would allow it the same 
level of independence. Operationally too, conditions were tough. After years of very low and negative 
economic growth, with similar projections for the foreseeable future, the utility inexplicably continued its 
power plant build programme (Chapter 6.5.2 – Phase IV), with the 4.1 GW Majuba power station 
commissioned in 1996, twelve years after construction began – a phenomenon of its by now decades old 
locked-in policy of continuous build. Indeed, Eskom was generating far more than it was selling – operating 
with a reserve margin of over 24% for a fifteen-year period (1982 to 1997), peaking at 38% for three 
consecutive years 1991 to 1993, ((Figure 6-9) Steyn (2003)). Another great challenge was electrifying the 
previously excluded majority of the population, which was a necessary but mammoth and expensive task, 
made more complex by the fact that a working relationship would have to be established with 
municipalities and their MEU’s, with whom Eskom always had a difficult, and mostly acrimonious, 
relationship.  
To survive, Eskom switched from a positive to a negative feedback loop - self-correcting mechanism vying 
for a stable condition - a shift that was also being pushed for by national government, realising that not 
only was additional generation not required, it came at an unaffordable financial cost to the country. 
Eskom’s extended period under a positive feedback loop had finally amassed such ever-increasing powers, 
that if left unchecked, it would overwhelm the entire political system (Knapp, 2007 – Chapter 2.3.1). A 
counter-balancing negative feedback loop was needed. Reform. Thus, in addition to announcing a 
moratorium on new power stations, government issued the 1998 Energy White Paper, which made neo-
liberal policy pronouncements, including its intention to involve the private sector to restructure Eskom 




driving electrification and employment equity, keeping electricity tariffs low and generating large profits. 
Simultaneously, its overtures (negative) to potential investors, which were tacitly reinforced by the lack 
of decisive action from government and coupled with trade unions’ active and vocal opposition to private 
sector partnerships, resulted in little investment interest from the private sector. Eskom remained intact 
and in just over a decade had successfully reinvented itself; reclaiming its prime position of jewel in the 
country’s crown by winning international awards. The tale of the first half had ended surprisingly well. 
The second half, from 2000, was a very different story. It saw the exit of the old guard, normal in terms of 
institutional evolution; had the requisite knowledge-transfer occurred. Unfortunately, it did not (Styan 
2015; Jaglin & DuBresson 2016); and for the first time in its chequered history, the distinctive technical 
competence that the utility always enjoyed, was now eroded over a relatively short period of time by the 
rapid exit of experienced, competent personnel; replaced by politically subservient appointees, as 
highlighted by the short tenures of those holding key leadership positions75 and multiple corruption 
scandals that have plagued the utility, (as detailed above in Eskom in Crisis Again). The high level of 
autonomy and independence that Eskom historically always operated under, was now also lost, as its 
relationship with national government had now become one of definitive subordination, in what is 
tantamount to “government boiler room capture”; the extent of which was first raised by the Public 
Protector’s 2016 State of Capture Report, followed by Eberhard’s and Godinho’s Eskom Inquiry Reference 
Book and of course the ongoing Parliamentary Inquiry into Eskom. Thus, what is evident is a two-pronged 
assault on Eskom’s operational capability – in a near debilitating combination of lack of leadership and 
loss of technical expertise. It laboured under a sustained and disastrous series of senior and key leadership 
appointments that weakened corporate and strategic governance, while simultaneously facing the exodus 
(or decline in morale) of experienced and competent technical staff, who themselves were replaced by 
new or insufficiently experienced personnel, thus further weakening the utility. This decline of Eskom, its 
impact on the national economy and the cost to the fiscus has been presented in detail above, defined 
by: rolling blackouts from 2005 becoming a daily occurrence for extended periods in 2008 and 2014, and 
the country in 2017 continuing to operate with the uncertainty that they may return at any time; 
leadership instability; high levels of large scale corruption; regular and significantly above-inflation tariff 
increases from 2008, needed to fund poor management decisions, a bloated workforce, corruption and 
massive cost overruns of the new power plants – with these events ultimately leading to the parliamentary 
inquiry which commenced in 2017. 
When viewed through the theoretical prism, these outcomes strongly suggest conversion, where rules 
remain the same, but are interpreted and enacted in new ways under changing external conditions, to 
serve new ends. And as per the typology, these change agents being opportunists who “exploit whatever 
possibilities exist within the prevailing system to achieve their ends.”  (pp. 27) 
6.7 Chapter Comments and Findings 
Insofar that countries are unique and follow their own developmental path, similarities exist; allowing for 
broad generalisations to be made. South Africa’s three characteristics of a large indigenous population, a 
sizable European settler population and huge mineral wealth, distinguished it from other resource rich 
countries who only had combinations of these. And although minerals were discovered prior to the 
formation of the Union of South Africa (1910), when the British formally exited the scene, their influence 
 




on political and economic structure endured. Three distinct periods, each one controlled by one of the 
three ethnic groups, have been identified in this chapter: In the period up to 1948 it was the English-
speaking white population; the second period (1948 – 1994) saw Afrikaner nationalism dominate under 
apartheid; and from 1994 the indigenous population took control of government. Here the research 
findings suggest that the ruling group have never enjoyed total control, as one or both groups not in power 
could not be completely side-lined; with a key consequence being that the incumbent ruling group, more 
often than not, adapted existing, as opposed to developing new, policies to prioritise its electorate and 
interests. This has seen policies and structural frameworks survive; with little, or isolated, true reform 
being introduced. It is possibly for this reason, and because of the stranglehold (although waning) of the 
MEC on the economy, that the way “things are done” in South Africa has undergone little transformation. 
Several systemic weaknesses have repeatedly surfaced over the decades; but the responses or solutions 
to address these - regardless of the ethnic or race group in control of government - have in most cases 
been superficial. Table 6-14 illustrates how recurring issues present themselves and resurface over time. 
Table 6-14: Summary of Findings of South Africa’s Political Economy (1910 – 2017) 
1910-1948 
 








• White labour represented by 
labour unions. Semi and skilled 
labour reserved for whites only. 
Challenge to white labour resulted 
in a shift to conservative 
government in 1926 who 
introduced ‘civilised labour’  
• Capital and even state sought to 
circumvent policy by training 
Africans 
• Economy restrained by skills 
shortages 
• Entrenchment of pro-white labour 
policies for the Afrikaans populace 
through job reservations 
• Increased mining mechanisation a 
move to contain wage costs and 
disruptions 
• Agricultural and mining model of 
low wages and labour exploitation 
transferred to industrial sector 
(unsuccessfully)  
• Economy restrained by skills 
shortages 
• Employment equity and BEE to 
address misalignment of the labour 
market 
• Black unions align to political parties 
to influence policy. ‘Decent jobs’ 
official mantra with policy of wage 
protection over job creation 
• Unemployment rises from 20% in 
early 1990s to 25% in 2014  
• Economy restrained by skills 
shortages 
Finding: For well over one hundred years, government labour policy has favoured one racial or cultural group over another. 
Noting that under apartheid this practise was exclusionary and indefensible, whereas under the democratic government 
necessary and morally appropriate but to a large extent inappropriately implemented and manipulated (see BBBEE Chapter 
5.6.2). As a result, the country has always created elites (often undeserving) at the expense of the broader population and 
excludes full economic participation.  
Another enduring, and confounding, policy priority is targetting a ‘high wage – high productivity’ under a Porterian model, over 
a labour intensive one (Nattrass, Seekings, 2015). This excludes the majority, while the continuous upliftment of skilled workers 
widens inequality. Skill shortages are, and continue to be, a weakness of the labour market 
Industrialization 
• Mineral wealth recognised as a 
‘wasting asset’, necessitating the 
need to develop a viable secondary 
sector 
• Government embarks on creating 
an   enabling environment for this 
through Escom, Iscor, IDC etc. 
• Industry is supported by import 
substitution and trade tariffs 
• Decentralization, supported by 
incentives, to create economic 
activity in rural areas, with limited 
results as firms are unable to 
operate profitably without 
subsidies 
• Government report recommends a 
switch from import substitution to 
export orientation 
• Signatory to the World Trade 
Organization means trade 
liberalization and tariff removal 
• Some winners but most companies 
unable to compete without trade 
protection. Situation exasperated by 
Indian and Chinese manufacturing   
Finding: South Africa’s industrialization is inextricably linked to the MEC, while non-MEC production is largely uncompetitive, 
with limited scope for exports. The removal of tariffs demonstrated just how reliant firms had become on tariffs. Government’s 
unequal protection of categories within sectors was demonstrated by the way in which trade liberalization tariffs were 




reliant and imports capital equipment, which is greater than exports and a net drain on foreign exchange. The small size of the 
market and selective government support of certain industries has led to an oligopolistic market structure 
Current Account Deficit 
Finding: In all three periods, the economy has relied on inward foreign investments to balance its foreign exchange requirements 
(37% of the current account deficit between 2003 and 2014 (Strauss, 2015)), creating regular flashpoints and destabilising the 
economy when investors withdraw large amount of money on short notice. Mining, and less so agriculture, are the country’s 
bedrock of net foreign exchange inflows. The current account deficit in 2015 was 5.4% and 4.4% of GDP in 2014 and 2015, and 
averaged 4.11% of GDP for the period 2005 to 2015 (World Bank). The foreign exchange inflows fluctuate due to the cyclical 
nature of commodity prices, but ultimately their contribution is diminishing 
Electricity 
All generation, transmission and 
distribution brought under state 
control. MEU’s cannot supply users 
(>25kVA) in their area of jurisdiction 
Escom starts a massive new build 
programme. Tariffs rise sharply to fund 
capital expenditure; and government 
intervenes after industry protests  
Energy white paper (1998) calls for reform 
and competition. Programme stalls due to 
labour protest and lack of government 
commitment 
Finding: Eskom controls the ESI and taking control of municipal EDI is not inconceivable, having threatened to cut off defaulting 
municipalities and take over their operations. Its policy, supported by national government, of using residential sales to subsidise 
commercial and industrial tariffs aligns with developed country models, which is contrary to developing country practises. In 
2011, industry and mines accounted for 77% of sales but generated only 67% of revenue (Thopil, Pouris, 2013) 
Path Dependent Mechanisms 
Economy: A young country shifts from 
an agrarian to a mining economy, to 
exploit its resources. Inevitably, the 
multiplier effect of the positive 
feedback loop locks economic 
development to the MEC. 
ESI: VFTPC, and then Escom, must 
generate new & large quantities of 
power for the mines, pursued through 
economies of scale. The multiplier effect 
kicks off Escom’s long term modus 
operandi of continuous build – Positive 
feedback loop. 
Economy: Economic growth during the 
first period emboldens unsustainable 
policy – positive feedback loop. The 
economy suffers from international & 
national pressure. Government 
responds by attempting to maintain 
equilibrium – Negative feedback loop. 
ESI: With continuous build now 
entrenched in its psyche, it's business as 
usual for Escom; doing whatever is 
needed to grow its generation capacity 
– Positive feedback loop.  
Economy: The economy has changed little 
since 1994. Globalisation has exposed 
structural inefficiencies and an 
uncompetitive economy - evidenced by 
low growth, high unemployment and 
inequality. Reform & innovation exists in 
small measure, as stasis dominates to 
maintain equilibrium; in a classic 
illustration of a negative feedback loop 
ESI: Reform avoided through poor 
implementation Eskom’s influence, and 
labour. From 2000, incessant political 
interference led to decline, inefficiency 
and corruption – Positive feedback loop. 
When looking at the developmental trajectory over the three time periods, mineral wealth being used to 
industrialise, is not in question. It was. What is in question is the path it followed, and continues to follow, 
which has always delivered sub-optimal growth, as well as political instability and entrenched inequality. 
During all three periods, government policy has always excessively favoured a narrow segment of the 
ruling group’s constituents, creating a small cluster of elites and increasing both the levels, and absolute 
numbers, of inequality - with the broader African population bearing the brunt. Also, vain attempts to 
stimulate the economy through the implementation of internationally prescribed models, often, have had 
opposite effects. Standard economic theory, for example, for low industrialization and high 
unemployment, ascribes the remedy of a labour-intensive growth path as per Arthur Lewis’ Economic 
Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour. Industrialised nations with low unemployment, focus on 
improving productivity, as per Michael Porter’s Competitive Advantage of Nations. But little theory exists 
on South African circumstances, which are once again unique: an industrialised country with high 
unemployment (Nattrass & Seekings 2015). Seen in this light, it is perhaps time for a new multifaceted 
approach, borne of and in tune with local circumstances. Here, the fundamental restructuring of Eskom 
that its current quagmire necessitates, may very well provide the insights to do so – as both a microcosm 
and key driver of the South African political economy – were the political will to do so exist. This has not, 
for over a century and counting.  
Ultimately these circumstances have created fertile breeding ground for Escom to pursue its own 




the country’s overall wellbeing. And these ambitions were totally clear – absolute dominance of the 
electricity sector by means of a build programme aimed at creating large economies of scale.  However, 
this single minded quest to control all electricity markets, meant that Eskom’s expansion plans prioritised 
market control, often at the expense of an appropriate and economically viable build plan that considered 
the national economy, regardless of whether it was SAR’s reluctance to rely on municipal electricity 
supplies, mining and industrial expansion as a government imperative or the need to electrify the hitherto 
unserved, which offered a credible excuse. Indeed, with national government as tacit ‘big brother’ from 
the start – beginning with the influence to essentially veto expanded municipal power generation – 
Escom/Eskom maximised the leverage that this ‘special relationship’ afforded it, to the detriment of both 
private and municipal power generation. Ironically, this has led to precisely the kind of monopoly that the 
country’s original electricity legislation actually sought to forestall – the unintended consequence of which 
a century later, is a nation almost wholly reliant on a by now teetering monolith where entrenched 
behaviours, locked in trajectories, long-established path dependencies, and the same original 
unwillingness to move away from total control of the ESI, have never really shifted, even when there has 
been government intervention a la commissions of enquiry and white papers. Indeed, through a process 
mostly of conversion, the utility has continually sought to create an ingrained monopolistic reality, the 
scale of which poses a genuine threat to the economic health of the country and the wellbeing of its 
citizens – be it sanctioning the CDF in the 1970s to allow it to build more power stations; high tariff 
increases in the 1970s and from 2006 to cover funding shortfalls and operational inefficiencies. 
Government backed loans increased from R174 billion (2011) to over R300 billion in 2017. Equivalent to 
8% of GDP, with plans for an additional R340 billion by 2022, this prompted global economists and the 
international investment bank Goldman Sachs to state that Eskom posed the biggest risk to the South 
African economy (Bloomberg, 2017).  
More than anything, research in this chapter has sought to demonstrate the extent to which politics, the 
economy, government and the ESI (inclusive of EDI) are inextricably linked. Indeed, the complexities are 
of such magnitude, that any attempted changes to EDI which are anything more than superficial, cannot 
be considered in isolation. Thus, with the national ESI environment and framework now painted as a clear 













7. Municipal Electricity Undertakings and Local Government  
 
7.1 Objectives and Structure of the Chapter  
Previous chapters identified the municipal ESI institutional stakeholders and explained why MEU’s were 
constantly “under siege” from their political masters (at local, provincial and national level), as well as the 
dominant national utility at particular times - VFTPC to begin with and then Eskom. This chapter now 
demonstrates how this ultimately played out – retaining the now familiar structure. It identifies the 
political, technical and financial obstructions that the above-mentioned institutions placed in MEU’s way, 
the latter’s response and the outcomes. Here it should be noted that in all of this, MEU’s as operating 
entities also had to deal with everyday trading conditions and normal operational necessities - technology 
changes, economic ups and downturns, staff competency and many others. These are also considered in 
this chapter, using Johannesburg as a case study. This allows for a detailed account of how broader 
decisions manifested at a specific MEU – especially since it is the one that services the country’s financial 
centre and biggest city.      
Stylistically, the research presented under each of the time periods is anchored around the primary theme 
affecting the municipal ESI at the time. From 1910 until 1948 for example, it was the relief of rates; from 
1948 until 1994 it was the Escom battle for rights of supply; and in the final period (from 1994) the 
challenge of providing electricity for all. Of course, other pertinent matters in each time period are also 
addressed.      
7.2 Historical Backdrop – Up to and Including Union (1910) 
With the exception of Johannesburg and Kimberly, numerous attempts to establish municipal government 
in the interior between 1850 and 1900 failed; such as in Potchefstroom, Pretoria, Lydenburg, Rustenburg, 
which Green (1957) attributed to a lack of financial viability. Towns still required the provision of services 
however, and the first appointments of a town or municipal engineer were made in 1850’s. The non-
permanent nature of the municipalities meant that the engineering positions were on a temporary or part 
time basis, except for Kimberly and Johannesburg where the discovery of diamonds (1870’s) and gold 
(1880s) made municipal government viable. It was under British control that municipalities were formally 
established across the Transvaal, most of which came into existence in 1903. During this period, the town 
engineer was responsible for all public works under municipal governance. Depending on the size of the 
town, engineers for water, sewerage and electricity, all of whom would report to the municipal engineer 
were also employed (Mäki 2013). Most of the early engineers were trained via the apprenticeship system.  
The Cape Electric Light and Telephone Company was formed in 1879 and the country’s first electric lighting 
appeared in Cape Town’s railway station in 1881, which was extended to Table Bay Harbour by 1882. The 
same company successfully tendered to Kimberley’s Town Council for street lighting and in 1882 
Kimberley became the first town to have electric street lighting and a municipal electricity undertaking. 
From there, the demand for electricity grew across the country, summarised by the Association of 
Municipal Electricity Undertaking (AMEU) 80 Years Handbook (1995) as follows. – “Durban Town Hall was 
illuminated in 1888, Pietermaritzburg got its first lights in 1897. Johannesburg built its first generating 




1895. A similar chain of events occurred in Bloemfontein were electricity was first supplied in 1900, during 
the Boer war meaning that the plant was under military control and only handed over to the municipality 
when the war ended. By the turn of the century most independent electricity generation plants, for one 
reason or another, had been taken over by the local municipalities. The result was that municipalities 
generated most of their electricity. A practise which endured for many years”. (AMEU 1995)    
7.3 The Union of South Africa (1910 – 1948)  
7.3.1 Municipal Finances and the Policy of Rate Relief from MEU Revenue  
Provincial government was mandated to create local authorities and controlled them via ordinances, 
which is why local government functions varied across provinces. The newly formed South African 
government borrowed greatly from the British structure. This was true for local government as well, with 
one difference. Local government in South Africa was not responsible for, and played a very limited role 
in, the provision of social services, such as health and education. Social services resided with provincial 
government. From the start (1910) municipal financial self-sufficiency was strictly enforced, regardless of 
pressure placed on municipalities, such as natural population growth and urbanization. By illustration, in 
1937 Johannesburg had balanced its municipal budget consistently since Union, without any contribution 
from central or national government (Maud 1938, p.290), and 68 years after Union the national average 
of central government grants to municipalities was just 4.7% of total revenue (Solomon 1983, p.58). 
Trading services, such as electricity and water, were allocated to local government and the surpluses 
generated from the charges, and property rates, became the two major revenue sources.  
Services provided by municipalities could be broken down into two categories. The first were pure public 
goods, which are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. This means that individuals cannot be effectively 
excluded from their use and the use by one individual does not reduce availability to others. Classic 
examples include street lighting, national defence, footpaths and flood control. The second category, 
quasi-private goods, was for services that could be charged for based on consumption - units of electricity, 
litres of water, cubic feet of gas, kilometres travelled etc. Quasi-private goods have characteristics of both 
private and public goods (Chapter 3.5.3).  
It was a requirement that major cities provide their allocated functions, regardless of whether they could 
do so at a profit. Many were provided for free or only charged a nominal fee, such as libraries, museums, 
public swimming pools and sport facilities. Transport was almost always operated at a loss. Conversely, 
the provision of electricity, water and gas were profitable undertakings. The limited availability of gas in 
South Africa, with water being viewed as a basic and fundamental right, meant that the bulk of the trading 
surpluses were generated from the sale of electricity. In the early 1940s, based on gross receipts, fees 
from trading services accounted for almost 60% of total income, while property taxes contributed 25% 
and the remainder (~15%) was from other sources (Holmes & Cowden 1949, 123–124).  These figures 
differ somewhat with (Maud 1938), whose figures for the period 1903 to 1935, shown in five year 
increments, are presented below in Table 7-1. A few things become immediately clear. The first is the 
ever-increasing value and contribution of electricity to total revenue, reflecting the rapid uptake. The 
second is the flat, even decreasing, contribution that property rates made to municipal revenue. During 
the period the contribution from rates more than halved from 39% of the total in 1905 to just 16% in 
1934, while total municipal revenue almost tripled from £1.3m to £3.7m. This was only possible because 




Table 7-1: Contribution to Total Municipal Revenue (£) for Johannesburg by Category (1905-1934)  










Total Revenue  
1905 525,312  362 409 143 533 311 376 1 339 630 
% of Total Revenue  39% 27% 11% 23%  
1909 303,442  290 741 222 023 755 443 1 571 649 
% of Total Revenue 19% 19% 14% 48%  
1914 348 958 286 565  281 136 663 198 1 579 857 
% of Total Revenue 22% 18% 18% 42%  
1919 443 582 401 751 394 149 935 918 2 175 400 
% of Total Revenue 20% 19% 18% 43%  
1924 484 794 545 092 490 127 1 037 356 2 557 369 
% of Total Revenue 19% 21% 19% 41%  
1929 627 314 783 114 683 609 1 913 718 3 934 726 
% of Total Revenue 16% 18% 17% 49%  
1934 614 987 931 674 867 560 1 380 361 3 764 918 
% of Total Revenue 16% 25% 23% 37%  
Source: Maud (1938) 
A more telling number however is the actual surplus, as a large revenue contribution could be offset by a 
similar, or even bigger, net expense which often was for transport. By comparing property rates to the 
surpluses from trading undertakings, Figure 7-1 shows the extent and the speed with which the 
Johannesburg municipality started using contributions from services to subsidise property taxes, pursuing 
an indirect over direct taxation policy. During this period, indirect taxes peaked in 1935 and contributed 
as much as 77% of the municipality’s total revenue. Revenue from rates, consequently, did not increase 
materially. £341 972 was collected in 1903, when the population was 109 000, increasing to £587 511 in 
1935 when the population had grown to 438 000 (Maud 1938, pp.289–292). Figure 7-1 shows that 
electricity and water became the main municipal revenue contributors. Property ratepayers also 
benefitted from the city preferring to impose special rates for specific purposes, (such as road levy, water 
main extensions and for the tram), rather than increase property rates. Figure 7-1 may also demonstrate 
the uncertainty and difficulty associated with property tax collections. Annual increases or decreases of 
over £100 000 were not uncommon, as can be seen, and this cannot be explained by the policy of keeping 
rates as low as possible. Electricity and water provided far more reliable revenue sources, where 
disconnection for non-payment is relatively straightforward.   
The percentage net profit from trading undertakings could vary wildly. For example, electricity made a 
loss of 21% in 1907, but just three years later it registered a 63% 77  net profit. This perhaps is 
understandable in the early years where large infrastructure investments were necessary and proved very 
profitable, except for transport. Over a 30-year period, the net profit from gas averaged 23%, Electricity 
22%, Transport 5%, and Water 19%. (Derived Maud 1938). 
 
76 As the total surplus made by abattoirs and the produce market was relatively small, £36 062 and £72 954 respectively over 30 years, these 
have been omitted from the figure. 





        Source: (Maud 1938) Randall (1938) 
Figure 7-1: Annual Property Tax Collections versus Contributions from Trading Undertakings in Aid of 
Rates for Johannesburg Municipality  (1904-1936) 
Table 7-2 illustrates the extent to which, and how quickly, ratepayers were trading surpluses. General 
rates and road rate charged by the city decreased, while capital expenditure increased substantially, thus 
a constantly increasing part of the burden was borne by the trading departments (Randall 1938, p.412)  
Table 7-2: Contribution of Municipal Undertakings to the Relief of Rates for Johannesburg (1925-1937) 
Year Ended 30 
June 
Net Contribution by 
Trading Departments 
Rates  Total 
Revenue 
Net Contribution by Trading 
Departments to Rates  
 £ (000) £ (000) £ (000) % 
1925 91 485 729 18.8 
1926 107 512 773 20.9 
1927 129 513 829 25.1 
1928 161 549 890 29.3 
1929 183 627 1 005 29.2 
1930 193 632 1 019 30.5 
1931 158 633 1 044 25.0 
1932 183 713 1 206 25.7 
1933 222 616 1 217 36.0 
1934 256 613 1 132 41.8 
1935 415 690 1 325 60.1 
1936 390 693 1 264 56.3 
1937 395 706 1 332 55.9 
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Randall (1938, 410–411) was very critical of the city’s practise, which was nothing less than a tax, and not 
a “good one”, as it was “inequitable and disguised, but probably recommends itself partly because the bulk 
of the citizens do not realize that they are being taxed, and therefore do not object”. The paper goes on to 
warn against keeping rates as low as possible by pushing the profits from the trading undertakings as high 
as possible. It was viewed as unsustainable and that the policy needed to be reversed. A more equitable 
distribution, through higher rates, could not be reasonably challenged by rate payers. A 1935 Commission 
of Inquiry which reported on municipal power stations stated: 
“…the profits of the electricity department…, allocated in relief of rates, unduly favour the 
ratepayers at the expense of the consumers. They are unreasonable from the point of view of the 
users of electricity, and uneconomic from the point of view of industrial and general development 
of the city.” (Maud 1938, p.114)   
Relief of rates was not unique to Johannesburg and was practised by all municipalities. The question 
arising, is why it was pursued to the extent that it was? Certainly, part of the answer is, as Randall notes, 
that the users of services were exploited. However, there was strong political will to retain this practise, 
which prevails in present day 2017. This research posits, that this was yet another practise inherited from 
the British system of government, which became entrenched even though the British removed it in 1947, 
because of the autocratic structural governance framework. Through provincial government, national 
government continually allocated new functions to municipalities with little or no additional financial 
support, while not allowing them to generate additional revenue. From a municipal perspective, the ability 
to self-fund gave them a semblance of decentralised government and the benefits (as detailed in Chapter 
3) that accrue with it. 
Chandler (2007, 70–97) explains Britain’s complicated system of local government from 1800, designed 
to benefit the industrial and commercial elite, comprising the majority of councillors and alderman – a 
situation which did not change materially after the passing of the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act, also 
known as the Reform Act. The objective of the Act was to reform boroughs which were run on party lines 
and offered little to the local population. Under the Act, a uniform system of government was established 
for 178 out of the 246 towns (Craythorne 1977, p.6) and large towns were required to disband their closed 
corporations and set up new councils based on rate payer elections. The effect was that the interests of 
landowners were now merged with those of industrialists, while improvements in terms of services for 
the local population came gradually, as more and more services came under the control of municipalities. 
Limited reform during the first forty years was replaced by the “golden age of municipal government that 
culminated by the end of the century in the established municipality subsidising the rates through 
profitable trading services and spearheading major infrastructure developments” (Chandler 2007, p.76), 
which ceased with the passing of the Electricity Act of 1947. The improved services in the cities led to 
large scale urbanization, and by 1901, 79 percent of the population were in urban areas, compared to 54 
percent in 1851. The 1884 Electoral Reform Act gave all male households in rural areas the right to vote 
in parliamentary elections. This was followed by municipal reform in 1888, when the local voting was 
extended to tenants of rooms or of land valued at more than £10 per year (Chandler 2007, pp.96–100).  
In South Africa, the right to vote in national elections was limited to white males only, and even greater 
limitations were placed on municipal elections. This right was highly prized and the failure of a qualified 




voters in the local papers. In the Transvaal, Ordinance Number 8 of 1912 (repealed by Ordinance Number 
2 of 1914) required a “property qualification” for voters. A report by the Report of the Local Government 
Commission of 1921 called for this ordinance to be re-established, as “only responsible citizens with a real 
stake in the municipality should be entrusted the franchise” (Cloete 1978, 119–123). The recommendation 
was not adopted but illustrates two things. The first is that the British system was replicated in South 
Africa, and consequently, the second is the privilege and power that property owners enjoyed. The Cape 
Province kept the municipal voters roll limited to property owners for a much longer period, until as late 
as the 1950s78. Thus, in addition to surplus revenue from undertakings, users were being charged a tax 
they were not aware of. This arrangement was also in the councillor’s interest as minimising property 
taxes would ensure the support of the electorate. The practise continued even when the vote was 
extended to all white citizens, as property owners were likely to carry the greatest influence and provide 
financial support to political parties.  
7.3.2 The AMEU and the Policy of Rate Relief from MEU Revenue 
Contextual Background 
The policy of rate relief from municipal undertakings did not enjoy universal local government support. 
Many were against it, not least of which were the electricity undertakings, whose operations were 
undoubtedly making the biggest contribution to the relief of rates. The topic was first raised as early as 
the second AMEU79 convention in 1917, and came up regularly for discussion thereafter – 1927, 1929, 
1935, and 1936. The issues raised at each convention centred around concerns of what was believed to 
be the unsound policy of allocating “net surplus profits” from electricity undertakings for the relief of 
rates; and all the issues raised are included in the 1937 paper outlined in the next section. Indeed, by 1937 
the AMEU had succeeded in drafting a policy recommendation for the provincial administrators to 
consider, with the objective of inspiring legislation that placed a limit on this practice. In its original form, 
the recommendation was based on the United Kingdom’s Electricity Act of 1926, but after a heated debate 
the proposal was watered down significantly. As it turned out, the recommendation only made it to the 
administrator of the Cape Province, and promptly postponed when the municipality itself objected.  
The topic of relief of rates was consuming an inordinate amount of time at annual AMEU conventions in 
the build-up to the 1937 policy paper, with highly charged discussions having to be ended by the chairman, 
and always with no mutually agreed outcome. Typically, but not always, the MEU delegates opposed the 
practise, whereas municipal councillors’ interests lay in appeasing their voters, who did not want to see 
their property taxes rise. It was therefore decided at the 1936 convention that the AMEU needed to adopt 
a formal position at its next convention. The next section now provides a summary of the AMEU’s 
executive committee’s rationale for opposing the practise of relief of rates, followed by responses 
received from delegates, both for and against the practise.   
 
78 Based on an interview with Richard Frantz. Previous CEO and director of Merz and McLellan, whose father was a municipal manager in Cape 
Town in the 1940s and 1950s.  
79 Although the majority of the delegates at the conventions were electrical engineers, councillors and mayors were well represented and stayed 
for the full conference. These delegates represented different constituencies which mostly, but not always, led to the differing views. By the 
1960s, as travel became more accessible and other issues were of greater priority, fewer mayors and councillors attended and generally only for 




Summary of the AMEU Paper Presented at the 1937 AMEU Conference Analysing the Policy of 
Rate Relief and Outlining its Position  
The paper, prepared and presented by Councillor James, addressed the topic by breaking it down into 
themes, each of which then consider the advantages and disadvantages of the practise. To maintain the 
integrity of the paper, the below precis maintains the original format and then concludes by detailing the 
various responses put forward by the delegates.  
General Considerations  
From a MEU perspective, rate relief is defined as the act of literally using electricity undertakings to relieve 
ratepayers of the need to pay the full amount necessary to balance the general fund revenue for municipal 
services, by extracting lump sums from the electricity undertaking. It also includes the provision of public 
and inter-departmental electrical services at less than cost.  Electricity is no longer a luxury only accessible 
to an affluent few, but has become a necessary requirement for the health and general well-being of a 
community. Similarly, for industrial activity to provide employment and economic well-being, it is a 
requirement that electricity supplies are made available to a virtually unlimited extent, at low cost. 
Alternatives to electricity do exist, but are generally less convenient and have a diminished security of 
supply. However, charging inflated prices to cover other expenditure raises the likelihood of a loss of a 
business. The objective of the electricity undertaking is to provide the service at the lowest possible cost 
and dividends are received intangibly through the increased valuation of the district served, and not 
necessarily in cash. Additionally, higher tariffs ignore the needs of the poorer sections of the community. 
Indeed, the inordinate temptation of “easy money” from electricity sales has prompted other countries 
to introduce legislation to control such action; making the AMEU’s 1937 attempt to embolden such 
legislation consistent with global practices.   
Equity 
It is not equitable for electricity users to unwittingly contribute to total municipal expenses. The greater 
the usage, the greater the contribution. All ratepayers are not necessarily electricity consumers, but all 
electricity consumers are ratepayers, either as owners of property or through the rent that they pay. 
Ratepayers may own large tracts of land using no electricity, whereas a family must pay rates and 
electricity. It is thus unsurprising that owners of large rental properties and undeveloped land stand to 
gain the most from, and are the most ardent supporters of, the policy. A figure of 14.5% is quoted as a 
real case example of the contribution towards the relief of rates. In other words, the price of electricity is 
14.5% more expensive than it should be to pay for other municipal enterprises. 
Financial Security 
Municipal reliance on revenue from electricity undertakings has become so convenient, that in certain 
instances the amount taken exceeded gross profit, resulting in a deficit being carried forward. This practise 
would undoubtedly put future development of the undertaking at risk; and in extreme cases risk the 
undertaking itself. This was either due to councillors not understanding the consequences or because they 
had so little regard for the undertakings. The relief of rates is only possible when there is a surplus, which 
is a true one – after allowance has been made for external charges, such as redemption, interest on loans 




or subject to variation on personal opinion. It is the way that these three items are treated that makes 
such sizable amounts available for the relief of rates. 
Electricity undertakings operate in a rapidly changing environment, where improved technology is 
constantly introduced. This could lead to equipment having to be replaced during its working life, and 
undertakings must be financially prepared to do so. The transfer of money for rate relief rather than being 
put back into the business, leads to the situation where undertakings must enter into loans to finance 
new equipment and operations, adding interest costs and further necessitating tariff increases. This 
practise is akin to raising loans indirectly for the relief of rates, whose legality is questionable. Here, 
additional minor arguments for ratepayer relief include that on account of ratepayers effectively standing 
as guarantors, loans are secured at a lower rate. This too is refuted by the AMEU executive on the basis 
that it is in the ratepayers’ interest and that financial institutions are already very willing to loan funds to 
electricity undertakings. 
Rewards to Ratepayers 
The relief of rates practise is supported by the argument that ratepayers are entitled to a return on their 
investment, as they ultimately stand as guarantors. The argument is rejected on the basis that the 
ratepayers are only liable for interest on the capital invested in the undertaking, which of course, benefits 
the district and in turn their investment. But even if it is accepted that the ratepayers as investors are 
entitled to a reward, it can be argued that their reward consists of them becoming owners of an asset for 
which they have not paid anything. This takes the form of the increased valuation of their properties due 
to the prosperity which the supply of electricity has brought. The advantages to ratepayers is maximised 
by supplying electricity at the lowest possible price and operating the undertakings in a prudent financial 
manner, rather than reducing monthly rate payments.  
Legislation 
The problem of rate relief is not unique to South Africa. In England legislation in 1926 was introduced to 
place a limit on this practice. In New York, a proposal to aid rates from municipally owned electricity 
undertakings was rejected outright on the basis that it is the private sector’s purpose to obtain profit. 
Public undertakings are created and operated for the well-being of the population, and although it is a 
requirement that they are properly managed, consumers must not pay a higher tariff to benefit 
ratepayers.   
Turning to South Africa, the Electricity Act of 1922 requires Escom to regulate its charges at its various 
undertakings to operate at neither a profit nor a loss. Other licensees (notably VFTPC) were required to 
distribute 25 percent of their surplus profits to their consumers.  
Although no legislation exists for municipal undertakings, a draft ordinance had been published in the 
Cape Provincial Gazette (19th May 1936)80. It allowed for a portion of net surplus revenue from electricity 
undertakings to be used for the relief of rates, but limited it to 1/20th of the total capital expenditure of 
the undertaking (same as Electricity Act of Great Britain 1926). Furthermore, if transfers are deemed 
excessive in the opinion of the Provincial Administrator, the Administrator could direct that no further 
contributions be made for a specified period thereafter without written consent.    
 





Relying on profits from undertakings for the relief of rates is a doubtful practise, as it is an unreliable form 
of taxation because profits vary from year to year. An overreliance on this revenue source is likely to 
create municipal funding problems if electricity sales or profits drop. Additionally, using electricity profits 
to fund unprofitable or risky municipal enterprises, discourages the enterprise itself from maximising 
profits. In conclusion, electricity undertakings should be run on business principles and the provision of 
services to the municipality itself should be at market rates and without subsidy. This principle should 
apply to municipal services undertakings, such as gas, water etc.  
Delegate Responses to the Official AMEU Position on the Policy of Rate Relief 
The moderator then opened the session to the floor and Table 7-3 captures the essence of what where 
lengthy, polite, but pointed responses, in favour and against the practise. Two things can be surmised 
from the responses. The first, is that the delegates had very strong views on the subject, creating conflict. 
The second, is that a scan of the responses both from this conference and others (before and after) 
confirms that typically MEU delegates (technical) supported the removal of the practise and councillors 
(political) opposed its removal.      
Table 7-3: Summary of Responses to the AMEU Executive Committee on the Policy of Rate Relief at the 
1937 Conference 
Municipality  Comment 
Support the Removal of Rate Relief from Municipal Electricity Undertaking Funds 
East London -Practise equates to an indirect tax 
-As electricity undertakings are natural monopolies, they are exploiting their position 
-Concern that technological advances may more readily replace electricity if it is too expensive 
-Electricity profits for rate relief must be limited to a small percentage with consumers enjoying lower tariffs 
Johannesburg -A longstanding topic in Johannesburg and the views of the Town Council (politicians) do not coincide with that 
of their financial advisers and engineers  
-Ratepayers should receive relief subject to a limit, which should be “somewhat higher” than what the caps 
applied in other countries. Reserves for obsolescence should be maintained 
-Before appropriations are made, consideration should be given to the reasonableness of electricity tariffs  
Pretoria* -Does not encourage prudent accounting, such as provision for depreciation and obsolescence 
-Artificially high electricity tariffs harm a city’s competitiveness  
-Experience from England shows that the practise was abused and necessitated legislation 
-Many councils have terminated the policy from other undertakings (gas, water). Why is it done for electricity? 
-The fact that the Electricity Act effectively nationalised the industry, is an admission that it is a public utility 
needed in modern life and therefore must be provided at lowest cost  
Krugersdorp  -Recognised the different interests of councils and engineers, but believes that profits should be returned to 
consumers or placed in a reserve or equalising fund  
Cape Town -Failure to match loan periods to the useful life of equipment is effectively raising loans for the relief of rates. 
Proper and prudent accounting is crucial 
Port Elizabeth -Larger electricity consumers do not benefit from the relief of rates i.e. surpluses do not accrue in a 
proportion that is related to the rateable value of the property 
Support the Policy of Rate Relief from Municipal Electricity Undertaking Funds 
Bloemfontein -Eskom’s efforts to curb municipal electricity undertaking profits have become an obsession 
-Municipalities are trading concerns which are required to provide functions and services. Some of these are 
unprofitable by their nature, but as they are vital and necessary, they are provided. By not using the funds 
available from profitable undertakings, the city is forced to raise loans or increase its taxes. Either way the 
consumer is in the same position, as a cheaper electricity tariff is offset by a higher tax rate. It is a vicious circle 
and what is given with the one hand is taken away by the other  




-Services lose money, break-even or make money; but they must be provided. It is sound financial logic to adopt 
a “swing and roundabouts” approach 
-If profits may not be used, ratepayers will refuse to pay higher rates for services operating at a loss 
-Sales are increasing despite the amounts charged for rate relief, suggesting that rates are not too high and do 
not hamper industrial progress 
-Electricity is no longer a luxury but a necessity and thus can be taxed. This has the overall effect of reducing 
direct taxes, such as income tax 
-Municipal undertakings do not pay taxes, yet use available infrastructure (roads, publicity etc.) Relief of rates 
is a way of contributing  
Stellenbosch -The points advanced in the paper do not apply to municipalities who do not generate and take their supply 
from Escom. These towns also have limited prospects to attract industry, thus profits from electricity allows 
rates to be kept at a level which encourages new buildings, which expands the revenue base 
Durban -It is municipal policy to maximise profits on electricity sales and use the proceeds for rate relief 
-Preventing the relief of rates from profits will only result in councillors finding another way to tax the electricity 
undertakings 
-Even though it is an indirect tax, it is very thinly disguised and must be exploited to the fullest 
Neutral 
Escom -Councillors and engineers should not be pitted against each other, as both should be working to achieve the 
same objective – the progression of the city and not their individual departments 
-Possibly too simplistic to state that what the one hand gives, the other takes away  
-Municipalities distribute surpluses to subsidise rates; only to take loans when there are shortfalls. Reserve 
accounts should be kept; these could be used to finance capital projects and called upon when needed 
-The impact on small, medium and large consumers must be considered  
-Undertakings must charge their municipalities on a cost or cost-plus percentage basis for own consumption 
*The delegate from Pretoria stated the arguments from both camps, but personally believed that the surplus towards rate relief 
should be limited to 2% percent of the outstanding debt of the undertaking per annum 
           Source: (AMEU 1937, pp.77–106) 
After robust and lengthy debate, consensus could still not be reached. The executive committee’s 
objective for a common position against the practise of relief of rates had to be abandoned; concluding 
that while it did not agree with many of the comments received, it could not proceed without a mandate. 
It was resolved that a sub-committee be formed to investigate and present their findings at the 1938 
conference.  
How the Relief of Rates Debate Ended 
Predictably, little changed and the sub-committee reported at the 1938 convention that a common 
position could not be agreed upon. The proceeding’s notes reflect the frustration and exasperation of all 
the delegates, to the extent that it was unanimously agreed to close the topic without any discussion. In 
1939 the issue was raised once again by the councillor from Cradock who enquired about the status and 
whether any progress had been made. It was confirmed the sub-committee was not able to find a common 
position. Furthermore, municipalities had been hit hard by the de-rating Act and were now even more 
reliant on the revenue from municipal undertakings. Discussions scheduled between national, provincial 
and local government to address financial relations between the three were postponed indefinitely due 
to the outbreak of World War II. It was agreed that there would be no purpose in resuscitating the matter 
at the convention (AMEU 1939). 
Due to the war, the next convention was held four years later in 1943. Here, a proposal to establish a Joint 
National Electricity Power Board was endorsed by the executive committee. The Board would be made 
up of all the municipal ESI participants to co-ordinate national efforts across the three tiers of government. 




objectives included: 1) Future planning for new generation; 2) Regulation of profits and relief of rates; and 
3) Uniform policies of local supply regulations and interpretation of government legislation affecting the 
ESI. The response from the United Municipal Associations was not positive. The Orange Free State 
municipal association’s response was that a channel to national government existed through the United 
Municipal Executive (UME) and would not want to create a new entity; and would not associate itself with 
the proposal. The AMEU was shocked with the strong response, but felt it was necessary to proceed. It 
was decided to resubmit a copy of the application, with reasons as to why the formation of the Board was 
being proposed, and to send copies to all members of the Municipal Executive (AMEU, 1945).   
True to form, the topic was on the agenda for the 1945 convention and once again there was little to 
report. The AMEU president proposed that a more forceful approach be taken and that national 
government be approached directly. Councillor Eden from Cape Town took the floor to say that although 
he supported the views of the AMEU, he felt a different approach was needed. The real issue was the 
relationship between central and local government. Over the years, municipalities had been required to 
undertake additional functions, which they did not believe was their responsibility and received no 
additional income. Being so hard pressed for money, the municipal treasury was often forced to act in the 
way that it did. The situation deteriorated to the extent that the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and 
Accountants were preparing a report which was to be submitted to the Minister of Finance. Consequently, 
a meeting was held with the four provincial administrators and an overhaul of the municipal system was 
the expected outcome. Indeed, change was already taking place and Cape Town had instituted a system 
where the amount to be taken from the electricity undertaking’s net profit account would be negotiated 
in advance. This practise was to be extended to the other service undertakings. The councillor 
recommended that the matter of the Joint Board not be pursued and that it would be better if it was dealt 
with internally, as Cape Town had done. The councillor’s proposal was adopted (AMEU 1945). 
A motion not to discuss relief of rates was raised in the 1946 AMEU Convention, to the surprise of some 
stalwarts who had carried the battle for so many years. The committee had come to realise that practise 
would not be reversed and decided to change their approach to “damage limitation”. This entailed that a 
distinction had to be made between the AMEU opposing the policy and doing so in a financially 
responsible manner, which would not put the electricity undertakings at financial risk. A resolution was 
passed to convey this message to the UME (AMEU 1946). 1946 was the last year that Relief of Rates was 
on the proceedings agenda or discussed at an AMEU convention, with the focus for municipal 
undertakings quickly shifting to rights of supply, as will be detailed in the next section.  
Amidst this climate and the ongoing challenges of municipal funding and finances, the UME (1944) 
through the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants prepared a memorandum for 
municipalities to receive financial relief from national government. Indeed, lack of progress, even 
prompted the Institute to suggest that the items raised be investigated by a Commission. Eventually the 
request did succeed in getting a response from government - a refusal. The Minister of Finance responded 
(1945), stating that the municipal claims be redefined according to specific principles, which he provided. 
The suggested principles were however unworkable as there were too many entrenched vested interests, 
and would require provinces to give up, or share, most of their revenue sources  (Jenvey 1964, 147–148). 
Ultimately, any hope of changes to local government functions and the financing thereof ended when the 
ruling party lost the national elections in 1948 and the NP came into power.  
From a historical institutionalist perspective, tracing and providing an accurate account of these events 




itself in a positive feedback loop whose benefits, a hidden tax, were of such a magnitude, that opting out 
or transforming became increasingly unlikely. Furthermore, an accurate account of the concerns raised 
by those who opposed it, allows for an evaluation of what has come to pass. In other words, it becomes 
possible to determine how prophetic these assertions were some eighty years later in 2017, through a 
counterfactual analysis, undertaken in Chapter 8.3. 
7.3.3 Municipal Electricity Undertakings: Development and Operations up to 1948  
The previous two sections considered the contribution that electricity surpluses made to the overall 
municipal budget and then how the MEU, through the AMEU, responded to this practise. This section now 
completes the picture by detailing, from a technical and operational perspective, how municipalities first 
started generating and distributing electricity. The objective being to demonstrate, especially with regards 
the larger cities (and here we consider Johannesburg), how the MEU developed utilities in their own right. 
Johannesburg is also of significance to this research as it has had a long relationship with Escom - 
sometimes collaborative and beneficial, often acrimonious and difficult.  
The first attempts for the bulk supply of electricity in Johannesburg were nothing short of disastrous. A 
concession, for electricity and gas supply with land, was granted to a private company in 1888. The 
company went bankrupt before any generating equipment had arrived and was acquired by the 
Johannesburg Lighting Company in 1891. This company did not fare much better, with only 117 and 276 
houses having electricity and gas supply respectively. It was bought by the sanitary board in 1895. Gas 
reticulation did not develop much until 1929, but the electricity undertaking did, once the size of the gold 
deposits in the city were confirmed. The council expanded its own generation and entered into a supply 
agreement in 1897 for between 300 to 500 kW with the Rand Central Power Supply Company. The supply 
agreements were extended and expanded until 1906, when the city expected to generate all its power 
requirements internally through a new plant it had commissioned. This failed spectacularly, and a year 
was spent trying to fix the plant before it was shut down in 1907. The municipality then entered into an 
agreement with VFTPC for the supply of 1 700 kW, and over the next four years the VFTPC and the 
municipality attempted (unsuccessfully) to enter into long term supply agreements. The matter was 
resolved in 1911 when having built a new generation plant of 13 MW on the original President Street site 
of the failed plant, it was found “practically equal to all demands made upon it81”. This was largely due to 
the economic slowdown brought on by the outbreak of World War 1. By then the VFPTC had tired of the 
constant fruitless discussions and negotiations (Maud 1938, 111–114).  
In 1916, the municipality evaluated an £80 000 extension to the President Street plant, but also considered 
using the plant as a baseload station and taking supply from the VFPTC during peak hours only. The council 
decided against both options, but by 1923 a decision could no longer be delayed and once again the 
council was faced with the same decision – additional own generation or taking a supply from the VFPTC. 
Based on the recommendation of a report undertaken by Clark consulting engineers and submitted to the 
council in April, it was decided to erect a new £550 000 power station. However, it was no longer a 
straightforward decision. The 1922 Electricity Act was now in force and required all new power stations, 
or extensions greater than 10 per cent of existing generation capacity, to submit an application to the 
Provincial Administrator, who was compelled to ask the newly created Escom to sanction or oppose, but 
not obliged to follow (Chapter 6.4.2). The timing of Johannesburg’s new power plant application coincided 
 




with the new VFPTC power plant being planned in Witbank. Escom, which now had a financial interest in 
the Klip and Witbank plants, did not support Johannesburg’s application and proposed three alternate 
power supplies for the city (McLellan 1936). The first was to take its entire supply from the Witbank plant. 
The second was to take a full supply from the VFTPC Witbank and Witwatersrand’s plants, or thirdly to 
keep its existing plant and take a partial supply from the VFTPC. The Johannesburg Electricity Undertaking 
(JEU) though, was not going to be outmanoeuvred and countered by making piecemeal extensions to its 
existing plant, which were small enough not to require the Administrator’s approval (McLellan 1936). The 
turning point in this saga came when the VFTPC was not able to adequately meet the needs of the mining 
industry and a reciprocal supply proposal between the two was put forward, where the JEU would supply 
VFTPC during the day (when the mines needed the most power) and vice versa in the evening, when it 
was the JEU’s whose demand peaked. The city council rejected this proposal and the Administrator, 
against the wishes of Escom, approved Johannesburg’s application for a new power station in January 
1928 (Maud 1938, 116–118). Johannesburg’s insistence for own supply centred around three issues: 1) 
Continuity of service; 2) Financial considerations; and, 3) Local industries and consequent value to its 
ratepayers. The first issue dealt with the high incidence of power outages that would result from a long-
distance overhead transmission from Witbank due to the “constant and inevitable interruptions, 
principally due from lightning”. The consulting engineers also calculated that it would be of greater 
financial benefit to the city if it generated its own electricity. By this time the city had become accustomed 
to, and reliant on, the profits generated from its electricity trading – the returns from 1912 to 1924 were 
120%. Finally, the city wanted the annual money spent on wages and stores to be kept in the local 
economy (Sankey & Clark 1925). 
The new Jeppe power station, utilised a 10 MW turbo generator which it extended three years later with 
two more 10 MW generators. The demand for electricity in Johannesburg continued to grow and plans 
for an additional plant were only approved by the Administrator when the city entered into an agreement 
to buy power from VFTPC during peak periods. A major overhaul of the facility was undertaken between 
1935 and 1939, resulting in a total generation capacity 114 MW. In 1939, the JEU was granted permission 
to build the 300 MW Orlando power station in Soweto. Delayed by World War II, it only came into 
operation in 1945 (Fraser 2008). 
The JEU’s reciprocal supply agreement with the VFTPC, and by default with Escom when they were 
expropriated, proved a beneficial one. Johannesburg’s electricity was entirely integrated into the greater 
Witwatersrand system, allowing the two supply companies to assist each other during shortages. This 
factor is the most likely reason that Escom did not object to Johannesburg’s application to build the 
Orlando and the Kelvin A and B power stations soon thereafter (1957 and 1962), as at the time Escom was 
struggling with shortages (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000, p.137).  This cooperation agreement, as we 
will see, ended as soon as Escom stabilised its supply. By 1959 Johannesburg had 570 MW of generating 
capacity and sales of 1 350 GWh  (Christie 1984, p.162). 
Rest of South Africa  
The situation was similar in most of South Africa’s major municipalities, who extended their power 
stations or built new ones in the period 1935 – 1945. The outbreak of the Second World War provided 
municipalities with the opportunity to catch up with demand and viewed by “desperate engineers as a 




Both Escom and Cape Town municipality operated generation plants, each with its own consumers. In 
1924 the two parties agreed to operate in parallel through a co-operative interchange arrangement.  But 
with demand increasing, it became apparent that “technically and financially the right course to pursue 
was for the resources of the Dock Road and Salt River Power Stations to be ‘pooled’ and for the two 
stations, which are already interconnected, to be operated as a single producing unit”, and Cape Town 
entered into a pooling arrangement with Escom in 1932 (Escom 1931, p.31). Escom notified the Cape 
Town Council in 1951 that it would not be renewing the agreement when it expired in May of 1957 (Palser 
n.d.) The municipality had to decide whether to buy its power from Escom post 1957 or build a new power 
station. It opted to build a new power station (Athlone), but the council entered into a bulk purchase 
agreement with Escom for the period 1957 – 1961, as there would be a shortfall between the expiry of 
the pooling agreement and the commissioning of Athlone Power Station. Table 7-4 lists the power stations 
built and operated by the Johannesburg, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth municipalities since 1895. 
Table 7-4: Municipal Power Stations in Major South African Cities  
Power Station Commissioned  De-Commissioned Output (MW) 
Johannesburg 
President Street 1906 1907  
President Street II 1907 1927 13 
Jeppe Power Station 1927 1961 40 
Jeppe Power Station (South) 1934 1961 74 
Orlando 1939 1998 550 
Kelvin Power Station A 1959 Still operating (privately owned) 180 
Kelvin Power Station B 1970 Still operating (privately owned) 420 
Cape Town (Pooling arrangement with Eskom up until 1957)  
Molteno 1895 1920  
Dock Road 1904 1962 9MW combined 
Kalk Bay 1907 1923 
Salt River I (operated by Eskom) 1928 1979 90 
Table Bay 1939 1983  
Salt River 2 (operated by Eskom) 1955 1995 240 
Athlone 1962 2003 180 
Athlone (Gas)  1973 Still operating 36 
Acacia 1976 Still operating  171 
Steenbrass 1979 Still operating 160 
Roggebaai 1981 Still operating 40 
Port Elizabeth 
Mount Road 1925 1985  
Swartkops 1954 1996 240 
       Source: (Palser n.d.) (Fraser 2008)(Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000)  
7.3.4 Concluding Comment  
During the time period of 1910 to 1948, the appropriation of trading profits in aid of rates was common 
and entrenched practise amongst municipalities. The Transvaal and Cape Provinces had no legislation to 
limit the transfers of profits in relief of rates, whereas in Natal and the Orange Free State ordinances had 
been promulgated limiting the application of trading profits. The basis used in determining the amount to 
be transferred varied amongst local authorities and ranged from deducting the full amount (after any 
losses) down to pre-determined and arbitrary amounts (Holmes & Cowden 1949, 75–80). Although the 




percentage, the use of electricity surpluses for the relief of rates (in line with the British Act of 1926) it 
was able to demonstrate to city treasurers that the wholesale plundering of trading accounts would have 
long term consequences, to which they responded:  
“The appropriation of rates in South Africa to the relief of rates represents a reasonable 
percentage of the capital outlay of the corporation (1.96% nationally and 1.44% for Johannesburg) 
and is free from serious criticism, particularly in view of the fact that adequate provision is made 
for loan and depreciation charges”.   (Holmes & Cowden 1949, p.79)      
Surpluses from all of Johannesburg’s trading departments in 1946 amounted to £277 190, compared to 
£415 335 in 1935, a decrease of 33%. The national average of surplus contributions as a percentage of 
municipal revenue had dropped to 11% by 1946. However, the municipalities were in a state of financial 
crisis, having been given additional functions by national government, namely the Public Health Act of 
1919; The Housing Act 1920; Urban Areas Act 1920; and the Slums Act 1934, for which they received 
minimal financial assistance from national government. High rates of urbanization and the plight of black 
people, which national government ignored, contributed to their financial stress, forcing municipalities to 
rely on the “limitations of the rating system as compared with direct taxation of income”. The crossroads 
had been reached. Either national or provincial government intervened or local government could 
continue to drift, gradually losing its ability to serve any objective (Holmes & Cowden 1949, 215–218). 
National government’s response to a formal request for a commission into municipal finances 
demonstrated that it chose the latter. 
7.3.5 A Historical Institutional Perspective 
The 50- year period under review saw the genesis of municipal generation and distribution, by which time 
many MEU’s were utilities. Here, two inter-related features are worthy of closer scrutiny from a historical 
institutionalist standpoint. The first, is a textbook case study of how increasing returns leads to path 
dependence (Mahoney, 2000). Electricity supply was categorised as a municipal function, within its area 
of jurisdiction, but at the time the extent to which this function would be technically and financially 
feasible, let alone the proverbial “cash cow”, could not be known. As noted in Chapter 3 (Table 3.2), 
certain municipal functions are not able to cover costs (transport) or generate nominal surpluses (water). 
However, with electricity it soon became evident that large surpluses could be generated for the relief of 
rates; effectively as an alternate but hidden revenue source. Once this realisation was made, it was 
immediately seized upon, placing it on a path of increasing returns and long-term lock-in (Chapter 2.3.3), 
the stickiness of which has been such that it persists in 2017. By example, Table 7-1 shows that in 1905 
property rates and electricity surpluses contributed 39% and 11% to total municipal revenue for 
Johannesburg, but by 1934 the respective contributions were 16% and 23%, property rates had dropped 
by more than half while electricity surpluses doubled.  
The second feature is the internal tensions this practise created. Here the key actors were the councillors, 
municipal treasury and the electrical engineers of the MEU’s. AMEU membership allowed both councillors 
and electrical engineers to attend conferences, sharing equal rights and privileges. And although the views 
from these two camps were not necessarily universal, the research has found that there was sufficient 
consensus for a common view. On the one side, the councillors and treasury supported the practise; and 
as a hidden tax, most consumers were not even aware that they were paying it. Moreover, the ones who 




municipalities grabbed with both hands, amplifying the trend in a positive feedback loop. In contrast, 
there was intense opposition from the MEU’s and the AMEU to this practise, (see Chapter 7.3.2). This 
group fought hard for the practice’s abolition, but would settle for a maximum cap on surpluses, so as to 
bring stability and sustainable practises to their operations (negative feedback loop). Ultimately, the 
councillors and treasury won the day, and not even relevant international examples of national legislation 
to limit and then end the practise, were able to convince local or national government. As predicted by 
the theory (Pierson 2000b), the now locked-in path dependent practise continued accentuating the 
positive feedback loop, which was able to resist changes.  
Here it is worth considering why the AMEU was not able to reach a completely unanimous stance on the 
policy, albeit that the issue was raised as early as 1917 (Chapter 6.4.2) and endured until the NP came into 
power in 1948, when it was finally dropped. During this time, AMEU proceeding minutes show that the 
outlawing or capping of the practise was the predominant view within the AMEU, yet this standpoint was 
never formally adopted at the annual proceedings, necessitating numerous technical committees to 
investigate the matter further; ultimately leading to little and eventually being abandoned. This would 
suggest that strong divisions and internal conflict existed within the core of the AMEU on the policy of 
relief of rates. However, this was not the case, for a combination of reasons. First, and most importantly, 
the MEU’s whether represented by the AMEU or making their own representation, were a division within 
the municipality and thus subordinate to the ultimate decision makers within the municipality. Secondly, 
although the municipal councillors and treasurers (who opposed the AMEU adopting a formal position 
against the practise) were able to do so because they were granted AMEU membership, the same 
reciprocal privilege was not afforded to the MEU general managers and they had no access, knowledge 
or influence at UME (councillors) or Institute of Municipal Treasurers82 proceedings. This placed the AMEU 
at a distinct disadvantage. Finally, and perhaps ultimately, although the AMEU members could 
convincingly argue why the policy was not a sound practise, they offered little in the way of proposing 
new or alternate sources of revenue. Thus, in the absence of a viable alternative to serve as a catalyst that 
forced a change (critical juncture), the positive feedback loop was always likely to endure; probably even 
if the AMEU’s position was formalised and unanimous. 
7.4 The Apartheid Era (1948 – 1994) 
This section of the chapter consists of three distinct parts. The first, using the AMEU minutes from the 
early 1950s, provides a record of the development of the municipal ESI. Indeed, during this long time 
period of NP rule, there were three dominant themes relevant to this research, which the municipal ESI 
was grappling with. Accordingly, the research is structured to reflect this. The first period (1955 to 1969) 
deals with rights of supply and culminates with a critical juncture. The second period (1971 to 1988) covers 
the municipal ESI’s era of distribution; and the final period of just five years, considers the industry’s 
response and preparation for national democratic elections - leading up to the next critical juncture.  The 
three periods retain the AMEU timeline format, with the objectives of: 1) Presenting developments in 
chronological order; and, 2) Presenting the information in a straightforward and concise manner. 
The next instalment reverts to a general overview of municipal finances and the policy of rate relief. 
Building on this, the final section then undertakes a detailed examination of Johannesburg’s municipal 
 




finances and electricity surpluses. The conclusion then consolidates the research and provides a historical 
institutionalist perspective. 
7.4.1 Municipal Electricity Undertakings: Development and Operations   
“The relationship between municipalities and Escom had been a love-hate one. Escom loved to 
have the municipalities’ extra capacity on hand in times of crisis, but loathed the way the big 
municipalities were seen to be taking advantage of the situation. The municipalities could not 
help but be suspicious of the motives of “Big Brother”, which was rapidly looking to gain and 
then maintain its monopoly over the South Africa electricity industry.”  
Conradie & Messerschmidt (2000, p.138)            
By the 1950s the AMEU was meeting biannually and attended by the municipal electrical engineers from 
all the major cities and towns that generated electricity and / or had an electricity undertaking. A recurring 
theme was the financing of the AMEU, which relied heavily on membership fees. The trend of smaller 
towns opting to outsource their electricity requirements to Escom meant the closure of their electricity 
department and letting their AMEU membership lapse. This practise grew in the 1950s, as Escom’s new 
generation plants came into service. The larger municipal undertakings, especially Johannesburg, 
operated fully integrated utilities, and did not see themselves as electricity distributors. The minutes of 
the AMEU meetings83 provide a blow by blow account of how Escom and national government conspired 
to end municipal generation, which is the focus of this section of the research. The AMEU meetings84 dealt 
with technical, administrative, research, legal, safety and other issues of the day. The next section is a 
transcript of the minutes and presented in a diary format in chronological order. The contents focus on 
the research topic, namely the political development of the ESI from a municipal perspective, and 
specifically Johannesburg. As would be expected, two topics were eternal – the relief of rates and Escom. 
The entries include other items deemed interesting to the research.   
Period 1: Rights of Supply (1955 – 1969) 
30 November 1955: It was reported that the ECB85 had agreed to give municipalities the right to supply 
electricity to rural areas outside their area of jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. Johannesburg did 
not accept the ECB conditions and formed a sub-committee to interact with the ECB to address the 
issues86. Pretoria had a policy of charging higher tariffs in rural areas and the ECB required them to provide 
justification as to how the tariffs were derived. Cape Town charged rural users the City tariff plus 20%. 
The ECB wanted all undertakings to apply a standard formula for rural users, to which the AMEU rural 
tariffs sub-committee submitted a proposal but received no response.    
 
83 Often the AMEU minutes make references which are vague, and refer to annexes or other sources which have not been included. Thus a certain 
amount of interpretation is required. The author has made every attempt to do this as accurately and objectively as possible   
84 AMEU minutes are only available from 1955 onwards. Records from previous years have been lost or destroyed. 
85 The ECB was established under the 1922 Power Act to regulate holders of licenses, excluding local authorities, government departments, the 
SAR or self-producers not selling electricity. Marquard (2006 p. 133) notes that the ECB had almost no capacity (with 3-5 board members and 
one staff member) finding no records prior to 1978. It appeared that the ECB’s time was taken up playing a mediating and facilitative role in 
resolving disputes rights of supply and addressing consumer grievances  




The AMEU clarified the definition of Undertakings in November 1956, as: “A local authority carrying on 
an electricity supply undertaking”. “Supply” included generation and distribution. It was reported at the 
same meeting that undertakings across the country were experiencing difficulties with coal supplies. 
The ECB had contacted the AMEU informally to get their view on amendments to the Electricity Act that 
they were considering. This was discussed at the May 1957 meeting and the decision was taken at the 
November meeting to contact the ECB directly. Of greater urgency was an ECB notification sent to all 
municipal undertakings. Henceforth any supply to an industrial customer, which was greater than the 
existing 150 kW allowable limit, needed to be approved by the Ministry of Economic Affairs - 
representation and the submission of an application for each connection would be required. The AMEU 
rejected this outright and would request the ECB to arrange a meeting with the Minister. Ventersdorp 
informed the committee that they would allow their AMEU membership to lapse as the municipality had 
decided to take its bulk electricity supply from Escom. 
April 1958: The ECB responded to the AMEU’s objections, informing them that the proposed conditions 
would be modified, but provided no further detail. Attempts to meet with the minister of Economic Affairs 
yielded no results. The ECB referred the AMEU to the provincial secretary, who did not reply. It was 
accepted that a meeting would not materialise and that a different approach was needed. A sub-
committee was formed to discuss the matter with Escom directly, in the hope that the matter could be 
resolved amicably.  
The feedback at the November 1958 meeting was that Escom had been contacted, but no response had 
been received and it was unlikely that one would be forthcoming. The AMEU decided to report the matter 
to the Institute of City Treasurers who represented their interests at the Borckenhagen Commission 
meetings. 
May 1959: Wepener municipality allowed its membership to lapse. The theft of copper had become an 
epidemic and a request was to be made to national government to review laws. Municipalities opting to 
take their bulk supply from Escom stated that their finances were adversely affected by Escom’s practise 
of increasing tariffs on very short notice, as this additional cost had to be absorbed until the next 
scheduled annual tariff increase. It was proposed that Escom increases be passed on to consumers 
immediately. While still waiting to meet with the Borckenhagen committee, it was agreed that 
municipalities be entitled to service industrial users in their areas of jurisdiction, as well as outside, but 
subject to permission. This decision would be communicated to Escom. Finally, a questionnaire would be 
drafted to determine where each municipality stood on the issue of “native” reticulation.  
October 1959: The auto-adjustment of tariffs to reflect Escom increases was approved. The participants 
heard that the Borckenhagen committee had postponed their meeting. The ECB had not finalised the 
revised conditions but agreed to provide temporary permission to municipalities to extend their 
reticulation to rural areas. The AMEU welcomed this, because the primary concern was that smaller 
undertakings would negotiate directly with Eskom if the decision was delayed any longer.  
May 1960: Bredasdorp and George Municipalities in the Cape Province resigned. The revised conditions 
for supply to rural areas had been received from the ECB, two issues were raised by the AMEU. The first 
was in regard to the requirement of a uniform tariff. Rural tariffs had to be divorced entirely from 
municipal area tariffs, as they could not be brought in line with municipal tariffs due to different cost 
structures and voter pressure groups. The second item was the vagueness of Clause 3, which dealt with 




supplier was no longer willing / able / required to do so. It could not be that the alternate supplier would 
simply take responsibility for future interest and redemption due, with no consideration of the capital 
investment to date. The clause needed to allow for full compensation at a mutually agreed price. Finally, 
it was patently unfair to expect a local authority to invest in a distribution network only to allow Escom to 
decide to supply any users whose load exceeded 150 kW. Other items included confirmation that the 
meeting with the Borckenhagen commission was set for November 30 1960, and the supply to “native” 
areas would be looked at by an internal committee who would assess the possibility and the cost 
associated.  
April 1961: The AMEU committee accepted the ECB conditions for municipal supply outside its area of 
jurisdiction, which maintained the 150kW supply limit, but did not accept this as an internal restrictive 
condition.  
November 1961: The sub-committee presented its findings, which found that Escom and the undertakings 
were essentially competitors when it came to supplying industrial customers within a municipal area of 
jurisdiction. The sub-committee was authorised to meet and negotiate directly with Escom on the subject. 
May 1963: It was agreed that a committee, which would collaborate with the Municipal Treasurers 
Association, would submit a memorandum to the 5th Borckenhagen report. It was also resolved that the 
AMEU forge stronger relations with the UME.   
November 1964: The committee agreed to support the UME proposal that the Electricity Act of 1958 be 
amended to compel users situated within the municipal area of jurisdiction to take supply from the 
municipal undertaking, if available. To capitalise on the above UME efforts, the AMEU submitted a formal 
request to the UME to lobby for the amendment of the more onerous conditions of electricity supply to 
rural areas. Feedback was received at the May 1965 meeting. The Secretary of the Minister Commerce 
and Industry had informed the UME that it would not support the proposal to compel users to take 
electricity supply from a municipal undertaking. 
October 1965: The Orange River Hydro Project team was constituted to investigate titled ‘Rights of 
Generation and Supply’ which would be presented to the Minister of Economic Affairs. The same team 
would respond to a request from the UME to provide comments to the Secretary of Commerce and 
Industry on the electricity supply by municipal undertakings, within and outside their area of jurisdiction.  
A proposal was put forward for a coordinated study of electricity tariffs.  
With Orlando, the upgraded JEU peaking plant, and Kelvin A and B power stations all operational, 
Johannesburg started planning for the future. MM were appointed to evaluate the available options and 
delivered a series of reports. The first report, revised with updated figures, (MM 1966) identified: ‘Basis 
A’ which avoided or delayed the construction of a new plant by taking supply from Escom. ‘Basis B’ 
considered zoned supply, where Escom would take complete responsibility for supplying a zone of the 
city, with additional zones added as required. Basis A and Basis B were evaluated against a simultaneous 
study on the economic viability of the JEU building a new plant (MM 1965). The study, using a growth rate 
of 7.5%, estimated that maximum demand would grow from the 594 MW recorded in 1965, to 1 420 MW 
(5 700 million kWh) in 1978. Estimating the future output and derating of the existing power stations and 
acceptable standby requirements, it was calculated that if the JEU opted to build a new power station, it 
should be sized at 1 000 MW. The conclusions of the study were that a zoned supply (Basis B), was the 
least financially advantageous option and would also introduce transmission and distribution difficulties. 




date of the new plant, and a net saving could be expected by 1978 which stabilized at approximately R1.75 
million per year in 1980. The report considered the future supply and price of coal, transport costs and 
bulk tariff costs before recommending that the city builds a new generation plant at Liefde-en-Vrede, 
which would need to be started by June 1966 for the unit to be in service in March 1971.  City management 
accepted the recommendation and submitted an application for a new power plant to the Provincial 
Administrator (Johannesburg Undertaking 1966).  
At the May 1966 AMEU meeting, the Witbank representative reported all outstanding issues on rights of 
supply and generation had been resolved amicably with Eskom. This was a positive omen and the board 
agreed that the sub-committee continue with its work, as the ECB requirement for a standard formula for 
rural municipal electricity supply was not straightforward.   
November 1966: The UME requested a full memorandum on the rights of supply and generation; the tariff 
study was deferred for a further 12 months; and a suggestion that Eskom applies a reduced tariff to 
municipalities was propsed, but it was decided not to approach Eskom.   
May 1967: Representations made by the UME on behalf of the AMEU and Municipal Treasurers had been 
considered and it was felt that ‘any attempt aimed at depriving local authorities of their primary right to 
generate and supply electricity in their own areas and utilize the income thereof for the benefit of their 
communities had not been brought out forcibly enough by them’. To correct this the AMEU and Municipal 
Treasurers would be invited to at all future UME meetings, which included an upcoming meeting 
scheduled for August with the Minister of Economic Affairs.  
A meeting with the Minister was held on 23 August 1967, but as the delegation was only granted one 
hour, only three items were addressed: Firstly, a proposed amendment to the Electricity Act, providing as 
a matter of right, the opportunity for a municipality submitting an application for a generation license to 
respond to any comments or objections made by Escom. The Minister agreed to this but Escom came 
forward requesting that they too have the right to respond to the reply. Secondly, for local authorities to 
be represented at Escom and the ECB. The Minister’s view was that this was unlikely as it would set a 
precedent for other ESI participants to claim the same right. The UME pointed out that this was unlikely 
as only Escom and municipalities were licenced to generate electricity, but the minister decided to 
withhold a final reply. The final item was a request for the ECB to report to the provincial administrators 
rather than Escom. Under the existing arrangement it was difficult for the municipalities to conclude 
anything other than that Escom representatives protected their own interests in their reports – acting as 
consultants, competitors and as an interested party, all at the same time. Mr Leishman, representing 
Johannesburg, demonstrated that Johannesburg could generate electricity at a cheaper rate than the bulk 
tariff that Escom charged the City and that the municipality would be using sewerage water for as much 
as 80% of the plant requirements, whereas Escom used fresh water only – a 1956 study concluded that 
water would be a limiting factor to the country’s economic development (MacKay, 2003).  It was further 
requested that should municipal borders be extended, electricity supply becomes an automatic right and 
subject to the outcome of a negotiation with Escom. The Minister would only make two promises. The 
first; giving local authorities the opportunity to reply to points made by Escom in its reports to the 
Administrator, and the second; that local authorities retain the right to generate electricity, but only if it 
was shown that this could be done cheaper than Escom. The Minister undertook to put these two points 
in writing and respond fully to the UME memorandum submitted. This had not be done at the time of the 




At the May 1968 AMEU meeting, Mr Leishman stated that the Minister’s failure to respond was causing 
serious delays to its application for a new generation license. It was agreed that Johannesburg and Port 
Elizabeth would send ‘reminder’ letters to the Minister and Provincial Administrators. Mr Leishman also 
advised the AMEU committee that the City had decided to institute legal proceedings and would approach 
the Supreme Court to get its application to build a new power station approved.  
November 1968: A response87  from the Minister was received after the release of the findings and 
recommendations of the Borckenhagen Commission report. The Minister adopted the Commission’s 
pronouncement that ‘the country’s requirements of electricity should be undertaken by Eskom’, summed 
up by the following statement:  
‘Accordingly, I trust that your Executive would give positive support to the Government’s policy 
and that it would encourage its members to tailor their planning so as to fit in with the 
Government’s objectives. Your co-operation in this matter would be sincerely appreciated’ 
In reaching its conclusion, the commission stated that no evidence had been received from local 
authorities. Leishman disputed this, stating that the commission had made no request for any evidence 
on municipal generation to be submitted. Mr Lombard who represented the AMEU at the commission 
hearings, stated that the only issue raised was the right of supply in urban areas and that the matter of 
generation had not come up. A lengthy debate ensued with opposing views, which on the one hand 
accepted that Escom would in future be the de-facto generator of electricity and on the other that the 
strongest possible action be taken to protect municipal rights to generate electricity. It was resolved that 
the UME be requested to arrange a follow up meeting with the Minister, with the requirement that he be 
properly briefed and that it not be limited to a brief session. 
June 1969: Reporting on the outcome of a meeting held in Margate88 between all affected parties to 
resolve the rights of supply issue, (which came to be known as the Margate Convention), the AMEU had 
agreed to accept the minister’s proposal from his letter as ‘probably the best solution to the problem’. 
Municipalities henceforth accepted that Escom would become the de facto bulk supplier and generator 
of electricity, leaving distribution to them. In return for the loss of revenue, municipal distribution borders 
would be extended, subject to an agreement reached between Escom and the municipality. The AMEU 
requested that the UME take responsibility for entrenching this principle in the Electricity Act. The 
Margate Convention was the event where local authorities relinquished their right to generate electricity. 
In the 1969 Johannesburg Annual Report of the General Manager Electricity Department (Johannesburg 
Undertaking 1969, 1–4), Leishman confirmed that the Provincial Administrator, following the directive of 
the Minister, had turned down Johannesburg’s application for a new 1 000 MW power station for the 
third time on the 14th of April 1969. A detailed explanation followed, explaining that the city never 
contended that it could generate more cheaply than Escom, but that the bulk supply rate offered by Escom 
was higher than the cost of self-generation. The city attempted to get an assurance from Escom that tariffs 
would not increase by more than a third over a period of 15 years (coal costs excluded), but Escom would 
not agree to this. Even though the lawyers felt that there was a high chance of the Administrator’s decision 
 
87 A copy of the letter is not attached. The contents are derived based on the responses from the meeting minutes   
88 Meeting minutes were not found in the archives, but references in the AMEU minutes make it clear that the UME, AMEU, Escom and ECB 




being set aside, it was decided to take bulk supply from Escom as demand was growing and the plant 
could not be built before demand would exceed supply.  
‘The situation now is that Johannesburg, and the other large municipal self-generating authorities, 
will now contribute to the national power system being created and it is anticipated that this will 
be at a greater cost that self-generation so far as estimated up to the stage of completing the 
proposed 8 X 125 MW new power station by 1980.’ (Johannesburg Undertaking 1969) 
R Leishman took early retirement the following year. Having fought so hard for so long, the loss was 
crushing, and he lost his will to continue89.  
Period 2: A new Business Model - Era of Distribution (1971 – 1988) 
Having lost the rights of supply battle, MEU’s had to adjust to their diminished role of distribution and 
accept that they were now price takers with limited bargaining power. Generation activities were reduced 
to nursing their existing power plants to eke out every last kW of power. With Escom firmly in control of 
ESI, it was in its interest to maximise municipal electricity consumption, as this presented a new market 
which would underpin its build programme. The next two decades saw less acrimony, characterised by 
greater cooperation, but mutual tension was ever near.   
September 1972: Escom agreed to support the AMEU application to the ECB to remove the 150 kVA supply 
limit to industrial users.  
May 1973: Following from the Margate Convention, the transfer of distribution rights from Escom to 
Municipalities had commenced90; Escom informed the AMEU that its application to be represented at 
Escom had been rejected and the AMEU decided to drop the matter91.  
During the periods 1973 to 1977 there was much discussion and debate about the interpretation of how 
Escom-owned distribution infrastructure should be valued, based on the recommendation of the 2nd 
Borckenhagen report. The AMEU felt that they were represented in an unsatisfactory manner by the UME 
and decided to approach Escom directly. This approach yielded better results, but unexpectedly and 
contrary to the commitment made in 1972, Escom reversed their decision to remove the municipal 150 
kVA supply limit to industrial users. A furious AMEU submitted a new application to the ECB to have this 
condition removed. In response to frequent tariff increases with no notice period, Escom stated that it 
was not able to provide a six-month notice period.  
May 1977: The AMEU noted the Government’s Commission of Inquiry (Browne) to identify the reasons of 
Escom’s frequent and high tariff increases, and that it would make a representation.  
November 1977: Escom notified municipalities that load shedding was to be expected.  
March 1979: Discussions were held with the ECB about distributing to areas outside their jurisdiction; and 
a committee to explore the viability of solar water heaters to reduce overall and peak demand was set. 
 
89 Meeting with Stan Bridgens on 5 September, 2016 
90 The minutes do not clarify whether this included the transfer / control of assets. Given that such an arrangement was never mentioned in 
the minutes, it is presumed it was limited to the rights 
91 At the 23 August 1967 meeting with the Minister (see above) it was agreed that local government would have direct representation at Escom 




October 1981: Escom requested that the notice period for tariff increases be reduced from three to one 
month. This was rejected by the AMEU who stated that three months’ notice was the absolute minimum. 
JEU had entered into a bulk supply agreement with Escom in 1973/74 when its plants were no longer able 
to meet demand. Later that decade, the JEU commissioned MM to undertake two reports. The first, 
evaluated how the city’s power supply system (MM 1979) could be best used to maximise profits from its 
existing plants; shield its users from excessive Escom tariff increases, Escom changes to the tariff 
structures and frequent outages. The report analysed usage patterns, forecast future consumption for 
planning purposes and discussed how to maximise the Orlando and Kelvin plants. The study reported that 
the 1978 maximum demand of 1 066 MW would reach 3 189 MW in 2000, which could be reduced to 2 
839 MW through energy efficiency measures (load control and higher tariffs). The second report, (MM 
1981) investigated the viability of new generation opportunities, including unconventional options. The 
study concluded that it was not economically feasible to build a replacement power plant at Orlando. 
Peaking plants were found to be uneconomic and with too many technical barriers. Likewise, pumped 
storage opportunities were too small to be viable and alternate technologies investigated were not viable. 
The best option, the report concluded, was for the JEU to invest in extending the life of their existing fleet 
for the longest period possible.            
August 1984: The De Villiers Commission had been formed, to which the AMEU made representation. The 
advisability of a standard tariff for users would be considered and national workshops on township 
electrification were attended by AMEU representatives.  
September 1985: The AMEU submitted comments on the draft Energy Policy: 1) On municipal generation, 
the policy needed to allow for security of supply and not limit itself purely to economic considerations; 2) 
AMEU fully supported load management and energy conservation, which needed to be co-ordinated by 
Escom, with the AMEU willing to serve on any committee; 3) Electricity Amendment Bill: Section 22(5): 
The ECB needed to retain control over surpluses derived from municipal electricity trading, but individual 
tariffs need not be approved and gazetted; and, 4) The RSC’s role should be limited to co-ordinating major 
engineering and financial planning. Distribution must only be undertaken by local authorities. 
September 1986: Escom agreed (relented) to fixed annual increases on the 1st of January.  
November 1987: Eskom power marketing approaches the AMEU to market electricity jointly. Support and 
training would be provided at the branch levels, with an undertaking that future strategies be worked on 
jointly, to which the AMEU agreed.  
February 1988: Eskom provided an assurance to the AMEU that a maximum demand charge would not be 
levied on MEU’s that still generate electricity.  
Period 3: Quo Vadis - Preparing for a Democratic Government (1988 – 1994)                                    
‘The statement that the distribution industry has not been ‘capable’ of supplying electricity to 
those who need it is incorrect and objectionable. The distribution industry was not allowed to do 
so by Government policy”   AMEU response to Department of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs Report on the Development of the EDI November, 1992 (AMEU 1992)         
By 1988, AMEU and Eskom relations had improved significantly. Eskom had recently, as a consequence of 




back when the supply of townships and rural areas began (Marquard). Eskom’s new management team 
worked hard to improve public perception of the utility and there appeared to be a new openness and 
sincerity in their relations with the AMEU. Eskom was entering a period of over-supply and started offering 
tariff discounts and forming joint working committees. The AMEU in February 1988 for example, agreed 
to work with Eskom in developing and implementing their Power Marketing campaign. Given the history 
between the two, it was never going to be straightforward; and indeed both were operating in a highly 
charged and uncertain economic, political and structural environment. P W Botha’s privatisation plans, 
strongly supported by the Minister of Minerals and Energy, DJ De Villiers (not Willem Johannes who 
chaired the De Villiers Commission of Inquiry), meant the entire ESI was nervous and tended to overreact 
to most events. For example, McRae’s “Electricity for All” programme which was still being developed and 
not publicly communicated for fear of national government reprisals, only stoked the flames of distrust. 
Municipalities reported Eskom distribution activity in black urban townships to the ECB, and the AMEU 
took the matter directly to McRae and Maree. A meeting was held in early 1989 where Eskom assured the 
AMEU that it was not its policy to interfere with municipal supply areas and that any takeover of Eskom 
systems by municipalities would be determined by economic principles. Eskom actions were blamed on a 
miscommunication between management and the sub-regions, which they would correct. The AMEU left 
the meeting satisfied but remained wary of its old foe.  
The AMEU 1989 Cape Town conference was themed ‘Quo Vadis’, and was part of a broader strategy to 
define the Association’s objectives, mission and function, in response to the Department of Planning and 
Provincial Affairs deliberating on the future of municipal electricity supply, under the privatisation push. 
A discussion following the opening address, saw the Eskom representative (Botes 1989) state that “red 
lights are flashing”. Eskom and up to 500 municipalities served 4.5 million users, yet 22 million people still 
had no access. Electricity for all (by now formally announced by Eskom) was a priority and an imperative 
and could only be achieved by rationalising the ESI. Consumers would need to be supplied by distribution 
companies and not municipal undertakings, of which no more than 70 were needed. This bombshell was 
followed by his personal view that Eskom itself needed to be broken up to form part of the 70.  
The AMEU’s response was immediate. An extraordinary meeting on the ‘Rationalising the ESI’ was held 
one month later on the 10th of November, 1989 (Minutes 1989). AMEU members were incensed: 
“…municipal electricity undertakings have been running well and ESKOM was looking to off-load 
non-paying black areas…” 
“…how would ESKOM supply electricity to black areas, as they neither have the manpower or 
resources to do this efficiently.’ 
“…combined venture as proposed by ESKOM…would mean that industry will subsidise black areas” 
Having vented their frustrations, the discussions changed tone and members confirmed their 
commitment to electricity for all; requesting a meeting with Eskom for an official clarification of their 
interpretation of rationalisation of the ESI. Less than three months later, with the government now under 
F W de Klerk, the Minister of Energy in his budget speech announced that he did not see Eskom as a 
suitable candidate for privatisation in the near future (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000, p.263).  
Eskom was given a reprieve but the future of municipalities remained uncertain. In October 1990, the 
Thornhill Report was released (Section 3.4.1 page 53), and it became evident that things were changing 




and a full day workshop produced a SWOT analysis (Figure 7-2). Although none of the models proposed 
by Thornhill were ultimately adopted, the report created the basis for discussion and ultimately led to the 
consolidation of municipalities which took place under the ANC government92  
 
Figure 7-2: AMEU ‘Quo Vadis’ SWOT Analysis 
From 1990 until the 1994 elections, the regionalisation of EDI dominated discussion. During this charged 
and uncertain period, the stakes were high. Consultation extended beyond the traditional industry 
participants of government, AMEU, ECB and Eskom. The AMEU had to position itself in the ongoing 
National Electrification Forum (NELF) discussions, which had multiple and diverse stakeholders93, who the 
AMEU was not accustomed or familiar with. The AMEU had to reach consensus amongst its constituents, 
which was not straightforward as they had different political affiliations. Ultimately it was agreed, and 
communicated externally, that the AMEU accepted that regionalisation94 of some form was necessary. 
The following is a summary of the documents and reports produced by the AMEU to convey its standpoint 
and define its role in any future structure.  
The AMEU agreed that the EDI needed some form of rationalisation but noted that the proliferation of 
supply authorities was a direct result of government’s devolution policy. As most local authorities supplied 
less than 20 MVA, the system was grossly inefficient, but was designed according to national policy that 
required separate and autonomous electricity supply authorities, rather than developing a technically 
efficient and integrated system. A negative consequence of this practise was staff shortages. Integrating 
the systems into larger units was therefore supported by the AMEU, as it would improve efficiency. The 
 
92 Interview with Professor Chris Thornhill (author) 14 July, 2016 
93 These included: Chamber of Mines, ANC, National Union of Mineworkers, National Union of Metal Workers, Department of Mineral and 
Energy Affairs, Eskom, Organised Business, National Civic Organization (SANCO), Agricultural Union (SAAU), UME and the Energy Development 
Research Centre  
94 The terms regionalization and rationalization are used interchangeably in the various reports. The research quotes the term used based on 




AMEU however, adopted a peculiar, and frankly inexplicable, stance on the issue of too many tariff 
structures leading to cross-subsidisation. It noted complaints submitted to the ECB about high municipal 
tariffs, primarily from black areas, and argued that the practise of building separate infrastructures was 
extremely costly, naturally leading to large differences in tariffs. Adopting a sliding scale meant that there 
would be an over-recovery in white residential areas to cover the costs of a BLA, which went against free 
market principles that promote efficiency and productivity. The AMEU challenged the notion that 
municipalities were charging high tariffs to rural areas, on the basis that Eskom under-recovered on its 
Tariff D (rural supply), effectively cross subsidising the service. The ECB thus needed to take steps against 
Eskom rather than suggest that Eskom take over municipal supply to rural areas (AMEU 1990).          
January 1991: Eskom’s introduction Time of Use (ToU) to large customers, led to a shift in usage and a loss 
of revenues for municipalities (Figure 7-8), which was to be recovered from households. AMEU has 
lobbied Eskom (unsuccessfully) for the ToU tariff to be based on a daily, and not a monthly maximum.  
Concerns were raised at the meeting, that Eskom had applied to provincial government to start 
distributing electricity to urban black residential areas, with the view of taking control of this market. 
Essentially Eskom was planning to compete against municipalities, which was contrary to the ‘Margate 
Convention’. Municipalities were encouraged to take steps to protect their client base.  
September 1991: Government new policy resolved to make electricity available to all who could afford it. 
To achieve this, it was necessary to identify ways to make electricity more accessible through regional, 
rather than local, supply; standardised tariffs and by-laws; depoliticising supply and easier financing.  
June 1992: The AMEU and Eskom met to discuss tariffs: 1) It was resolved that an agreement be reached 
as to the extent that Eskom would be allowed to influence municipal tariffs; 2) Municipalities would 
support standardised tariffs, if Eskom would do the same; 3) The development of regions around a nucleus 
was acceptable, on condition that in time they came under the government control; 4) The introduction 
of ToU tariffs for households was needed; and, 5) National inclining block tariffs would be introduced.  
In September 1992 the AMEU attended the inaugural NELF workshop95, where electrification was the 
major theme and the restructuring of the EDI was debated. Consensus was reached on the ‘suppliers’ 
being Eskom and the AMEU, but no consensus could be found as to whom should represent the ‘users’ 
and the matter was referred to a committee for resolution.  The AMEU recognised the need for: EDI 
regionalisation, the acceleration of the electrification programme and the need for simplified tariffs, but 
noted that vested interests were likely to resist change and that local authorities were best placed to 




95 National Electrification Forum (NELF) was formed in 1993, at which Eskom came to an agreement with the ANC that it would electrify 2.5 





         Source: (AMEU 1993) 
Figure 7-3: Proposed ESI Structure for South Africa (1993) 
In May 1993 Eskom applied to become an AMEU member and invited the AMEU to a workshop on pre-
paid tariffs. Following the NELF national conference (May), the AMEU position was articulated in its 
November Progress Report (AMEU 1993) - summarised in Table 7-5. 
Table 7-5: AMEU NELF Progress Report  
Structure and Regulatory Framework 
• Governance: Rationalisation of EDI could result in municipalities losing their right to distribute electricity 
• Structure: Three models proposed (regional, district and local – Figure 7-3), but all requiring independent oversight 
• Metropolitan Alternative: Unpopular choice as cash surpluses would not be distributed equitably 
• Local Authority and other Generation: As Eskom was performing well, it would remain intact for the present period. 
Municipal generation remained unresolved. Generation should not be the sole right of one entity 
• Legitimacy: Future local authorities must be accepted as legitimate as payment attitudes are linked to this 
Finance and Tariffs 
• Electricity Surplus to other Services: Consensus that electrification be funded from within ESI96. Before agreeing to this, 
if at all, alternative sources of revenue for the municipal sector would need to be identified and put in place 
• Transfer of Assets/Liabilities: A mutually agreed policy before the transfer of assets could take place, if distribution 
ceased to be a local authority responsibility 
• Non-Payment: Estimated at R1 billion in 1992 and growing at R25 million p/a, the issue was raised as a priority 
• National Domestic Tariff: The over 1 000 tariffs (1c to 45 c/kWh) were partly responsible for non-payment. A national 
tariff would increase tariffs in established areas (white), but principles would have to be agreed upon 
• Development Funding: A fund established to prioritise the national electrification programme  
Other 
• Human Resources: Existing staff would need to be accommodated and absorbed  
• Transition: Rationalisation must be undertaken in an orderly fashion to avoid unnecessary disruptions 
Recommendations 
• Local government remains engaged in the process 
• The future government should not accord one party sole generation rights 
• Local authorities are adequately compensated for any loss in revenue as a result of the regionalisation process 
 
 
96 AMEU experience was that average consumption for white households was 1 000 kWh / month but just 200 kWh for black households, which 
was insufficient to fund a distribution system, even with higher densities in black areas. This necessitated a fixed charge but only served to 




March 1994: The AMEU, UME and Eskom met a month before the elections to discuss municipal levies. 
The AMEU agreed that electricity was an essential service and should be provided at the lowest possible 
price. The UME stated that the municipalities had become very reliant on the surplus, so it could not be 
arbitrarily removed. This gave the opportunity for the AMEU to once again put forward its views, held 
from the 1930s, that the surplus be shown as a visible tax. Eskom offered the AMEU representation at its 
tariff committee and all agreed on the need for a national tariff, subject to a working model agreed to by 
all.  
The immediate section that follows, now casts focus on municipal finances and the practice relief of rates 
from MEU revenue during the current period under discussion. 
 
7.4.2 Municipal Finances and the Policy of Rate Relief from Municipal Electricity 
Undertaking Revenue 
 
With the NP in charge, and the same funding challenges, the UME (1953) once again approached national 
government for the appointment of a commission of enquiry into their finances and how financial relief 
could be provided. Indeed, the issues raised and the proposals put forward, differed little from those of 
1944; with the following problems deemed as requiring investigation (Jenvey 1964, p.149): 
• The appropriation of funds to central and provincial government, which are generally regarded to be 
local sources of revenue; for example vehicle licensing fees not accruing to local government and the 
practise of exempting national and provincial government from paying local rates and license fees; 
• Central government delegating functions such as health services to local government, but failing to 
provide additional revenue;  
• Additional burdens expected as a result of post-war development; 
• The limitations imposed by the restricted nature, and lack of elasticity, of the sources of revenue 
available to local authorities; and 
• The possibility of finding means to overcome the financial difficulties imposed by the above factors, 
by broadening the basis of local taxation. 
Government finally yielded, and in August 1956 the Minister of Finance appointed a committee to be 
chaired by Mr Borckenhagen. The Committee of Enquiry into the Financial Relations between the Central 
Government, Provinces and Local Authorities understandably came to be known simply as the 
Borckenhagen Report. The terms of reference asked the committee to investigate and report on inter alia: 
The existing functions of local authorities, whether these were justified and the extent to which functions 
should be abolished, diminished or transferred; the sources of income of local authorities, and the 
adequacy of the income sources to perform these functions;  and, any alterations to the sources of income 
that “appear to be desirable”, together with the impact that such alterations would have on national and 
provincial finances, as well as the legal considerations to give them effect (Borckenhagen 1964). 
The Borckenhagen enquiry took 15 years to finalise. Individual reports where issued during the 50’s and 
60’s, but the government only released the White Paper setting out its standpoint in 1971; whose 
outcomes ultimately provided nothing but disappointment for local authorities after such a long period. 
Lewis (1987), mayor of Johannesburg in 1970, who had been so hopeful in 1966 that new sources of 




recommendations, as it based its figures on outdated 1962 statistics”. The committee took the view that 
there was no justification for provincial or local government to pay local taxes, but proposed that certain 
functions, most notably in health, be redirected to provincial or national government; figuring that this 
would materially reduce the financial burden on local authorities. Given the reduced functions, the 
committee could not support the contention that local authorities were reaching the economic limits of 
property taxation or that they needed any new sources of revenue. It left it to national government to 
decide on the suitability of license fees, and local sales taxes for government – suggesting that the latter 
should be collected by national government and distributed on a suitable basis to local government. With 
relation to electricity supply, the committee sided with Escom. Although stating unequivocally that 
distribution and the associated surpluses for municipal funding should reside with local authorities, 
industrial users (mines, railways and other large users) should be afforded the protection of Escom rates. 
This entrenched Escom’s right to directly supply energy intensive users and drove the final nail in the 
coffin for municipal electricity generation. (Marquard 2006; Jenvey 1964; Borckenhagen 1964; Craythorne 
1982; Browne 1983) 
“..the main task of meeting the country’s requirements of electricity should be undertaken by 
Escom, and that further expansion of municipal generation stations in areas which could be 
supplied by Escom be discouraged”  (Borckenhagen 1964, p.15 Fifth Interim Report) 
The practise of rate relief from electricity surpluses was officially sanctioned by national government when 
it endorsed the following finding from the report in the 1971 White Paper (Ministry of Finance 1971): 
“Profits on power for industrial use should be limited but the Committee believes that the picture 
of profits made by local authorities in the trading departments can be exaggerated” 
Not surprisingly, municipal finances did not improve after the Enquiry. The issue remained high on the 
agenda for municipalities and they continued to lobby government. The topic also caught the attention 
of academics, see (Botha 1969; Various 1979; Penny 1967; Scholes 1976; Manning 1969; Cowden & 
Holmes 1969; Botha 1973). The research topics varied and included: the deficiencies of the municipal 
funding system; the inequity and shortcomings of the property rating system; the inability of local 
government to undertake its functions due to funding shortages forcing it into an ever-increasing cycle of 
cross-subsidisation; and the growing burden placed on municipalities to deal with social problems created 
by apartheid. Alternative and additional models were put forward, all of which were largely ignored by 
national government.      
Municipalities however, were in distress, through escalating internal costs, the combination of high 
inflation and nominal interest rates, as well as a lagging base on which to levy property tax as principal 
revenue source (Solomon 1983, p.10); and national government was finally forced to act. In 1976 the 
Minister of Finance appointed the Committee of Inquiry into the Finances of Local Authorities, which was 
chaired under GWG Browne. The objective of the report was to report on the adequacy of the existing 
sources of finance for local authorities; adjustments needed to establish a more satisfactory relationship 
between income and expenditure; and the extent to which finances could be improved through 
efficiencies and financial controls (Browne 1980). As with Borckenhagen, the Browne report offered little 
to the municipalities. No new revenue sources were identified, in fact implying the opposite and proposing 
that municipalites were inherently inefficient and should put their affairs in order – a finding that was 
expressed forcefully (Browne 1980). For capital projects, the report recommended that this ought to be 




reduce existing revenue sources by recommending that the suprluses from all trading services be 
restricted to 10% for five years, and thereafter to a maximum of 5%. Browne recommended a system of 
transfer from white to Indian and Coloured local authorities, and joint services committees for areas of 
common interest (James & Simons 2008). This was the precursor to the introduction of the Regional 
Services Councils. Craythorne (1982) provided a scathing analysis of the work done by the Browne 
committee, finding fault with its limited understanding of local government and stating the committee 
clearly pushed through national government directives:  
“The startling display of ignorance could have been avoided…. It might have been hoped that 
having got off to a bad start the report might have improved but unfortunately this was not the 
case” 
“It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this was deliberately done to avoid dealing with the 
need for subsidies to local government.” 
The Browne report was not well received by local government. Under pressure, national government set 
up yet another inquiry – the Croeser Working Group on local government finances, and focused on 
surpluses from electricity distribution. The Croeser working group overturned the Browne 
recommendations and suggested that surpluses be restricted ‘as far as possible to 10%’. The group also 
endorsed and promoted the policy of RSCs (see Page 44-48). The Regional Services Act of 1985 introduced 
a levy on a business’s payroll and turnover (RSC Act 1985).  
Ultimately, the issues facing local government were not resolved by national government. In truth, its 
actions made matters worse, and it would appear that the commissions of enquiry fixated on identifying 
weaknesses in local government; indeed that they served as a vehicle to introduce new national policy 
under the guise that consultation had taken place during the investigation. The broader economic and 
political situation compounded the issues even further; and in trying to keep the country solvent in the 
mid to late 1980s, the Finance Ministry took control of local government finances from the provincial 
administrators.  
In all of this, funding local government in an inflationary and stalling economy was difficult, while 
municipalities still had few instruments with which to raise funds. The contribution made from electricity 
surpluses thus had not only grown in importance over the years, but as shown in the tables and graphs 
below, became a primary funding source. 
7.4.3 Johannesburg’s Municipal Finance and Electricity Surplus 
When looking at Johannesburg as a particular focal point for this period, one immediately notes that in 
line with its population and geographical expansion, so too did electricity consumption grow. Here Figure 
7-4 illustrates the growth in electricity usage for the period 1952 - 1995. The JEU sold 928 534 029 units 
in 1952 and 6 229 159 044 in 1995 – an average growth rate of 4.9% (Figure 7-5).  
Figure 7-4 shows both macro and micro trends. For example, 1953 and 1954 reflect the post-war boom 
years, while the period up to 1976 reflects the positive economic conditions punctuated by small 
recessionary periods. The impact of the Soweto riots is clearly visible (1977 - 1979), followed by the short-
lived gold run of the early 1980s. From thereon there is modest growth due to high tariff increases and of 





      Source: JEU Annual Reports of the General Manager of Electricity  
Figure 7-4: JEU Annual Sales (1952 - 1995) 
 
       Source: ibid 
Figure 7-5: Average Percentage Growth in Electricity Sales for Johannesburg (1952 - 1995)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Figure 7-6 is interesting for many reasons, as it shows how electricity surpluses became a reliable and 
























































































































































































































the following year can be seen clearly. Notable examples include 1959, 1972 and from 1985 onwards. 
Infrequent but larger nominal tariff increases up to the late 1970s, were replaced with smaller annual 
tariff increases to begin with, becoming more significant in the late 1980s. 
 
          Source: ibid 
Figure 7-6: Annual Contributions towards Rate Relief and Tariff Increases for Johannesburg (1952 - 1995) 








































































































































































































Table 7-6: Key Events and Explanatory Notes to Figure 7-6 
Year  Events / Explanatory Notes 
1952 10% tariff increase led to large surplus (£325k contribution to tariff stabilization fund and £362k to rate relief). 
Concern that increasing interest rates will decrease future profits, but stabilization fund to delay tariff increases 
1958 £178k withdrawn from stabilisation to add to £173 surplus to make a £351k contribution to the relief of rates  
1959  For the first time in over 20 years, the rate fund had to contribute to electricity operations. Due to high capital 
charges, a mild winter and poor economic conditions, necessitating a 20% tariff increase. The GM notes: “tariffs 
were reduced in 1936 and during that 13-year period only increased twice (10% in 1952 and 1956), compared to a 
200% tariff increase in other commodities over the same period.” 
1960 Net surplus of £789k apportioned £500k to rate relief and the balance to the stabilisation fund 
1961 No tariff increase forecast for at least two years. South Africa becomes a Republic, abandons the British Pound and 
introduces the Rand at an exchange rate of 2:1 
1965 Buoyant economic conditions leading to a surplus of R2.38 million97. R1 million allocated to the relief of rates. The 
rate stabilization fund had accumulated R2.5 million and a decision was made to use the money to buy gas 
turbines. Surplus revenue from electricity in future would be allocated as follows: 
• 40% or R1 million (whichever the greater) to the relief of rates 
• 36% to Council Capital Development Fund  
• 24% to electricity capital development fund 
1971 Financial results for the year were disappointing and a tariff increase would become necessary 
1972 High costs had a material impact on profit, necessitating an electricity tariff increase aimed at raising revenue by 
up to 25%. Three different tariff structures were introduced (domestic block, non-domestic block and a demand 
tariff with off-peak). R1.5 million was withdrawn from the stabilization fund. It is the first tariff increase in 12 years 
1973 Record surplus of R6 568 428 recorded 
1975  Increased operational costs result in a reduced surplus, prompting an application to the Provincial Administrator to 
authorise a 17.5% increase 
1976 Revenue increased by 23.1% but offset by 38.9% increase in costs. The decreased surplus is seen as a direct 
indication of the economic climate of the country 
1978 Despite tough trading conditions, a record surplus of R8 493 814 was recorded, attributed to the strict control of 
expenditure. Tariffs were restructured to manage demand, with 90 MW maximum demand reduction targeted due 
to Escom’s supply shortfall and JEU reduced generation. JEU issues a warning that the current situation of selling 
electricity at below cost and not reinvesting in assets cannot continue. The low charges are only possible because 
of what is supplied internally (self-generation), decreasing annually as the existing plants lose efficiency and O&M 
costs increase. A much higher electricity tariff is forecast for the future   
1979  Programme to electrify Soweto continues, but an inadequate budget resulted in regular outages due to 
overloading. Tariffs increased by 8.5%  
1980  Sales increase, prompting the hope of an economic recovery. Policy is to maximise own supply which is 
significantly cheaper than Escom. A R2 million spent to develop a monitoring facility to achieve this objective 
1983 Economic recession results in the JEU recording its first ever decrease in sales (0.9%). Investment in control centre 
led to a R7.5 million saving in Escom demand charges. The JEU supplies the Sandton area, levying an 18% surcharge  
1987 Record surplus of R104.8 million (nominal) recorded. Tariffs increased by 12.5% to ensure that the required surplus 
was achieved. R800k allocation made to subsidise electricity tariffs in Lenasia  
1990 Two annual tariff increases become unavoidable (1988, 1989 and 1990) due to Eskom increases on short notice. 
Ageing staff, an inability to attract and retain new recruits result in the need for consultants, estimated to cost four 
times more. Old plants can no longer compete with Escom pricing, resulting in a decline in generation  
1991 Escom begins process of phasing out special tariffs (discounted) tariffs, prompting the JEU to increase its own 
generation by 5.5%. Practise of increasing tariffs for residential and business users at different rates is introduced 
1992  The JEU reduces residential electricity tariffs by 10% and limit the increase on business tariffs to just 5% 
1993 Tariffs are increased by 25% in 1993, followed by 11.50% in 1993 and 10.50% 1994  
          Source: ibid 
Figure 7-7 now illustrates the annual contributions made by the electricity department to the relief of 
rates for the period 1952 to 1995. Notably, two things stand out: The first, is the extent to which 
contributions increased from the early to mid-1980s. During this period Escom was in an over-supply 
 
97 South Africa used the British pound sterling until 1921, when the South African pound was introduced. South Africa adopted the rand in 1961; 




situation and offered the city bulk supply discounts. Recognising that once Escom became the JEU’s 
primary supplier, a way would be found to remove the discounts, the JEU accepted Escom’s offer, but 
kept the Orlando Power station operational as an alternative supply.   
“We knew that if we shut down Orlando, the game was over and Escom would revert to the 
original tariffs, so we kept two boilers operational. This worked well, and we were even able to 
increase the discounts, until 1990. The electricity undertaking made large surpluses during this 
period.”   Martin Pomeroy, City Electrical Engineer98 
 
Figure 7-7: Annual Contributions towards Rate Relief from Electricity Surpluses for Johannesburg (1952 – 
1994) 
The second standout observation is the profound effect on the electricity surplus that occurred in 1992, 
when the city reduced residential tariffs and limited the increase on business tariffs. The surplus dropped 
in real terms (using 1994 as the base year) from R449 million to R234 million. The loss in revenue from 
electricity in 1991 was offset by a corresponding 68% increase in revenue from property rates 
(Johannesburg Municipality 1992, p.vi) (Figure 7-899). The inevitable question thus arises: Given the 
prevailing operational environment, why did the city take the drastic and risky decision to reduce 
electricity tariffs? The answer is the evolution of Sandton - “a nouveaux riche exemplar of peripheral 
urbanization” - and Murray (2011, p.114) explains that this was not by design:  
“In 1967, at the height of apartheid, the National Party carved out two new municipalities, 
Sandton and Randburg100, in what at the time was the peri-urban periphery of Johannesburg…. 
this decision to create a separate local government at Sandton was primarily motivated by the 
mounting fear of losing citywide elections to the white political opposition, which had its strongest 
 
98 Martin Pomeroy joined the Municipality in 1959 and moved to the electricity undertaking in 1979. He was the City Electrical Engineer from 
1992-1994 and the GM from 1995 to 1996. Interviewed 27 January 2017 
99 The Financial Statements reflect the increase but provide no further explanation. The annual increase in the property tariff increased 
marginally from 3.97cents to 4.1cents in the Rand, providing little insight  
100 Randburg was staunchly Afrikaans and a NP stronghold, giving it autonomy would entrench NP support. This was not the case in Sandton, and 
















































































































base of support in the northern suburbs…. In order to secure their own tax base, Sandton municipal 
authorities set out, with some animus, to compete against the Johannesburg central city for 
corporate clients by offering considerably lower property taxes rates, and relaxed zoning 
applications favourable to the expansion of commercial and retail development.  
In addition to lower property rates and relaxed zoning requirements, Sandton received its electricity 
supply directly from Eskom, at significantly lower rates than what was being charged by Johannesburg. 
The effect was that Johannesburg came under pressure from its anchor tenants, the city argued that it 
offered far superior infrastructure, all of which came at a cost. However, this was insufficient: “there was 
a backlash from energy dependent consumers and particularly those who were close to the borders of 
Johannesburg where their competitive counterparts enjoyed the Eskom demand tariffs some 40 to 50% 
less than Johannesburg’s”. To start, the exodus was not wholesale. Companies retained their offices in 
Johannesburg, but new offices and expansions located in Sandton and Randburg. Once the new offices 
were established, the entire company followed101. Democracy saw the demarcation of new municipal and 
provincial boundaries, Johannesburg absorbed Sandton and Randburg municipalities as well as several 
townships, most notably Soweto and Alexandra, to form a Metropolitan Local Council. A peculiarity of this 
new arrangement was that Eskom continued to distribute to Sandton and Soweto, while rates had to be 
equalised across the city - prompting the Sandton rates boycott in 1996; dealt with in the next section.  
 
Note: The sharp drop in property rates revenue in 1977 was not explained in the annual financial statements, but doubled 
(nominal terms) the following year  
Figure 7-8: Annual Contributions from Property Rates and Electricity Surpluses for Johannesburg (1975 – 
1995) 
 
101 Meeting with Stan Bridgens – Director Technical Services, Johannesburg Electricity Undertaking. Employed at the undertaking 1958 to 1995. 






















In painting a strong numerical picture of municipal funding reliance on limited sources during this period, 
Figure 7-9 shows the extent to which electricity sales and property rates make up the bulk of municipal 
revenue. Indeed, a closer analysis ( 
Table 7-7) reveals that municipal functions were: 1) Operated at a marginal profit or loss (water and 
sewerage); 2) Heavily subsidised (transport and health); or 3) Almost completely subsidised (culture and 
roads) by property rates and electricity surpluses. Figure 7-10 shows the city’s exclusive reliance on rates 
and electricity to provide functions for the period 1991 to 1994. 
 
Figure 7-9: Contribution of Property Rates and Electricity Sales to Total Revenue for Johannesburg (1975 
– 1994)  
Table 7-7: Surplus / (Deficit) for Selected Municipal Functions for Johannesburg (1991 – 1994) 
Service 
Surplus / (Deficit) Millions – Real, 1994 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
  Marginal: Up to 20% 
Water 17 -4 -2 -1 
Sewerage 23 17 8 6 
Gas 5 -1 0 4 
  Heavily Subsidised: 20% to 60%  
Health and Housing  -137 -103     
Transport -47 -42 -38 -36 
  Completely Subsidised:  >60% 
Culture -152 -175 -171 -175 
Health and Housing      -105 -99 

























Figure 7-10: Aggregated Income and Expenditure Statement for Johannesburg (1991 – 1994) 
More than anything, the long period under NP rule again demonstrated an escalating intransigence in 
shifting away from the practice of relief of rates on the part of municipalities – particularly given that the 
generation battle had been lost to Eskom – with the growing reliance on distribution revenue being made 
worse by national government’s ongoing dithering in critically addressing the challenges of municipal 
funding – which itself was overtaken by socio-political events in the latter part of the period, as the nation  
inexorably began to move towards democracy.  Immediately hereafter however, are the concluding 
remarks on the period under current discussion, before then repeating this section’s process in the final 
time period – post-94.  
7.4.4 Conclusion and Second Critical Juncture  
In terms of theoretical analysis, the period from 1948 to 1994 offers much for the historical institutionalist 
to ponder upon. Indeed, during this time, certain aspects of the relationship between municipal funding 
and electricity generation and distribution saw little change, whereas others went through significant 
turmoil, with examples of the latter including a critical juncture in the late 1960s as death-knell to 
Net SurplusNet Expenses Net SurplusNet Expenses Net SurplusNet Expenses Net SurplusNet Expenses
1991 (Millions) 1992 1993 1994
Deficit 77
Surplus 12 14 45
General Expenses 175 239 224 230
Trading Services (excl Electricity) 234 212 257 243
Electricity 381 214 235 244
Planning & Tenders 43 104 30 28
Housing & Health 137 103 106 99
Culture 152 175 171 175













































municipal electricity generation and the gearing up for another at the end of the period, in the country’s 
transition to democracy – coupled with significant incremental changes throughout this timeframe.   
Here the analysis commences with an examination of the path dependent process of relief of rates, which 
by the end of the period was referred to as ‘cross-subsidisation’ and warrants some reflection as both 
concept and reality. In building up to such reflection, the research found that the right to vote in municipal 
elections was only extended to white males who were property owners; and that both conditions were 
necessary[1]. Upon reflection, this arrangement then had two key outcomes: 1) Only a very small portion 
of the population (property owners) were contributing to municipalities’ primary revenue sources; and 2) 
This small group of property owners had a direct influence over municipal policy, as they were the only 
ones who could vote and it was in any councillor’s personal interest to appease their electorate. Reducing 
the said electorate’s’ property taxes went a long way towards achieving this. Thus, ’relief of rates’ was an 
apt description that clearly captured the raison d'etre of the practice. Indeed, lower property taxes were 
likely to encourage property investments; and since this form of revenue collection was working well, the 
practise remained, and in fact expanded under the notion of increasing returns, even after municipal 
voting rights were extended to all white, male and female citizens within the municipality. Viewed in this 
light, there can be no implication other than that cross-subsidisation of municipal services was an 
accepted practice.  
What is of particular pertinence when examining the practice of relief of rates from a municipal 
perspective however, is that when the time finally did come for municipalities to start delivering to their 
adjacent previously unserved black townships, both politicians and municipal treasurers joined their 
colleagues in the electricity department and cried foul; albeit that the latter had in fairness always 
opposed this practise, even though in this instance opposition to it was indefensible. Suddenly, under 
these circumstances, cross subsidisation was unfair and reflective pricing was what was needed; which in 
truth appears to be a mildly panicked response to the realisation of the cost and effort to service these 
areas after decades of neglect, coupled with an unsurprising knee-jerk reaction to decades of the “us and 
them” ideology of apartheid. By November 1989 the reality of the situation had sunk in and the AMEU 
sought to meet with national government and Eskom to confirm their commitment to the “Electricity for 
All” programme. And it is from this that the name change from relief of rate to cross-subsidisation became 
one of the outcomes.  
Staying with the original notion relief of rates that dominated the majority of this period however, the 
research has found that this practise continued to accelerate under the process of a positive feedback 
loop throughout the period under discussion; with Figure 7-7 demonstrating this convincingly with little 
need for supporting explanation. What does warrant commentary though, is the consequence of the City’s 
decision to reduce its residential electricity tariffs and minimise the increase on business tariffs, in 
response to the exodus of its residential, commercial and industrial client base to Sandton. The impact on 
the City’s finances was devastating and the policy was reversed the following year when electricity tariffs 
increased by 24% (Figure 7-6). Here, historical institutionalists would normally account for the transition 
from stasis (negative) to amplification (positive), via the logistical S-curve defined by long periods of 
inactivity where pressure builds and then takes off - often overcorrecting - and shifting from a negative to 
a positive feedback loop. But in this instance, we have witnessed the reverse – a backward overcorrection 
to an initial seemingly progressive correction. In this, Williams (2012) reminds us that the positive 
 




feedback loop endeavours to remain on its path, especially one that has been in place for decades, which 
was the case here. Indeed, shifting from a positive to a negative state is not straightforward and requires 
a clear “window of opportunity” for change, which in this case wasn’t present. He thus concludes that 
misdiagnosing events generally leads to much upheaval, effort and cost, but ultimately yields little. In this 
particular scenario for example, the marginal reduction of residential electricity tariffs and the limiting of 
business tariffs increases, while compensating for this through above average property tax increases, was 
never going to sufficient to stem the outflow. In earlier chapters we saw how residents respond to 
excessive local taxation, regardless of whether it is real or perceived, which is either through evasion or 
migration to a municipality which is more affordable, as occurred in Johannesburg. In truth though, the 
high tariffs (electricity and property) were merely a contributing, and not the primary, factor. Albeit that 
cost may have played a role, residents were in fact fleeing the city centre due to political events at national 
level and rising crime levels in the CBD.    
Finally, when examining drivers of change during this period, both incremental and punctuated change; 
with regards to the latter the research identified a critical juncture, namely the Margate Convention of 
1968 that ended future municipal generation, however this event as has been shown was not an 
exogenous shock but the outcome of many years of pressure (incremental change) from Escom. This is 
particularly significant, because the identification of institutional change is the primary objective of the 
chosen framework.   
 
Ultimately, changes and their effects over long periods of time can be difficult to identify, because of the 
variables involved and the varying size of incidents of change. One approach would be a “before and after” 
comparison, which accounts for (or excludes) punctuated equilibrium, depending on perspective. 
Nevertheless, if we consider Johannesburg through this “pre and post” prism, in 1948 it was a functional 
utility with a highly skilled and effective workforce, which was able to service its customer base and sell 
large quantities to Escom. And it had an aggressive expansion programme, with plans for a new state of 
the art 1 000 MW plant to come online before 1970. The Margate Convention changed all that however, 
and the JEU over a period of 20 years - the remaining lifespan of its Orlando and Kelvin power plants - had 
to transform itself from a utility to a distribution company, now forced to take its supply from one 
company, Escom. It did what it could, but it had to watch as its fortunes declined, while speculating about 
what could have been. Experienced staff (who could not be readily replaced) left, revenues shrank and 
the municipal treasury squeezed the utility as much as it could to maximise surpluses, due to the ongoing 
recession during the political turmoil of the 1980s. All of these point to being a function of drift “changed 
impact of existing rules due to shifts in the environment”, before finally Johannesburg had to come to 
terms with the new reality of “Electricity for All” – displacement “the removal of existing rules and the 
introduction of new ones”.  
With the coming 1994 elections though, these changes were only precursor to the challenges that lay 
ahead - outlined in the next section.   
7.5 Democratic Elections and Electricity for All (1994 – 2017) 
7.5.1 Setting the Scene 
The immediate post-democratic period was dominated by two pressing, but contentious issues. Pressing 




ideologies amongst the stakeholders and the economic consequences of the different options would 
deliver vastly different outcomes. Once again, and as would be expected, Eskom and the municipalities 
locked horns. The first issue was the urgent need for Eskom and municipalities to meet the targets and 
commitments made towards national electrification. The second issue was the restructuring of the ESI.   
7.5.2 The National Electrification Programme (NEP) and the New Regulator (NER) 
By bringing together the technical and financial capabilities of the ESI with political legitimacy and support, 
it allowed the participants to take decisions that would be both politically acceptable and practically 
implementable (Bekker & Marquard 2008). Having served its purpose and in danger of compromising 
agreed outcomes due to the theoretical debates on the form of a future ESI, the NELF was disbanded in 
1995 (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000, p.314). NELF’s work was consolidated into a final report which 
was presented to the GNU and highlighted the state of crisis that the ESI was in, most notably the 
distribution sector which needed urgent restructuring. Over 400 municipalities distributed electricity and 
Eskom serviced a further two and half million consumers directly, ranging from high intensity users (mines 
and smelters) down to indigent households. As many as 120 municipalities serviced fewer than 1 000 
households and more than 90 had annual revenues of less than a million rand. The result was a fractured 
industry with too many tariffs, vastly disparate charges and varying service levels. Users in Gauteng paid 
between 9 and 17 cents /kWh whereas equivalent users in Mpumalanga (where most of the power 
stations where located) paid 23 to 32 cents /kWh. Surpluses from electricity sales were as inconsistent - 
50% of the total were generated by the top four municipalities, the next 25% was distributed amongst 18 
municipalities, with the final quarter being divvied up amongst the remaining 380 plus local authorities, 
almost all of which were operating their undertaking’s at a loss, meaning no surpluses but not necessarily 
that the revenue generated from electricity sales was not being used to pay for other functions. The report 
recommended the establishment of an electricity regulator to replace the ECB, that it be given wide 
ranging powers and be charged with overseeing the restructuring of the ESI, which in its first phase would 
see Eskom absorb the small and non-performing municipal undertakings. This would pave the way for the 
second phase, which would see the establishment of a limited number of (5 to 17) Regional Electricity 
Distributors (REDs) which was more feasible than the 400+ existing separate entities. Consolidating the 
EDI would achieve the long held objective of cost reflective tariffs, end cross-subsidization (relief of rates) 
and ultimately deliver a competitive ESI (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000; Bekker & Marquard 2008; 
Galen 1997). Although seemingly sensible and undoubtedly in the national interest, the NELF reform 
recommendations directly challenged the vested interests of Eskom and the local municipalities and “the 
controversial recommendations ground to a halt” (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000, p.320). The regulator 
(National Energy Regulator – NER) was however established on 4 October 1995, with ex-Eskom CEO 
McRae appointed as its first chief executive, and many key positions being filled by ex-Eskom personnel. 
All exemptions to regulations were removed from the Electricity Regulation Act as henceforth Eskom and 
all MEU’s would report to the newly created NER. With so many Eskom people at the NER, there was little 
question as to where sympathies lay, an issue which became a source of contention for the AMEU.      
A first order of business for NER, was the establishment of the Electricity Working Group (EWG) which 
was tasked with making recommendations on the future structure of the EDI. All stakeholders were 
involved (24 workshops in total) and a thorough analysis of the industry was undertaken. Many of the 
affected parties (Eskom, AMEU, Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants) undertook their own 
reviews. Unsurprisingly, Eskom and the AMEU clashed (again) when the latter discovered that Eskom 




(WET), than the one being paid by municipalities. Eskom countered by insisting that municipalities do 
likewise and separate their electricity undertakings from the rest of their municipal services. The 
Electricity Restructuring Interdepartmental Committee (ERIC) was then set up by government to review 
the findings of the EWG. The stakeholder consultations undertaken during the NELF, EWG and ERIC 
processes, readily identified the issues (Galen 1997, p.1):  
1. The EDI is fragmented, inefficient and needs to be rationalised to ensure financial viability to meet its 
responsibilities; 
2. Electrification is a critical infrastructure development activity that must be prioritised; 
3. The electrification programme, in its current format, is funded by cross-subsidies and the cost of 
serving new, low usage customers is estimated at R1.2 billion for the period 1995-1999102;  
4. Tariffs needed to become cost based. To do so cross-subsidies would need to end, or if kept for them 
to be marginal. Electrification, funded through existing tariffs was permissible but had to be done in 
a transparent manner where the tax or levy on sales was easily identifiable by the consumer; 
5. The practise of setting numerical electrification targets was deemed wasteful, inefficient and an 
ineffective approach to promote economic development or the equitable provision of services; and,   
6. The ESI needed to separate generation, transmission and distribution. Only then would a competitive 
operating environment be created which would lead to cost savings and economic efficiencies.  
Political ideologies and the vested interests of the various stakeholders made finding mutually acceptable 
action difficult. For example, the urgent need to reform and consolidate EDI was universal, but how? The 
creation of a national electricity distributor was favoured by some, whereas others believed that a small 
number of regional distributors, the so-called REDs, would be more efficient and more responsive to local 
concerns and interests. The boundaries103 of REDs required careful consideration of ownership, asset 
valuation, regulation and human resources. The ERIC report and its recommendations was submitted to 
cabinet. In May 1997, after numerous revisions to address comments and concerns, cabinet approved the 
consolidation of the EDI into the maximum number of financially viable and independent RED’s. (A 
Eberhard 2007; Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000; Galen 1997).   
However, not all tiers of government agreed. The ERIC recommendation to establish RED’s was 
immediately rejected by the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) 104  at its inaugural 
meeting, as it was viewed as a constitutional matter. Electricity and gas distribution, amongst others, were 
municipal functions protected by the supreme law of the land. SALGA’s position did not deter national 
government, which in 1998 issued the Energy Policy White Paper which detailed government’s intention 
to reform the ESI (Chapter 6.4.1). 
Eskom’s price compact, which reduced tariffs in real terms by 20% during the period 1992 to 1996, was 
about to expire. An analysis by Steyn (2001, chap.4) of the compact outcomes found that the original 
targets were not achieved, and although electricity prices decreased, they only did so marginally. Eskom 
did however succeed in its other (four) objectives of improving its financial and technical position, 
delivering on its electrification targets and promoting black employment within the organization. The 
electrification programme was starting to weigh heavily on Eskom’s finances, as its original plan to target 
 
102 The capital costs, which were separate, were estimated at between R1.3 to 1.7 billion / year 
103 It was concluded in the ERIC process that using provincial boundaries for REDs was not appropriate as nine would be too many and some 
would not be financially viable (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000, p.317) 




urban areas which had high a concentration of (more) affluent users had to be conceded to the municipal 
undertakings. Despite developing criteria to evaluate the financial and economic cost-benefit analyses of 
prospective projects, the need to meet its annual connection targets always took priority. For example, a 
review of thirty Eskom electrification projects found that more than 60% did not meet its internal 
evaluation criteria (Steyn 1996, p.5). As was the well-established norm of the ESI, cross-subsidisation was 
used to cover the shortfalls of the programme. Concerns about the wisdom of this practise were raised 
on numerous occasions, supported by large quantities of anecdotal evidence and academic research. - 
Electricity it was argued, while a necessary ingredient for economic development and growth, could not 
create it without other physical infrastructure components such as roads, water, sanitation and housing. 
This made the investment hugely inefficient and compromised other opportunities – see (Conradie & 
Messerschmidt 2000; Steyn 2001; Bekker & Marquard 2008; Galen 1997; Davis 1996) (Goldemberg et al. 
2000, p.375). Such arguments had little impact and the programme continued unabated.  
The ANC needed deliver on the RDP and could not afford to look a gift horse in the mouth. The conundrum 
it faced was that recognising that the ESI was delivering electricity at a significantly faster rate than what 
the organizations responsible for other infrastructure could deliver, was electrification to be delayed? 
Possibly not, but as Galen (1997, p.16) notes, better guidance was needed from national government:  
“What is the goal of electrification? To provide electricity for all or to support economic growth in 
the near and long terms?......Currently, the answer ……..is “electricity for all”. Yet the strategic 
vision contained in the RDP suggests that it is “also to support economic growth in the near and 
long terms”. ……. It does not seem feasible to pursue both goals simultaneously. This, however has 
become the policy by default and has led to confusion and inefficient delivery…..” 
The much higher levelised costs of rural connections also necessitated Eskom to strengthen its bulk 
infrastructure and extend its transmission networks and transformers. This was compounded by lower 
than forecast consumption, and in turn revenues. Low income household’s consumption was estimated 
at 350 kWh/month, but less than a third of this amount was used.  Squeezed on both sides, Eskom needed 
additional revenue. With the price compact officially expired, Eskom started levying an implicit levy on 
existing electricity users, with a portion going to municipal undertakings, to fund the electrification 
programme. For a variety of factors, it was decided to move the next phase (II) of the electrification 
programme from Eskom to the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME). An evaluation of the 
programme for the period 1994 – 1999 found that it cost R8 billion, increased electrification from 36% to 
66% nationally through 3 million connections, primarily in cities and towns (Borchers 2001, p.iv).  
7.5.3 MEU’s Contribution to the National Electrification Programme 
A meeting was held between AMEU, NER and Eskom on the 14th of February 1997. The first item on the 
agenda was Eskom’s recently, and unexpected, announcement of a 5% tariff increase, which Eskom CEO 
Morgan said was “based on historical and statistical data which found Eskom to be an efficient distributor 
of electricity, which cannot be said of many of the local authorities”. The AMEU objected on the basis that 
any increase on such short notice was problematic, as their end users needed at least a 6-week notice 
period. NER’s McRae accepted this and suggested that henceforth only one tariff increase per annum be 
allowed. On the topic of the R300m allocation made to MEU’s by Eskom to support electrification projects, 
Eskom presented the statistics in Table 7-8, but noted that many applications had been rejected as they 




Table 7-8: Municipal Applications for Eskom Allocation to fund the Electrification Programme (1997) 
Number of applicants 151 
Number of projects 431 
Number of connections applied for 339 000 
Total value of claims R960m 
Average cost per connection excluding the service connection R2 831 
The R300m was an annual award for five years, which McRae (NER) said was a ‘gift’ from Eskom to level 
the playing field between itself and the MEU’s. The AMEU took immediate exception and rejected outright 
the notion that it was in any way a gift as the money originated from municipal users. McRae immediately 
retracted the term ‘gift’. Secondly, the AMEU questioned the fairness of allocating an amount which is 
less than the actual cost of a connection, as many municipalities were not able to fund the shortfall. NER 
enquired whether the AMEU would prefer a National Electrification Fund to which the AMEU council 
agreed. AMEU’s position was that the R300 million was an ineffective use of money, as 45% of the amount 
was funded from local government income and then passed back to them in the form of a subsidy, 
effectively halving the real contribution to local government. Whereas, Eskom could fund the full cost 
(averaging R3 500 / connection plus losses), compared to the municipal allowance of just R1 000 / 
connection. Models to unlock the situation were discussed. Not much came from this as McRae was 
abruptly replaced shortly thereafter. The National Electrification Coordinating Committee (NECC) was 
formed in April 1999, which was then absorbed by the Integrated National Electrification Programme from 
2002, which was funded from the national fiscus (Bekker & Marquard 2008, 12–13) (Eberhard 2005b). 
7.5.4 RED’s (So Close, Yet so Far), ISMO and ADAM (Much of the Same) 
The need to Reform EDI and the Regional Electricity Distribution (RED) Programme 
‘Major differences between the various stakeholders remain unresolved and government seems 
unwilling to face the reality that the creation of the REDs will almost certainly require a 
constitutional amendment that limits the role of local government in electricity distribution.’ 
       Eberhard (2005b) 
By 2005 there were 278 municipalities, and the more than 400 electricity distributors that existed before 
the new millennium had merged into ~180 units, which in the view of most and specifically national 
government, was still too many (DME 2002; Mlambo-Ngcula 2004). Having abandoned plans to privatise 
generation, government remained committed to reforming the EDI, as issues identified in the mid-1990s 
persisted.  
Could consolidation and reform, under the existing legal framework, be achieved? The 1996 Constitution, 
Section 156 (1) and (2) assigns and lists the functions which municipalities have exclusive authority over, 
which includes electricity reticulation. Although, national and provincial government have the legislative 
and executive authority to see to the effective performance by municipalities (Section 155 (7)), the 
Constitution only allows provincial government to intervene, if the municipality “cannot or does not fulfil 
its executive obligations.” In 2002, the DME stated that in their opinion EDI restructuring could still occur 
without a constitutional change. The basis on which such a conclusion was based remains unclear, but 
suggests that national government believed that a political solution was probable. A view municipalities 




as municipalities negotiated knowing their participation was voluntary and thus from a position of 
strength (A. Eberhard 2007; Eberhard 2005b; Pickering 2010; Gaunt 2008).    
In 2000, national government appointed Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC) to develop a mutually 
beneficial and acceptable model for all stakeholders which addressed the contentious issues of 
boundaries, ownership, asset valuation, regulation and human resources. The report, meant to serve as a 
blueprint, was compiled by the EDI Restructuring Committee (EDIRC) (DME 2001) and proposed six RED’s, 
each anchored by a metro to provide financial sustainability (Figure 7-11), supported by 57 
recommendations to achieve the end objective. The blueprint was approved by Cabinet in 2001 and EDI 
Holdings, a state-owned entity, was formed in 2003 to resolve outstanding issues and manage the process. 
In early 2005, the President Mbeki confidently set June 2005 as the target date for the establishment of 
the first RED (RED’s1), a pilot project jointly approved by Eskom and the Cape Town metropolitan 
government. The target was achieved, but on paper only. The stumbling block was Eskom, who having 
previously supported the programme, was unwilling to operate under the rules and provisions of the local 
government system105, which were different to those applicable to state owned entities. On this basis, 
Eskom resisted (refused) transferring its assets, customers and staff to RED1 control. To appease Eskom, 
the RED’s were categorised as non-municipal entities, but unsurprisingly, this arrangement then became 
unacceptable to the City of Cape Town who stated that the nature and structure of the arrangement had 
fundamentally changed to its detriment, and it promptly pulled out and asked NERSA to revoke the RED1 
distribution license and re-establish the status quo. All agreements were cancelled and RED1 was 
dissolved.   
 
*Provincial boundaries in black 
      Source: Eberhard (2013)      
Figure 7-11: Six Wall-to-Wall REDs  
EDI holding was instructed in 2006 by the DME to make RED’s work, and in a presentation made by CEO 
Phindile Nzimande in June 2008, she believed that they were getting close: “Never before has the 
 
105 Municipal undertakings are subject to the Municipal Systems Act and the Municipal Financial Management Act (MFMA), whereas Eskom is a 




environment for the establishment of the RED’s looked so substantially promising”. Her optimism came 
with the caveat of ambivalent stakeholder support, emanating primarily from the voluntary nature of the 
restructuring process and the lack of enabling legislation. An example of the latter was demonstrated by 
the 2007 Electricity Regulation Amendment Act which empowered both the minister and the energy 
regulator to establish norms and standards, key performance indicators and required municipalities to 
ring-fence their operations and financial results. Depending how one interpreted the amendment, it 
either divided or duplicated the oversight role, creating confusion for the municipalities and 
compromising the role of the regulator. From 2006 over R1.2 billion was spent on reviving the RED’s, but 
with little progress. Government finally threw in the towel and the RED’s scheme was officially abandoned 
and EDI Holdings wound-up following a cabinet decision made on the 8th of December 2010.  
Reforming the EDI, which had developed and was entrenched for longer than a century, was never going 
to be straightforward. The scheme itself and the perspective and vested interests of the primary 
stakeholders is summarised in Table 7-9. The failure of RED’s however, the periphery ones aside, came 
down to three issues:  
• How ownership of the REDs would be determined? 
• How local government and Eskom would be compensated for their assets? 
• Who would control the REDs? 
The attempt to reform EDI took fifteen years, cost several billion Rand and yielded little. The real victims 
however were the physical municipal distribution systems. During this extended period of uncertainty, 
the owners of each distribution system (municipalities and Eskom), in being told that their assets would 
be transferred into a new structure for an unknown sum or for nothing - as many feared - adopted a policy 
of minimum maintenance. Not only were non-essential capital investments put on hold, preventative and 
common infrastructure suffered the same fate. Indeed, it was not uncommon to wait for equipment to 
fail before action was taken. The backlog of infrastructure maintenance was R27.4 billion in 2008, and by 
2013 estimated at R35 billion (Figure 7-12) and growing at approximately R2.5 billion per annum, which 
the Minister of Energy (formerly DME) and NERSA continually kept referring to as a ticking time bomb  
(McDonald 2009; Eberhard 2000; Eberhard 2005b; Pickering 2010; Kessides & Maurer 2007; A Eberhard 
2013; Gaunt 2008; Eberhard 2005a; A. Eberhard 2007; of Minerals & Energy 2001; DME 2002; Mlambo-
Ngcula 2004; Savage 2008; Nzimande 2008a) (Yelland 2010). 
Table 7-9: Summary of National, Local and Eskom Perspectives to REDs 
National Government Perspective 
National government’s motivation for creation of RED’s: 
• EDI is fragmented in terms of investments, sharing of facilities, services and people development 
• The large number of distributors has resulted, over time, to non-standardised systems and approaches 
• Inequitable treatment of consumers-  wide range of tariffs for similar consumers, unfair discrepancies between Eskom and 
municipalities. National policy (1998 White Paper), calls for cost reflective tariffs and to make subsidies transparent 
• Small and/or low-income user base has made many distributors operations loss making or bankrupt 
• ‘Higher’ municipal priorities lead to networks being neglected resulting in capacity shortages and supply interruptios 
affecting the economy  
• Experienced and skilled staff are lost to the private sector meaning key positions become occupied by under-skilled 




• Electrification performance unacceptably inconsistent nationally and Free Basic Electricity106 is slow and inconsistent 
• A regional distributor would accelerate electrification rollout 
• Reduced regulatory oversight is a natural outcome of industry consolidation   
• Municipal reliance on surpluses is contrary to government’s objective of low tariffs and economically sustainable 
• Creation of 6 REDs aimed at addressing the identified issues 
Municipal Perspective (Detailed analysis of the AMEU perspective is provided later on) 
The primary stumbling points for the municipalities: 
• Boundaries: To sustain operations the right balance between marginal/loss making (low income households) and profitable 
(commercial, industrial and middle to high income households) consumers is required  
• Metros did not want to absorb smaller MEU’s as this would lead to further cross-subsidisation. A reduced surplus would 
result in metro residents having to pay more for municipal functions  
• Although the EDI restructuring blueprint made clear provision for remunerating municipalities for their assets and giving 
them a share in the RED’s, the municipalities remained sceptical and raised concerns as to how this would (could) be done 
equitably. A. Eberhard (2013b) identified inter alia the following unresolved issues: 
o Control over customers and credit control. Municipalities’ most effective collection instrument to collect charges 
is electricity disconnection. Losing this could lead to far greater financial consequences than the surplus loss  
o Street lighting and municipal usage 
o Credit ratings of municipalities who lose the revenue stream  
o Conditions of service and servitudes  
There was also significant internal ANC political opposition as local politicians feared a loss of influence and maintained that it 
was their role to provide developmental government. National politicians called for a broader solution to fix the EDI 
Eskom Perspective 
Publicly, Eskom supported RED’s - it reconfigured its distribution into six networks to align with the proposed layout. In contrast 
to the municipalities however, Eskom played a more strategic game, allowing municipalities to lead discussions and raise issues. 
Eskom held back waiting to see whether its future role in the restructuring process was suitable and act accordingly. An example 
was cited above with RED’s1. A further example was in 2002 when Eskom would not sign a voluntary co-operation agreement 
until its conditions were met (Section 7.5.5: AMEU Minutes February 2002). 
Evaluation of the REDs Model 
Gaunt (2008) undertook a case study of EDI restructuring efforts under the REDs model. Although, at the time of the study, RED’s 
had not officially been terminated the writing was on the wall for the proposed model and with the benefit of hindsight his 
evaluation insightful. Initially, it was believed that the issues (listed above) affecting the EDI would be addressed by REDs, as: 
• Inequality between municipalities that derive revenue from electricity and those that did not would be reduced; 
• Six REDs of roughly equal size would lead to the desired tariff reform; 
• Consolidation would eliminate the need to rescue failing municipal distributors; 
• Skills training and demographic representation would be easier to achieve; 
• With just six distributors, the regulator could focus on the primary issues of reliability and quality; 
• Six RED’s was the same number of distribution units Eskom had prior to the national grid, suggesting it was the right number; 
• Consolidation would lead to better management, reduced and more effective government coordination. 
 
The RED’s model aligned with the World Bank’s recommendations (Kessides & Maurer 2007, p.7), who in their assessment 
believed that municipalities were not sufficiently able to run technically complicated and capital intensive networks, and raised 
the practise of diverting electricity distribution surpluses away from maintenance to fund other services as a major risk. However, 
Gaunt’s evaluation found that international examples of EDI restructuring from the mid-1990s had yielded mixed results and had 
certainly not delivered the leverage expected. That the greatest economy of scale was achieved by utilities with about 20 000 
customers and that most larger utilities did equally or less well, but never better. Utilities that went across (water and sewerage) 
were likely to do better than the ones that went deep i.e.: single service large base. This finding is supported by the ability of 
small MEU’s under apartheid to have serviced the white inhabitants of their towns profitably for decades. The second motivation 
for REDs was to ensure that each one was financially sustainable, implying uniform tariffs and no cross-subsidisation. However, 
the loss of surpluses, especially for the metro’s, who relied on them to fund electrification and other municipal functions, only 
meant that municipalities would tax RED’s electricity distribution. Finally, municipalities do more than just supply electricity, they 
provide street lighting, traffic lights etc. Economies of scale already exist in this integrated municipal system and removing a 
section from it would create additional transaction costs. Gaunt provides additional evidence and concludes by stating that initial 
assumptions of the benefits of RED’s may have been invalid or no longer relevant. For example, electrification occurred despite 
the failure of RED’s. Recognising that continuing to do nothing was not a viable option, he suggested improvement through 
incremental change 
 
106 National Government introduced Free Basic Electricity in 2004, which provided poor households with 50kWh/month allowance funded by 




         
 
Source: A Eberhard (2013) 
Figure 7-12: Estimated Refursbishment and Maintenance Backlog of EDI in 2008 
Government continued to entertain notions of reforming the ESI as per the pronouncements made in the 
1998 Energy White Paper. In what can only be described as déjà vu, in the 2010 state of the nation address, 
President Zuma, under pressure to resolve the electricity supply shortages, announced the creation of an 
inter-ministerial committee on energy. The committee would inter alia develop an Integrated Resource 
Plan (IRP); facilitate the long-awaited participation of Independent Power Producers; keep electricity 
tariffs affordable for the poor; the creation of the Approach to Distribution Asset Management (ADAM); 
as well create an Integrated Systems Operator (changed to Integrated Systems Market Operator or ISMO 
to better reflect its role) - “We will establish an independent system operator, separate from Eskom 
Holdings.”  
Approach to Distribution Asset Management (ADAM) 
With the RED’s dead, EDI Holdings was absorbed by the DoE in April 2011, inheriting the issues the RED’s 
was set up to resolve. In November 2012, Cabinet approved the DoE’s ADAM programme which would 
work with municipalities to address the high backlogs of maintenance and refurbishment of their 
distribution networks, but due to the enormity of the task a phased approach would be adopted. National 
Treasury re-allocated R320 million of the funds not utilized by EDI Holdings to DoE to initiate Phase 1 or 
the “Mini-ADAM”, which would target nine MEU’s (seven municipalities and two metros). Updating 
parliament on the progress of mini-ADAM in November 2013, the SALGA representative explained that 
the majority of the selected MEU’s did not have the financial or human resources to identify and develop 
high level electricity master plans to normalize their networks. The ADAM programme, it was emphasised, 
was not there to provide grant funding, but a holistic approach to get MEU’s to understand, address, 
manage and monitor the identified issues. With regards skills shortages, ADAM was encouraging better 
skilled metros to adopt a municipality to provide training and know how. For finance, Treasury had been 
approached, by SALGA and COGTA, to identify suitably appropriate financing mechanisms (A. Eberhard 
2013a). In October 2015, the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation when reporting on DoE 




and the remaining five were progressing well (Presidency 2015). At the February 2016 update to 
Parliament, the DoE stated that the mini-ADAM report was being finalised and would be released by May 
2016 (PMG 2016b). This deadline was not met and at the next visit to Parliament (3 May 2016), the DoE 
representative stated: “The close out report of this mini-ADAM will be submitted by May 2016”, 
presumably later that month (PMG 2016c), meaning yet another session in Parliament where the 
programme could only be discussed in general terms. The 2017 visit by the DoE to Parliament raised the 
urgent need for the maintenance of the national distribution system, estimated to have increased to over 
R80 billion. The shortcomings would be addressed by the ADAM programme, which would be informed 
by mini-ADAM experience107. However, the DoE representative provided no programme or budget details 
(PMG 2017b).  
In September 2017 (PMG 2017a), the DoE, NERSA and Eskom briefed parliament on the state of the EDI. 
From the briefing notes, two discussion points are of interest. The first, and rather curiously, was that 
local government was not present and were represented by the DoE. The second, was the vastly divergent 
standpoints of the DoE, NERSA and Eskom. Presenting first, the DoE stated that there were 182 
municipalities and Eskom, with a revenue split of 42% and 58% respectively. The EDI faced massive 
infrastructure problems and raised the following items affecting the sector: 1) Bulk purchases by an 
increasing number of housing estates is affecting margins; 2) Increasing urban migration, leading to higher 
demand in urban areas, causing overload and illegal connections; 3) High income households are 
generating their own power and switching to other energy forms; 4) The view of municipalities that their 
constitutional authority to solely distribute electricity was undermined by Eskom and questioned NERSA’s 
licensing process; 5) Large users migrating to Eskom supplied areas to take advantage of lower tariffs; and, 
6) The large debts owed by municipalities to Eskom. The DoE then reiterated the urgent need to address 
the municipal maintenance backlog, which would now require an innovative solution as Treasury was no 
longer able to provide additional grants and tariff increases were not an option. Stakeholder discussions 
led to a proposal under the ADAM funding mechanism whereby a central loan facility would raise capital 
at the national level and serviced by the 5% to 8% earmarked in the tariff for maintenance, thus 
guaranteeing repayment. - The DoE had initiated talks with international development finance institutions 
to determine its viability (le Cordeur 2017b). A final item raised at the briefing was an EU funded smart 
grid study where the objective of the pilot is to develop national policy. Eskom presented next, and 
immediately retorted that the constitution was clear that distribution was not exclusive to municipalities. 
Eskom went on to say that there had been rezoning108 which had caused an overlap between municipal 
and Eskom distribution boundaries, the municipalities expectation for Eskom to enter into a service level 
agreement to operate, was in their view, unnecessary as they are a licensed distributor. Eskom informed 
the committee that it had complied with the MEU’s request to decrease the number of tariff categories 
to municipalities, there were now 3 (11). A concern for Eskom was another annual decrease in sales, 
compounded by the late (non) payment by municipalities who were charged interest at prime + 5%, 15 
days after invoicing. Eskom had recently revised the terms by reducing the interest to prime + 2.5%, 30 
days after invoicing but it was too soon to report on the impact of these changes. NERSA presenting last, 
stated that although the municipal tariff allowed for 6% to be invested in maintenance, most 
municipalities did not do this. A major obstacle for NERSA was the poor state, and often failure, of MEU’s 
 
107 The final mini-ADAM report was not available on the DoE website, indeed no mention of the programme was found on the website. 
Attempts to source the report were unsuccessful.  
108 It is unclear from the meeting notes who instituted the rezoning, whether it was an internal exercise and whether Nersa and/or the 




to submit mandatory reports. NERSA closed by stating that municipalities had to change their funding 
models as high-end electricity users were increasingly generating their own electricity or switching to 
other forms of energy.      
The sheer lack of progress since 2011 is astounding. Knowing from 2008 that the capital investment 
backlog was growing at R2.5 billion per annum and of national urgency, the DoE took the better part of 
four years to complete mini-ADAM and spend a paltry R320 million. During this period the backlog 
ballooned to R80 billion in 2017 and the DoE was still referring to mini-ADAM and considering innovative 
finance mechanisms. Eskom’s direct assault on the MEU’s sole distribution rights within their area of 
jurisdiction, suggests that all bets are off. Indeed, the Margate agreement is 48 years old and may no 
longer apply? (Section 7.4.2 – June 1969) 
Integrated System Market Operator (ISMO)   
Eskom as a vertically integrated utility which generates, transmits and distributes, has always managed 
and controlled South Africa’s electricity system, and the function it serves as a systems operator is not 
independent (Pickering 2010). The publication of the ISMO Bill on the 13th May 2011 was going to 
introduce competition by creating a level playing field for all ESI participants. A new state-owned entity, 
which would take over necessary Eskom assets, would buy electricity from generators to sell to customers, 
showing them prices from which they could choose. The Bill came under a significant amount of criticism 
for focussing too closely on encouraging investment in generation to overcome power outages, without 
adequately addressing fundamental issues. For example, the Bill did not state who would own and 
maintain the grid and what steps would be taken to ensure that there would be no Eskom or political 
interference (see - Steyn 2013; Gulati & Saliem 2012; Eustace 2012). However, the entire industry (outside 
of Eskom) agreed that that the creation of an ISMO was urgent and necessary and had to proceed even if 
in an imperfect state. For a truly competitive and transparent market, it was essential that Eskom lost 
control of the national power dispatching function, which balances supply with demand, as Eskom would 
always be likely to favour their own power generation over that of independent power producers (IPP’s) 
(IPP’s)(Pretorius 2012). Even with universal support, the Bill kept stalling in Parliament. New hope 
abounded when the State President made a renewed commitment to the Bill during his state of nation 
address in 2014, confirmed some months later by a senior representative at the DoE stating “vigorous 
attention is now being given to the establishment of the operator’s office to implement independent power 
supplies” (ParlyReportSA 2014), followed by a formal statement from the Department that the “Bill was 
undergoing refinement” (DoE 2014). The Bill never made it to Parliament, which the Minister of Energy 
(Martins) subsequently admitted to blocking. Market commentators speculated that Eskom influenced 
this action and finally succeeded in killing the bill. This hypothesis is both plausible and probable. Citing 
the fragile status of Eskom, government officially withdrew the ISMO Bill to allow Eskom the time and 
space to stabilise its power plants.  
“The ISMO Bill in its current format is off the table. There will be a new bill that will be developed 
that is fit for the current situation and not create any instability within the electricity supply…” 
     Dr Wolsey Barnard: Acting Director General, DoE February 17, 2015.  




7.5.5 Democracy and the Evolution of the AMEU (1994 – 2012) 
Unless stated otherwise this section is a transcript of AMEU minutes, conferences and internal documents, 
providing an internal view of the MEU’s response to national government’s attempt to implement RED’s. 
Note: the format MonthYY (February 1997) is an AMEU meeting. External meetings are noted as such. 
In 1994 a meeting109 was held between UME, Eskom and AMEU to discuss municipal tariffs. It was a 
repetition of the AMEU’s standpoint articulated in such detail in the 1930s (Section 7.3.1). The AMEU 
agreed that as an essential service, electricity should be sold at cost - but were unable to do so due to the 
demands made on them by their own municipalities - and unless an alternate revenue source was made 
available by national government, municipalities had little option but to maximise surpluses from trading 
services. The AMEU proposed its long-held view, that the practise continue, but done in a transparent 
manner by separating the charge and reflecting it for what it is – a tax. To improve relations, Eskom agreed 
to allow AMEU representation at the Eskom tariff committee. The AMEU then pointed out that as per 
Electricity Act (1941), municipalities were entitled to have a 50% representation in the composition of the 
ECB. The creation of a new regulator, to replace the ECB, which functioned at the time as the interim 
regulator, meant that the municipalities would lose the right to govern and regulate their own income 
from supply of electricity. Thus, the AMEU would support the creation of a new regulator under the same 
arrangement. Finally, the AMEU agreed in principle to a national tariff structure on the condition that a 
working model was developed first.  
February 1995: The AMEU appointed consultants to conduct an analysis of Eskom tariffs. The objectives 
of the study were not stated, but seemingly it was to start preparing for any requirements that the new 
regulator might impose. Indeed, documents developed for the NER works groups which were about to 
start, included: 1) The development of cost reflective tariffs; 2) The introduction of an upper limit for 
surcharges and surpluses, 10% was proposed as a reasonable number; and 3) Tariff subsidisation needed 
to be ring-fenced to make it transparent, cross-subsidisation limited to fair and reasonable amounts, and 
eliminating the practise of tariff increases to cover revenue shortfalls.   
September 1995: For the mooted restructuring of the ESI, the AMEU council meeting was used to discuss 
and, where possible, come to a common position on issues being discussed within the industry. There was 
unanimous agreement that: electricity network boundaries and technical considerations should not be 
artificially constrained by political boundaries; that government finalise the country’s energy policy 
framework and define the role of ESI’s in licensing and regulation, as a matter of urgency; and, that where 
possible, issues be resolved independently of the ESI restructuring process. The first, was the development 
of a cost of supply methodology to rationalise national tariffs structures and identify cross subsidies / 
rebates / levies to the level playing field in the distribution industry. The second, was the establishment 
of a national electrification funding mechanism to work on an equitable basis to electrify all areas. 
February 1996: The AMEU responded to the NER’s Electricity Working Group’s Report issued November 
24, 1995 on the restructuring of the ESI. The AMEU felt that multiple issues had not been properly 
 
109 This meeting accurately captured the state of uncertainty which existed under the old guard of the ESI, which could not be certain of what the 
future held. Issues were raised without necessarily expecting resolution but rather an attempt to gauge where their counterparts stood. It also 
presented an opportunity for concessions or agreements, which under normal circumstances were unlikely, such as AMEU representation in 




considered. Their response is summarised in the Table 7-10 below. On the number of RED’s this needed 
to be based on the maximum number that could operate viably from inception.  
Table 7-10: Summary of AMEU Response to NER Work Groups 
Finance  Structure 
• Continued access by local government to trading surpluses 
from MEU’s needed clarification 
• How trading surpluses were appropriated in relation to specific 
local governments needed to be quantified 
• A distinction between urban and rural electrification was 
required, the latter seen as a national responsibility  
• Financial viability of regional undertakings had not been 
rigorously defined and demonstrated 
• An ESI funding mechanism was of utmost importance and 
further clarification was required 
• Special customers were listed but not defined. If serviced by 
the distribution network, wheeling arrangements and charges 
needed to be defined 
• Benefits of introducing competition had not been 
fully demonstrated 
• Model needed immediate finalisation so that it 
does not impact on existing operations and 
programmes 
Governance Transition 
• NER board representation and methodology needed to be 
defined, with appointees close to the customer –this was not 
clarified in the report 
• Autonomy, accountability and responsibility of the regional 
management was not properly addressed 
• A timeframe for the legislation process was needed 
as well as any new structures to be introduced 
• Existing staff members should not be prejudiced by 
the introduction of new structures 
The AMEU at the same time sought legal opinion to confirm that the clauses in the constitution made it 
impossible for national government to remove reticulation from municipal funding. 
On the 14th of February 1997, the AMEU executive council met with the NER. With regards ESI 
restructuring, the AMEU noted that as over a year had passed since the EWG completed its report, it 
appeared that there was no strong desire from national politicians to restructure the industry. McRae, 
who had left Eskom and was heading up NER, expressed the opinion that government would still act, but 
ESI and tariff restructuring needed to be done simultaneously. Howard Whitehead (AMEU) put forward 
an alternative set of restructuring proposals. The AMEU believed that it would take a brave government 
to restructure the industry in a “big bang” approach, which would have the following consequences: 1) 
The perceived / real sources of income raised by local government from electricity; 2) The pressure from 
local government and Eskom unions; 3) The conditions of service; 4) The ensuing increased costs to 
existing Eskom customers; and 5) The apparent unwillingness on the part of Eskom for ESI restructuring. 
In Whitehead’s view these factors had impacted national government’s will to act. Furthermore, attempts 
to force change would not only go against the country’s democratic principles, but probably the 
constitution. On this basis, the AMEU suggested that it would be more effective if the industry participants 
worked together to develop a programme to remedy the problems of the system, namely tariff and 
electrification funding inequities, unlimited contribution to municipal services and diversity of tariffs. Two 
approaches were proposed. The first, a market-based approach, would see electrification funded on an 
equitable basis by allowing supply and demand to set the tariffs. These economic forces would cause the 
restructure to take place, whilst setting a phased in cap on the contribution to municipal services. A move 
to standardised tariffs could be regulated. The second, would use a phased approach to standardise tariffs 
nationally, either equal to Eskom tariffs (as they had the biggest customer base) or according to another 




Electrification would be funded from borrowings which would be met from capital charges on the 
operating budget and the books of every local authority would be balanced at the input end. This 
approach would require regulating the costs of all distributors and a phased in capping of the contribution 
to municipal services.  
NER responded by saying industry needed to continue looking for solutions and government’s indecision 
was as much the fault of industry, as it proposed two different models.  In addition, the NER board was 
facing a lot of political opposition to the ring fencing of municipal electricity revenue, but a final decision 
would be taken by 30 June 1997. The AMEU was also seeking a position on the practise of ring fencing 
and had taken the matter to the Institute of Municipal Treasurer’s and Accountants (IMTA), who would 
be providing them with guidelines, but as everyone was aware the structure of tariffs and the structure 
of the ESI were insuperable. In closing, NER stated that only 60 Municipalities had submitted their NER 
statistics returns for 1995, and only two municipalities present at the meeting had submitted their returns. 
The AMEU undertook to contact its members and ask them to submit their returns by 15 March, 1997.  
March 1997: Eskom informed the AMEU it had decided not to include it at its tariff council meetings. On 
the issue of ESI restructuring the council resolved to co-operate with the newly formed SALGA. MM would 
be appointed to advice on the approach and the role that the AMEU could play in the new structure. 
August 1997: The council resolved to accept the ERIC ESI restructuring report presented at the DME and 
SALGA workshops which was to be presented to Parliament to guide them on the creation of RED’s. The 
AMEU noted its dissatisfaction in the disparities in Eskom transmission pricing and would advocate for the 
creation of a national electrification fund.  
February 1998: As no formal announcement on ESI restructuring had been made, the council resolved not 
to take any further action. It was felt that a presentation made by NER to national government to highlight 
the crisis in which the industry was operating had been ineffective. The AMEU ESI committee had 
reviewed the final report110 submitted by MM and had found it to be poor but would not act.  
March 1998: It was reported that the ESI restructuring programme had lost its leader and it was believed 
that the programme had stalled. The AMEU decided to make representations to NER and government on 
the urgency to proceed as there was an urgent need for the two to find common ground. An illustration 
of the crisis was the increasing number of municipalities defaulting on their payments to Eskom. 
Plettenberg Bay had taken the decision to transfer its business to Eskom. It was also reported that Eskom 
did not support the idea of a national electrification fund. 
January 1999: The AMEU noted that the Energy White Paper which had just been released, the sections 
on RED’s (Section 7.1.3.3); Transitional Structure (Section 7.1.3.4); Local Authority Rights with respect to 
Electricity Distribution (Section 7.1.3.7); and Electricity Sector Governance (Section 7.1.7) were contrary 
to the proposals111 put forward by SALGA and the AMEU. The meeting also noted that NEF’s application 
for funding exceeded R700m but only R300m was made available.   
August 1999: It was brought to the attention of the AMEU that Eskom viewed itself as a service authority, 
and some councils had entered into agreements with Eskom, where they would receive a royalty based 
 
110 The report is not available. A copy was not found at the MM library or in the AMEU archives 




on Eskom electricity sales within their municipal boundaries. The AMEU committee did not have sufficient 
information to form an opinion but felt that the manner in which Eskom had gone about this was not open 
or transparent. It was recorded at the meeting that the NER had raised concern that the Municipal 
Structures Amendment Bill, which authorised local authorities to set their own electricity tariffs, would 
lead to a proliferation of tariffs. The opposite of what was trying to be achieved under the proposed 
reforms. 
March 2000: in view of the possible amalgamation of MEU’s into regional distributors, AMEU discussed 
the importance of ring-fencing finances. A question posed at the meeting was: If AMEU supported RED’s, 
how would they advise municipalities to deal with issues surrounding revenue and trading surpluses?  
In June 2000, PwC released the eagerly awaited ESI restructuring report 112 , which put forward 58 
recommendations to achieve the reform objectives. Whitehead, an AMEU honorary member and on the 
SALGA ESI technical working group, published a paper at the 2000 AMEU Proceedings, titled 
“Restructuring of the EDI”. Noting that significant progress had been made to narrow the gaps which 
existed between the preferred approaches of Eskom and SALGA, but that “the ultimate decisions lie in the 
hands of the politicians both at national and local level or sphere.” His paper articulated SALGA’s position 
by providing an explanation for each of the 15 (of the 58) recommendations which were contentious from 
their perspective. The most pertinent recommendation are summarised, followed by SALGA’s response: 
(for the full list and detailed explanation refer to Whitehead (2000). Recommendation 6: National 
government would hold a ‘golden share’ in each of the REDs. Local government was questioning this 
recommendation as it gave national government certain rights, most notably that REDs could not sell 
shares (to whomever it may be) without national government approval. SALGA did not object to the 
principle of a golden share, but to how this authority would be exercised. Given that local government 
has been mandated by the constitution to reticulate electricity, then it would follow that the golden share 
reside with them; Recommendation 12: Assets were to be valued upon transfer, either on the basis of a 
relative depreciated replacement cost or discounted cash flow, depending on which was most 
appropriate. SALGA found this to be reasonable but felt they could not commit to one or the other and 
needed to examine each in practise first. A major concern for SALGA was that MEU’s, even though SALGA 
had advised them strongly not to do, were likely to delay maintenance and upkeep while the programme 
was being decided, and this would reduce the value of the asset 113 ; Recommendation 19: Retail 
competition needed to be introduced as a priority. SALGA did not object to competition but called for a 
longer transition period, as MEU’s will would need time to adjust to the new operating environment; 
Recommendation 24: The regulation of the EDI needed to be a combination of national and local 
arrangements: SALGA agreed with the recommendation but felt PwC had done insufficient work in this 
area and more detail analysis was needed to ensure that there would not be an overlapping of 
responsibilities and confusion; Recommendation 30: Tariffs to low income households must be below the 
cost-reflective rate. SALGA’s view was that although necessary, this was a welfare issue and needed a 
political solution, dealt via a national indigent policy. The purpose of the restructuring was to reduce and 
even eliminate cross-subsidisation; and Recommendation 56: Licenses, agreements and other legal 
instruments necessary for the established REDs should be drafted under the co-ordination of the 
transitional structure. SALGA’s view was that a single service delivery agreement for all municipalities 
 
112 The report, on the whole, was adopted by the DME in February 2001 as the strategy and blueprint to reform the sector. 
113 This ultimately was the case. Municipal assets would be valued to determine their shares as a percentage of the RED. Fearing that there would 
no financial compensation for their assets there was no incentive to undertake anything more than basic or emergency maintenance – Interview 




within the REDs would be unworkable as each municipality’s needs would be different and the result 
would be that the large municipalities would dominate.  
July 2001: SALGA, under increasing pressure from its members to ensure that their financial interests 
would be protected agreed to write a letter to the Minister at the DME to suspend the EDI restructuring 
programme until the outcome of the financial impact study had been completed. Municipalities were also 
calling for greater transparency from Eskom and wanted to see them charging their distribution areas the 
same transmission tariff to the one levied on municipalities.   
February 2002: The technical committee provided an update on the progress of the EDI programme: 1) 
Eskom had still not signed the voluntary co-operation agreements with the MEU’s and would not do so 
until its conditions were met; 2) DME believed that restructuring could still occur without a constitutional 
amendment; 3) SALGA is against moving electricity distribution from Schedule 4B to 4A of the constitution, 
as this had the potential to degrade the security basis for bank loans; 4) SALGA’s financial impact study 
found that municipalities would need to be compensated by R4.3 billion for the loss of income resulting 
from the EDI restructuring, and a further R2.2 billion to ring fence their electricity departments; 5) 
Municipalities would need to retain the right to levy a surcharge on electricity distribution; 6) On the basis 
of the PwC model, municipalities would become the minority shareholders in all REDs. In light of the 
above, the AMEU’s resolved to advise their members that in preparing for REDs all MEU’s needed to 
corporatize and ring-fence their operations. 
April 2003: The technical committee confirmed that Eskom had restructured its divisions to match the 
proposed REDs boundaries. A statement issued by the DME on REDs, delivered a mixed bag. The first two 
comments were supportive, but the third less so : 1) National government supported the notion that all 
municipalities own REDs shares; 2) Provision for a municipal levy on electricity would be incorporated; 3) 
In the opinion of the DME, terminating “cutting” electricity supply as a means to enforce payment of other 
municipal debts was not a sound legal vehicle. The committee took note of the DME’s position. It was 
reported that the AMEU had entered into a formal cooperation agreement with SALGA and that almost 
all municipalities supported the introduction of Free Basic Electricity.  
March 2004: The introduction of the Municipal Financial Management Act (MFMA) removed many of the 
perceived advantages of EDI, and the EDI bill had not shown any signs of progress. 
October 2006: As a result of the failure to launch REDs1 in Cape Town, the AMEU reconsidered its position 
on the REDs, as follows: 1) REDs would need to be municipal or public entities; 2) Support for the 6 REDs 
model was confirmed; 3) A firm legislative framework was needed for restructuring to occur in an orderly 
and equitable manner; 3) Tacit acknowledgement would be required from all stakeholders that 
reticulation and distribution meant the same thing, and that a 132 kV supply cut-off114 was accepted; 4) 
All REDs would have to be regulated by NERSA; and, 5) All customers would need to be included in the 
REDs scheme and Eskom could not supply customers privately or separately. Further, AMEU sought a legal 
opinion on the distinction between a public and a municipal entity (PE & ME), which found that a PE 
reported to national government, whilst a ME reported to local government. A PE was created in terms 
of the Companies Act and its chairman was appointed by national government whereas local government 
 




appointed the chairman of ME. Finally, national legislation can deem a ME to be a PE. In an unexpected 
turn of events, SALGA informed the AMEU that it no longer required input from the AMEU. 
October 2007: The smaller municipalities had become sceptical about the EDI process. SALGA, however, 
publicly reaffirmed its support for REDs.  
October 2008: An announcement by government that it had decided to change the constitution to allow 
for REDs, was discussed at length. The AMEU decided that it should not take an official stance or express 
an opinion, but if pressed they would support SALGA’s position.   
March 2009: SALGA issued a position paper on EDI restructuring, network maintenance and 
refurbishment which helped foster consensus in local government on the nature of the relationship 
between REDs and municipalities. SALGA submitted a list of consolidated issues to EDI Holdings which 
needed to be resolved before any further restructuring could take place. 
October 2010: The AMEU was advised by EDI Holdings that energy security had overtaken EDI 
restructuring as a national priority, which was not expected to be resolved before 2017115. Dr de Beer, the 
CEO of EDI Holdings, however encouraged municipalities to continue consolidating their MEU’s operations 
based on long term concession agreements   
In a frank post mortem presentation at the 2011 AMEU conference of the EDI restructuring programme 
by ex-CEO of EDI Holdings (De Beer & Waters 2011), Dr de Beer lamented the lost opportunity. The state 
of the distribution network, bar a few pockets of excellence, had been neglected and the longer this 
continued, the more expensive and the greater the economic and political consequences. He conceded, 
that the EDI restructuring efforts had yielded some positive results, but largely with the better resourced 
metros and Eskom distribution, who had acted to reassess the state of their assets. It was the smaller 
municipalities, the very ones that EDI Restructuring was supposed to benefit by creating a more balanced 
and equal industry for all users, who had received the short end of the stick. The need for a constitutional 
amendment was undoubtedly the elephant in the room, however, in his opinion this was not the sole 
reason. There were other issues which led to the failure of RED’s: Political Will: The DoE (now split from 
the DME) always publicly stated its commitment to the process, but contradicted this by reducing the 
funding allocations to a level which made meaningful progress unattainable; Legislation: The required 
enabling legislation, which could have been leveraged from national policy objectives, was not created; 
Enforcement: NERSA’s repeated failure to hold municipalities to account. The outcome was that most of 
the issues EDI restructuring aimed to correct did not materialise, inter alia, harmonised tariffs, 
consolidation of the industry, cost reflective tariffs, maintenance of the system. However, in the view of 
McDonald (2009, p.50), the biggest failure was to perpetuate and entrench the apartheid practise of a 
pricing scheme that subsidises industry and middle class, while charging low income households higher 
absolute tariffs. Resulting in reduced consumption or the use of alternate, often more dangerous, forms 
of energy. 
Terminating REDs of course did not change anything, and all industry participants continue to recognise 
the urgent need for reform. SALGA has made public pronouncements and issued position papers on 
restructuring of the EDI (A Eberhard 2013; PDG 2013), but progress remains slow.  
 




7.5.6 Non-Payment of Municipal Services and Funding Shortfalls 
The phenomenon of non-payment of municipal services has a long history, dating back to the 1980s; 
having successfully been used as an effective protest tool against an illegitimate minority government 
(Chapter 4.4). This practise continued after the 1994 elections however, and by all accounts has become 
endemic and of serious concern. Ascertaining the reasons for continued non-payment has thus spurred 
significant research from all sectors - government, NGO’s and academia (see McDonald 2002; Mavhungu 
2011; Peters 2012; Fjeldstad 2004; Ringane 2013; Treasury 2001; National Treasury 2011). The reasons 
are of course a combination of factors and are not limited to just one explanation, as often touted by 
various sectors who selectively focus on singular signals to support their perspectives and arguments. 
Reasons for non-payment include: unwillingness to pay, ability to pay, entitlement, inability of 
municipalities to collect (no metering system, broken meters, no billing system), unhappiness with service 
or associated services delivered, an ingrained culture of non-payment (“others do not pay, so I won’t”),  
as well as a lack of trust in local government to use the funds received effectively - together with non-
payment remaining an indirect form of protest against national government, as the electorate is unable 
or unwilling to vote for any other political party – voicing dissent through non-participation. 
Regardless of the reasons, the effect of non-payment for services on municipal finances is devastating and 
greatly impedes municipalities’ ability to deliver on their constitutional mandate of developmental local 
government. For the period 1994-2003 municipalities accumulated a total of R24.3 billion of consumer 
debt due to non-payment (Fjeldstad 2004); growing to R108 billion in 2016; 66% of which was owed by 
households (National Treasury 2016b). In a presentation to Parliament in August 2016, the CEO of Eskom 
reported that municipalities owed the utility R6 billion, which excluded R1.4 billion written off in 2004, 
and stressed the need to recover these funds. In early 2016, and again in 2017, Eskom went as far 
threatening to disconnect the top 20 defaulting municipalities, who in early 2016 owed R3.68 billion 
(Whittles n.d.) The threat yielded some results, as 60 municipalities entered into repayment agreements, 
including 19 of the top 20. In 2015, the acting CEO of Eskom suggested that the utility bypass municipalities 
and supply all customers directly with electricity, to improve Eskom’s financial situation. The 
consequences of such an action were analysed by StatisticsSA, (Figure 7-13) who found that 30% of 
municipal income was derived from electricity sales (2013) and that the “the financial viability of many 
municipalities could be tenuous if they were no longer able to trade economic services, such as electricity”. 
Another ploy put forward by Eskom was the introduction of pre-paid meters, which it believed should be 
made mandatory for the entire residential sector (PMG 2016a)116. Indeed, the amount owed to Eskom by 
Soweto, which it supplies directly and is not included in the municipal debt, was R4.74 billion for the year 
ended 2016 (Eskom 2016, p.41). 
 





      Source: StatsSa (2016)  
Figure 7-13: Percentage of Overall Municipal Income Earned from Sales of Electricity (2013) 
Ultimately, municipal funding shortfalls must be covered in some way. The most expedient is to divert 
funds, such as bulk purchase payments to Eskom (PMG 2016a); but this practise only buys time and 
eventually the shortfall must be sourced. Municipalities thus turn to the two sources available to them. 
The first is to increase property taxes and service tariffs on the existing resident base. This is problematic 
though, as it penalises compliant residents who will thus resent it. In all likelihood, the added financial 
pressure on residents may lead to a greater percentage of non-payment. The second source is national 
government transfers. This however immediately goes against the core principles of decentralisation. 
Decentralised government, the constitution acknowledge, could only be achieved if local governments 
were largely financially self-sufficient, which is why the specific revenue generating functions they 
perform and their “equitable” share of nationally collected revenue (skewed towards rural municipalities) 
are both protected by the constitution. Of course, local government has always relied on national 
government to fund deficits, to some extent. This was easier under apartheid when municipalities only 
had to concern themselves with the white population and could effectively ignore black townships. Since 
1994 however, annual grants from national government, which strain national revenues and generally 
come with conditions that affect / impede envisaged local government independence, have been growing 
steadily. In its 2003/4 Local Government Fact Book for example, the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government (DPLG) states that “financial viability is one of the key constitutional challenges facing local 
government”. At the time, the DPLG calculated that metropolitan municipalities generated 97.8% of total 
income to fund operating expenditure from own sources, while local governments were at 89% and 
district municipalities at 76.4%. District municipalities received almost all of their revenue from the now 
defunct RSC levy (DPLG 2004, p.44). Soon thereafter, spawned from a 2003 policy shift, NT announced a 
3-year average annual 18.4% increase in funding made available to local government, for the provision of 
free basic services, the extension of services and to improve service delivery. National government 
contributions to local government for the period 2003 to 2016 (Figure 5-2), seen as a percentage of total 
national revenue (including budget deficits), almost tripled from 3.6% to 9.1% and has gone from R26 




increase from 2006 to 2007 was to compensate municipalities for the revenues lost from the removal of 
the RSC levy (Treasury 2016b; Naional Treasury 2011; Treausry n.d.; Treasury 2016a; Treasury 2003).       
By 2015, government grants were the largest contributor to municipal revenue, (31%); followed by 
electricity sales (28.3%) and property rates (14.7%) (StatsSA 2016). 
7.6 Case Study: Johannesburg Electricity Undertaking (JEU) 
7.6.1 Aligning to a New Political Structure and Extended Service Area (1995 – 
2001) 
In 1994 Johannesburg comprised of thirteen separate municipalities, divided along racial and within this, 
ethnic or cultural lines117, with differing capacities and in many instances overlapping functions and 
powers. After the 1995 local government elections, a two-tier system was introduced, where the 
municipalities were merged into four independent geographical sub-structures called Metropolitan Local 
Councils (MLCs) councils, overseen by the Greater Johannesburg Metro Council (GJMC). The consolidation 
proved more difficult than expected. Although each MLC and the GJMC had its own tax base and budget, 
it was treated as one. The incorporation of previously unserved black townships, inhabited by almost 
entirely by low income households, could only be serviced by redirecting cross-subsidisation. The two 
white and affluent suburbs of Sandton and Randburg (Chapter 7.4.1), having been absorbed into the 
GJMC, were henceforth levied the same property tax rates as the other (white) suburbs. The introduction 
of the revised, and higher, property tax resulted in a three-fold increase for previously under taxed 
Sandton households, who responded with a rates boycott, knowing that the city could not use its most 
effective creditor collection tool, cutting off users’ electricity supply until outstanding arrears had been 
settled, as they were supplied by Eskom. Sandton residents opened a separate account into which 80% of 
residents paid their old taxes, plus 20%. The boycott lost steam after two years but cost the city over R200 
million in unpaid and unrecovered revenues. Payments during this period dropped throughout the city 
(Table 7-11), and dropped as low as 81% in 1997. The city’s 1998 financial statements reported that 
outstanding debt had increased to R2.9 billion, of which it was felt only R1.3 billion was recoverable. 
Reduced revenues did not deter the ANC led municipality from continuing to focus on delivery. Budgets 
were expenditure driven, with little thought as to how they would be funded118 - all coming together to 
create a perfect storm (Lodge 2003; Barchiesi 2011; Amen & Bosman 2006; Kulkarni 2012; Johannesburg 
1995). The newly elected councillors and politicians who held senior positions were new to a job which 
was complex, demanding and the task at hand considerably underestimated. As Schuster (1995) put it:  
“…by the inexperienced, third rate politicians representing the ANC at the local level. The problem 
is one that plagues the entire country, because most of the ANC’s seasoned leaders have gone to 
work in the upper echelons of government. …nowhere (are the deficiencies) better illustrated than 
in the tortuous gestation of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council.”  
 
117 The white population of South Africa were primarily descendants of British or Dutch nationals, who following the Anglo Boer Wars were 
distrustful of each other. However, the country attracted many migrants from Europe (Portuguese, Greek, Italian, Jewish and others) who 
tended to stick together 
118  In 1996 Martin Pomeroy took early retirement citing continual political interference. Budget allocated for capital expenditure or other 
previously agreed allocations, would be taken on short notice to pay for other municipal activities resulting in an under maintained network and 




Fourteen major issues were identified by the Attorney General in the 1997 and 1998 financial statements, 
at the height of the crisis, when Johannesburg was technically bankrupt. Observations made in the 1998 
report on electricity, and a few other issues are detailed below to demonstrate just how endemic and dire 
the situation had become:     
• Electricity: Although regular reconciliations of electricity purchases and sales were being performed, 
the councils did not provide explanations for the variances. Factors such as readings based on 
assumed or estimated consumption and numerous unread meters, resulted in the losses of the 
councils being unquantifiable. It was noted that distribution losses could not be accurately calculated 
per council due to the electricity metering network boundaries not matching council boundaries. 
• Vacancies Financial: Most functions were found to be understaffed. This placed additional pressure 
on experienced staff members, who were expected to work beyond reasonable expectations. Thus, 
many senior / experienced employees resigned, these positions were either not filled or filled by 
people placed in acting positions. The situation resulted in a lack of segregation of duties, which 
became a pervasive practise throughout all councils.  
• Staff Training: The high incidence of skilled staff resignations leading to added work pressure on 
remaining officials meant that new hires were not adequately trained. There were also insufficient 
training programmes. 
• Lack of Accountability: Pervasive across the municipality and exasperated by staff shortages and 
limited skills. 
• General IT Controls: Generally poor controls (lack of security, passwords shared, lack of skills to 
maintain systems, limited change management controls etc.). Little action had been taken to address 
the issues identified and raised during the previous year’s audit. 
• Collapse of Housing Debtors Scheme: Since the system collapsed the previous year, it remained non-
operational.  
Table 7-11: Payment Levels of Administrative Areas within Johannesburg (1996 -1998) 
Administrative Area 1996 1997 1998 
% 
Orange Farm  6 3 
West Soweto  14 23 
Alexandra  21 13 
Dobsonville  25 44 
Soweto  27 33 
Ennerdale 75 34 71 
Lenasia 64 55 91 
Johannesburg East 90 85 89 
Sandton 97 87 91 
Johannesburg South & North  90 93 
Randburg 100 94 90 
Roodepoort  98 103119 
      Source: Municipal Archives. 
In mid-1997 the GJMC was not able to pay a R300 million bulk electricity bill from Eskom (Matebese 2013, 
p.11). National government finally intervened in 1998 when 10, and then 15, councillors were given 
 




control of the city. Known as the C15, they had executive authority to design and implement municipal 
service policies, including the outsourcing or corporatization of municipal functions. A city manager 
position was created in 1999 to hasten the transition. Khetso Gordhan, a respected activist, was appointed 
and he developed a three-year turnaround strategy which came to be known as iGoli2002. City gas and 
Rand Airport were sold and most of the utilities were corporatized (ring fenced), requiring them to operate 
as private sector companies but still wholly owned by the CoJ. From this process, City Power (electricity), 
Johannesburg Water and Pik-it-Up (refuse) and the Johannesburg Roads Agency were created from 2000. 
The plan also included massive budget cuts, dropping from R1.7 billion in 1995 to R500 million in 1999 
and unsurprisingly resulting in a deterioration in services and maintenance, and an exodus of skilled staff 
(Lodge 2003; Barchiesi 2011; Johannesburg 1995).  
The crisis also had an impact on reporting. In 1995120, the year Mr Pomeroy resigned, the JEU department 
published its last Annual Report of the General Manager – Electricity Department, a report which dated 
back to 1917. The municipality published consolidated annual financial statements for the period 1995 – 
2000, which were contentious as each MLC wanted their own set. The reports focused heavily on the poor 
state of affairs, but were scant and provided little detail about the performance of the electricity business, 
other than warnings about inaccuracies due to operational shortcomings – broken meters, no meter 
readings, inaccurate billing etc. Figures for electricity, as with all other services, were rolled up and 
reported as total sales and total purchases. Operational expenditure was also reported as a total. More 
detailed figures for electricity, only became available once again from 2002, a year after City Power was 
formed and had operated for a full financial year, and gradually improved over time. The issues are 
illustrated with some select extractions from the 1995 – 2000 Consolidated Financial Statements (Table 
7-12). Although declining, the sale of electricity continued to provide a reliable revenue stream for the 
municipality - Figure 7-14.  
Table 7-12: Extracts from City of Johannesburg Consolidated Financial Statements (1996 – 2000)  
Year Comment / Statement 
1996 65% of electricity meters in Ennerdale are non-operational. 
1998 Electricity and Water: An electricity billing audit has been initiated and has identified that substantial amounts are 
not being billed. These have been attended to and are receiving ongoing attention. Electricity losses have increased 
from 6.2% (1997) to 8.2% (1998), which equates to R163 million of unbilled revenue. 
1999 The credit control system was enhanced in 1998, leading to 216 294 service cuts and the finance department is in 
the process of retrieving R356 million over a 15 month period. Collections have been outsourced on a commission 
basis. Payment levels increased accordingly, from 90% to 92% for the year under review.  
2000 Due to inadequate control measures, the Auditor General was unable to verify the accuracy and completeness of 
revenue from electricity and water billing 
Source: Johannesburg Municipality 2000 (1995-2000) 
 





Source: Johannesburg Municipality 2000 (1995-2000) 
Figure 7-14: City of Johannesburg – Electricity Sales and Purchases (1995 – 2000) 
7.6.2 Corporatization – The Establishment of City Power (2001 – 2017) 
The JEU was corporatized in 2001 under the name City Power (SOC – State Owned Company). It was 100% 
owned by the CoJ and established in terms of the Companies Act. Governance, regulatory and service 
agreements exist between the two to ensure performance. City Power’s (CP) mandate from its (only) 
shareholder is to buy and sell electricity to the citizens of Johannesburg. In 2014, its two primary suppliers 
were Eskom (80%) and Kelvin Power station (20%), which was privatised in 2001. 
Surpluses Generated from Electricity   
CP’s first year of operations recorded a R385 million (R181 m 2015 real) loss, but this was less than 5% of 
the total R3.9 billion (R8.4 bn) loss recorded by the Johannesburg Metro. Operations stabilised and CP 
recorded a surplus in 2003, and has continued to do so ever since, except for 2008 when it was still 
profitable but high finance costs resulted in it posting a deficit. Trading surpluses from CP were the primary 
reason the Metro was able to achieve financial stability and operate profitably, especially from 2009 





















Figure 7-15: Electricity Surplus Contribution to Total Municipal Surplus for Johannesburg (2002 – 2015) 
This feat is more remarkable, if bulk purchases and electricity revenue (Figure 7-16), and revenue from 
delivered electricity (Figure 7-17) are analysed. Figure 7-16 illustrates that the differential between bulk 
purchases and sales is relatively constant from 2002 until 2008, when the spread increases until 2012 and 
then stabilises again. Figure 7-17 shows that delivered electricity is flat from 2007 and declines markedly 
from 2010, however, this is not the case for bulk purchases which remain constant and only start to 
decline from 2013 - implying that CP kept buying the same number of units but reselling fewer every year 
i.e.: there were losses in the system, but surpluses remained stable from 2009 to 2012.   
 

































































Figure 7-17: Electricity Purchased versus Delivered, Johannesburg (2007 – 2015) 
The above demonstrates the extent to which Johannesburg was able to initially capitalise from the 
electricity crisis. Several reasons could have accounted for this. The first was that it was because the 
disproportionately high electricity tariffs rose from a very low base (until 2007 South Africa had amongst 
the lowest electricity tariffs in the world) - meaning a considerable lag effect before consumers were 
affected sufficiently to respond through behaviour and / or technology change. The second was that South 
Africa was initially able to weather the 2008 global financial crisis relatively well, a combination of low 
external debt, sound fiscal and monetary policies, the resilience of the banking system, and of course, 
economic activity generated from its hosting of the 2010 World Cup, allowed it to avoid outright recession 
(Baxter 2009; OECD 2010). However, things did not improve from 2010 and the country entered a long 
period of low economic growth, punctuated by recession, and a stubbornly high unemployment rate, 
where it continues to languish in 2017 – “Growth has disappointed in the last few years. Weak  consumer  
demand,  persistently  falling business  investment and  policy  uncertainty.....bold structural reforms, 
supported by social partners, are needed to unlock the economy” (OECD 2015). A third reason was that by 
levying a tariff increase commensurate to that of Eskom, CP created a greater return as it gained the 
additional benefit from the difference between Eskom’s bulk supply rate and its retail rate. The CP tariff 
increases were similar, and often greater, than Eskom tariff increases. (Year: Eskom, CP) 2008: 27.50%, 
22%; 2009: 34.1%, 31%; 2010: 24.80%, 29%; 2011: 25.80%. 31% and so on. Thus, Eskom tariff increases 
were by no means a straight pass through to the CP consumer, or any other consumer supplied by an 
MEU. - Figure 7-18 shows how all six metros benefited from increased revenue from 2008 to 2012, 
because of the tariff increases, resulting in higher surpluses, as was the case for Johannesburg (Figure 


















        Source: Eberhard, R (2016) 
Figure 7-18: Revenue from Electricity Sales for six Metros (2007 – 2015) 
These short-term gains were always going to come at a price and many within CP knew it, but were largely 
powerless to do anything about it. 
“City Power Johannesburg (Pty) Ltd does not set its own tariffs. In developing the proposed tariff 
increase, the company has to adhere to the COJ tariff development methodology. The outcome of 
this methodology is a proposed tariff escalation rate. This rate is transacted into the company’s 
financial models and then submitted to the Board Pricing and Regulatory Committee for 
consideration.”   City Power Annual Business Plan (2006 – 2011) 
Thus, it is the CoJ, and not CP, who decide on the annual surplus to be generated from electricity sales. 
Taking this one step further, the CoJ develops the following year’s budget knowing that shortfalls can be 
covered from electricity, and to a lesser extent, other trading surpluses. In other words, the electricity 
tariff increases are derived primarily on municipal funding requirements and not economic principles or 
regulatory requirements121. Eskom sharp tariff increases from 2007 affected all electricity consumers and 
ultimately, and understandably, led to consumer resistance and reduced demand.  Indeed, this was 
predicted from 2009 (see Inglesi & Pouris 2010; Inglesi-Lotz 2014; Inglesi-Lotz 2011; Inglesi-Lotz & Pouris 
2012), whose research forecast that the magnitude and frequency of the tariff increases, would first result 
in decreased consumption, and then lead to long-term stagnation of electricity demand – until at least 
2025. On release, these predictions were dismissed as overly dramatic and alarmist, with Eskom and 
national government of the view that were it not for the electricity supply shortages, the economy would 
be growing. - And that once resolved, constrained demand (deemed certain and cumulative), would 
unlock economic growth and even boost it, as delayed projects became viable122. This, unsurprisingly, did 
not happen but what did become clear was that the Inglezi-Lotz and Pouris predictions were accurate – 
certainly in the residential sector. In 2013, Eskom commissioned a study to determine the effects of tariffs 
 
121 Practice confirmed with one of the CP interviewees, who stated that 2015/16 was the first year that the CP tariff adhered to the NERSA 
prescribed methodology, which derives the tariff from a weighted average of: 70% Eskom tariff increase and 30% CPI 




















on national household electricity consumption (Jordaan & Dekenah 2013) - Table 7-13, and the authors 
found that although all electricity users reduced their usage, they were affected differently. The bottom 
decile, because they use such a small amount that it cannot be reduced further; and the top 4% (the last 
decile was broken down further) were the only groups who reduced their consumption by less than 20%. 
The remaining 86% of the electricity consumers shifted to a more elastic state. This can be seen in CP’s  
declining trend in total demand from 2008/09 (Table 7-14), which CP attributes “slow economic recovery, 
energy efficiency improvement, technology conversion to exploit alternative energy sources, reduced 
consumption base, and a variety of other factors”, which it expects to persist until 2019.  
The Financial and Fiscal Commission’s 2016 Technical Report dedicated an entire chapter on the subject, 
titled “The Impact of Electricity Price Increases on Municipalities”. Peters (2016) used econometric 
modelling to quantify the impact that the sharp increases in electricity prices have had on municipal 
expenditure and revenues. The higher cost of bulk electricity purchases was found to have had a 
“statistically significant and negative impact on municipal revenue in all categories of municipalities, 
particularly metros and large towns.”  
Table 7-13: Direct Nominal Price Elasticity between 2006 and 2011 
 
kWh are estimated using an average price per kWh  




Table 7-14: City Power Total Demand 2006 to 2017 (GWh/annum) 
Financial Year End Demand (GWh/a) Volume Growth 
2005/06 12 147 3.6% 
2006/07 12 900 6.2% 
2007/08 13 091 1.5% 
2008/09 12 938 -1.2% 
2009/10 13 115 1.4% 
2010/11 13 116 0.0% 
2011/12 13 066 -0.4% 
2012/13 12 826 -1.8% 
2013/14 12 608 -1.7% 
2014/15 12 361 -2.0% 
2015/16 12 011 -2.8% 
2016/17 11 755 -2.1% 
Source: (Power 2016) 
Additionally, the CP funding model is controlled almost exclusively by the CoJ. Annually, CP submits its 
budget requirement to the CoJ, which the CoJ considers before allocating a final amount. A consequence 
of this approach is that the CoJ is always more likely to defer CP capital invesement for repairs and 
maintenace (see Table 7-15) to fund its own priority projects and thus exasperating the under-investment 
in municipal EDI infrastructure, as detailed in Chapter 7.5.4 ADAM. Finally, CP has no direct financial 
control of its business consumers pay their accounts directly to the CoJ. 
This higly centralised approach meams tha CP management has limited authority and control over its 
business, creating major operational risk for the MEU, as CoJ bureaucrats and politicians are less likely to 
have the necessary expertise, understanding or share the urgency to resolve CP critical issues. The points 
highlighted in bold from the SWOT analysis in the 2016 - 2021 annual business plan (Figure 7-19) illustrate 
the consequences of the centralised operating model. For example, supporting CoJ cluster programmes 
(Threats) takes priority over refurbishing and extending the network; while, outages and the slow 
restoration following outages (Weaknesses), is clearly not good for business. The SWOT analysis reflects 
a utility which is unable, perhaps incapable, of taking the necessary corrective actions to correct 




Strengths  Weaknesses 
• ISO accreditation 
• Good knowledge and understanding of the 
business 
• Well documented value chains 
• Supportive stakeholder and board 
• Position in top management team filled 
• Strategic risks identified and documented 
• Updated risk management process in place 
• Pockets of strong subject matter expertise 
• Communication (internal and external) 
• Change management  
• Contracts management 
• Perceived low employee morale 
• Ineffective performance management 
• Poor implementation of docuemnted processes 
• High vacancy rates 
• Inability to execute projects and follow through on benefit realisation 
• Process leading up to decision making is slow 
• Revenue collection  
• Reducing the average age of T&D network where it is in excess of 40 
years through refurubishment and replacement  
• Obsolete and unrelaible equipment where no spares are available 
• Improving network safety (replacement of high risk equipment) 
• A network that, due to densificiation, has in many areas exceeded its 
firm capacity and in some instances reached its installed capacity 
• Outages and slow restoration times following outages 
Opportunities Threats 
• Expansion of supply 
• Security of supply 
• Alternative energy sources 
• Community involvement/engagement (Jozi@work) 
• Smart grid realisation 
• Company image/reputation  
• Public private partnerships 
• Off grid solutions 
• Investment in energy management systems 
• ToU tariffs to recover peak demand liabilities  
• Smart meters and tariffs to reduce load to address 
present generation constraints  
• Household conversion to gas cooking and heating 
• Load shedding  
• Theft/vandalism, illegal connections leading to loss of 
revenue and damage to infrastructure  
• High debt levels leading to non-payment or reduced 
consumption  
• Dramatic increase in the cost of labour and materials 
• Comply with the cluster programmes while trying 
refurbish and extend our network  
• Industrial action  
• High levels of coal usage leading to increased GHG 
despite pressures to reduce 
• Energy efficiency and embedded generation 
        Source: Power (2016) 
Figure 7-19: City Power 2016 SWOT Analysis  
City Power and the National Regulator (NERSA)  
In 2014, NERSA issued benchmarks to help guide distributors. Table 7-15 compares these benchmarks 
against CP’s 2013 to 2015 figures from their annual financial statements. Note: 2011 was the last year that 
CP published a debt collection percentage (91%). 
Table 7-15: City Power Performance compared against NERSA Guidelines (Real, 2015) 
Guideline Range & (Mean) 2013 2014 2015 
Bulk purchase energy costs as percentage of total costs 58% – 78% (75%) 70% 73% 69% 
Surplus as a percentage of electricity sales 10% - 20% (15%) 11% 9% 4% 
Total system losses  5% -12% (10%) 30% 30% 30% 
Average sales price ratio to average purchase price  Set at 1.58 2.24 2.25 2.10 
Spending on repairs and maintenance as a percentage of sales revenue Set at 6% 3.3% 4.4% 4.1% 
Debt collection rate  95% N/P N/P N/P 




The Relationship Between Tariffs and Electricity Losses 
Higher tariffs led to reduced consumption and increased non-technical losses123, and this can be attributed 
to two factors: The first, is the ability to pay: An everpresent reality in a society with such high levels of 
inequality, made worse during weaker economic conditions and a 300% increase in electricity tariffs over 
a five year period (2007 -2012), leading to late payment,  bad debt and / or theft. The second, was an 
already inefficient and error prone administrative department immobolised when the transition to a new 
computer system in 2010 was mismanaged. The now notorious Johannesburg billing crisis led to the 
formation of the Joburg Advocacy Group124. However, the billing problem is not limited to a sub-par ICT 
system, the problem is far greater and across the board125. Poorly skilled and / or tardy and / or corrupt 
administrative staff who capture incorrect information; field workers, who for the same reasons, read 
meters inacurately or estimate readings; new connections that are not registered on the system, 
erroneously or for illegal gain, resulting in the provision of free electricity - especially prevelant in large 
residential estates or office parks where there is a a lot of sub-metering, and although not quantified could 
account for a much as 4-6% of the energy dispatched. A contributory factor is the difficult relationship 
that exists between CP and the CoJ, largely the result of the operational framework described above, and 
made worse by over fifteen years of operating from a seperate location which has led to weak institutional 
linkages, impersonal relationships and ineffective communication.  
The practise of cross-subsidisation is entrenched to such an extent that it has become standard operating 
procedure. A researcher from Stellenbosch Universtity’s sustainable energy studies centre, was asked to 
ascertain the viability of installing photovolitaic panels on municipal buildings126 to offset electricity usage. 
Having identified several suitable buildings, the research ended when reliable and up-to-date electricity 
bills could not be produced and installed electricity meters, if operational, could not be relied upon. Quite 
simply, the researcher concluded that the Johannesburg Property Company did not receive electricity bills 
from CP, and if it did, did little about them. The research was terminated, because without electricity bills 
no business case could be developed. It is therefore highly probable that it is standard practise for all CoJ 
municipal entities to pay little, or even nothing, for electricity127. To fund these internal non-technical 
losses and deliver the surplus needed by the municipality to cross-subsidise municipal functions, mark-
ups are increased. In 2010 municipal electricity mark-ups averaged 57.5% and 50.2% in 2011 (Jordaan & 
Dekenah 2013, p.7). The authors cautioned that this practise presents a cash flow risk, as users respond 
by shifting to a more elastic state by switching to alternate energy and / or take additional measures to 
reduce consumption. This is exactly what has happened at CP, energy delivered dropped to 8 736 GWh in 
2015 from 11 723 GWh in 2011, while losses increased materially (Figure 7-20). The CP 2012 annual 
business plan estimated the cost of non-technical losses to be R3.8 billion, by any account a massive 
amount. Under the heading Key Revenue Related Challenges, it states:  
 
123 Non-technical losses are made up of administrative issues (estimates, unread meters, incorrect billing) and non-administrative (illegal 
connections, theft and meter tampering)  
124 http://www.joburgadvocacy.org/  
125 Interviews held with employees and consultants to CP 
126 Municipal property is managed by the Johannesburg Property Company. As with CP, JPC was established 2000 as a private company wholly 
owned by CoJ 




The R3.8bn losses indicated below are made up of R1.9bn administrative losses and R1.9bn of non-
technical losses” The causes listed are unbilled customers, tampering, illegal connections, 
incorrect billing and estimates   Power (2012, p.33) 
If one considers that the non-technical losses “challenge” was more than double the increase in turnover 
(R1.6 billion) - which in monetary value was greater than 30% of turnover (R12.6 billion); and, in energy 
terms, represented 24% GWh delivered - then it is nothing less than an unmitigated disaster and a major 
business risk. The question that naturally arises is how it came to this?  
In seeking an explanation, we start with technical losses first. Discussions with industry professionals, 
corroborate Nersa guidelines, who have set 6 – 7% as the benchmark for distribution losses. CP reported 
technical losses of 6% until 2002, the following year the figure was increased to 9%, where it has remained. 
The basis for this was an internal report which idenfited a few remote outlying areas within the network 
with losses of 9%, this higher figures was used to reflect the state of the entire network, allowing for the 
re-categorisation of up to 3% of non-technical losses. Indeed the 2012 annual plan suggests as much: 
“(Technical losses) …been assumed to be 9%. Tests are currently underway to validate this figure, and 
initial results indicate that this figure may be 7%” (Power 2012, p.36). These test results were never made 
public or referred to again and the losses have remained at 9%  in the subsequent plans (2013 – 2017).  
With regards to non-technical losses, these were generally within the Nersa guidelines of up to 5% for the 
period 2005 to 2011, but exploded from 2012 - Figure 7-20. Three reasons account for the underlying 
causes leading to theft and administrative errors: The new billing system, the delayed effect of the tariff 
increases, and the decline in the economy. What is abundantly clear from the annual business plan during 
this period is that although recognised as a high priority item, with loosely described action items to 
address the losses, such as:  
Non-technical losses continue to be a challenge, due to increased theft and vandalism (Annual 
Busines Plan 2014, page 70) 
Meter readers must face penalties for poor data capturing (Annual Business Plan 2015, page 51) 
Electricity losses, technical and non-technical, are too high at 30% and this requires urgent 
attention (Annual Business Plan 2016, page 79) 
Many more statements could be cited, but the point is that having identified and interrogated the causes 
of non-technical losses in some detail, two things remain constant: their high levels persist, as does the 





Figure 7-20: Total Electricity Losses at City Power (2002 – 2016)  
The 2015 Annual Business Plan (page 50), states that non-technical losses may be considered to be 
revenue losses. Which indeed they are. But to what extent? Figure 7-21 illustrates two things. The first, 
represented by the line graphs, is the consequence (delayed) of high annual tariff increases on non-
technical losses, as technical losses have remained at 9%. Tariff increases of 22% (2007), 31% (2008), 29% 
(2009) and 30% (2010) were followed by a more than ten fold increase in losses (2% to 25% in 2011 - 
Figure 7-20). It is true of course, that losses cannot be attributed solely to high tariffs and the stabilisation 
and slight improvement from 2013 is more than likely due to the improvement in meter reading and the 
billing sytem. The second, shown by the bars, is the consequence that reduced consumption and high 
losses has had on surpluses. Using the NERSA guideline of 10% (mean) for total system losses as the cap, 
the value of lost revenue in excess of 10% is quantified. At 2015 real prices, system losses over 10% for 
the ten year periond 2006 to 2015 amounted to over R8.4 billion.  
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Non-technical losses 5% 5% 9% 3% 4% 3% 4% 4% 3% 2% 25% 25% 22% 19% 21%
Technical  losses 6% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9%















Figure 7-21: Revised Electricity Surplus for Johannesburg if Losses Capped at 10% (2006 – 2015) 
 
Business Model Conflicts faced by City Power Management 
Competing priorities are a reality for every business and perhaps more so for government, which has the 
dynamics of servicing and satisfying its constituency, attempting to align with broader government 
policies and objectives, institutional rivalries and the presiding economic environment. In addition, to the 
tariff setting constraints detailed above, MEU’s operate under a framework that imposes major conflicts, 
the most relevant being: 
National Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Targets (NEES)  
The NEES of 2005, set an overall voluntary target of 12% by 2015, using 2000 as the baseline year128. The 
residential and commercial voluntary target was set at 15%. The post-2015 NEES129 found that energy 
intensity improved by 23.7%, significantly more than the 15% target. However, the post-2015 strategy 
does not distinguish between the individual contributions of autonomous change (changes in structure of 
the economy), technological advancements and deliberate policy interventions – where the first two 
would take place irrespectively, and thus this figure merely serves as a proxy to efficiency improvements 
 
128 Since the NEES was published this metric has always been uncertain, primarily because of the paucity of the available data and Department 
of Energy’s inability to provide clear guidance 























































and not a like for like comparison130. The dilemma faced by CP, which is the case for all municipal 
distributors, is the split incentive dilemma they face. On the one hand, under the constitutional 
requirement of co-operative governance between the three spheres of government, CP (as are all MEU’s) 
is obliged to implement national policy, which targets reduced electricity consumption. The implication 
thereof is a reduction in revenues. On the other hand, CP’s sole shareholder who sets annual tariff 
increases, relies upon the electricity trading surpluses to fund its operations and allocate an annual budget 
to CP. Clearly, there is little incentive for the CoJ or CP to actively pursue a nationally set voluntary target. 
The only area of congruence, where CP has an incentive to promote energy efficiency amongst smaller 
users, is those they subsidise or who have a high percentage of bad debt. If the 2008 supply shortages are 
thrown into the mix, the CP strategy is understandable - A combination of measures for low income 
programmes, which also satisfies social welfare objectives, and load shifting over a total net reduction. 
“If a consumer is using outdated and very inefficient lamp at night, when our Eskom tariff is the 
lowest, then that is not my problem. But if someone is using high consumption inefficient 
equipment in winter during peak periods, when I can only recover part of the tariff (selling at a 
loss) then I am going to do something about that.” Paul Vermeulen (City Power, 2017) 
Under energy efficiency and demand side management, the 2015 and 2016 CP Annual Business Plan uses 
the future, rather than the present or past tense, which in a nutshell explains the status. The measures 
put forward are listed in Table 7-16 and evaluated, where Status is 1= implemented (no assessment or 
measurable level of success provided); and 2= failed or no large scale action taken to date.  
Table 7-16: Summary and Evaluation of City Power Energy Efficient Programme 




Funded by a DSM surcharge on consumers. 43 000 units installed in low 
income area  
Low income 1 
Ripple control Electric water heaters can be centrally disconnected during periods of peak 
demand and supply shortages. Controllers were installed in the 1980s but 
have not been maintained and new controllers have not been installed as 
planned, rendering the system ineffective  
Load shifting 2 
Smart meters Under a programme of load sharing (during load shedding) the city could 
reduce demand centrally to avert blackouts. The technology would also allow 
for the long-anticipated introduction of ToU tariffs. Smart meters were 
installed but CP has not been able to communicate remotely with them, 
meaning that manual meters reading is still required 
Load shifting  2 
Gas for cooking Encourage households to convert from electric to gas stoves, as they are 
generally used during peak periods   
Load shifting 2 
Street lighting Convert to efficient lighting. 40 streets were targeted Conservation 2 
Building retrofit  An initiative to upgrade municipal buildings with energy efficient technology Conservation 2 
 
Single Supplier (Eskom) means that CP is a ‘Price-Taker’ 
The legislative structure forces CP to buy from Eskom. A “very small contribution is sourced from Kelvin 
power station” (Power 2016) and negligible amounts from IPPs. The existing legislative structure does not 
 
130 Declines in energy intensity are a proxy for efficiency improvements, provided: a) energy intensity is represented at an appropriate level of 





support municipal generation and private sector generation must obtain a generation license from NERSA 
(with very few granted of any scale), or under a ministerial determination, such as is the case with the 
REIPPP Programme. Kelvin can supply CP for historical reasons, and any additional IPP generation qualifies 
as demonstration projects, own use, or falls under a minimum threshold. This creates two issues, one 
direct and the other indirect, both with adverse consequences. The first, is that CP may not generate its 
own electricity, as it did very successfully in the past, and which is now viable with RE technology advances 
which have improved performance and reduced costs. The research found that during the 1980s, when 
Orlando was operational, CP was able to negotiate discounts from Eskom. Conceivably, creating a 
competitive environment would result in a similar outcome. An added benefit would be improved energy 
security. The indirect effect is that Eskom continues to maximise its returns from the residential and 
commercial sectors, with a revenue to sales ratio of 1.56. While the same ratio for mining is 0.96 and 
industrial sector is 0.82 (Thopil & Pouris 2013) - effectively selling electricity to these sectors at a discount. 
Coupled with the City’s requirement for high returns to fund other functions, the price of electricity in 
Johannesburg is the highest in the country Table 7-17. Thus, the city continues to lose large users who are 
moving to surrounding areas that offer a lower rate. Eskom, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni are near. CP, citing 
the property owners’ association believes commercial office rentals are R8/m² in Sandton. High volume 
residential users are also responding by reducing consumption and / or generating their own power (next 
section) 
 Table 7-17: Average Municipal Effective Tariff (Revenue from sale of electricity / units sold)  
Metro (c/kWh real = 2015) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cape Town  45 45 56 71 81 91 96 96 99 
eThekwini 47 50 56 70 81 91 95 94 102 
Johannesburg 53 55 70 85 108 144 141 148 140 
Ekurhuleni 46 45 53 69 98 111 112 113 120 
Tshwane 48 52 60 74 86 96 102 103 113 
Nelson Mandela Bay    68 77 91 96 93 96 
Average (Metros) 48 49 59 74 92 109 111 111 114 
Eskom (Average to munis) 27 27 33 41 47 57 61 63 63 
         Source: Eberhard (2015) 
Embedded Generation and the Death Spiral 
The 2003 Renewable Energy White Paper targeted a 10 000 GWh saving over a 10-year period. Little was 
done to achieve this target, and it was the national SWH rebate programme, launched and administered 
by Eskom in 2008, that showed some intent. South Africa’s hosting of the UNFCCC Congress of the Parties 
17 in 2011, saw tangible commitment and the will to achieve the target. In the residential sector, high 
electricity tariffs, supply shortages (blackouts) and increased environmental concerns, combined with the 
drop in the price of photovoltaic systems, has seen their increased uptake in households and small 
business, with CP estimating that 30 MW has been installed in Johannesburg. This exacerbates the utility 
‘death spiral’, which is an international phenomenon, and may spell the end for utilities, as embedded 
generation results in revenue erosion, declining profits, rising costs and weakening credit metrics. This 
prompted studies (see Janisch 2013) and internal modelling by municipal distributors. The industry called 
for NERSA to pronounce guidelines and regulations, but after issuing a discussion document in 2015 
followed by guidelines, they were withdrawn and would be included in the Department of Energy’s new 




than to make generation less than 1 MW exempt, subject to an agreement with the distributor. NERSA’s 
silence on this matter is deafening and unhelpful. CP has implemented a policy of paying only 40c / kWh 
for electricity generated, way below the over R1.50 / kWh it charges for supply. Very few are enticed by 
the offer and opt to install outside the structure. CP acknowledges this is a problem, but as with their DSM 
programmes, they have taken a backseat as Eskom has stabilized supply with no blackouts in over a year 
(early 2017). 
7.6.3 Right of Reply – City Power Management’s Response to Research Findings 
A meeting was held with Mr Quentin Green (Chief Financial Officer) and Mr Louis Pieterse (Director of 
Engineering) on October 31, 2017. The objective was to gauge their response to some of the key research 
findings131, and to get their perspective on past, present and future issues confronting CP. 
The deteriorating state of the distribution system was indeed confirmed. An aging system, which in many 
areas is over a hundred years old, has been further compromised by the amalgamation of eleven 
electricity departments in the mid-1990s, each with its own design philosophy. Much needed capital 
investment to maintain the system has been kept to an absolute minimum - in part because of the 
uncertainty that presided from 2000 until REDs was finally called off in 2010 - but primarily because of the 
longstanding policy of “relief of rates”. The time to replace and expand the entire system is fast 
approaching, and in truth has probably passed, as many sections are overloaded. Having consistently 
“sacrificed” most of its capital expenditure132 budget requirements to the CoJ, CP cannot afford to replace 
the system, and is looking to national government for the required funding. Given the contribution that 
Johannesburg makes to the national economy (16%), it is Mr Green’s view that it is incumbent upon 
national government to recognise the risk that the poor state of the electricity distribution system poses 
to the country’s fortunes and prioritise the investment needed. Mr Pieterse confirmed that the DoE had 
recently presented an asset management methodology to all MEU’s, which in his opinion is a very well-
considered framework. However, given that the Department has not, for some time now, honoured any 
of its existing financial obligations to the CP, their concerns revolve around ‘if and when’ the Department 
will have the funds to implement the programme. A funding solution put forward by Mr Green is the 
revival of the loan levy, which was used successfully during the 1990s. Under this scheme, the existing 
DSM levy would be increased from 0.02c/kWh, to say 0.06c/kWh and the proceeds would be used to 
upgrade the system. The loan would be returned to consumers in the form of a stable and strengthened 
system, as well as lower future tariff increases. 
It was also asserted that a major drain on CP’s finances is the unjust standing arrangement between the 
undertaking and Eskom regarding public lighting and traffic lights. CoJ residents are, more or less, shared 
equally between Eskom and CP, but the latter solely bears the electricity and maintenance costs for these 
public services. Why and how these arrangements came into effect, and why they remain, was not 
explained. It was however stressed that the resources (time and effort) are indeed material, accounting 
for as much as 12% of the CP annual repair and maintenance budget.  
 
131 As only one hour was offered for the meeting, it was not possible to cover all the research findings. The summary of the meeting was sent to 
both for their review and comment. 
132 Mr. Green stated that the CoJ generally approves the annual operational budget submitted to it by CP. Having previously worked at CoJ, 




The duo also shared the view that the existing and exaggerated policy of cross-subsidisation could not 
continue and that cost-reflective pricing would have to be introduced. High electricity tariffs to fund 
municipal functions has affected consumers, who are responding by reducing their usage or with 
businesses migrating to areas where tariffs are lower, as can be seen by the declining annual growth:  
2012 = -0.8%; 2013 = -1.84%; 2014 = -1.58%; 2015 = -2.08%; 2016 = -1.63%; and 2017 = -0.06%.   
This prompted the question about the accuracy of figures pointing to domestic conventional electricity 
user tariffs being subsidised by 22.7% (Table 7-18). Here the “user” is the post-paid residential customer 
(middle to high income category), who typically consumes in excess of 1 000 kWh/month; with affluent 
users consuming significantly higher levels. A tariff information guide issued by City Power (2017) to 
explain the impact of the 2017 tariff increases to the consumer, calculated 450 kWh of usage (including 
all system charges) at 211.11c/kWh for post-paid and 128.17c/kWh 133  for pre-paid. The difference 
between the two is significant; thus at face value, a negative value for pre-paid is understandable, but 
why for post-paid? Mr Pieterse stated that the table is correct and that he would forward the study 
explaining the reasons for this. Hereto however, several requests for the study have gone unanswered.   
Table 7-18: Levels of Cross-Subsidisation at City Power (2015 / 2016) 
TARIFF CATEGORY Cross-Subsidisation 
Contribution (Rm/annum) % Potential Charge 
Domestic pre-paid -434 33.4% 
Domestic post-paid -876 22.7% 
Agricultural -1.0 49.7% 
Business  66 -7.9% 
Large Users (MV) 540 -13.4% 
Large Users (LV) 705 -18.8% 
Explanatory note: Positive contribution values indicate inflows (revenue) to the cross-subsidisation 
account, while negative values indicate outflows (pay-out) to the specific tariff categories. It is evident that 
“Large user” and “Business” categories contribute substantially to allow the subsidisation of the domestic 
and agricultural sectors.  Source: City Power (2016, p.90) 
It was also strongly asserted that Mr Green and the senior CP management - supported by the Board and 
the CoJ - are “waging a war” against internal and external theft and corruption, in an attempt to reduce 
losses in line with the NERSA recommended mean of 10% (see Table 7-15). Indeed, dishonesty in various 
guises has resulted in massive losses to CP, compounded by the concomitant loss of economic activity and 
the impact on safety in the city during protracted power outages134. According to Mr Green, their efforts 
are paying off and non-technical losses are at levels last-seen five years ago. There was little though that 
CP could do to reduce technical losses below 9% - due to the age of system. However, the figures provided 
at the meeting do not correspond with those from the audited and published CP financial statements and 
business plans. Mr Green disputed the low non-technical losses reported between 2009 to 2011 as being 
too conservative a figure, but was not able to explain why the figures varied and on what basis they were 
audited and published.  
 
133 The pre-paid tariffs are marginally higher than the post-paid tariffs (~6c/kWh), but are not charged a monthly service charge (R114) and 
network charge (R337). CP applies a block tariff, the tariff increase by 16c/kWh after 1 000 kWh, and again at 2 000, and 3 000 kWh. 
134 In September 2017 cable thieves gained access to the underground tunnels and melted 36km copper wires which plunged the CBD in 




Figure 7-22 compares the published non-technical loss figures against those provided in the interview. 
Note: A figure for 2017 has not been published yet. Technical losses are not included, as both sources 
report them to be 9%.  
  
Figure 7-22: City Power Non-Technical Loss Percentage – Audited versus Internal (2011 – 2017)  
Ultimately, beyond the various challenges unpacked above, Mr Green believes the biggest threat to the 
CP business model has been the consistent erosion of gross margin: 
2011 = 38.6%; 2012 = 33.9%; 2013 = 31.8%; 2014 = 29.8%; 2015 = 28.25%; 2016 = 27.8%; and 2017 = 
26.7%.  
Here, the primary stated reason behind the decline in gross margin, is Nersa’s limitation on annual 
increases. Another contributing financial factor is the time-lag, (approximately 20 days), between CP 
paying Eskom for electricity purchased and collecting revenue from its customer base. This is a major 
driver for the utility encouraging existing, and requiring new consumers, to take their supply on a pre-paid 
basis.  
Finally, Mr Green acknowledged the threat of embedded generation and energy efficiency, but however 
believed that it is still a long way from impacting their business. In his view, less than 2% of the customer 
base is currently either willing or financially capable of investing meaningfully. It is also believed that 
energy efficiency programmes undertaken by CP are necessary, but are minor in comparison to the total 
business, and thus have a very small impact on the overall sphere. Then, ending the meeting on a positive 
note, Mr Green supported his assertions regarding the effect of price increases, by pointing to the annual 
growth / decline consumption figures (listed above), which have flattened out (-0.06%) - possibly 
suggesting the tariff increases have been absorbed - with CP expecting consumer electricity purchases to 
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7.6.4 A Historical Institutionalist Perspective 
The third and final critical juncture identified - the 1996 Constitution which elevated local government to 
one of the three spheres of government - occurred in tandem with multiple political and technical ESI 
developments. Thus, here, in examining the context that these developments created, the analysis 
commences at a broad level, via national government and Eskom, and then narrows down to the MEU’s 
and more specifically the JEU. Indeed, the interrelatedness of all the players in this environment and 
particularly the “special” relationship between government and Eskom, sometimes results in what may 
seem as repetition in the analysis; but is a direct product of the powerful impact that they had on each 
other, which has to be viewed from their individual perspectives.  
From the outset, when one in broad terms assesses the ESI at the advent of democracy, unsurprisingly 
the immediate post-apartheid period was dominated by the need to not only expand, but accelerate and 
formalise the electrification initiatives started by Eskom under their “Electricity for All” programme. This 
was particularly pertinent given that the overall electrification rate in the country in 1990 was an 
unflattering 35% (Statistics South Africa, 2012135), where WLAs enjoyed almost universal access, while 
BLAs did not. Indeed, under such circumstances, the pressure on the newly installed GNU to develop policy 
to urgently redress chronically inequitable access to electricity, held the potential of serious implications 
for Eskom – especially since the spectrum of consequences stemming from government action, intended 
and unintended, was profound. Here, at the one end of the scale, Eskom stood to lose the long-standing 
operational independence from national government that it had always enjoyed (as detailed in Chapter 
6.5.2). Of greater concern was a real threat to the monopolistic vertically integrated model that it had 
painstakingly developed over the previous decades. It was therefore undoubtedly in Eskom senior 
management’s interest to ensure that they were intimately involved in policy formulation and 
implementation. Thus, by being ahead of and embracing proposed changes, Eskom stood every chance of 
maintaining the status quo - a strategy that Maree and McRae successfully adopted from 1985 in 
implementing the De Villiers’ recommendations - described in McRae’s own words: “I had seen all over 
Africa how disastrous such political interference could be. We had to keep the government out of the 
engine room.” This proven approach could now once again be deployed to address the organisation’s 
post-1994 challenges, which ostensibly were a continuation (albeit a deepening) of most of the 1985 and 
1991 action points mandated by the DME, as we will see below. Indeed, the research has found no 
evidence to suggest that Eskom, and by inference McRae and Maree, changed their position. The highly 
coveted engine room remained strictly for Eskom engineers. And the manner with which this was 
achieved, was ingenious. 
In observing Eskom’s timeless quest for ‘engine room independence’ and growth above all else, in Chapter 
6.5 the research found that from 1970 Eskom was able to manifest its aggressive new power plant build 
programme, and notwithstanding the De Villiers commission’s recommendations, still managed to build 
five of the six planned power plants by 1995 (Phase III and IV); regardless of strong evidence that not all 
were needed or affordable. This is a clear example of the “sticky” culture which continuously sought to 
amplify the growth trend. In such regard though, Baumgartner (2002) warns that left unchecked, a 
positive feedback loop will ultimately lead to an unstable system and self-destruction, which is precisely 
the situation that Eskom, with a 38% reserve margin (Figure 6-9) and a stagnant, even shrinking, economy, 
 
135 South African Electrification Programme (http://energy-access.gnesd.org/cases/22-south-african-electrification-programme.html) Energy 




had begun to flirt with in the early 1990s. Such a massive over-supply of electricity meant that Eskom 
needed to stabilise its position by switching to a negative feedback – reverting to the thermostat analogy 
from Chapter 2.3.3 – with the objective of maintaining a set temperature. Which it did. The carefully 
considered transition was seamless; involving the simultaneous co-existence of a positive and negative 
feedback loop - the former of which was the completion of the new power plant build programme, which 
then paved the way for the latter. Indeed, by prioritising and implementing the ANC’s RDP objectives 
before the ANC had even conceived, let alone requested such from it, Eskom dealt a strategic 
masterstroke.  
When looking at Eskom’s relationship with government in all this, (following-on from the re-emergence 
of De Villiers who was now serving in FW de Klerk’s early 1990s cabinet as an economic adviser), Eskom 
(Chapter 7.5.2), agreed with national government to implement four objectives. These are listed below 
and extended to the post-1994 era, to demonstrate their relevance and how they amounted to action by 
Eskom that was designed to appease the GNU and then ANC government: 
• Price compact: Nominal tariff increases remained below the inflation rate until 2003136 (Figure 6-8) 
• Electrification targets: At its peak, Eskom was electrifying over 300 000 homes per annum, and was 
the primary contributor to shifting the national average from 35% to 66% by 1999 (Borchers 2001, 
p.iv). The utility was also cooperating and coordinating the electrification programme with the MEU’s; 
• Technical and financial position: Eskom re-established itself as a world class utility. Financially, reaped 
the benefits of its low capital requirements and cost cutting measures from the early 1990s, which for 
example resulted in the workforce dropping to 39 000 from 66 000 by 1995, and 30 000 in 2005;  
• Promoting black employment: Technical and management positions occupied by black personnel 
went from 5% in 1993 to 50% in 1997 when Maree retired (Chapter 6.6.2). Followed by an aggressive 
short-term quantitative employment equity target, whereby 50% of senior management positions 
would be occupied by black employees. 
Within this context, Eskom’s high-performance levels meant that national government could focus on 
other areas, as it could not achieve more or do so any better or faster. Additionally, there was no reason 
to suspect that Eskom’s actions were in any way insincere. It harmonised its objectives with those of the 
ANC’s RDP. The new millennium, however, saw the confluence of several items that had been simmering 
in the background: Firstly, the cost of the electrification programme had started to mount, R8 billion in 
total by 1999 (nominal). Moreover, after a decade or so of electrification, the DME was theoretically better 
capacitated to undertake what essentially was a government function and Eskom needed to switch its 
focus back to its core business; with a decision thus taken for the DME to take responsibility for the second 
phase of the NEP from 2000. However, and as an interesting example of the impact of unintended 
consequences, Eskom’s ability to electrify 2 500 000 households made it a vital aspect of a key element in 
the new government’s process of attaining and maintaining perceived legitimacy. In this, it not only left 
the “engine room” door ajar, but laid out a welcome mat which the politicians quickly seized. The second 
simmering issue was the fact that the Energy White Paper (1998) and the 2001 Cabinet decision (Figure 
6-7) pointed to, as Eberhard’s 2001 paper (pg 25) concluded, a “fundamental restructuring aimed at 
increasing competition in the (ESI) sector”. National government signalled its intent by placing a 
moratorium on Eskom’s construction of new power stations, even though demand from the newly 
electrified households and economic growth had seen the reserve margin drop to ~20% and the Energy 
 
136 After the 1994 democratic elections (even though the price compact was still in force) Eskom undertook to reduce the real price of 




White Paper itself predicted a supply deficit by 2007. Eskom was indeed facing a new operational reality. 
Thirdly, while the high capital costs of electrifying new households were one thing, the low electricity 
consumption and increasing levels of non-payment by consumers (be it due to an unwillingness or an 
inability to do so) and by municipalities (bulk supply), was another; and this began to materially erode 
Eskom’s finances. Finally, and very significantly, when Eskom was ‘riding high’, a litany of poor decisions 
and choices were made (Chapter 6.6.2 – Eskom in Crisis Again). Ultimately, they created the foundation 
of the crisis which was to unfold from 2005 and were epitomised by the decision to build the two mega 
power stations of Medupi and Kusile; marking the formal starting point of Eskom reeling from one fiasco 
to the next and of politicians taking centre stage at Eskom for the first time in its 90 year history. Here the 
period of 2000 to 2005 aligns with the thoughts of North (1990) and Baumgartner (2002) in Chapter 2.3.3 
(Punctuated Equilibrium) who contend that change is “not as sudden as it may appear” and often on the 
back of long periods of seeming inactivity.  
In the 20 plus years following the 1994 elections, two diverging realities appear to have been at play: 
policy and practise. Recognising that the existing ESI model which had been in place for decades, had 
outlived its usefulness, it would appear that government’s objective in overhauling the system was to 
address policy and practises that had become unsuitable or defective, through reform, as opposed to 
change, which would simply mean doing things differently. Certainly, at face value, reform was necessary 
to deal with challenges that included: far too many MEU’s (over 400) and each with their own tariff 
structures; non-cost reflective tariffs; many medium and smaller sized MEU’s operating at a loss; capital 
investments to maintain and service the EDI infrastructure now lagging; smaller and medium sized MEU’s 
unable to retain and hire competent staff; and finally, efforts to reverse the practise of non-payment and 
theft of electricity, not only failing, but the situation in fact getting worse. Here in seeking a solution, 
national government’s approach was certainly not haphazard. Nationally, it organized and participated in 
extensive public consultation, public forums and committees (NELF, EWG, EDIRC and ERIC), while 
internationally engaging with global agencies (World Bank, IMF, USAID and others), as well as academics, 
who provided updates on the latest international thinking and experience. This led to the Energy White 
Paper (1998), followed by cabinet’s endorsement of REDs, the creation of EDI etc. and indeed, in policy, 
in the strongest possible manner, with a cabinet decision (Chapter 6.6.2) which implied reform was 
certain. Alas, in practice, little was achieved. Private sector investment did not materialise, the REDs 
programme was terminated in 2010 and by 2015 the ISMO in the DoE’s director general’s own words was 
“off the table” while ADAM in 2017 is progressing so slowly, that it is anyone’s guess if anyone is working 
on it all.  One small victory perhaps was that the number of municipal distributors did decrease to under 
180, but still significantly more than the six targeted under REDs. 
In fairness, the one shining light has been the grid electrification programme which had reached over 90% 
by 2016137. Unfortunately there is a BUT in this too, because as life-changing as access to electricity has 
been for the millions of households who are now spared the drudgery of collecting firewood or using 
unsafe and / or unhealthy alternate energy sources138 (coal, paraffin, candles), the programme has fallen 
way short of the RDP objectives of translating this into economic productivity gains – making the supply 
unaffordable for service provider and the consumer. In addition, the research also recognises that grid 
electrification will not automatically result in the displacement of fuels such as paraffin and firewood for 
cooking, and that this particular phenomenon is well established in Africa for a variety of reasons (see 
Sustainable Energy Africa: Household Energy Access page 248).  
 
137 http://www.eskom.co.za/news/Pages/Jun4.aspx  




In hindsight, little reform was ultimately achieved and at best some change occurred primarily through 
the process of drift (where the impact of existing rules was affected due to environmental shifts). The 
impact of this context on local government and MEU’s however, was profound; and it is this that we now 
turn our attention to. 
Electricity distribution was an exclusive municipal function as decreed by the 1910 Power Act - which was 
clearly highly prized, as evidenced by the bruising battle with Eskom at the 1969 Margate Agreement. It 
was therefore curious to note local governments’ slow and limited response to electrifying adjoining 
townships in the late 1980s, which they knew was necessary, inevitable and urgent. This unwillingness to 
act, presented Eskom with the opportunity to wrest control and drive the electrification programme, and 
warrants closer consideration. Here, although unwilling to electrify townships, MEU’s immediately raised 
their objection with Eskom’s most senior management for encroaching on their domain. Eskom was, 
somewhat easily, able to placate the MEU’s, on two grounds: The first, was Eskom’s assurance that they 
had no intention of violating the long-standing agreement and that any takeover of Eskom’s systems by 
municipalities would be done so on economic grounds. The second, cut to the heart of the matter. MEU’s, 
aware that their adjoining townships would have to be electrified, knew that this could only be achieved 
if the surpluses generated from electricity sales and / or other revenue were made available by the 
municipal treasury. This would not be straightforward for several reasons: 1) Most of these households 
could not, and many would not pay; 2) Even if they did pay they were unlikely to consume sufficiently 
large quantities to make the investment economically viable; and, 3) The investment that would be 
needed to build new networks, even if economically viable, would require the diversion of surpluses 
earmarked for white suburbs, which would lead to lower service delivery levels to the de facto electorate, 
which had the high probability of political ramifications for the white councillors.  
Ultimately, the combination of these factors resulted in municipal treasury and local government 
politicians not sanctioning electrification – the former on financial grounds and the latter for reasons of 
electioneering. Unfortunately, neither chose to recognise the moral imperative and were seemingly 
unwilling to act in order to start closing the inequality gap between white and black neighbourhoods. 
Ironically, indeed predictably, politicians and treasury now adopted the MEU’s decades-old argument 
against cross-subsidisation and the need for cost reflective tariffs (see Chapter 7.4.1 Period 3). The MEU’s 
thus decided in the short term, to turn a blind eye to Eskom’s “Electricity for All” programme; but allocated 
significant time, effort and resources through the AMEU, in developing a viable strategy to address what 
they finally and reluctantly recognized would be an issue they could not only no longer ignore. and which 
as the mandated distributors of electricity, they needed to deliver upon. The alternative, once unthinkable 
option, would be to cease being the sole distributor of electricity in urban areas. The AMEU’s strategy 
however, came to little - overtaken by nationally coordinated events regarding electrification, which were 
a combination of having to play catch-up with Eskom and taking direction from the new regulator (NER), 
packed with former Eskom employees, including McRae as CEO. Unsurprisingly MEU’s were on the short 
end of most decisions.   
Simultaneously at national government level, the transition to democracy appeared to be about 
acceptable concessions; key amongst these being the safeguarding of minority (white) rights. Here, as 
detailed in Chapter 4.5.2, the NP pushed hard for a decentralised approach to local government, while 
the ANC was arguing for simply taking-over the existing system, which aligned with their long-held 
centralist ideology. Here, the NP’s decentralist motivation was two-fold. The first reason revolves around 




existing white neighbourhoods, which under a decentralised approach could operate, more or less, as 
they had been, for the foreseeable future. The second reason, as Bekker (1988: p. 30) pointed out, is that 
the NP knew all too well how a highly centralised state could wield power. The elevation of local 
government to a sphere of government however, meant little without financial autonomy (Chapter 3). 
Thus, the 1996 Constitution allocated dedicated and exclusive revenue raising functions, inter alia 
electricity distribution, to local government. The ANC, in accepting this inclusion were not conceding, but 
had changed their viewpoint to that of developmental local government (Chapter 4.6.2) as an appropriate 
means to address the inequities of the past - which could not be achieved if municipalities could not raise 
the required revenue. Additional motivation for the ANC, is that it added a political layer (distance) 
between itself and the electorate, and the view that local government was closer to the people and 
theoretically in a better position to grasp and satisfy their needs (Chapter 3.3). Through displacement 
(remove and replace existing rules with new ones), the ANC (Chapter 4.6.1) did obstruct the continuation 
of strong white controlled local communities, by demarcating boundaries to make them more inclusive 
and representative, and to redistribute political power.  
These political developments had serious knock-on effects for the municipal EDI. The positive spin off was 
that the constitution not only safeguarded the revenue source, but ensured its protection under the 
highest law of the land. There was however a price to be paid. The new, and much larger municipal 
boundaries meant that MEU’s had to be amalgamated - creating operational, technical, financial and 
policy challenges - many of which remain in 2017. Technically for example, MEU distribution networks 
had developed over many decades, with each MEU adopting a specific design philosophy, such as radial, 
ring, main, parallel and meshed. For Johannesburg this became, and remains, a particular issue. Here, the 
challenge of the large number of MEU’s that had to be amalgamated (Table 7-11) to create City Power139, 
was further compounded by former long serving Eskom employees now employed by City Power due to 
Eskom’s downsizing and the staff retention problems experienced at the JEU in the mid-1990s. These ex-
Eskom staff members had a natural bias towards its distribution design, and proceeded to consolidate the 
expanded network on this basis, rather than continuing with the original configuration - creating a 
disjointed and technically inefficient system. The budgetary constraints of a municipality in high financial 
distress at the time, ultimately may have led to the system being ‘made’ to work; but the combination of 
these three factors did result in several long-term negative outcomes – a distribution system with higher 
technical losses, outages and costs. From a financial perspective too, the MEU’s were also being squeezed 
on two sides. On the one, they were expected to electrify new households, which they knew were not 
financially viable or sustainable and that the only way to do this would be through internal cross-
subsidisation. On the other side however, any surpluses generated by an MEU, and often more, were 
allocated by the municipal treasury to cross-subsidise other municipal functions. Indeed, in a positive 
feedback loop, this practise was exaggerated from 1994 onwards, to pay for the urgent need to deal with 
the backlog of services and poor performance of municipal employees (Chapter 7.6.1). Finally, as regards 
policy ramifications, municipal EDI was facing an uncertain future. Indeed, the AMEU’s internal research 
from as far back as 1989 (Chapter 7.4.1 Period 3) had concluded that the current model was unsustainable 
and that the number of MEU’s would have to be reduced significantly - to fewer than 70. National 
government had similar ideas, but its thinking was more along the lines of just 6 or 7 REDs. Regardless, 
the consequence was a clear signal to all municipalities that operated MEU’s, to reduce capital and 
maintenance expenditure, so as to avoid a stranded assets scenario until a final outcome had been agreed. 
Here, the AMEU took a proactive stance and engaged extensively with national government and Eskom, 
 




but as the research has found, their ongoing input enjoyed little consideration - a curious response from 
national government, given how vocal municipalities were during the consultations and that they had 
unambiguous constitutional cover. Ultimately then, the decade of deliberations before REDs were finally 
scrapped, resulted in the predicted negative (feedback loop) outcome of very limited capital investments 
(stasis) in the municipal distribution systems – a root cause of the decline of the system, which in 2017 
had an estimated refurbishment and maintenance backlog of as high as R80 billion.  
Looking back, more than anything, the period prior to and after 1994 was one that touted wholesale 
reform to improve service delivery. The review however, has shown that little has come to pass, other 
than the licensed municipal distributors dropping from 400 to ~187. Electricity distribution though, 
remains a primary contributor of municipal revenue, as it always has. Indeed, the self-reinforcing path 
dependent phenomenon of increasing returns, which has been in a prolonged positive feedback loop state 
to fund other municipal functions, not only has seen warnings about its unsustainability dating as far back 
as 1930 go unheeded, but has been significantly ratcheted up since 1994, despite national government 
policy to chart a new path. And while this is a situation that historical institutional theorists warn will 
ultimately lead to punctuated equilibrium, at the moment, the current positive feedback loop is being 
accentuated by technological developments in energy efficiency and renewable energy, as well as failings 
at Eskom, which has led to high tariff increases and an unreliable supply. Thus, it is abundantly clear that 
municipal EDI is under extreme pressure, as it faces a variety of challenges ranging from consumers 
reducing their usage, to localised outages, losses (technical and non-technical outages) and maintenance 
costs - the combination of which, at the very least, certainly means lower surpluses. The reality that the 
‘golden goose’ is no longer able to serve the municipal treasury as it used to, is becoming a harsh reality, 
leading to more intense, frequent and vocal public discourse from local government (SALGA, CIGFARO 














The research has thus far delivered a detailed historical account and institutional analysis of municipal ESI. 
This concluding chapter now examines the theoretical and policy conclusions of the study findings via the 
research approach adopted. Herein, the policy dimension illustrates how national government from 
formation of the Union (1910), pursued, and continues to pursue, two fundamental but diametrically 
opposing objectives, whose inherent contradictions drive an enduring conflict, reaching fever pitch in the 
last 20 years: 1) An over-burdened, financially ‘self-sufficient’, local government with limited scope to 
collect revenue needed (property tax and surpluses from services – with the majority by far being raised 
from electricity sales) to administer its mandated municipal functions; and, 2) A vertically integrated 
utility. Complicating matters even further, are conflicting national objectives, where on the one hand neo-
liberal economic policies adopted by government are supportive of cost reflective tariffs to enhance 
competitiveness and productivity, yet on the other hand national policy calls for developmental local 
government where a significant portion of funding is sourced through cross-subsidisation. The research 
has shown that this dichotomy has, and continues to be, the basis for the discord that exists in the ESI – 
leading to broader political and economic fallout for the country, and to the death knell of municipal EDI 
reform from the late 1990s. This was demonstrated once again from 2010 as a new and imminent 
structural crisis, the so-called death spiral (Chapter 7.6.2), threatens the entire ESI industry but EDI 
specifically. Yet government’s (national, local, NERSA and Eskom) failure, perhaps even inability due to 
lock-in, to adequately deal with the crisis is impacting negatively on developmental local government – 
particularly service delivery. Left unresolved it will undoubtedly result in the same impasse (failure to 
restructure) but with graver economic and political consequences.   
The approach of the concluding chapter is thus relatively straightforward; commencing with a summary 
of the first research objective, the lifeblood of the research. The research questions and the second 
research objective is then addressed. The chapter ends by providing an overall assessment of the research 
findings and prospects of future municipal EDI reform. 
8.2 History and Electricity Matters (Research Objectives) 
Research objective one consists of two parts. The first; to document the political origins and development 
of municipal ESI. The second; to assess the effectiveness of applying historical institutionalism to do so. 
Part one was deemed necessary because a consolidated and detailed chronological narrative on this 
subject does not exist. Where it does exist, it tends to be one-dimensional - representing a specific 
viewpoint, be it political, economic or technical. The implication is that analyses on outcomes or 
institutional arrangements tend to be narrow or simplistic. This research, validated by existing academic 
ESI research (amongst others: Christie, Marquard, Horwitz, Fine and Rustomjee, Steyn, Conradie and 
Messerschmidt), recognises that municipal EDI is complex. Thus, in differentiating itself from existing 
work, the detailed tracing of historical events and decisions taken by institutions associated with this 
sector, allows this research to provide a multi-dimensional analysis of various perspectives and their 
intrinsic inter-connectedness; crucial to understanding EDI outcomes and genuine reform succeeding. The 
research has identified multiple examples of history repeating itself - desirable if outcomes are positive 
but surely not the opposite. At national level, from 1910 we saw three periods where one party (ideology) 




beneficiation would replace import substitution in the early 1970s (Chapter 6.5) but failed. Reintroduced 
in 2009 (Chapter 6.6), it did not heed the poignant findings of Fine and Rustomjee (1996) regarding the 
MEC structure of the economy – echoed over a decade earlier by Christie (1984). Thus, the economy in 
2018 continues to stutter, while inequality and unemployment rise. Similarly, national government 
timelessly supports Eskom; even putting the country’s sovereignty at stake. And local government 
continues to be overburdened and underfunded, even more so given past inequities. Whilst reflecting on 
the existing primary specific literature this research regularly references, it is worth pausing to consider 
the extent to which this thesis aligns (or not), and where appropriate adds to them. Marquard (2006, pg 
154), Christie (1984, pg 164) and Conradie and Messerschmidt (2000, pg 138) all identify Borckenhagen 
as the source of the provincial administrator’s decision to reject the JEU’s application to build a new power 
plant in the 1960s, spelling the end of municipal generation. This research, through alternate references, 
not only corroborates these findings but adds deeper insight by relaying the JEU’s perspective and how 
this led to the Margate agreement (Chapter 7.4.1). These three authors recognise the importance of the 
event but do not detail the massive ramifications this had on municipal revenue. Appropriately so, as it 
was not the focus of their research. Turning to the subject of cross-subsidisation. Horwitz, Conradie and 
Messerschmidt, and Marquard all recognise that this was taking place. Escom was offering farmers a non-
cost reflective tariff and municipalities were using their surpluses to keep their property taxes down. 
However, as Horwitz (pg 22) points out when the electrification programme commenced in the early 
1980s first by Eskom and then the MEU’s, to start, they both insisted on cost reflective tariffs. The logic of 
this paradoxical requirement for BLA’s but not WLA’s is difficult to reconcile and the research explores the 
dynamics and tension between these two institutions in electrifying households until it was taken over by 
national government in 2000. Indeed, the thesis has expounded on the discord and financial 
consequences that the policy of relief of rates wreaked over decades. Yet this practise not only continues, 
it expands, displaying the hallmarks of a path dependent process. It was the single most important reason 
for the failure of the proposed reforms under RED’s, and not the first or last time that it causes discord. 
History matters – here the thesis builds on Eberhard’s inputs during the RED’s process by providing more 
detail, which aligns with his research and views, from the municipal perspective. But before assessing the 
usefulness of new institutionalism, applied through historical institutionalism, it is necessary to determine 
whether the second objective and the research questions were adequately addressed using this approach. 
This aids in-depth theorising of the findings; hopefully contributing to ongoing debates around strengths 
and weaknesses of historical institutionalism as a research framework.     
The second objective was to consider the complexities created by using surpluses from electricity sales to 
cross-subsidise municipal functions, which conflicts with national priorities. Historical analysis has shown 
this practise is not new; developed over a prolonged period to satisfy other, but ultimately competing and 
counter-productive, objectives of national government. Over time these linkages strengthened to such an 
extent that disentangling them is no longer straight-forward, as the effects are not only universal but likely 










Re-tracing the history of all the actors has shown the complex relationship between the national economy, 
the three tiers of government and the ESI – where each actor is represented by different government 
institutions with diverse mandates and interests – thus resulting in the inevitable situation of 
contradictory / conflicting policy positions and competing objectives. Such a situation may not 
immediately qualify as being overly unique nor material, as many other functions or services offered by 
government and its agencies require compromise. But how it unfolds may matter; and for EDI it does. As 
the research has shown, here, the current institutional arrangements regarding municipal EDI are reaching 
breaking point, with dire social and economic consequences for all – a situation not receiving the attention 
it deserves; overshadowed by events engulfing Eskom. However, connection points between these two 
crises exist. Both shield operational inefficiencies, as well as consumer resistance, manifested at one end 
by reduced consumption and electricity theft, and at the other through defection (fuel switching and 
embedded generation), together with more energy efficiency and reduced consumption. Ultimately, 
national outages caused by mismanagement (coal supply contracts), plant shutdown’s (maintenance), 
delays in commissioning new plants (mismanagement), financial distress (corruption, staff strikes and pay 
demands) will attract public attention over localised municipal outages varying from MEU to MEU, with 
equally ominous consequences.  
Thus, it becomes necessary to determine the extent to which circumstances matter – to examine how 
events evolved. Here, two options exist: One; a narrow analysis can be conducted, as was done for the 
implementation of RED’s, which focused on national government priorities. This is not to imply that the 
approach was rushed or not taken seriously; lasting almost ten years and costing billions of Rands. 
However, the research pointed out how important factors were sidestepped, under-estimated or flat out 
ignored - issues which were material sticking points for local government and MEU’s. This includes for 
example, the contradiction and perceived unfairness of the constitution allocating municipal distribution 
to local government, but under the proposed REDs model, MEU’s were required to cede the ‘golden share’ 
to national government (see Chapter 7.5.5 for additional examples). The alternative option is a detailed 
and accurately sequenced historical account of events, providing complete understanding of institutional 
and policy development. Such understanding is more likely to provide the basis upon which appropriate 
decisions can be taken. The latter, I would argue, allows for a clearer determination on the extent to which 
history matters. To date, the former more expedient approach has led to little reform, and if anything, 
put the system under greater strain. Thus, to contribute towards a resolution, this thesis presents a 
detailed and holistic analysis which not only introduces new insights but explains the rationale behind the 
‘stickiness’ of existing path dependency. Here, a further distinction needs to be made between 
understanding historical events resulting in the present-day dynamics of the current crisis, versus 
attempting to take corrective action. For the former a historical analysis is appropriate, whereas for the 
latter, a historical understanding is required.    
Ultimately, competing institutional objectives are bound to collide with and impact each other. But what 
happens when this conflict is extreme and allowed to endure for a long period (over 100 years)? In this, 
the research has tested the theoretical assertion that negative and positive feedback loops can occur 
simultaneously (Pierson, 2000b; Williams, 2012 - Chapter 2.3.3). Indeed, both look to subvert change; the 
first by adjusting to deviations; the second by reinforcing the existing path. Here the important distinction 
between the two is that a negative feedback loop’s objective is to remain on a specific point on the path, 
whereas the positive feedback loop may result in a shift, which may bring about some change, but on the 




their positions on the ESI path, both institutions engaged in negative and positive feedback loops to 
maintain and retain the increasing returns derived from this chosen path.    
In meeting part one of the first objective, this thesis traced the development of municipal ESI from its 
genesis; with the following unique features. Firstly, although the South African electricity narrative has 
been told before from different perspectives (Eskom, national policy, politics and apartheid, mineral 
wealth), the research findings showed that a consolidated municipal and AMEU account does not exist. 
Secondly, in addition to qualitative research practises of face-to-face interviews, published records and 
other secondary sources, the hunt for new information also led to the discovery of original and previously 
unconsidered primary resources (detailed in Chapter 1.6.2), including AMEU committee meetings (1950 
to 2017)140 with additional supporting documentation141; AMEU Proceedings Journals from 1915; Merz 
and McLellan internal library with unique source documents such as project notes, government and 
municipal reports and minutes of meetings; and , interviews with industry participants.  
These ‘new’ and previously unseen primary research resources proved invaluable, and indeed this 
research would have been compromised or not possible without them. Firstly, they brought a fresh, 
accurate, detailed perspective; that of the AMEU – with existing literature on the country’s ESI providing 
a reference point and an opportunity to offer both sides. For example, the consequences of the Margate 
agreement which stopped the JEU (and all other MEU’s) from building new power plants, had massive 
consequences for the entire country, not just the City. Escom, having secured its monopoly was able to 
pursue its aggressive and overly optimistic new build programme. This led to inefficiencies and tariff 
increases, detailed in Chapter 6.5.2 (Escom) and 7.4.3 (JEU). Contrast this to a decade earlier when Escom 
was somewhat kept in check by a thriving JEU, not only selling it its excess capacity, but making minimal 
tariff increases and an amiable / professional working relationship between the two possible. Secondly, 
the meticulous manner in which events were stored (detail and date order) allowed for conducting the 
research in accordance with the framework’s prescripts. As explained in the methodological approach 
(Chapter 2.6.1), it is easy to get caught up in the euphoria of free-flowing historical story-telling; often 
resulting in insufficient attention to the order of facts, selective inclusion or exclusion, and conscious or 
unconscious bias – all of which were ameliorated by the scrupulous detail that such primary research 
sources came with. Finally, the document research sources were augmented by interviews with 
individuals present at the time of key events discussed in the study - some as far back as the mid-1950s -
providing additional research sources and adding a human element which often cannot be captured in 
conference proceedings, minutes and personal notes.  
We now turn to answering the research questions and concluding an assessment of the framework used.  
 
140 Although the minutes of AMEU meetings over the more recent past (20 years) are readily available, with some published on the AMEU website. 
It is the minutes from 1950 until 1994 which provided great insight as they were all but forgotten  
141 The minutes have been stored for many years and have not been accessed in decades. Invariably some pages and annexes are missing or 




8.3 Summary of Findings (Research Questions) 
Research Question 1: What were the political decisions that shaped and continue to influence 
municipal ESI (EDI from 1969)? 
The research, through a historical institutionalist lens, identified specific events; interrogated further to 
confirm their historical origins and validity as critical junctures, of which there were three: 1) The Transvaal 
Power Act (1910); 2) The Margate Convention (1969); and, 3) The 1996 Constitution and the Energy White 
Paper (1998). The first identifies the starting point - the contingent event creating the path dependent 
and self-reinforcing sequence. The next two junctures mark points in time where a window of opportunity 
created the opening for a reactive sequence (reversal of events and a new path – change) or was 
insufficiently able to do so and ‘business as usual’ persevered. 
The historical institutionalist framework’s premise is to facilitate meaningful counterfactual analysis by 
identifying: 1) The time sequence of the initial conditions; 2) The option selected over other available and 
viable options (the contingent event); and, 3) How the selected event capitalises on its initial advantage 
to reproduce itself and become dominant (Mahoney 2000, p.514) (Figure 2-3). Key in detecting a critical 
juncture is the short period during which these policy options are available, followed by the long sequence 
of positive reinforcement, or institutional lock-in (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007) (Elson 2008, p.223; Capoccia 
& Kelemen 2007). Certainly, by focusing on events where influential actors are able to exploit situations 
of uncertainty to sway events in the favour of a specific group, critical juncture analysis highlights the role 
that these actors play in the formation of institutions (Capoccia 2015, p.3).   
The first identified juncture was the 1910 Power Act. Intuitively, one may have expected this to be shortly 
after the commissioning of the earliest municipal power stations. Johannesburg’s first power station came 
into service in 1891, and Kimberly and Cape Town as much as a decade earlier. The Act though is significant 
because of the legislative framework introduced, or the “rules of the game” it created (North 1990). Here 
the contents of the Act and its passing were motivated by the findings of the 1909 Power Companies 
Commission, set up in response to the concerns and perceived risks associated with the single supplier, 
VFPC. The commission identified the financial benefits of large-scale production, which it acceded could 
be financed by the private sector, but warned of the grave risks associated with a strategic commodity 
controlled by a monopoly. Distrust of the private sector and the advantage of entering Union with the(ir) 
regulation in place, motivated the Transvaal government to hastily pass the Act three days before 




Table 8-1: Historical Analysis of the Power Act (1910) 
Power Act Specifications Intended Outcome (Based on 
Research Findings) 
Actual Outcome 
Creation of a power undertakings 
board to issue and regulate 
generation and transmission licenses 
Oversee government policy and start 
regulating the ESI  
Precursor to the Electricity Act (1922) which created the 
Electricity Control Board and Escom. The Act endured 
until 1995 (Marquard: 2004, 144) 
Electricity tariffs to be regulated with 
surpluses redistributed to users – 
neither at a profit or a loss 
Minimise operational costs for large 
users (mines, government and railways) 
1. Rather than return profits, Escom builds new 
power stations (continuous build mindset)         
2. Roots of cross subsidisation 
Municipal undertakings can generate 
and transmit within area of 
jurisdiction – no license needed  
1. Supply requirements of large 
users are prioritised over those of 
the municipalities 
2. Residential market demand seen 
as negligible   
1. Creates two non-competing ESI’s (municipal and 
Escom) 
2. Secures (inadvertently) a major revenue stream 
for municipalities  
3. Large MEU’s (1950-1969) threaten Escom 
business model   
Private undertakings allowed, but 
subject to a license being issued 
Barrier to entry to maintain government 
control of ESI  
Excludes private sector involvement in ESI until 2010 
MEU’s may not supply large users 
(>25 kVA)  
Security of demand and economies of 
scale for Escom 
1. Eliminating competition introduces operational 
inefficiencies  
2. Escom dominates and dictates ESI  
3. Negatively affects MEU business model 
Expropriation after 42 years Ability to intervene in the event of 
negative outcomes of private sector ESI  
Same as above 
To ensure that the path dependency analysis is credible, it is necessary to confirm that the starting point, 
or critical juncture, is appropriate and that the sequencing and timing of events have been carefully 
considered (as detailed in Chapter 2.3.3 – Self Reinforcing Sequences); because it is at these critical 
junctures, where decisions taken affect outcomes over the long term, which complicate and frustrate 
future attempts to change direction or approach. For this, the theory tells us to determine whether the 
selection process had an element of contingency. Considering the available and plausible options at the 
time then allows for credible counterfactual analysis, which avoids random and hypothetical “what if” 
scenarios. On the first score, given the importance of the gold mining industry in Johannesburg at the 
time, and the influence it could wield, the decision to proceed as it did was not random, irrational or 
irresponsible. The Transvaal government was acting to protect the region’s economic interests and as part 
of its broader strategy to ensure that it would dominate the soon to be created Union of South Africa 
(Chapter 4.3). This event thus displays the two characteristics necessary to be classified as a critical 
juncture (Chapter 2.3.1), namely that it was possible for a different decision to have been taken, and 
secondly, that the options available were not infinite. But what were these, and was it the case that they 
could have been more plausible, even marginally so? Counterfactual analysis, based on the historic events, 
identifies two additional options. In the first, the Act is not passed before Union because consensus from 
the other three provinces is deemed necessary and appropriate, given that this event was just three days 
away. However, this option would have undoubtedly led to delays, and the extent to which the Transvaal 
lobby group would have been able to pass the Act in its original form, is difficult to assess. But (some) 
concessions and changes would have been a likely outcome; for example, being less influenced by large 
mining concerns, meaning lighter trading restrictions on MEU. For the second scenario we suppose that 
the authors of the Act are less wary of the private sector and more even-handed, creating a more 
competitive operational environment, and in so doing reduced future national over-reliance on Escom. 
With a path chosen, reinforcement and lock-in could now commence. Hoy, responsible for electrifying the 
railways, confirmed that although SARs had no interest in generating electricity to power its trains, it 
would not buy from private suppliers or MEU’s, as railways needed reliable power supply. This gave Kotze 




Bijl (with his vision on how to industrialise the country), the leeway to push for additional concessions 
than those originally proposed by MM for the 1922 Power Act. A commission (Escom) would not oversee, 
but run, the country’s ESI. The Act also ratified nationalisation. VFPC was on borrowed time and 
expropriated in 1948. From thereon, Escom could focus on eliminating MEU generation, which it did as 
we shall see in the next paragraph covering the second critical juncture. But at this point, the assertion 
made in Chapter 6.3.3 that these events were ‘foundational’, can be confirmed; where in line with 
Marquard’s view (2004: 146) the objectives of the regulation institutionalised with the Act, were 
“effectively preserved” for 85 years (1910 – 1995). Indeed, except for new municipal generation, which 
was officially stopped in 1969, and limited private sector generation from 2012 under the REIPPPP, the 
two path dependent processes created by the Act remain in place in 2017. Firstly, that users142 would be 
supplied by a nationally integrated utility (Escom); and secondly, the cross subsidisation of municipal 
functions from electricity sales, which did not apply to Escom. For the latter, the mining industry’s ability 
to influence the Commission Report which led to the publication of the Bill (precursor to the Act), was 
key. As pointed out by Christie (Chapter 6.3.2) the mining industry wanted the lowest possible electricity 
tariff and did not want a situation to arise which would allow MEU’s to charge mines higher rates for the 
relief of rates. Thus, the Power Act granted MEU’s the automatic right to generate and distribute within 
their areas of jurisdiction but not to specific (mines, government and railways) or large (>25 kVA) users; 
and required private utilities to apply for a license to operate in a municipal area, which was unlikely to 
be granted – and indeed none of any significance was. The consequence, which endures to 2017, is that 
the practise of the cross-subsidisation of municipal functions through an indirect tax levied by 
municipalities on their consumers, which at times and over time is practised beyond its economic limits, 
is a practise not imposed on users taking their supply from Eskom. 
One can thus conclude that the characteristic of path dependency is present, whereby the further that 
government progresses along a path, the greater the likelihood that other previously appropriate 
alternatives will not be considered, as has been the case. The combination of these events demonstrates 
conclusively that the Power Act was a critical juncture, and the starting point of path dependent ESI.  
The second critical juncture is less clear cut. The research identified the 1969 Margate Convention, where 
Escom (supported by national government) and the AMEU (supported by the UME) squared off. In 
hindsight, it was little more than the AMEU negotiating the best settlement, with the decision to halt 
municipal generation already made. In return, Escom would not challenge municipal distribution rights, 
and borders would be extended in recognition of cities growing, but subject to an agreement reached 
between Escom and the municipality. Escom’s concessions were minor if one considers that this informal 
agreement was contrary to the provisions of the 1910 Power Act, which guaranteed municipal generation 
and distribution rights. From hereon Escom would dominate all generation in the country. Thus, the 
agreement satisfies the third requirement of a critical juncture - where the outcome can reproduce itself 
to become dominant. Although necessary, this is not sufficient. For the event to be classified as 
contingent, it must be shown that Escom’s domination of generation would not have occurred regardless, 
through transformational or adaptive change (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007).   
Marquard's (2006, p.154) analysis found that during the 1950s and 1960s, Escom’s ability to access 
international loans with relative ease, allowed it to: 1) Fund its expansion programme; and, 2) Integrate 
the separate electricity undertakings through the construction of a national grid, made possible by high-
 




voltage transmission. The grid would unlock greater economies of scale, as much larger electricity plants 
could be built on the coal mines, eliminating transportation. Simultaneously, the Borckenhagen 
Committee weighed in by supporting Escom’s preferential right to supply energy intensive industry, but 
more importantly, by asserting that it was Escom’s role to meet the country’s electricity requirements, 
while “further municipal generation in areas which could be supplied by Escom should be discouraged”. 
The combined effect of these events necessitated reform, which took the form of the Electricity 
Amendment Act of 1971. This sequence of events supports the supposition of transformational change.  
However, although these events are not disputed, the research found that the situation was far more 
complex and that Eskom’s ability to continually benefit from rent-seeking, (always having national 
government’s tacit support), meant that it was able to influence outcomes. Firstly, Borckenhagen’s report, 
which investigated the financial relations between the three tiers of government, and primarily municipal 
funding shortfalls, took 15 years to be released as a White Paper, and provided local government  little 
financial relief and no new revenue sources (Chapter 7.4.1). The pronouncements it made on ESI sided 
heavily with Escom, and when the UME challenged these findings and recommendations, the Committee 
responded that MEU’s were contacted but failed to make representation during the consultation period. 
The AMEU minutes tell a different story; one of cancelled and postponed meetings, and that when 
meetings were held, they were short, vague and questions posed were superficial. Mr Leishman went as 
far as accusing the Committee of not being truthful (see Chapter 7.4.2 – May 1958, October 1959, May 
1960, May 1963 and May 1968).  Secondly, during this period municipal generation hinged on the JEU 
application to construct the 1 000 MW Liefde-en-Vrede, which needed to commence before 1966 to 
ensure uninterrupted internal supply. Both the Provincial Administrator and Minister of Economic Affairs 
postponed and cancelled meetings, and when the meetings were held (always in the presence of Escom, 
a privilege not extended to them) they were short, off-topic and inconclusive. These delay tactics 
disrupted JEU planning, which they knew jeopardised the project. The JEU’s application, to which Escom 
objected, was declined three times on the basis that the plant would not generate electricity at a cheaper 
rate than Escom. This was an incorrect interpretation of the regulations (conversion), because although 
true on paper143, the Liefde-en-Vrede plant would in fact generate at a cheaper rate than Escom could 
supply. This would translate to either a lower tariff for its consumers or greater surpluses, or both - clearly 
in everyone’s interest, except Escom’s. This is an important point, because the JEU plant which railed coal 
in and used sewerage for 80% of its water needs, (a benefit national government inexplicably appears to 
have chosen to ignore, even though government from 1956 stated that water would be a limiting factor 
to economic development (MacKay, 2003)), could still generate at a cost lower than the large Escom 
plants, which had no coal transportation costs and were operating at neither a profit nor a loss144. This 
begs the question, were Escom tariffs higher than they needed to be? Was this possibly to fund their 
expansion programme, which as already seen, has almost always been based on overly optimistic demand 
projections? Finally, in declining the application, the Administrator and Minister were contravening the 
Power Act (1910). The JEU had approached the Supreme Court and their lawyers were confident of a 
victory. It was behind the scenes political pressure, and the delays, which persuaded Leishman to drop 
the court action. By siding with Escom and choosing to ignore / overlook the merits of the application, 
government was, to some extent, irrational and one-sided; which then satisfies Mahoney (2000) 
 
143 The distinction here is that different metrics were being applied, Escom pointed to the cost of generation and not the (higher) cost of supply, 
which from a JEU perspective was meaningless as it was charged the latter   
144 Until 1985 (under the 1922 and 1958 Electricity Acts), Escom’s tariff structure was restricted by the principle that tariffs should set so that a) 




requirements for the decision taken at Margate to be classified as contingent. This is not to suggest that 
Escom would not have ultimately dominated the ESI, it would have, but had there been a competitive 
market, it may have taken longer and changed the dynamics of the ESI to the advantage of industry and 
the population. In conclusion, Escom was able to exert its influence to exploit a situation of uncertainty 
(Capoccia 2015), entrench its position and take control. Which it did. And its domination was such, that it 
then went on to either renege or partly honour many of the commitments made to the AMEU, which was 
powerless to hold it to account. Based on this trajectory, I argue that the Margate Convention was a critical 
juncture.  
The third critical juncture is the 1996 Constitution, which recognised and elevated, local government to 
one of the three spheres of government; representing a fundamental shift away from the three-level 
hierarchical inter-governmental system in place since 1910, with municipal function under the authority 
of the provinces. To address inequalities of the past, the constitution introduced a wall-to-wall local 
government system by providing that municipalities “be established for the whole of the territory of the 
Republic”, and given the executive authority to provide specified services (listed in Part B of Schedule 4 
and Part B of Schedule 5) in a sustainable manner, for which they are entitled to collect revenue - 
electricity reticulation being one. And it was this provision which was the death-knell of REDs. 
Municipalities, having sought legal opinion, knew that this was their trump card and that should the 
proposed EDI reform take a wrong turn, they could simply exit, which they did. We have seen how tense 
political negotiations between the ANC and the NP during the GNU, led to municipal functions enjoying 
constitutional protection. Official NP policy, through all of the 1980s, was for decentralized local 
government. Of course, this was in name only, as independent local government was just not possible 
while trying to maintain the apartheid system. Too many things could go wrong, and the country under 
the numerous “state of emergencies” had become highly centralized, with all decisions, big and small, 
having to go through PW Botha’s State Security Council. However, the NP negotiated fiercely for 
decentralised strong local government during the scripting of the final constitution under the GNU, as it 
was: 1) A means to protect (white) minority interests, knowing that they would lose the national elections; 
and, 2) A counter balance to potential abuses by national government. Conversely, the ANC was pushing 
for highly centralised government, which it believed was more likely to ensure the redistribution of wealth 
and the reversal of apartheid inequities. Mainstream international thinking at the time was for 
decentralised government (World Bank, the IMF, USAID, other agencies and many academics) - viewed as 
a means to entrench democracy and strengthen accountability. Identifying benefits for itself once its 
political position was secured after the democratic elections, the ANC yielded (see Chapter 4.5.2) and local 
government was elevated to a sphere of government. This outcome was never certain. If anything, with 
the ANC winning an outright majority, it could have dictated terms and insisted on a highly centralised 
structure during the short period of the GNU, had the balance of power within its constituency been 
slightly stronger.  
The challenge of decentralised local government, as the literature states, is that its autonomy can be more 
easily compromised if most of its funding is sourced from national government. Independent revenue 
sources, which the constitution provided, mitigate against this risk; but here we enter into the realm of 
tax theory, because national governments are not in favour of duplicate and competing taxes being levied 
by local government, such as personal or company income tax, GST and VAT, and thus limit the options. 
The constitution addressed this issue by disallowing local government from imposing income tax, VAT, 




services. In essence, the constitution formalised the existing and entrenched (sticky) path dependent 
practises going back to 1910, and further strengthened them by elevating local government to an equal 
and autonomous sphere. No longer could a provincial administrator issue non-negotiable instructions. 
Municipalities were still however expected to: be self-sufficient; deliver the functions that they always 
had; and, access the same revenue sources. How this approach would resolve the decades-old dilemma 
dating back to the 1950s, of municipalities simply being over-burdened, under-funded and under-
capacitated, is anybody’s guess. This is especially true if the political changes of having to deliver services 
to previously unserved areas, the establishment of new municipalities and their transformation, are also 
considered. These factors had huge implications for municipalities, not least of all Johannesburg, which 
almost went bankrupt in the late 1990s, as the case study has shown.   
Ultimately, the writing of a new constitution presented a window of opportunity where change was 
possible – providing the impetus for a reactive sequence that could have been employed to effect a 
reversal of events and ensure a new path – or was it another critical juncture point, due to the complex 
and competing priorities faced by all political actors in the three spheres of government, Eskom and the 
MEU’s, at this watershed moment in the country’s history (as detailed Chapter 7.6.4) - leading to further 
institutional lock-in? Table 8-2 shows why it is the latter.  
Table 8-2: Counterfactual Analysis of Electricity Distribution as a Constitutional Mandate (2006)  
Requirement  ✓ /  Motivation 
Time sequence of events ✓ Events have been clearly traced and reliable 
Other available and viable 
options 
✓ Several options were available. The one chosen was contingent, initial expectations were that 
the ANC would opt for highly centralised government 
Does event capitalise on 
initial advantage 
✓ Electricity surpluses are a primary municipal revenue source. When this was challenged by the 
RED’s reform, the constitutional prescript ended the programme  
Positive reinforcement  ✓ Having demonstrated constitutional cover, attempts by national government to reform the 
sector are on municipal terms, resulting in a deadlock  
Is the situation exploited ✓ Electricity surpluses have become the balancing figure for many municipal budgets. Capital 
investment on infrastructure is reduced to cross-subsidise other functions   
Having identified the three critical junctures that elaborate on how municipal ESI was formed and then 
endured for over a century, it is worth testing this against the theory. Historical institutionalists (as 
explained in Chapter 2.3.3) recognise that events occur continuously; yet some matter and result in path 
dependency, while others do not. Why though? Here, due to the influence exerted by economics, the 
tendency has been to evaluate events through a utilitarian explanation of efficiency. Mahoney (2000) 
however suggests that this should be expanded to include the sociological frameworks of “Functional, 
Power and Legitimation” (Table 2-1). Such an analysis not only provides different insights but becomes 
crucial if the most appropriate mechanism to reverse lock-in is being sought. Indeed, these additional 
frameworks have proved useful to the research, which has found that the practise of relief of rates, also 
known as cross-subsidisation, satisfies all the criteria of the functional typology. Indeed, while the other 
three typologies may contain similar individual elements, such as mechanisms of change or reproduction, 
or institutional characteristics, “functional” is the closest explanation that appears to fulfil all three 
criteria. The points below, summarise the functional typology in Table 2-1 – and each of the three features 





1. Mechanism of Reproduction: An institution is reproduced because it serves a function for an overall 
system: Yes, surcharges on electricity tariffs are an indirect tax, but not readily recognised as such by 
users, making them more palatable. 
2. Potential Characteristics of Institutions: Institution may be less functional than previously available 
alternatives: Yes, higher electricity tariffs have had the following effects over the long term: losing 
commercial consumers to Eskom supplied areas; users reducing their consumption or switching to 
other sources; a regressive tax; a negative impact on local competitiveness; and an over exploitation 
of cross-subsidisation, used to fund non-electricity services and other expenditure items such as 
wages – leading to system neglect as capital investments are delayed, reduced or (generally) both.       
3. Mechanism of Change: Exogenous shock that transforms system needs: Yes, the current system is so 
entrenched that national government’s attempt at transformational change (REDs) failed. However, 
first signs of exogenous forces starting to challenge the status quo have begun to appear, as per the 
JEU case study.   
Research Question 2: The extent to which national and local government’s inability to find a 
political solution in the RED’s reform process was due to underestimating broader dynamics and 
the entrenched status quo 
Question 1 has shown that the transition to a democratically elected government created a juncture point 
for change. Thus, determining the reasons for failure necessitates an analysis of the sequence of events 
pre and post the juncture point (Mahoney 2000).    
Government, after the GNU ended in February 1997, was under significant pressure to uplift the lives of 
millions. Spearheaded by the recently adopted constitution, delivery was to be achieved through broad 
policy frameworks, targeted strategies, legislation and action plans. The combination of urgency, newly 
appointed politicians with varying levels of skills, competence and experience, and the enormity of the 
task, compounded the inevitable and unavoidable unintended consequences and knock-on effects that 
every government experience. Calling for a “balance between independence and cooperation” to achieve 
the objectives of developmental local government, the 1998 White Paper on Local Government aligned 
with the constitution. Municipal capital projects would be funded from three sources, namely: grants from 
the consolidated municipal infrastructure programme, internal cross-subsidisation, and private sector 
involvement. Regarding electricity, the Paper recognised the revenue contribution made, but likewise the 
need for reform. It did not want to pre-empt ESI reform outcomes, as it recognised that the DME was still 
formulating the policy, but suggested that a local electricity tax could be implemented to offset revenue 
losses. The Paper was praised for recognising and taking responsibility for its service delivery obligations, 
which it did not take lightly; nor under-estimating the task. It was however heavily criticised for failing to 
recognise the state of crisis of local government, and on that score, all its good intentions became an 
elusive wish list. 
At national level, economic policy started with the RDP, shifted to GEAR and then ASGISA – with each 
move taking it ever-further away from the long-held ANC’s left of centre ideology. President Mbeki spoke 
of creating a competitive economy - explicitly emphasising fiscal austerity, deficit reduction, and pegging 
taxation and expenditure as fixed proportions of GDP.  
Overall, electricity policy reform was developed through various government forums and committees, 




compromise between economic efficiency and socio-economic upliftment. The former identified the 
urgent need for EDI restructuring; recognising that to create a competitive ESI, generation, transmission 
and distribution had to be separated; with an emphasis on cost reflective tariffs. Social upliftment 
imperatives then recognised that electrification had to be funded through cross-subsidisation, as new 
connections were to low consumption customers. To address the cross-subsidisation dilemma, the 
additional cost needed to be made transparent (shown as a tax). These recommendations were submitted 
to cabinet and in 1997 cabinet approved the consolidation of the EDI into the maximum number of 
financially viable and independent REDs. The Energy White Paper was released soon after (1998) and 
called for reform of the sector. Consultants were promptly hired to work out the details and in 2003 set 
up EDI Holdings for the sole purpose of restructuring the EDI. Chapter 7.5.5 explains how fraught this 
process became, resorting to drift to effect change, and the extent to which national government never 
fully grasped the stickiness of the situation – with electricity distribution at the core of municipal 
government. A post-mortem article on the demise of EDI Holdings issued by its CEO (De Beer & Waters 
2011) shows that it was only in 2009 that the penny finally dropped “Two years have passed since it 
became evident that any meaningful progress in restructuring the EDI was unlikely without a constitutional 
change”. Local government, with the backing of the constitution, was never going to just roll over if it felt 
that once again it was being marginalised.  
The window of opportunity for a reactive sequence (to transform or even reverse previous events) existed 
after the first democratic elections, when theoretically anything was possible. However, change was never 
going to be straightforward, as operational practises were on a well-established and entrenched negative 
feedback loop, wherein municipalities had to maintain the status quo to fund service delivery. Reform of 
the EDI would have required detailed assessment of dynamics perpetuating lock-in, and the development 
of a politically and economically acceptable alternative. What occurred, and unintentionally because of 
the complexity of the situation, was a national government policy approach that appeared contradictory 
and seemingly at cross-purposes. As such, it had little hope of derailing the entrenched path dependent 
practise of the relief of rates. On the one hand, national government spoke of transformational and 
developmental local government’s provision, in most instances, of loss-making services to the previously 
unserved population, funded through a combination of national grants and cross-subsidisation. On the 
other, it touted reform. Cross subsidisation of course had been a loyal servant for over a century; and this 
practise was possible, and indeed necessary given the context, if it was not overdone - which 
unfortunately it was, for two reasons, with one a consequence of the other. The first is that the principle 
of municipal financial self-sufficiency, albeit not as stringently enforced, remained the overall objective; 
as the recently concluded constitution, pursuing decentralization, escalated local government to one of 
the three spheres, allocating its roles, responsibilities, functions and revenue sources – of which surpluses 
from municipal operations were sanctioned and exclusive. Secondly, the demands on electricity surpluses 
to fund municipal functions were steadily and consistently increased by the combination of stalled 
national growth policies and the decline of local government competence. These two events led to the 
institutional reproduction and acceleration of the relief of rates policy in the post-democratic institutional 
arrangements. Astoundingly, through all of this, national government was still commissioning electricity 
workshops and endorsing reform ideals, such as cost-reflective tariffs, consolidation and efficiency.  
This convoluted policy context explains why the EDI restructuring programme, which consisted of 897 
projects, staffed by competent and dedicated individuals, stood little chance. It may have been that 




after adoption would have raised concerns about the ANC’s sincerity and would have faced massive 
external and internal opposition. Indeed, the 17th Constitutional Amendment Bill to effect this change 
was tabled in 2009 but withdrawn in 2011. Without a new and quantifiable revenue source - not just 
vague notions of profit-sharing with national government, which would hold the “golden share” and thus 
exercise control - municipalities were not going to give up their crown jewel.  
Ultimately, the primary issues which ESI reforms aimed to address i.e. a single generator (lack of 
competition), making MEU’s viable and functional, improved service delivery, and cost reflective tariffs, 
are in 2017 largely in the same state as when raised as problematic in the 1990s. Of course, the root 
causes of needing to address these issues, have not subsided, let alone disappeared. Indeed, as expected, 
they have become more urgent and perhaps a major contributory factor to the state of the EDI specifically 
and the ESI generally. Here it is not possible to speculate on what could have been; but certainly, the 
proposed reforms were carefully considered responses to looming problems. Key amongst these is the 
appropriateness and sustainability of a hidden tax, or ‘cross subsidisation’, as a major financial contributor 
to local government service delivery and by extension the legitimacy of national government. In the short 
term and under a scenario of flat or declining electricity tariffs, as was the case in the late 1990s until 2005 
(Chapter 6.6.2), perhaps it was. Certainly not once the large increases commenced from 2006, which 
added to the other contributory factors creating the death spiral (Chapter 7.6.2).  
In conclusion, given the complexity of the issues at the time - a young democracy and new government, 
uncertainty on how to approach and execute reform, the pressing need for service delivery, and the speed 
at which things were unfolding in the country at the time, EDI reform is tantamount to policy failure. The 
opportunity for reform was present but lost during implementation due to muddled and uncoordinated 
policy.      
8.4 Assessment of Objective 2  
Having addressed the research questions, we can now consider whether it was necessary, and indeed 
beneficial, for the research to have been this broad and detailed. Are the complexities of the two 
diametrically opposed objectives such that it necessitated a review and understanding of the evolution of 
the three tiers of government, the political economy of the country and Eskom, before the primary 
research topic could be tackled? I would maintain that it was; and for two reasons: 1) The inordinate role 
of centralised government, which wanted little to do with local government; and 2) The extraordinary role 
that electricity plays in the economy. This is clearly demonstrated by the outcomes of the advent of 
democracy, which had the potential to change any and all policy, but did not do so to the extent that one 
may have expected. As per Nattrass and Seekings (2015) “The ANC simply adopted existing government 
policy and deracialised them resulting in limited transformation and reform.” Thus, path dependent 
processes endured; and on this basis alone one must go beyond 1994 to understand the genesis and 
reasons for stickiness - certainly for municipal ESI.   
In its attempt to reduce the tax burden on property owners, local government made a crucial conceptual 
turn from the moment it first started selling electricity (as was its practise with most services it provided). 
Of course, the massive extent of revenue contribution to municipal finances from electrical generation 
and distribution was not, and in truth could not have been, forecast when electricity rights and privileges 
were granted to municipalities by the 1910 Power Act. Understandably, as soon as the true potential was 




their exclusive rights. Inherited from the British, the practise of relief of rates grew into the monster its 
naysayers predicted in the 1930s – warnings coming not only from the AMEU, but academics (Chapter 
7.4.1) and the findings of a commission of inquiry (Chapter 7.3.1), which concluded similarly from the 
“point of view of the users of electricity, and uneconomic from the point of view of industrial and general 
development of the city.” At the time it was estimated that to fund other municipal functions, electricity 
was 14.5% more expensive than it needed to be, becoming a massive drag for an energy intensive 
economy; with three direct outcomes – being less competitive, encouraging business to take their supply 
from Escom and becoming disproportionately inequitable for residential consumers. In the words of 
Councillor James (1938) “All ratepayers are not necessarily electricity consumers, but all electricity 
consumers are ratepayers, either as owners of property or through the rent that they pay.” The temptation 
of ‘easy’ revenue led to over-reliance, to the extent that in certain instances the amount taken exceeded 
gross profit. As operations fluctuate from year to year, the relief of rates should only be possible when 
there is a surplus – and a true one at that – after allowing for redemption, interest on loans and most 
importantly, depreciation and obsolescence of plant and equipment; often overlooked or subject to 
variation on opinion for capital expenditure. An overreliance on this revenue source is likely to create 
municipal funding problems if electricity sales or profits drop. Additionally, using electricity surpluses to 
fund unprofitable or risky municipal enterprises, discourages the enterprise itself from maximising its 
returns. This was the case in the 1930s and remains the case in 2017.  
The real issue always, was the relationship between central and local government. National government 
was constantly engaged in a balancing act between the perceived need of a self-sufficient local 
government (a British inheritance), the lack of sustainable means of independent revenue generation by 
the aforesaid local government, (especially given the practises inherited from Britain re local voting) and 
the need for a state owned utility which government would use as the foundation of its industrialization 
policy – triggered by a contingent event in 1910, whose key tenets through various historical processes of 
reinforcement, remains with us today. (Ironically, the underlying motive of the 1910 Power Act which was 
to address concerns about “a powerful monopoly” (VFTPC), was ultimately what it worsened.) This meant 
that the three actors were always in conflict.  Over the years, municipalities had been required to 
undertake additional functions, which they did not believe was their responsibility and received no 
additional income. Being so hard pressed for money, the municipal treasury was often forced to act in the 
way it did. What options did local government really have? It is true that landowners were protected, as 
an indirect tax was easier to collect than a direct one, and paid by a bigger base, reducing the burden on 
landowners. Concurrently and continuously, national government did not pay heed and would have little 
to do with local governments - piling them with additional functions. This led to several commissions of 
inquiry into municipal finances, Randall (1930s), Borckenhagen (1950s and 1960s), Browne and Croeser 
(1970s and 1980s), and all were unsympathetic to local government’s plea for additional funding, 
instructing them to be more efficient, while ratifying the practise of relief of rates in the 1971 White Paper 
and re-affirming this in the 1996 Constitution.  
Ultimately, Eskom benefited through all of this, because national government was developing its 
industrialization strategy centred around this vertically integrated utility. For example, it is not 
inconceivable that one of the albeit lesser drivers of national government’s plan from 1960 to offer 
financial support for industry to create jobs in the homelands (and out of white areas), had the added 
benefit of creating new demand for Escom at the expense of the MEU’s. Therefore, over a 120-year period, 
a complex relationship developed between MEU’s (the proverbial local government cash cow), national 




protected by the new constitution, any attempt to introduce change (reform) to municipal and national 
ESI is unlikely to succeed unless the knock-on effects to the entire system are considered and addressed.  
Has anything changed? Christie (1984:35) confirms that municipalities were practising the relief of rates 
in 1907 – effectively from when they first started generating and distributing electricity. Indeed, concerns 
of this being extended to the mining industry, formed the reason that Rand Mines vetoed the proposal of 
Johannesburg municipality supplying the entire city. The research identified two critical junctures 
(Question 1) when, according to the theory, the window for change was most ajar but did not occur. These 
two points in time were by no means the only instances when the practise was challenged or could have 
been challenged and meaningfully addressed. There were several others inter alia: International trends in 
the 1930s and 1940s which initially placed a cap on the transfer of surpluses and then ended them 
altogether, which were disregarded here; high and often bi-annual Escom tariff increases on very short 
notice in the 1970s; direct competition from Eskom in the 1980s which serviced adjacent areas, most 
notably Sandton; Johannesburg’s bold, but futile, decision in 1992 to reduce residential electricity tariffs 
by 10% and limit the increase on business tariffs to 5%, which backfired - resulting in a 25% increase the 
following year (Figure 7.3); and five double digit tariff increases by Eskom from 2008, putting the entire 
municipal funding arrangement under pressure. Throughout all of these opportunity junctures, nothing 
has yet changed. 
8.5 Assessing the Usefulness of Historical Institutionalism as a 
Theoretical Framework 
This research does not seek to engage in theory building - limiting its academic contribution to an in-depth 
analysis of the municipal ESI, which provides new content and insight. Having said this, it is worth 
reflecting on my experiences with the selected framework, and in so doing, deliver on the second part of 
the first research objective. Such critique is also likely to be useful to future researchers, if my recent 
interactions with many students and academics is considered. They, as was I, were attracted to 
institutionalism, but often found the approach, especially the historical, to be opaque, lengthy, subjective 
and unwieldy; leaving many to echo the words of Thelen and Steinmo “the institutions explain everything 
until they explain nothing” (Chapter 2.4) - notions I grappled with regularly. 
National government abandoning the reform of EDI after 10 years of effort, demonstrates that it was 
unable to unlock the institutional interconnections existing between itself and local government. Thus, by 
going deeper and wider, the research aims to provide a more nuanced understanding of the path 
dependent trajectory that has developed over many decades. Historical institutionalism was deemed 
appropriate, as it offers a lens to trace the institutional and economic evolution of municipal ESI within 
the context of the country’s three economic pillars – mineral resources, cheap energy and cheap labour. 
The strong linkages between the pillars meant that all three had to be considered.   
The concept of path dependence and critical junctures is relatively straightforward, widely understood 
and accepted. There is thus no benefit in interrogating or espousing on its usefulness for this research, as 
it has been adequately demonstrated in the answer to research question one. What is more complicated 
and less understood, is the process of incremental change during long periods of stasis. The approach 
adopted for this research follows, with contributions from others, Mahoney and Thelen’s advancement 
of the framework, with their typology to account for modes of change and change actors given political 




usefulness based on my experience. Here I am not alone: “The value of Mahoney and Thelen’s approach 
is that it provides testable hypotheses about how the nature of context and actor discretion relate to types 
of change, and it provides a potentially valuable framework for a more fine-grained understanding of the 
change process within energy transitions” Lockwood (2016).  
The research identified three critical junctures, all of which deepened the path dependent practise of the 
relief of rates, rather than having the opposite effect of providing an opportunity for reversal or 
termination. Indeed, exogenous shocks (in this case the 1994 democratic elections) often promise more 
than they deliver. Certainly, they can contribute, or even hasten, institutional change or not. The research 
has identified both. Albeit that the second critical juncture (Margate agreement) occurred at a specific 
place and date, detailed historical tracing has shown that it was not an exogenous shock. Rather it was 
the outcome of an ongoing process of Escom undermining the MEU’s and Johannesburg, as explained in 
Chapter 6.5.3, and identified through the typology as displacement (change type), with insurrectionaries 
as change agents. Applied to the typology, the historical events are congruent with the theory.  
In assessing whether institutional change occurred, the level of historical detail has generally allowed for 
a straightforward identification of the change type. Where this has not been possible Mahoney’s and 
Thelen’s typology has deciphered ‘grey areas’ providing clarity and certainty. By way of example, it is 
posited in Chapter 6.4.3 that the Electricity Act (1922) reinforced the 1910 Power Act through the process 
of layering – but it is also plausible to categorise this change as an outcome of drift or conversion. The 
application of the typology, which simultaneously evaluates the type and agents of change points 
identifies it as layering through a process of elimination, as detailed in that chapter section. Having 
demonstrated that overall I have had a positive experience in the application of the framework, it is useful 
to impart my experiences and insights:  
• The research topic I chose had various aspects to it, and the use of a multiple framework approach 
thus allowed me to work separately on these distinct aspects of the research problem;  
• As has been explained above, it is easy to get caught up in the drama of punctuated equilibrium and 
exogenous shocks to the system that force actors into new paths. However, this is seldom the case, 
and where punctuated equilibrium does occur, it is not as sudden as it may seem. It is the culmination 
of a series of events which have led to a decision or action point, which then marks a point in time – 
as expounded upon in Chapter 2.3.3 under Punctuated Equilibrium. It is the careful and accurate 
tracing of the behind the scenes events, or as per North the “period of friction”, which add value and 
understanding to the research;  
• Historical institutionalism is empirically demanding and can be difficult to apply. Limited research 
sources and findings do allow you to draw conclusions, but ultimately these cannot be substantiated 
or defended. Similarly, shortcuts will also lead to facile judgements which are easily exposed; 
• Linked to the previous point, a failure to present facts in their order and with the level of weight they 
carried at the time, means outcomes can be misunderstood, misinterpreted or misused. This can have 
negative consequences for the theoretical approach due to misapplication, but more importantly, 
may lead to long-term negative outcomes if acted upon;  
• The research amply demonstrates that from its genesis, the major decision points that have, and 
continue to, shape South Africa’s ESI (and consequently EDI) are politically driven; with economic and 
technical factors as secondary considerations. Here, prominent, but not isolated, examples include: 
municipal councillors institutionalising the relief of rates policy in the 1930’s; the Provincial 




and the decision under democracy, to continue to cross-subsidise municipal income from electricity 
by bundling it into the tariff as a hidden tax, rather than transparently reflecting it as such. These, and 
many other instances, therefore underline the appropriateness of the historical institutionalism 
described by Steinmo (2008, 151) as “an approach to studying politics.”   
• The framework has validated that analysis which concentrates on long-term conditions and gradual 
change, the long durée, is able to reveal and provide clear explanations as to why policy fails and the 
consequences thereof. It is my experience and belief that this research approach has provided insights 
that other methods may well not have. However, this can only be conclusively validated through the 
application of additional comparative research approaches, and perhaps a topic for future 
researchers; and, 
• The research has also benefitted greatly from the significant evolution that historical institutionalism 
has undergone from the late 1980’s. For example, incremental change would have been difficult to 
manage in this research under the framework’s earlier guidelines and approach; with the ongoing 
refinements to the framework, improving its usefulness, accessibility and applicability. This is also 
clearly evident through the growing number of theses over the last few years that have successfully 
anchored their research in historical institutionalism - which perhaps with poetic irony, itself has 
evolved in a process of incremental change. It is my hope that this study will make a similar 
contribution. 
Thus, we return to the core tenet of the chosen theoretical framework – History Matters. Certainly, we 
have seen that it does. The use of the historical institutionalism framework does however require detailed 
and reliable research sources, such as the ones I was fortunate to unearth; and under these circumstances 
it is a rewarding and worthwhile endeavour.    
8.6 Final Thoughts & Additional Research Findings 
With so much of this research pointing to the currently entrenched system’s resilience and ability to 
endure, an important question is whether the odds are then not heavily stacked in favour of continued 
path dependence? I would answer, possibly not. Table 8-3: illustrates how the relief of rates (cross 
subsidisation) has progressively evolved into a cumulative crisis since it was first flagged. In the table, 
concerns raised by the AMEU at the 1936 conference (and one subsequent factor identified in the 
research) are listed in the first column. The status of each is then rated at three key points in time, the 
two identified critical junctures and the present day (2017). Referenced research findings (in brackets) 
then justify the allocated rating where necessary – with the three rankings, or metrics, applied being 
‘limited, moderate and critical’. Here, the objective is not to provide a financial quantification of the 
impact of cross-subsidisation on the economy, nor does this analysis mean to imply that electricity tariffs 
are higher solely, or even largely, as a result of cross subsidisation – electricity tariffs increases have, and 
specifically from 1969, almost exclusively been the sole preserve of Eskom. Indeed, a 2015 analysis that 
compared tariffs, found municipal tariffs in several categories to be cheaper than Eskom’s145.  
The table’s objectives are thus twofold. The research has demonstrated how the relief of rates was 
inherited from the British system and retained even when Britain, along with New Zealand and New York 
 






City amongst others, discarded (indeed outlawed the practise) in the 1930s. Locally, at this time however, 
with Escom’s sole focus on servicing the mining industry, the practise was serving local government 
funding requirements well, becoming ever more entrenched as residential demand grew. These 
increasing returns naturally led to stickiness and the amplification of a positive feedback loop, despite 
credible economic theory to the contrary, which remains in place in 2017. Thus, the first objective is to 
ascertain how the context has changed. In other words, why concerns identified in the mid-1930s only 
appear to be threatening the entire system some 80 years later? Is it that it was a necessary requirement 
for all of them to manifest? Here, it then also becomes particularly significant to rate the indicators at 
other historical points to understand the variations in the ranking results. Thus, when one examines the 
table, the complete dominance of the ‘critical’ ranking in 2017, suggests a tipping point, where a new 
critical juncture opens the door to change, may be imminent. Not as an exogenous shock but rather a 
culmination of events of an ongoing process. If handled correctly, meaningful and long overdue reform 
can occur; and this suggests that the probability of change may significantly advance within the next five 
years - not by design - but the combination of: 1) Deterioration in municipal finance – made up of 
corruption, incompetence, a weak economy, and cross subsidisation reaching its economic limits; and 2) 
Infrastructure and service delivery revolts, which may force change through protest action by lower 
income consumers and reduced consumption by the MEU’s core profitable consumers, who through 
technological advances (Arthur, 1989), now have viable and cost-effective alternate options. Indeed, the 
historical institutionalist framework adopted, has demonstrated this potential, by identifying the 
competing vested interests of actors and the economic and social response to cross subsidisation in the 
form of a hidden tax. When, if and how such potential manifests, and what its results will be, offers 
interesting scenarios for future researchers to engage with.  Simultaneously, the second objective of this 




Table 8-3: Impact of Relief of Rates (1936 – 2017) 
Concerns with Relief of Rates  1936 1970 1996/98 2017 Research Findings 
1936  
Inflated tariffs raise the likelihood of 
loss of revenue through reduced sales 
/ fuel switching 
Limited – ESI in growth 
phase. Supply shortages 
as national grid and large 
Escom plants still under 
construction (Ch 5.4.2) 
Limited – South Africa’s 
economically most 
prosperous decade (Ch 
5.5.1) 
Moderate – Excess supply 
leads to tariff decreases (real 
terms), still unaffordable for 
many (Ch 5.6.2) 
Critical – 300% plus increase in 
tariffs 2008 to 2013 (Fig 5.8) 
Theory (Ch 2.4.2) warns that business & 
residents evade or relocate to municipalities 
with lower costs. The research found JEU 
higher electricity costs contributed (not 
primarily but not insignificantly) to the early 
1990s migration to Sandton and from 2000 
to high non-technical losses (Ch 6.4)  
High tariffs ignore the needs of poor & 
large households (regressive tax) 146 
Moderate – Poor white 
problem (Ch 5.3.1) 
Limited (Ch 5.5.1) Critical – Addressed through 
national policy (Ch 3.6.3) 
Critical – Relief provided 
through FBE, but insufficient in 
a context of high 
unemployment, inequality & 
low economic growth (Ch 3.6.5) 
The research has found that nationally, & 
specifically in Johannesburg (as per the case 
study), the high levels of non-payment are a 
combination of an inability to pay & protest 
at the inadequate service delivery levels 
Compromises prudent accounting 
practises (depreciation, redemption) 
leading to deterioration of system as 
surpluses are prioritised for relief of 
rates 
Limited – Infrastructure 
relatively new. AMEU 
concerned about the 
future (Ch 6.3.1) 
Moderate – Networks & 
generation plant ageing. 
Increased demands on local 
government (Ch 6.4.2) 
Critical – Service delivery to 
previously unserved BLA’s 
funded largely through cross-
subsidisation (Ch 5.6.2; 6.5.6) 
Critical – Same as 1996 (Ch 
5.6.2; 6.5.6) 
Table 6-15 demonstrates the extent to 
which City Power’s performance is deficient 
in meeting the NERSA performance 
guidelines 
Transfer of surpluses leads to little or 
no reserves, requiring MEU’s to take 
loans to finance new equipment and 
operations, adding interest costs and 
necessitating more tariff increases  
Moderate – As per 
AMEU minutes (Ch 6.3.1) 
Moderate – No evidence 
found to suggest otherwise. 
Municipal tariffs were 
increased in line with Eskom  
Critical – Case by case basis. 
Johannesburg on the verge of 
bankruptcy diverted all 
surplus revenue to the 
municipal cause (Ch 6.6.1) 
Critical – MEU underinvesting 
by as much R2.5 billion per 
annum (Ch 6.5.4) 
Although financial statements were not 
scrutinized to determine if this was indeed 
the case, the research did confirm that large 
surpluses are being transferred to subsidise 
other municipal functions at the expense of 
capital investment 
Electricity provision must be efficient 
(cost reflective rates and without 
subsidy) to stimulate the economy 
Moderate – Tariffs 14.5% 
higher to fund relief of 
rates (Ch 6.3) 
Moderate Critical – New users are low 
users, with most unable to 
afford costs (Ch 6.5.6) 
Critical – High tariffs have led to 
theft & delinquent accounts (Ch 
6.5.6) 
The relief of rates has aided the false 
economy under which Eskom operates 
(expanded upon in the closing paragraphs 
below) 
Doubtful practise - surpluses vary 
annually, an overreliance may lead to 
funding problems if sales / surplus 
decrease 
Moderate – WLA in 
growth phase (Ch 5.5.1) 
Moderate – WLA about to 
enter into economic decline 
phase (Ch 6.4.1) 
Moderate – Eskom over 
supply keeps system in 
balance, but warning signs 
present (Ch 6.5.5) 
Critical – High tariffs & losses 
have led to large surplus 
reductions (Ch 6.6.2) 
The research has confirmed that this has 
materialised since ~2010. Raised individually 
by municipalities & through SALGA, gaining 
in momentum – primary topic at CIGFARO 
2017 conference (Ch 4.2.2)  
Technological advances may lead to 
consumers switching to other energy 
sources, especially if tariffs are too 
high  
Limited – New electrical 
equipment & limited 
alternatives 
Limited - New electrical 
equipment & limited 
alternatives  
Limited – Electrification & 
reduced electricity tariffs 
fuelled demand 
Critical – High tariffs, 
technological alternatives & 
climate change now driving 
demand down (Ch 6.6.2) 
Concerns with regards to the death spiral 
are not limited to Eskom (Ch 6.6.2). 
Conversely, consumers who cannot afford 
the tariffs are reverting to unsafe energy 
forms or theft, undermining the national 
electrification project  
 




Some municipal functions are 
unprofitable by their nature; thus 
cross-subsidisation is necessary -
swings and roundabouts 
True – Thus proposal to 
place a cap on transfers 
& levy a direct tax 
 Address apartheid inequities, 
but do so in a transparent 
manner viz direct tax (Ch 
5.6.2; 6.5.6) 
Critical - Increase national 
contribution &/or introduce 
new municipal revenue sources 
(Ch 4.2.2) 
Central theme of this research, with findings 
that support it, is that local government has 
been allocated insufficient & inappropriate 
(cross subsidisation) own revenue sources 
to fund developmental government, 
undermining the legitimacy of government  
Post 1936  
Corruption &/or reduced competency 
of local government, leading to 
budget shortfalls  
No evidence found to 
suggest that this existed  
Moderate - No evidence of 
widespread corruption.  
Purging of municipal staff to 
make way for Afrikaans 
speakers, had affected 
service, leading to calls for a 
commission of inquiry into 
municipal incompetence (Ch 
3.4.3) 
Critical – Employment equity 
at government level leads to 
loss of experienced staff, 
often replaced by 
inexperienced political 
appointees. Corruption on the 
rise since early 1990s (Ch 5.6 
& 6.6.1) 
Critical – As per Auditor General 
& National Treasury findings, 
manifested by correlation 
between technical failure & 
alignment with political factions 
(Ch 3.6.5) 




Ultimately, while musing on the research findings and the implications thereof for local government, its 
MEU’s and its finances however, it is worth taking some time to reflect on the elephant in the room; 
Eskom. Before doing so, it would be unfair and unkind to overlook the efforts and achievements of the 
countless dedicated employees who over the past 90 years committed themselves to building a world-
class utility, the fourth largest at one point, which continues to power the economy. The utility however 
has enjoyed a charmed life, which may very well be coming to its teleological end; facing the same ‘death 
spiral’ challenges that all large utilities around the world are grappling with. Eskom’s situation though, is 
perhaps more extreme. Here, the majority of the country’s minerals, the ‘wasting asset’, have been 
extracted – ore yields are declining, mining depths increasing, and in a prolonged cycle of depressed 
commodity prices, many mines are closing or contracting – the US$ price of gold for example has 
decreased by 10% for the period 2012 to 2017. It would be alarmist and overstating matters to believe 
that mining activity is nearing the end of the road, it is not, but it has declined, and this can be seen by 
the electricity demand - volumes in 2017/18 were at the same level to those in 2007; but of greater 
concern (and here take your pick between actual outcome or DoE margin of error) “For the financial year 
ending March 2018, the actual total electricity consumed is about 30% less than what was projected in the 
Integrated Resource Plan of 2010147” (Minister of Energy – Jeff Radebe). Thus, the economy has started to 
transition to a significantly less energy intensive service economy, which profoundly changes the Eskom 
modus operandi and necessitates realism and an ability to adapt its business model to ensure its survival. 
Indeed, Jaglin (2016) predicts its demise within a five-year period - at the very least in its current structure.  
On reflecting somewhat deeper into what is present-day Eskom, I can’t help but conclude that the special 
place that Eskom held in government’s decision making, both pre and post 1994, created a false economy 
for the utility, which has finally caught up with it. Several instances of this, drawn from the research, are 
detailed to illustrate the point. Firstly, the Johannesburg case study has shown that the JEU was a well-
operated utility which was a net seller of electricity to Escom in the 1950s. This provided the municipality 
with an additional source of revenue which it used to reduce the impact that cross subsidisation placed 
on its tariffs. In the 1960s when Escom’s new plants had been commissioned and its purchases from the 
JEU started to decline, the JEU responded by keeping its generation costs below Escom’s, and when they 
were not, it took supply from the national utility to ensure that its tariffs were competitive, and surpluses 
maximised. Although not ideal from Escom’s perspective, it was sheltered from the full effect of 
competitive forces by the Power Act, which disallowed MEU’s from selling to large users and outside their 
area of jurisdiction, with the result that the JEU was not able to maximise returns on cost advantages. The 
only outlet for any generation surpluses was Escom, who paid a lower tariff than what large users would 
and only if it needed supply. If this was not enough, Escom conspired and succeeded in ending municipal 
generation in 1969, in flagrant disregard of the provisions of the Power Act (1910). Incensed, the JEU took 
the matter to the highest court to challenge the provincial administrator’s refusal to approve the 
application, but political pressure from senior levels in national government (as it was widely expected 
that the court would rule in the JEU’s favour) saw them withdraw the case just days prior the court 
hearing.  Secondly, both Escom and Eskom enjoyed privileges that other state-owned enterprises did not 
(Chapter 5.5.2: Phase II Horwitz 1994: p 11). This manifested in different forms. With regards funding, 
anything was possible - from the conventional (local and international loans, pre and post 1994), to the 
creative (Capital Development Fund in the early in the 1970s) to the blunt (large tariff increases on short 
notice to fund shortfalls and inefficiencies - again pre and post 1994 - and most recently with the new 
 
147According to the DoE website “The Integrated Resource Plan in the South African context is not the Energy Plan - it is a National Electricity Plan. 
It is not a short or medium-term operational plan but a plan that directs the expansion of the electricity supply over the given period. Its purpose 





build programme of Medupi and Kusile). Turning to demand projections, which underpinned Eskom’s new 
build programme; these were overly optimistic in the 1960s and 1970s and more recently from 2005, 
while in both instances the basis of the projections was questionable and actual demand failed to match 
the forecast, thus resulting in large long-term surpluses and debt. Then there is Eskom’s ability to veer 
national government stances to its benefit, but almost always to the detriment of the national economy. 
Here, we can consider its influence on the Borckenhagen inquiry, or stacking the newly formed NER in the 
mid-1990s with Eskom retirees (led by its former CEO), or being able to convince the DoE to get the ISMO 
“off the DoE’s table”, to name but a few. These examples suggest that the short periods during which 
South Africa has amongst the cheapest electricity tariffs in the world, come at a larger cost over the long 
term, particularly when operational inefficiencies take hold. These necessitate bailouts in the form of 
government guarantees or loans and/or steep and rapid tariff increases to consumers both big and small, 
with unacceptably negative impact on the indigent. How this will conclude is unclear, as Eskom during its 
95-year history has demonstrated an uncanny ability to survive. Indeed, correct action commenced from 
late 2017, with the appointment of a credible CEO (Hadebe), chairman of the board (Mabuza), and the 
replacement of the Minister Lynn Brown (with Pravin Gordhan) leading to an (ongoing) clean out of 
tainted management. Whether the new team can restore governance, confidence, morale and chart a 
new strategy to overcome key challenges, remains to be seen. Under the circumstances, Jaglin’s 
prediction seems not only reasonable but likely. Hazarding a guess, Eskom may succumb to exhaustion 
(Chapter 2.4) which is more akin to institutional breakdown rather than institutional change, reached 
through a gradual process which allows behaviour to undermine an institution.   
In closing, it should be noted that municipal EDI is one of several issues affecting local government, as 
observed by several academics and most notably Siddle (2013), Stanton (2009) and Thornhill148 (2016). 
Indeed, successful or more sustainable EDI reform, will by no means resolve the state of crisis of local 
government, as described in Chapter 4.6. And while National Treasury may very well argue, with some 
truth, that local government is sufficiently funded, issues of performance (incompetence and financial 
mismanagement) are where the bulk of the challenges lie. Figure 8-2 lists several matters plaguing local 
government, and once again stresses that these are unlikely to be resolved in isolation or without full 







Figure 8-2: Summary of Factors Contributing to Municipal Crisis  
The incalculable scope of challenges facing local government, as well as electricity supply and distribution, 
need not be seen as well-nigh insurmountable however. It is the hope of this research that by unearthing 
forgotten but relevant information, with the use of a recognized theoretical framework, it has provided 
the reasons for the strong linkages that exist between electricity and politics, delivering fresh 
perspectives. This may inspire positive new directions, which in some way contribute to eventually 
breaking the current impasse – ending the repeating cycle electricity provision has found itself locked into 
for over a century. 
Finally, what this research has demonstrated, is that opportunities for ground-breaking change do present 
themselves. It is not their unavailability that is the problem, but a variety of complex factors, which 
historical institutionalism has shown then lead to locked-in paths and behaviours. Ultimately, by 
unpacking these, this research aims to make them more visible and understandable, both in the academic 
and public domain, in contributing to a workable vision of a future South African electricity sector, which 
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